Remedios v. Teeple, 2025 ONSC 1692
Court File No.: FC-23-466
Date: 2025-03-18
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
B E T W E E N:
Sheldon Remedios (Applicant)
Counsel for the Applicant: M. Iyore
- and -
Courtney Teeple (Respondent)
Counsel for the Respondent: A. MacEachern
Heard: February 28, 2025
Decision on Motion
Justice J. Krawchenko
Background
[1] The Applicant and Respondent are the biological parents of Jaxon, who was born on 29 March 2020. He is 4 years old. There is no dispute regarding Jaxon’s paternity.
[2] This is a motion brought by the Applicant to amend Jaxon’s birth certificate to include the Applicant as a named parent, to record Jaxon’s legal name to include the hyphenated reference to his father’s surname, to amend any previously issued government documents to reflect the name change and to prohibit any further changes to Jaxon’s name without agreement or subsequent court order.
[3] In submissions, the Respondent conceded that there is no reason why the Applicant should not be named as father of the birth certificate, thus the remaining issue to be addressed on this motion is whether Jaxon’s legal name ought to be changed to include a hyphenated surname.
Procedural History
[4] This application was issued on 10 July 2023. The Applicant was initially seeking orders for parenting time, joint decision-making responsibility, child support and name change relief.
[5] At a Case Conference held on 12 October 2023, the parties agreed to a temporary without prejudice Order establishing a parenting schedule.
[6] At a Settlement Conference held on 8 January 2024, the parties consented on a further temporary order relating to the parenting schedule, guidelines child support (payable by the Applicant), child focused communications via Our Family Wizard, and that the Respondent would provide the Applicant with a copy of the child’s birth certificate within 30 days.
[7] The parties returned for a further Settlement Conference on 12 March 2024 at which time the parties reached a verbal resolution which was to be reduced to writing. The matter was further adjourned to Assignment Court on 27 March 2024.
[8] On 13 June 2024 the parties attended a Trial Scheduling Conference. The matter was set for a 9–10-day trial for the sittings of 18 November 2024.
[9] On 21 June 2024, the Applicant brought a motion for expanded parenting time including the summer months of July and August, which the Respondent opposed. The relief was granted with costs awarded against the Respondent.
[10] The parties entered into Final Minutes of Settlement in September 2024, wherein they settled all their outstanding issues with the exception of the issue we are now addressing. In the body of the minutes the parties made the following clear:
- the Respondent disagrees with the Applicant’s claim to include his name as a parent of the child on the child’s birth certificate; and
- the Respondent disagrees with allowing for a hyphenated surname including acknowledging both parents.
[11] At paragraph 50 of these Final Minutes of Settlement the parties wrote:
“These Minutes of Settlement including the paragraphs on decision making responsibility and custody of the documents are entered into by the parties without prejudice to the Applicant’s outstanding claims seeking to include his name as a parent to the child’s birth certificate; and to include his last name to the child’s legal name on all government issued documents. Consequently, the issues of the child’s name and inclusion of the father’s name to the child’s birth certificate shall not be considered as being incidental to the rights of custody or decision making”. (my emphasis added).
The Facts
[12] In their affidavits, the parties provide two different versions of their relationship leading up to the birth of Jaxon through to current times. The Applicant’s version is that up until shortly after the birth of Jaxon, he and the Respondent were supportive of each other and specifically as it related to Jaxon. The Respondent characterizes the relationship in a negative light, including at the moment of Jaxon’s birth.
[13] An example of this divergent narrative is found in the Applicant’s responding affidavit at paragraphs 18 and 19 wherein he deposes that “I was present with the Respondent from May 28, 2020, afternoon until the birth of our child. I was at the delivery room, holding the Respondent’s hand during her labour and the birth of our child.” Additionally at Exhibit C and D to this same affidavit, the Applicant appends a photo of himself holding Jaxon at the hospital and his text exchange with the Respondent, which reflects a close affinity to each other in relation to their newborn child, with the Applicant providing reports about Jaxon to the Respondent. At one point the Respondent writes “You’re a great dad”. In the Respondent’s affidavit at paragraph 31 she deposes that “Sheldon was not supportive of me during Jaxon’s birth. He did not support me during labour and sat on the opposite side of the room. He was interrogating me during labour and asking me questions like where I planned to live, which was not appropriate”.
[14] After Jaxon’s birth there was less and less cooperation and goodwill between the parties in relation to parenting and sharing time, requiring court intervention.
[15] Shortly after Jaxon’s birth, the Respondent certified the Statement of Live Birth pursuant to the Vital Statistics Act, RSO. The Respondent did not acknowledge the Applicant as the Father and unilaterally determined how to name Jaxon, which in this case, excluded the Applicant’s surname.
[16] Jaxon is biracial, the Applicant is of Indian descent and the Respondent is Caucasian. Jaxon is known as Jaxon Paul Glenn Teeple-Remedios in insurance policies, court endorsements and on a RESP. He is also known as Jaxon Teeple on a day care form and recreation center enrolment and on the Respondent’s benefits.
Issue
[17] As noted above, the Respondent mother initially opposed the inclusion of the Applicant as Jaxon’s father on the Statement of Live Birth (SLB). She now concedes that there is no reason why the Applicant should not be named as Jaxon’s father.
[18] With this concession, the only remaining issue relates to Jaxon’s surname; should it remain as registered or changed to include his father’s surname, in hyphenated form?
The Law
[19] The following are the relevant provisions of the legislation that touch upon this case.
[20] Sections 8 and 9 of the Vital Statistics Act (“VSA”) require that the registration of a child’s birth be done by way of a certification of that birth by the parent(s) of that child.
[21] Section 10(3)4 states that if the mother certifies the child’s birth father is unknown or unacknowledged by her, she may give the child a surname she chooses. The VSA also provides at section 10(3)2 that if both parents certify the child’s birth but do not agree on the child’s surname, the child shall be given either the surname of the parents if they have the same surname or (as is the case here) if they have different surnames, a surname consisting of both parents’ surnames hyphenated or combined in alphabetical order.
[22] Section 9(8) of the VSA sets out a prerequisite for amending the registration of births as being the receipt of a certified copy of an order made under section 17 of the Children’s Law Reform Act (“CLRA”), which would then require the Registrar General to amend the particulars of the child’s surname shown on the registration, in accordance with the order.
[23] Additionally, section 34 of the VSA offers another mechanism to change an error in the registration, wherein evidence is provided to the Registrar General sufficient to correct the error.
[24] Section 13 of the CLRA states that any person having an interest may apply to court for a determination (declaration) that person is or is not a parent of a child and at section 17 it further provides that any person declared to be a parent may apply to the court for an order that the child’s name be changed to any surname that the child could have been given under section 10(3) of the VSA.
[25] The Change of Name Act at sections 5(1) and 1(1.1) provide that it is a person with lawful custody who may apply to the Registrar General to change a child’s forename or surname or both.
Analysis
[26] There are several routes available when seeking to change a child’s name.
[27] The first is under the Change of Name Act. The Respondent argues that this motion is a name change application and therefore the provisions of the Change of Name Act apply. A name change is a process undertaken by way of an application to the Registrar General not to this court. Because the Applicant does not have lawful custody of the child, he has no authority to apply for a name change under that Act and accordingly he would have no recourse under that regime and this motion fails for want of jurisdiction.
[28] An alternate route to relief would be to seek a change in the registration under section 9(8) of the VSA. Under that regime, the Applicant requires a court order made under sections 13 and 17 of the CLRA, first declaring him to be a parent under s. 13, and then on that basis, the court making a further order to change the child’s name. While this may be appropriate in cases where paternity is not known or denied it seems a bizarre process in a case such as this, where parentage is not an issue and in fact acknowledged.
[29] A final route to relief is the exercise of this Court’s parens patriae jurisdiction, to order the name change if it is found to be in the best interests of the child. That is the route I take.
[30] It is common ground as between counsel that the jurisprudence [Milonas v. Copsas, 2018 ONCJ 713] references the following non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered in determining if a name change is in the child’s best interest:
- Does the proposed name change exclude the name of the non-custodial parent.
- The length of time a custodial parent has had sole custody of the child.
- Whether there is a continuing close relationship between the child and the non-custodial parent. Whether there would be any serious effect on the non-custodial parent.
- Whether either parent has displayed any malice or improper motivation.
- The age of the child or the weight to be given to the child’s wishes, considering the child’s age.
- The length of time the child has had its name.
- The surname of any siblings.
[31] In reviewing the enumerated factors and as supported by the evidence, I find that it is in the child’s best interest to allow for the requested name change. I find that:
a. the proposed name change does not exclude one parent or marginalize them but rather honours both of them;
b. the proposed hyphenated name is already being used on insurance documents and RESPs;
c. the Applicant father has a close relationship with the child and has taken steps, through court, to maximize his contact with the child;
d. the child is biracial, and the inclusion of the father’s surname would enhance Jaxon’s cultural identity;
e. the mother’s decision not to acknowledge father in the certification of live birth was evidence of her malice towards the Applicant, and it was only by virtue of her not acknowledging the father that the Respondent was able to unilaterally name the child;
f. Jaxon is very young and a change of surname would have limited if any impact on him;
g. As noted earlier, since birth, Jaxon has been identified both with single surname and with hyphenated surname; and
h. Jaxon has no siblings and there is no issue of confusion.
[32] In summary, this is the appropriate case to exercise my parens patriae jurisdiction in the best interest of Jaxon to grant the relief requested.
[33] In closing, I make reference to the decision of Justice Quinn in Gallant v. Lewis, where he made the following observation regarding the VSA, which applies in this case and with which I agree:
[25] The right of a mother to arbitrarily exclude the father in the naming of their child is a breathtaking example of sexual discrimination, leaving the father without recourse (short of the application launched) and rendering him a second-class parent. It is not in the best interests of a child to have his or her parents differentiated in this fashion. There will be obvious instances where it will be entirely appropriate for a father to be unacknowledged and for the child to be given only the surname of the mother—but this is not one of them.
Disposition
[34] In the exercise of my parens patriae jurisdiction, final order to go pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Notice of Motion dated 13 January 2025.
[35] If the parties cannot agree on costs of this motion, they may make brief written submissions to me through the trial coordinator, of no longer than 2 pages in length, double spaced, excluding bills of costs and offers to settle, on the following timetable:
- Applicant by 4 April 2025
- Respondent by 11 April 2025
If no submissions are received from a party by the set deadline, that party will be deemed to take no position.
Justice J. Krawchenko
Released: March 18, 2025