Nguyen v. Hollmeyer, 2025 ONSC 1682

COURT FILE NO.: FC70/22
DATE: 2025/03/17
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
RE: Ngoc Quynh-Lan Nguyen, Applicant
AND: Helge Gottfried Hollmeyer, Respondent
BEFORE: T. Price
COUNSEL:

• E. Fisher – Counsel for the Applicant
• B. Ludmer – Counsel for the Respondent
  HEARD: February 21, 2025

Endorsement

Background

[1] The parties married in Geneva, Switzerland on September 20, 2005, and separated on or about August 1, 2012. There is one child of their marriage, L., who is 13 years of age.

[2] Following the separation, until sometime in mid-2020, the parties continued to reside in Switzerland in separate residences. During that period, there were a number of different parenting schedules and arrangements. Eventually, the parties appear to have settled on an arrangement that had L. residing primarily in the care of the Applicant, Ms. Nguyen, and being in the care of the Respondent, Mr. Hollmeyer, for two evenings every week and on alternate weekends.

[3] In the period between the parties’ separation in 2012 and 2020, a number of noteworthy events occurred. They included Ms. Nguyen beginning to cohabit with her current spouse in February 2013, after he moved back to Switzerland from his home in Canada.

[4] With the return of Ms. Nguyen’s current spouse, the fraught relationship between the parties worsened, with Mr. Hollmeyer claiming that his far more liberal parenting time with L. diminished thereafter.

[5] It appears that the first of several court orders made by Swiss courts came in May 2014 when, according to Mr. Hollmeyer, a parenting time and shared parenting “convention” between the parties was said to have been “ratified.”

[6] That same year, Ms. Nguyen gave birth to her current spouse’s child in Switzerland.

[7] In 2017, Ms. Nguyen informed Mr. Hollmeyer of her intention to seek a court order permitting her to return to Canada with L., together with her current spouse and their child.

[8] Not surprisingly, Mr. Hollmeyer did not agree with the proposal. The removal of L. from Switzerland would mean that he would have reduced parenting time. The strife between the parties was amplified over Ms. Nguyen’s proposal.

[9] After Ms. Nguyen expressed her desire to return imminently to Canada in March 2018, the parties ended up before the court in Switzerland.

[10] On July 7, 2018, a Swiss court denied Ms. Nguyen’s request to leave Switzerland with L.

[11] According to Mr. Hollmeyer:

• the court also ordered that Ms. Nguyen “transfer” L. to him for the summer holiday;
• Ms. Nguyen appealed the court’s decision;
• her appeal was dismissed on August 10, 2018; and
• a further appeal by Ms. Nguyen was also dismissed in September 2018.

[12] On November 28, 2019, a different Swiss court granted the parties a divorce and determined that Ms. Nguyen could relocate to Canada with L. The order also provided Mr. Hollmeyer with parenting time.

[13] Mr. Hollmeyer appealed that decision, in January 2020, primarily because he disagreed with the removal of L. to Canada, but also because of his concerns about the parenting schedule imposed by the court.

[14] In March 2020, Ms. Nguyen joined the appeal, primarily to address the issue of the parenting schedule.

[15] On June 16, 2020, the Switzerland Court of Appeal allowed Mr. Hollmeyer’s appeal with respect to parenting time and dismissed that of Ms. Nguyen. On the primary issue, however, the order allowing Ms. Nguyen to move to Canada with L. remained intact.

[16] Mr. Hollmeyer was granted the following parenting time with L.:

• one week during spring school break, in Canada;
• eight weeks during the summer holidays, in Europe or wherever Mr. Hollmeyer might wish to go;
• two weeks at Christmas each year, in Europe or wherever Mr. Hollmeyer might wish to go; and
• two one-hour videoconferences per week, on Wednesdays and Sundays at 3 PM Canadian local time.

[17] The court order also contained provisions relating to L.’s travel between Canada and Europe.

[18] With the decision of the Switzerland Court of Appeal bringing the litigation in Switzerland to an end, Ms. Nguyen moved to St. Thomas, Ontario with L., who was then 7 years of age, in August 2020. They took up residence with Ms. Nguyen’s current spouse and their child in St. Thomas, where they continue to reside.

[19] While the evidence broadly suggests that the parties have been attempting to adhere to the terms of the June 2020 order with respect to Mr. Hollmeyer’s parenting time, both parties point to several problems that each says are being caused by the other. Mr. Hollmeyer complains that Ms. Nguyen consistently throws up roadblocks that interfere with his ability to spend time with L., while Ms. Nguyen counters that Mr. Hollmeyer intentionally complicates matters when it comes to making arrangements for L.’s travel.

[20] From Ms. Nguyen’s perspective, while the majority of the scheduled visits between L. and Mr. Hollmeyer did occur in accordance with the terms of the Swiss order, though often preceded by one difficulty or another, she has also claimed that since 2022, if not before, L. has “expressed an increasingly consistent and adamant desire to change the current parenting schedule,” wanting to spend more time in Canada with her brother and her friends and less time with Mr. Hollmeyer.

[21] It was primarily for this reason that Ms. Nguyen commenced this proceeding in 2022.

[22] L. has also claimed, according to Ms. Nguyen, that her relationships with Mr. Hollmeyer and his partner are becoming increasingly conflictual, which causes L. stress, claims which both Mr. Hollmeyer and his partner expressly denied. Ms. Nguyen has also attributed some of the conflict between L. and Mr. Hollmeyer to Mr. Hollmeyer’s unwillingness to recognize that L. is changing as she matures.

[23] For his part, Mr. Hollmeyer claims that Ms. Nguyen “manipulates, creates and advances narratives about L. being unsafe, unhappy or abused while in [his] care,” all of which claims he denies. He further alleges that when he has L. in his care, Ms. Nguyen is in constant communication with her, which undermines their relationship and interferes with their time together.

[24] To support his position, Mr. Hollmeyer noted that L. was actively involved in planning the activities and locations that she, Mr. Hollmeyer and his partner would visit during the summer of 2022, which contributed to them spending a pleasant summer together in Europe. He also noted that, once she arrived at their destinations, whether in Europe or Canada, L. enjoyed herself in his care in December 2022, March 2023, summer 2023, December 2023, March 2024 and summer 2024. To support his claims, Mr. Hollmeyer produced several photographs which suggested that, at least when the photos were taken, L. was enjoying herself in his care.

[25] It appears that Mr. Hollmeyer’s only complaint about L.’s behaviour, once in his care, related to her time with him in 2024 when, from his perspective, she evidenced a “high dependence” on her cell phone, spending disproportionate amounts of time speaking with her friends and watching TikTok videos instead of interacting with him.

[26] Whatever the quality of L.’s time in the care of Mr. Hollmeyer before December 2024, the events surrounding her planned time with Mr. Hollmeyer in Europe at that time resulted in this motion.

[27] In short, in December 2024, despite an agreement by the parties that she would go to Europe for Mr. Hollmeyer’s Christmas parenting time, L. refused multiple times over several days to get on the plane to Europe at Pearson Airport in Toronto, including after Mr. Hollmeyer had travelled to Toronto from Europe to receive L. from Ms. Nguyen and accompany her back to Europe.

[28] As with many things, the perspectives of the parties about the events surrounding the failed visit of December 2024 differ, as do their charges of who is to blame for what occurred. Suffice it to say that the whole event, occurring over several days, was a disaster.

[29] Based on the parties’ extensive evidence about the failed Christmas 2024 visit, I find that the following scenario most likely reflects the chronology of what occurred leading up to, and resulted in, the failed visit:

a. In September 2024, because of growing dissent by L. to continued travel with Mr. Hollmeyer, the parties agreed that they and L. would meet with a therapist in an effort to determine whether therapy for parent–child contact problems was suitable for the family. However, after attending a number of sessions, L. withdrew from the process, complaining that she felt unheard;

b. On September 29, 2024, Ms. Nguyen asked Mr. Hollmeyer if he would change the Christmas parenting schedule so that she could celebrate Christmas with L., which he declined to do;

c. On November 29, 2024, Ms. Nguyen, through her counsel, confirmed travel arrangements for L. for the Christmas period and provided Mr. Hollmeyer with a travel consent letter;

d. On December 21, 2024, the date that L. was to depart for Europe from Toronto, travelling alone, Ms. Nguyen and her spouse drove L. to Pearson airport for her scheduled departure;

e. On arriving at the airline’s departure desk, L. was distraught and crying. After being told by L. that she did not want to travel to Europe, and would not board the plane, airline staff told Ms. Nguyen that the flight could be rebooked;

f. Each party (Ms. Nguyen through her spouse) tried unsuccessfully to contact the other during the events at the airport, and thereafter, on December 21, 2024;

g. Ms. Nguyen, her spouse, their child and L. returned to St. Thomas on December 21, 2024;

h. On arriving home on December 21, 2024, L. texted Mr. Hollmeyer and told him that she did not wish to spend time with him or travel to Europe and would be remaining in Canada for Christmas;

i. On December 21, 2024, Mr. Hollmeyer rebooked the flight [1] for December 22, 2024, a fact communicated to Ms. Nguyen directly by counsel for Mr. Hollmeyer during the morning of December 22, 2024;

j. Ms. Nguyen told L. that they would be returning to the airport that afternoon for her to travel to Europe;

k. L. immediately contacted Mr. Hollmeyer and they spoke privately by telephone for approximately thirty minutes, later informing Ms. Nguyen that she had reiterated to Mr. Hollmeyer that she would neither travel to Europe nor get on a plane to do so;

l. Mr. Hollmeyer rescheduled the flight for December 23, 2024;

m. On December 23, 2024, Mr. Hollmeyer brought an urgent motion, returnable that day on short notice in St. Thomas, seeking an order requiring Ms. Nguyen to ensure that L. accompanied him to Europe;

n. Justice Campbell adjourned the motion to December 31, 2024, and, in doing so, urged the parties to reach an agreement about L. spending time with Mr. Hollmeyer over the Christmas period;

o. L. spent Christmas 2024 at home in St. Thomas with Ms. Nguyen instead of in Europe with Mr. Hollmeyer;

p. Following the court appearance of December 23, 2024, the parties agreed that Ms. Nguyen would pay for Mr. Hollmeyer to travel to Toronto on December 27, 2024 to retrieve L. and return to Europe with her, where she would stay for two weeks;

q. The plan for the exchange of L. on December 27, 2024 included Ms. Nguyen delivering L. to Mr. Hollmeyer at Pearson Airport and leaving immediately, with Mr. Hollmeyer being solely responsible for securing L.’s boarding pass, checking her into the flight, and travelling with her to Europe;

r. In an effort to “incentivize” L. to comply with the parties’ agreement, Ms. Nguyen offered her additional horseback riding lessons, “one of her favourite activities,” if she did so;

s. On December 27, 2024, a visibly upset L. continued to insist that she would not travel to Europe, including during her exchange from the care of Ms. Nguyen to the care of Mr. Hollmeyer;

t. Despite turning charge of L. over to Mr. Hollmeyer, rather than leaving the airport immediately, Ms. Nguyen lingered in the departure area within viewing distance of Mr. Hollmeyer and L.;

u. After taking charge of L., Mr. Hollmeyer continued to discuss her reluctance with her, to the point that they appeared to have an argument about L.’s resistance;

v. L.’s refusal to cooperate with the check-in procedure, and resistance to flying with Mr. Hollmeyer continued for a period more than one hour;

w. Ms. Nguyen finally left either the airport or the immediate area only after she had been contacted by Mr. Hollmeyer who accused her of interfering in his efforts to have L. travel with him by remaining in the airport, which he believed to be known to L.;

x. After receiving two calls from L., who continued to insist that she would not travel and asking her to return, Ms. Nguyen did so when Mr. Hollmeyer also asked her to do so;

y. Ms. Nguyen and Mr. Hollmeyer spoke in L.’s presence when Ms. Nguyen returned to the departure area in the airport. Amongst things said in L.’s presence, Ms. Nguyen admitted that she said that they were both causing L. distress by not listening to her and figuring out a way to solve their dilemma in a manner which respected L.’s views and preferences;

z. Mr. Hollmeyer contends that Ms. Nguyen also told L. that she was entitled to do as she wished and that she should contact security if Mr. Hollmeyer forced her to board the plane, while Ms. Nguyen contends that she chastised Mr. Hollmeyer, in L.’s presence, for adding to L.’s stress by not having contacted L. to encourage and reassure her about the trip, and that Mr. Hollmeyer said, in L.’s presence, that L.’s views and preferences were irrelevant;

aa. Neither Mr. Hollmeyer nor L. left for Europe on December 27, 2024. Instead, they stayed at an airport hotel for three days, as Mr. Hollmeyer told L. would occur if she failed to board the plane and fly with him to Europe;

bb. While Mr. Hollmeyer and L. did visit some tourist attractions in the Toronto area over that period, L. continued to vigorously assert that she wanted to go back to St. Thomas;

cc. Ms. Nguyen and L. communicated on multiple occasions by text and once by telephone call over the three days that L. and Mr. Hollmeyer stayed at the hotel;

dd. Eventually, a major dispute broke out between L. and Mr. Hollmeyer about L.’s repeated use of her cell phone, during which Mr. Hollmeyer physically removed it from L.’s possession and delivered it to hotel staff to be held for him – actions that he claims he took by “utiliz[ing] [his] parental authority” in order to give L. “a break from the continual undermining communications” that she was having with Ms. Nguyen;

ee. After unsuccessfully searching the room for her cell phone and learning from Mr. Hollmeyer that it was in the possession of the hotel, L. later left the hotel room and told front desk staff that she felt unsafe being with Mr. Hollmeyer;

ff. L. called Ms. Nguyen from the hotel lobby, asking that she come to retrieve her, while hotel staff called the police, leading to two officers attending the scene to sort out what had occurred;

gg. Ms. Nguyen also spoke with the hotel manager, during which she asked him to remove L. from the hotel and deliver L. to her in downtown Toronto, which he refused to do;

hh. At the suggestion of the police, and with the reluctant consent of Mr. Hollmeyer, L. returned to the care of Ms. Nguyen on December 30, 2024; and

ii. At some point in all the chaos occurring on December 30, 2024, Ms. Nguyen filed a motion, returnable December 31, 2024 seeking, inter alia, an order for the immediate return of L. to her care and “terminating” Mr. Hollmeyer’s 2024/2025 Christmas parenting time.

[30] Mr. Hollmeyer contends that Ms. Nguyen sabotaged the entire Christmas vacation.

[31] She, on the other hand, asserts that she “made all reasonable as well as many unreasonable efforts to ensure that L. travel[led]” with Mr. Hollmeyer, and that L.’s resistance to travelling with Mr. Hollmeyer is the result of him both “appear[ing] not to understand that L. leaves behind a full and active life when she travels with him and that it is important to her and her self-esteem to remain connected to that part of that life while abroad” and having “created and continu[ing] to contribute to a toxic dynamic between him and L.”

[32] When the matters were back before Justice Campbell on December 31, 2024, he adjourned the motions to a special appointment on February 21, 2025. It appears, however, that Ms. Nguyen’s materials for her motion returnable on December 31, 2024 were not filed and, by the time that the matter was back before Justice Campbell, the primary relief sought by Ms. Nguyen had been obtained as a result of the manner in which the issues of December 30, 2024 had resolved.

[33] By the time this matter was argued, the parties had agreed to jointly retain a psychologist “to assess and report to the Court on the needs of [L.] and the ability and willingness of the parties or any of them to satisfy [her] needs.”

Relief Sought by Mr. Hollmeyer

[34] In his motion, as it was constituted when it was argued on February 21, 2025, Mr. Hollmeyer was seeking an interim order:

a. addressing the effect of the Swiss court order in Canada and the parties’ agreement to follow its terms (“the status quo parenting schedule”);

b. finding Ms. Nguyen to be in breach of the Swiss order and status quo parenting schedule with respect to the Christmas parenting time and the weekly video calls provided for in the Swiss order;

c. imposing financial penalties on Ms. Nguyen for each day that she fails to ensure that L. is in the care of Mr. Hollmeyer in accordance with the Swiss order or the status quo parenting plan and all future parenting orders of the court as well as failed video calls or video calls not complying with the terms of the Swiss court order;

d. requiring Ms. Nguyen to “exercise all required guidance, boundaries, incentives and consequences in her parenting of L. to ensure compliance with the status quo parenting schedule and with the terms of any court order concerning parenting time and contact,” with several related and subsidiary clauses addressing those issues; and

e. granting him makeup parenting time for Christmas 2024, to occur in Europe in a manner and at a time of his choosing, which could include extended March break parenting time in Europe, with all costs being borne by Ms. Nguyen.

Issues

1. Is the Swiss Court order enforceable in Canada such that Ms. Nguyen’s failure to comply with it can result in a penalty being imposed on her pursuant to Family Law Rule 1(8)?
2. a. If the answer to question #1 is “yes”, what penalty is appropriate?
   b. If the answer to question #1 is “no,” can the court impose a penalty under Rule 1(8) in respect of Ms. Nguyen’s failure to comply with the parties’ “status quo parenting schedule,” whatever its source? If so, what penalty is appropriate?
3. What obligations, if any, are imposed on Ms. Nguyen as L.’s primary caregiver to ensure that she complies with the terms of the “status quo parenting schedule” agreed on by the parties, whatever its source?
4. What interim order is appropriate in the circumstances of this case based on the evidence adduced on this motion?

Issue #1: Enforceability of the Swiss Court Order

Is the Swiss Court order enforceable in Canada such that Ms. Nguyen’s failure to comply with it can result in a penalty being imposed on her pursuant to Family Law Rule 1(8)?

[35] The specific relief requested by Mr. Hollmeyer in respect of Ms. Nguyen’s obligations began with his request that the Court “recognize and promulgate as an order for parenting time under the Divorce Act and/or the Children’s Law Reform Act the status quo parenting schedule for Mr. Hollmeyer and the child L. under the terms of the Swiss order,” from which he moved to seeking an order under Rule 1(8) penalizing Ms. Nguyen for her non-compliance with the order.

[36] Ms. Nguyen’s response was that the Ontario Superior Court does not have jurisdiction to hear a compliance motion under Rule 1(8) with respect to the Swiss court order because it has not been recognized in Canada.

Discussion

[37] In his factum, Mr. Ludmer made the following submission:

16. Sections 2(9) (10) and 35 and 54 and 55 of the Family Law Act, in conjunction with Rules 1(2)(b) and 2(3) and 2(4) of the Family Law Rules, provide for the enforcement of Family Law Agreements, including Agreements on parental responsibilities and parenting time and Agreements on support and foreign Court Orders. Where a term of an Agreement/foreign Court Order is breached, the aggrieved party is entitled to take steps to make the breaching party comply with their obligations under the agreed or adjudicated parenting plan.

[38] A review of the sections cited by Mr. Ludmer is in order:

Family Law Act

• s. 2(9) A provision of a domestic contract in respect of a matter that is dealt with in this Act may be incorporated in an order made under this Act.
• s. 2(10) A domestic contract dealing with a matter that is also dealt with in this Act prevails unless this Act provides otherwise.
• s. 35(1) A person who is a party to a domestic contract may file the contract with the clerk of the Ontario Court of Justice or of the Family Court of the Superior Court of Justice together with the person’s affidavit stating that the contract is in effect and has not been set aside or varied by a court or agreement.
• s. 54 Two persons who cohabited and are living separate and apart may enter into an agreement in which they agree on their respective rights and obligations, including,
  • (a) ownership in or division of property;
  • (b) support obligations;
  • (c) the right to direct the education and moral training of their children;
  • (d) the right to decision-making responsibility or parenting time with respect to their children; and
  • (e) any other matter in the settlement of their affairs.
• s. 55(1) A domestic contract and an agreement to amend or rescind a domestic contract are unenforceable unless made in writing, signed by the parties and witnessed.

[39] Because ss. 2(9), 2(10) and 35 all refer to the term “domestic contract,” based on the requirements for their validity as set out in s. 55, which requires that they be in writing, signed by the parties and witnessed, and there being no evidence in this case that any of those things have happened or that any such agreement has been registered with the Family Court of the Superior Court of Justice, none of those sections avail Mr. Ludmer in his position that the Court should recognize the Swiss order or enforce the agreement of the parties to adhere to that order.

[40] Similarly, s. 54 addresses “separation agreements,” as both its title indicates and s. 51 indicate.

[41] Moreover, s. 51 explicitly provides that a “domestic contract” means, inter alia, “a…separation agreement.”

[42] Therefore, as with the other sections of the Family Law Act cited by Mr. Ludmer, because there is no evidence of the parties having entered into a separation agreement which meets the requirements of s. 55 to be considered valid, s. 54 is also of no utility to Mr. Ludmer on this issue.

[43] Mr. Ludmer also relied on the concept of “public policy” to support his position that the Court enforce the Swiss order, writing in his factum:

18. It is sound public policy that Parenting Agreements and the status quo be encouraged. If the parties agreements were simply ignored, it would eliminate any incentive to use the time and resources to negotiate Parenting Agreements and every separated family immigrating to Canada would immediately have to start a family law case.

[44] Mr. Ludmer’s submission is based on the following written by Justice Kiteley in Tumino v. Tumino, 2002 OJ No 4696, a case where, after the parties had reached an agreement, reduced to writing, that neither would relocate with the children for at least five years, the mother proposed to move within a year:

35 … As the Supreme Court of Canada said in Gordon v. Goertz (1996), 134 D.L.R. (4th) 321, at paragraph 114:

Parental agreements should be the rule and must be encouraged since parents are generally in the best position to assess the best interests of the child. In addition, such agreements minimize ongoing parental conflict and litigation, which are clearly not in the best interests of children. Research on the emotional impact on children of such conflict, notwithstanding its limits, widely supports this common sense observation ...

36 From this I conclude that the Supreme Court of Canada accepted that it is sound public policy that parenting agreements be encouraged. If the contents were simply ignored, it would eliminate any incentive to use the time and resources to negotiate them.

[45] As I have noted, there is no such “agreement” in this case. In my view, it is more of a voluntary, informal parenting-time arrangement, a concept to which I will return when discussing the interim order that I did make.

[46] Notwithstanding his arguments as set out in his factum not being of assistance to him on the question of whether the parties are bound by an enforceable agreement, Mr. Ludmer next focused his attention on how the court could enforce the Swiss order, or the parties’ practice of complying with its terms, which he variously labelled as both an agreement and “the status quo parenting schedule,” under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules, writing:

17. While Family Law Rule 1(8) talks about “Orders”, given the broad and purposeful interpretation of Rule 1(8) established by the Court of Appeal in Bouchard v. Sgovio, [2021] ONCA 709…and the interpretive provisions of the Family Law Rules, there is no reason why the Family Law Rules cannot be used in conjunction with the Family Law Act to assist in enforcement of Family Law Agreements and foreign Court Orders.

[47] What Mr. Ludmer failed to address in his factum, however, was whether Rule 1(8) can be used by a Court to compel compliance with a foreign court order that has not been recognized in Canada.

[48] When asked that question during his submissions, Mr. Ludmer asserted that it could, but he cited no authority in which this specific question had been addressed.

[49] He also made no submissions, written or oral, on whether the Swiss judgment should be recognized in Ontario in accordance with the common law. As a result, I do not address that topic in these reasons.

[50] Instead, Mr. Ludmer submitted that authority could be found in Family Law Rules 2(2), 2(3) and 2(4), which provide as follows:

Primary objective

(2) The primary objective of these rules is to enable the court to deal with cases justly.

Dealing with cases justly

(3) Dealing with a case justly includes,

• (a) ensuring that the procedure is fair to all parties;
• (b) saving expense and time;
• (c) dealing with the case in ways that are appropriate to its importance and complexity; and
• (d) giving appropriate court resources to the case while taking account of the need to give resources to other cases.

Duty to promote primary objective

(4) The court is required to apply these rules to promote the primary objective, and parties and their lawyers are required to help the court to promote the primary objective.

[51] The best example of a rejection of the principle claimed by Mr. Ludmer to exist with respect to the relationship between the broad reading of Rule 1(8) articulated by the Court of Appeal in Bouchard v. Sgovio, supra, and Rules 2(2), 2(3) and 2(4) is found in the former debate about whether Rule 1(8) could be interpreted in such a manner that the Court could impose a penalty on a person who had failed to comply with an order. (See, for example, MacNamara v. Weaver, [2023] ONSC 192, at paragraphs 29-34)

[52] That jurisprudential dispute was resolved, not by resort to Rules 2(2) to 2(4), but by the recent amendment to Rule 1(8), which added Rule 1(8)(a.1), specifically granting the Court jurisdiction to impose “a penalty or a fine” for non-compliance with “an order in a case or a related case.”

[53] Moreover, while Family Law Rules 2(2), 2(3) and 2(4) are broad and purposive, they cannot reasonably be interpreted, in my view, as addressing a specific legal question, such as the enforceability of a foreign judgment or order relating to “decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact with respect to a child,” all of which are specifically addressed in s. 41 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12 (CLRA). It provides as follows:

41 (1) Upon application by any person in whose favour an order granting decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact with respect to a child has been made by an extra-provincial tribunal, a court shall recognize the order unless the court is satisfied,

• (a) that the respondent was not given reasonable notice of the commencement of the proceeding in which the order was made;
• (b) that the respondent was not given an opportunity to be heard by the extra-provincial tribunal before the order was made;
• (c) that the law of the place in which the order was made did not require the extra-provincial tribunal to have regard for the best interests of the child;
• (d) that the order of the extra-provincial tribunal is contrary to public policy in Ontario; or
• (e) that, in accordance with section 22, the extra-provincial tribunal would not have jurisdiction if it were a court in Ontario.

(2) An order made by an extra-provincial tribunal that is recognized by a court shall be deemed to be an order of the court and enforceable as such.

[54] Ms. Fisher, on behalf of Ms. Nguyen, argued against Mr. Hollmeyer’s request for enforcement on the very basis that he did not seek, in his Answer and Claim by Respondent, an order pursuant to s. 41 of the CLRA. Instead, she notes that neither party has sought in their pleadings that the Swiss order be recognized in Ontario, and that each has requested a new order of the Family Court.

[55] In her application issued on March 16, 2022, Ms. Nguyen seeks an order pursuant to s. 42 of the CLRA, which authorizes a court in Ontario to, “by order…supersede an extra-provincial order in relation to decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact with respect to a child where the court is satisfied that there has been a material change in circumstances that affects or is likely to affect the best interests of the child and…the child is habitually resident in Ontario at the commencement of the application for the order…”

[56] In his Answer and Claim by Respondent, Mr. Hollmeyer seeks an Ontario order which, in large measure, mirrors the Swiss order, both with respect to his parenting time and with respect to such ancillary issues as travel arrangements and conditions for L., amongst others.

[57] Despite his pleading, when making his submission that the Court can “recognize and promulgate” the Swiss order as an Order in Ontario capable of enforcement, Mr. Ludmer also cited comments made by Justice Karakatsanis relating to “timely, affordable and fair access to justice” at paragraphs 21 to 31 in Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7.

[58] Hryniak v. Mauldin is distinguishable because this is not a motion for summary judgment. While it might have been, had Mr. Ludmer included in his pleadings a claim to have this court recognize the Swiss order, that was not the approach he has taken. He seeks a new Ontario order which will look much like the Swiss order, which is not the same thing, in my view, as asking the Court to simply recognize the Swiss order in Ontario.

[59] In my view, the dicta of Justice Karakatsanis cited by Mr. Ludmer, properly interpreted, was written to address the benefits of summary judgment motions to both litigants and the justice system. I do not accept that what she wrote can form the foundation for a process that ignores or tries to circumvent a process expressly provided for by statute.

[60] That noted, with the addition of Rule 1(8)(a.1), I find that Mr. Hollmeyer is within his rights to seek a penalty against Ms. Nguyen if the Swiss court order is found to be “an order in a case or a related case.”

[61] Under Rule 2(1):

• “case” is defined as meaning “an application or any other method allowed in law for bringing a matter to the court for a final order or provisional order, and includes all motions, enforcements and appeals”;
• “court” is defined as meaning “the court in which a case is being heard”; and
• “provisional order” is defined as meaning “an order that is not effective until confirmed by a court.”

[62] Under Family Law Rule 37.1, the only provisional orders to which the Family Law Rules appear to apply are those made under s. 44 of the Family Law Act, which relate orders for support or orders varying support orders, which is not in issue on this motion.

[63] As I read the remaining definitions, the order of the Swiss court, by itself, cannot be an order for the purposes of enforcement under Rule 1(8) because it was not made in a proceeding commenced by an application to a court in Ontario where a final order about the issues between the parties can be made, nor has it been “deemed to be an order of the court,” capable of enforcement as such, through recognition on an application therefor.

[64] In the result, I find that, in the absence of:

a. a pleading by Mr. Hollmeyer requesting that the Family Court recognize the Swiss court order under the CLRA as an order of the Superior Court in Ontario;

b. a properly executed agreement between the parties which has been registered with the court for enforcement in Ontario and which addresses Mr. Hollmeyer’s parenting time; and

c. authority for a court to enforce, pursuant to Family Law Rule 1(8), a foreign court order that has not been recognized in Ontario under s. 41 of the Children’s Law Reform Act,

I lack the jurisdiction to enforce the Swiss court order against Ms. Nguyen pursuant to Family Law Rule 1(8).

[65] As a result, the answer to the question posed in respect of Issue #1 is “No.”

Issue #2

[66] In light of the answer to question #1, the next issue becomes that set out in 2b, supra:

If the answer to question #1 is “no,” can the court impose a penalty under Rule 1(8) in respect of Ms. Nguyen’s failure to comply with the parties’ “status quo parenting schedule,” whatever its source? If so, what penalty is appropriate?

[67] For the same reasons, that I concluded that Mr. Ludmer cannot enforce the Swiss court order in Canada, I find that the “status quo parenting schedule,” not being an order, can be enforced under Rule 1(8).

Issue #3

What obligations, if any, are imposed on Ms. Nguyen as L.’s primary caregiver to ensure that she complies with the terms of the “status quo parenting schedule” agreed on by the parties, whatever its source?

[68] As I have noted, the evidence broadly suggests that the parties have been attempting to adhere to the terms of the June 2020 order with respect to Mr. Hollmeyer’s parenting time, although that process has not occurred without a number of difficulties.

[69] In fact, despite the events of December 2024 that ultimately resulted in L. not traveling to Europe with Mr. Hollmeyer and his accusation that Ms. Nguyen was entirely responsible for the loss of his parenting time on that occasion, Ms. Nguyen’s position on the motion included a request that, instead of the punitive relief sought by Mr. Hollmeyer, the court should set rules for what she must do to try to ensure that L. complies with the parties’ efforts to follow the terms of the Swiss order, a process that I earlier referred to as their voluntary, informal parenting-time arrangement.

[70] Instead of the more encompassing set of rules that Mr. Hollmeyer sought to impose on her, particularly about the exchanges of L. for travel, she sought a much looser set of rules, with a provision that, if she complied with them, she would be deemed to have done all that she was required to do to ensure that L. would travel with Mr. Hollmeyer and would not be subject to sanctions under any future Rule 1(8) order if L. refused to go.

[71] With that being her position, Ms. Nguyen made clear that she was not seeking an order terminating Mr. Hollmeyer’s parenting time.

[72] Mr. Hollmeyer’s response was to the effect that Ms. Nguyen really does not want L. to travel to be with him. On his behalf, Mr. Ludmer submitted that, with less severe conditions imposed on Ms. Nguyen for failing to ensure L.’s compliance with their voluntary, informal parenting-time arrangement, it is probable that L. will never again travel to spend time with him.

[73] The difference between the parties’ positions on the issue of the obligations that might be placed on Ms. Nguyen is seen in the following taken from their materials:

Proposed Orders

Mr. Hollmeyer’s Proposed Orders

[74] In his motion, Mr. Hollmeyer was seeking the following orders respecting parental obligations:

a. that the parent, or their designate, transitioning the child to the other parent shall drop the child off at the airport to the other parent or designate and leave immediately without delay;

b. that [Ms. Nguyen] shall exercise all required guidance, boundaries, incentives and consequences in her parenting of L. to ensure compliance with the Status Quo Parenting Schedule and with the terms of any Court Order concerning parenting time and contact and she shall never accept any assertion by L. that she does not, or will not, comply with the Status Quo Parenting Schedule or the terms of such Court Orders;

c. recognition that each parent shall be entitled to have a full and active role in providing a sound moral, social, economic and educational environment for L. All decision-making powers shall only be exercised in a way that is in the best interests of the L. Neither parent shall make any statement, nor take any action, with the intent or effect of portraying the other parent as marginalized or secondary in the life of L. Rather, each parent shall in all communications to or relating to L., message that both parents are to be considered full and involved parents in L.’s life;

d. recognition that each of the parents shall foster a feeling of affection between L. and the other parent. Neither parent shall speak to, or in the presence of, L. in a derogatory manner concerning the other parent, nor permit anyone else to do so. Neither parent shall do anything which would estrange L. from the other, which would injure the opinion of L. as to other, or which would impair the natural development of L.’s love and respect for each of the parents (and their partners and extended families);

e. Specifically, each parent shall communicate to, and foster in, L. a concept of the other parent as (i) safe; (ii) loving; (iii) available; (iv) able to make a substantial contribution to the upbringing of L. at least equal to that of the other parent; and (v) that the parents are supportive of the terms of the Status Quo Parenting Plan and Court-Ordered parenting arrangements as being in the best interests of L.

f. that the parties shall cease all unhelpful narratives and educate and cause L. to immediately cease to believe and to reject all such unhelpful narratives. In particular, without limitation, the following narratives shall be prohibited:

• That the Respondent father is not capable of meeting L.’s needs.
• That the Respondent father is not safe.
• That the Canadian plan of care is better or more superior than the plan of care in Europe.
• That flying to Europe is unsafe.
• That the Respondent’s partner …is mean, unsafe or not a suitable caregiver for L.

Ms. Nguyen’s Proposed Orders

[75] Ms. Nguyen, on the other hand, proposed the following orders:

a. that L. be in [Mr. Hollmeyer’s] care at March Break 2025 for a period of 7 days, to occur in Canada;

b. that [Ms. Nguyen] shall provide [Mr. Hollmeyer] with a signed Travel Consent prepared by [Mr. Hollmeyer] at least one week prior to the commencement of any travel with L.;

c. that on an interim without prejudice basis, exchanges into [Mr. Hollmeyer’s] care shall take place at Toronto Pearson Airport, at a Terminal of [Mr. Hollmeyer’s] choosing, unless otherwise agreed by the parties in advance and in writing;

d. that exchanges shall take place 3 hours prior to any flight departure time, or at such other time as may be agreed by the parties in advance and in writing;

e. that [Ms. Nguyen] and/or her designate shall deliver L. to [Mr. Hollmeyer] and immediately vacate the premises, leaving [Mr. Hollmeyer] alone with L. from that point forward;

f. that [Ms. Nguyen] will at all times encourage L. to travel with the [Mr. Hollmeyer] as scheduled; and

g. that in the event the Applicant complies with the foregoing, she will be deemed to have discharged her obligation to comply with the regular parenting schedule.

Discussion of Parental Obligations

[76] While there is no enforceable court order at this time, other than that which I released shortly after hearing the motion in order to allow the parties to plan for March break, and no formal agreement exists between them which is otherwise enforceable, after hearing the motion I informed the parties that, in my view, there needed to be some specific rules set down in order to give their voluntary informal parenting-time arrangement some force.

[77] Accordingly, the order that I made addressed how to ensure that L. attended her parenting time with Mr. Hollmeyer, what is to occur if she does not, and how Mr. Hollmeyer is to interact with her when she is in his care, rather than focusing on the specifics of when his parenting time is to occur, since I have concluded that the Swiss court order cannot be enforced in Ontario at this time.

[78] To that end, I agree with Mr. Ludmer about the obligations that the law imposes on a child’s primary parent to ensure that the child complies with whatever order, agreement, or voluntary, informal parenting-time arrangement under which the parties are operating relating to the other parent’s right to spend time with the child.

[79] Those obligations, mainly noted in the context of existing orders, have been set out in many cases, almost all of which Mr. Ludmer seems to have put into his factum.

[80] I will note just a few, taken from my earlier decision in Young-Marcellin v. Marcellin, 2021 ONSC 3026, paras 146-158, since the principles are clear:

Godard v. Godard, 2015 ONCA 568

28 … Ontario courts have held consistently that a parent "has some positive obligation to ensure a child who allegedly resists contact with the access parent complies with the access order" : (citations omitted)

29 No doubt, it may be difficult to comply with an access order, especially as children get older. Parents are not required to do the impossible in order to avoid a contempt finding. They are, however, required to do all that they reasonably can. In this case, the motion judge inferred deliberate and wilful disobedience of the order from the appellant's failure to do all that she reasonably could: she failed to "take concrete measures to apply normal parental authority to have the child comply with the access order". (Bolding added)

30… [W]hat does the mother do when this child doesn't want to go to school or doesn't want to go to the dentist? What are her mechanisms? Right? ... Does this child have an allowance? Does she have a hockey tournament that maybe she's not allowed to go to if she doesn't go to see dad before? Are there things she could do to force her to go short of the police attending at her house and physically removing her?

Stuyt v. Stuyt, [2009] O.J. No. 2475

45 … There is no evidence that the Respondent took any disciplinary action against Braden for his refusal to abide by the access regime to which both the Applicant and the Respondent had agreed. He did not ground him. He did not remove any privileges. He did not impose any sanctions for disobedience to parental instructions. … (Bolding added)

54 I join in the chorus along with several of my colleagues who have observed as follows.

A parent has some positive obligation to ensure that a child who allegedly resists contact with the other parent complies with the existing access order. (Hatcher, supra, at para. 27; Quaresma, supra, at para. 8)

A parent governed by an access order is not entitled, in law, to leave access up to the child. (Hatcher, supra, at para. 28; K.(B.) v. P.(A.), [2005] O.J. No. 3334 (S.C.J.) at para. 24)

There are many tasks that a child, when asked, may find unpleasant to perform. But ask we must and perform they must. A child who refuses to go to or stay at the home where he is supposed to be under an access order should be treated by the parent the same as a child who refuses to go to school or who otherwise misbehaves. The job of a parent is to parent. (Hatcher, supra, at para. 28; Geremia v. Harb, para 44)

55 The Respondent cannot hide behind Braden's wishes as a reason not to comply with the orders of Polowin J. Whether the Respondent or Braden agrees or disagrees with those orders, both must comply with them. It is the responsibility of the Respondent to show that he is the adult, he is the parent, and he will take appropriate steps to make sure that the access schedule in the orders is complied with. (Bolding added)

B.K. v. A.P., [2005] O.J. No. 3334

22 … Not only has the mother not returned Charles to the father's custody, she has not made any effort to do so. In her affidavit, she states several times that Charles refused to leave her home on February 13 and has remained in her de facto custody since, by his own choosing. While she states that she has continued to encourage Charles to follow the court order, the specifics given are with respect to encouraging Charles to visit his father, at Easter and Father's Day. Notably, he did visit his father on both occasions. There is nothing in the mother's affidavit to show that she told Charles about the April 13 order, and that he and she must comply with it. No effort to actually deliver him or send him to his father's, as required by that order, has been made. The comments of Chadwick J. in Fenato v. Fenato, [1999] O.J. No. 3546 (S.C.J.) (QL):

para. 15 I find it hard to understand how a custodial parent cannot control or direct an 11-year-old child unless the parent is not making a sincere effort to do so. I would expect if the father had taken a firm…stand Dominic would have returned to his mother and these incidents involving the police may never have occurred. It certainly leads one to draw the inference the father has very little control over his 11-year-old son. If this is indeed the case Dominic may be completely out of control as he enters his teenage years.

24 It is clear from reading her affidavit that the mother's view is that Charles does not want to live with his father. It is equally clear that, given his wishes, she does not intend to comply with the court order that he do so. The law does not entitle Ms. B.K. simply to leave this up to Charles. I find Ms. B.K. in contempt of paragraph 1 of the April 13th order. (Bolding added)

Michener v. Carter, [2018] O.J. No. 2325

33 What steps does a parent have to go through to ensure that access take place? In Jackson, Chappel J. suggested four requirements for the parents to ensure access take place. In para. 63(d) of her decision, Chappel J. suggested an inquiry as to the following four factors:

i. Did they engage in a discussion with the child to determine why the child is refusing to go?

ii. Did they communicate with the other parent or other people involved with the family about the difficulties and how to resolve them?

iii. Did they offer the child an incentive to comply with the order?

iv. Did they articulate any clear disciplinary measures should the child continue to refuse to comply with the order? (Godard, Supra.; Jackscha v. Funnell, 2012 ONSC 10467). (Bolding added)

40 Whatever reason the children do not want to see their father, however, the real issue is whether the mother is taking all reasonable efforts to ensure that the access order was complied with. In the present case, I do not believe that she has. Prior to the abortive February visit, Ms. Michener deposed that"If the children do not want to spend time with him or call him, I am not going to 'punish' or 'impose consequences' and if this is what the respondent interprets the term 'reprimand' in paragraph 49 of his affidavit I think it is inappropriate." It appears that the most that she is willing to do is to "encourage and promote the concept of having contact with their father regularly when they can and he is available." Later, after the failed visit, the applicant says that "I did encourage the children and told them it was okay for them to go with their father to Toronto and I was in support of it." When I asked counsel as to whether that was the only evidence of the applicant's attempts to force the children to go on the access visit, he confirmed that that was it.

42 Absent from all of these things were the latter two things that Chappel J. suggested were necessary for proof of compliance with an access order affecting children who were ambivalent over a visit with their father. The applicant provided evidence of neither inducements nor disciplinary measures designed to enforce what both of these parents agreed was in the best interests of the children, which was a four-day visit with their father. Rather, Ms. Michener confirmed that she was not willing to impose any consequences on the children if they did not wish to go on a visit with their father; she said that the most that she is willing to do is to encourage the children to go on a visit with their father which is, frankly speaking, insufficient to answer the allegations that she is in breach of the February 1 consent order.

44 I would firstly note that the reasons why the children do not want to go are not necessarily relevant to an enforcement motion where what is in issue is the efforts made by the responding party to make the access happen. It must be remembered that these parties agreed on two separate occasions that a visit between the children and their father was in the children's best interests. Ms. Michener cannot now be heard to say that the visits may not, in fact, be in the children's best interests when the parties previously agreed that they were. (Bolding added)

[81] Given the statements in these authorities, and others like them, I could not accept Ms. Nguyen’s request that her obligations to ensure that L. attended her parenting time with Mr. Hollmeyer extended only to “encourag[ing] L. to travel with [Mr. Hollmeyer] as scheduled” and “deliver[ing] L. to [Mr. Hollmeyer]” at Pearson Airport “3 hours prior to any flight departure time”, then “immediately vacat[ing] the premises, leaving [Mr. Hollmeyer] alone with L. from that point forward.”

[82] Ms. Nguyen’s proposal lacked any hint of a consequence for L. for resisting travel to see Mr. Hollmeyer, which the cases make clear is required as a component of exercising parental authority. It is for that reason that I did require that Ms. Nguyen do more than she proposed, including imposing consequences on L. if she refused to travel so that Mr. Hollmeyer could exercise his parenting time with her.

[83] While I acknowledged the absence of an enforceable order in Ontario before I released the interim order herein, it is a fact that the parties had did have and adhere to their voluntary, informal parenting-time arrangement about when Mr. Hollmeyer’s parenting time would occur. Ms. Nguyen did not seek on this motion to change that. She proposed, in fact, that it continue in accordance with the parties’ arrangement. In those circumstances, I felt it quite appropriate to impose on her some of the same conditions that would be imposed on someone bound by an order.

[84] Similarly, I found that, for an interim motion, some of the terms sought by Mr. Hollmeyer seemed excessive, in the absence of evidence about the need for them. In my view, those terms are better left to trial, when the parties have more time to develop their cases, and after the jointly retained psychologist has had an opportunity to meet with L. and the parties and provides the court with her recommendations.

[85] Because my order is the first in Ontario in this case imposing obligations on the parties, I also concluded also that it would not be appropriate for me to pre-impose Rule 1(8) sanctions on Ms. Nguyen if L. fails to comply with the terms of my order relating to the parties’ arrangement.

[86] Should Mr. Hollmeyer bring a similar Rule 1(8) motion in future, based on events occurring after February 27, 2025, that decision will be left to the Justice hearing the motion, apprised of all the evidence from the parties, who are both subject to terms in my order.

[87] I wish to be clear, however. Any future Rule 1(8) motion under the terms of this order can only pertain to whether a party failed to comply with the terms of my order. It cannot pertain to whether either party failed to comply with the voluntary, informal parenting time arrangement or the Swiss order unless and until there is an Ontario Court order expressly setting out Mr. Hollmeyer’s right to parenting time, whether based on the Swiss order or some other basis.

[88] Given these considerations, the order that I am now making in this matter, while closely mirroring that which was released on February 27, 2025 with Reasons to follow, which I have now provided, contains minor modifications to reflect some of the findings in these Reasons and the addition of a costs provision:

Interim Order

On an interim basis, the following provisions shall apply for all travel required to be undertaken by the parties’ child, L.L.H., born December 14, 2011 (hereinafter, the child) in order to give without prejudice effect to the Respondent’s parenting time in accordance with the parties’ voluntary, informal parenting-time arrangement, which mirrors an order of the Civil Appeal Court of the Cantonal Court of Switzerland, dated June 12, 2020:

1. The Applicant shall provide the Respondent with a signed Travel Consent prepared by the Respondent at least one week prior to the commencement of any travel with the child.

2. Commencing immediately, the Applicant shall, regularly and repeatedly: a. affirm to the child that she supports her travelling with the Respondent because, as her parents, both she and the Respondent have agreed that is in the child’s best interests to have a positive relationship with the Respondent, and that such travels with him are intended to support that relationship; and b. confirm to the child that, because of that agreement, it is her obligation to travel with the Respondent as scheduled.

3. If the child, despite the Applicant having complied with paragraph 2 hereof, actively or passively resists travel with the Respondent, the Applicant shall next: a. firmly direct the child to travel with the Respondent as scheduled; b. inform the child that a court has also decided that she must travel with the Respondent, and that court orders must be obeyed; and c. tell the child, in clear language, that if she does not travel with the Respondent, the Applicant shall impose immediate, meaningful, and ongoing consequences including, but not limited to, the loss of her ability to use electronic devices for other than school purposes, and the loss of privileges such as her continued participation in extracurricular activities.

4. To give effect to the terms of this order, regardless of any expressed or other resistance by the child, the Applicant, accompanied by her partner, if he chooses to participate, shall: a. transport the child to the point of departure of the public conveyance that will be utilized by the Respondent for the transport of him and the child for their travel (Union Station in Toronto for any train travel; Pearson Airport at a Terminal of the Respondent’s choosing, unless otherwise agreed by the parties in advance and in writing, for any air travel); b. accompany the child to the point of where the child is to be exchanged between the parties, whereupon both the Applicant and the Respondent shall remind the child, in their own words, that they, together, have agreed that her travel with the Respondent is in her best interests because it will ensure that she maintains the important father/daughter relationship that exists between her and the Respondent; c. tell the child that she wants her to enjoy herself while travelling with the Respondent; d. if necessary, because of continued resistance by the child, remind her, in the presence of the Respondent, of the consequences of refusing to travel with him, as set out in Paragraph 3c hereof; and e. regardless of the child’s emotional state, leave her in the care of the Respondent, immediately vacate the premises, return to her vehicle, and return to her home in St. Thomas.

5. If the child refuses to travel with the Respondent despite the Applicant’s compliance with the provisions of Paragraphs 1 through 4 of this order, upon the child returning to the care of the Applicant, she shall immediately impose meaningful, and ongoing consequences on the child for refusing to travel with the Respondent. The Applicant shall also advise the Respondent, in writing, of the nature of the consequences that she has imposed and their duration.

6. While the child is in the care of the Respondent, she shall be entitled to communicate privately with: a. the Applicant for a single period of no longer than 20 minutes per day, at a time to be agreed upon, in advance of travel, by the parties. In the event that the parties cannot agree on the time of day when the child may communicate with the Applicant, the Respondent shall make the decision, so long as the time of day upon which he settles is between the hours of 7:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time or Eastern Daylight time, as applicable, if the call originates from Europe, and 11:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time or Eastern Daylight time, as applicable, if the call originates from Canada; and b. her friends, collectively, for a single period of no greater than 40 minutes per day, at a time to be agreed upon, in advance of travel, by the Respondent and the child. In the event that the Respondent and the child cannot agree on the time of day when the child may communicate with her friends, the Respondent shall make the decision, so long as the time of day upon which he settles is between the hours of 7:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time or Eastern Daylight time, as applicable, if the call originates from Europe, and 11:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time or Eastern Daylight time, as applicable, if the call originates from Canada.

7. To give effect to the child’s rights of communication in Paragraph 6 hereof, the Respondent shall provide the child, at his cost, with a telecommunication SIM card or ESIM card that will allow for roaming charge-free communication between the child and the Applicant whenever she is travelling with him outside of Canada.

8. The Respondent shall not, at any time, remove the child’s cell phone from her so long as she limits her communications with the Applicant and her friends in Canada to the 60 minutes per day and during the hours permitted in accordance with paragraph 6 hereof.

9. On any day during which the child fails to limit her communications with the Applicant and her friends to the 60 minutes per day and during the hours permitted in accordance with paragraph 6 hereof, the Respondent is permitted to remove the child’s cell phone for the balance of the day on which a contravention occurs, after which it shall be returned to her the next day in order that she can communicate with the Applicant and her friends for the 60 minutes per day and during the hours permitted in accordance with paragraph 6 hereof.

10. In the event that the child, while in the care of the Respondent, attempts to communicate with the Applicant more often than once per day, or outside of the hours permitted in accordance with paragraph 6 hereof, the Applicant shall reject such additional attempts to communicate with her unless they have been approved by the Respondent, a fact that he must communicate to the Applicant if that is the case. The Applicant shall demonstrate her compliance with this term by not answering the child’s unapproved additional or untimely telephone calls and by not responding to any text messages that she sends.

11. While the child is in the care of the Respondent, should she express the desire or need to discuss issues of importance to her, he shall make sufficient time available to do so as soon as possible. During such discussions, he shall respect and respond thoughtfully to the child’s thoughts and opinions. He shall not, at any time, dismiss them by suggesting that they are the products of her physical state, her age or state of maturity, or ideas communicated to her or mandated by the Applicant.

12. While the child is in the care of the Respondent, he shall not, at any time, permit his partner, Dr. Tavanxhi, to parent or discipline the child.

13. Neither party shall speak to, or in the presence of, the child in a derogatory manner concerning the other party, nor permit anyone else to do so.

14. Neither party shall do anything which would estrange the child from the other or which would injure the opinion of the child as to the other, nor permit anyone else to do so.

15. With respect to the twice weekly phone calls allotted between the Respondent and the child when she is not in the care of the Respondent, the Applicant shall physically initiate the phone call to the Respondent on the specified day at the specified time and shall hand the phone to the child, who shall then be provided with at least one hour of privacy to converse with the Respondent.

16. The remainder of the issues raised by the Respondent in his Amended Notice of Motion returnable on February 21, 2025 are, as appropriate, adjourned to trial, if partially addressed in this order (Paragraphs 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 14 of the Respondent’s Amended Notice of Motion dated February 7, 2025) or, if not addressed in this order (Paragraphs 3, 4, 13, Paragraphs 21-31, and Paragraphs 15-20 of the Respondent’s Amended Notice of Motion dated February 7, 2025) are adjourned either to trial or such other date as the parties may have agreed, in consultation with the Trial Coordinator.

Costs

17. The parties are strongly encouraged to settle the issue of costs. If they cannot, they may forward written submissions to me through the Family Court Trial Coordinator at St. Thomas.

18. The parties’ costs submissions shall not exceed five typewritten pages in Times New Roman 12-point font, with double spacing.

19. The parties’ costs submissions shall be accompanied by any offers to settle, whether accepted or not, together with a list of all persons who worked on the matter for whom a claim for costs is being made, their position, the amount being sought for costs in respect of that person, and a complete and clear description of the work undertaken by each person for whom a claim for costs is being made.

20. Each party shall also advise the amount of costs that their client should be required to pay to the other party should the other party be found to have been the successful party on the motion.

21. The submissions of the parties are to be served and forwarded to the Family Court Trial Coordinator at St. Thomas by no later than 15 days from the date that this judgment is released to them.

22. Should either party wish to respond to the written costs submissions of the other, each such party shall serve and forward their responding submissions to the Family Court Trial Coordinator at St. Thomas by no later than 30 days from the date that this judgment is released to them.

23. If no costs submissions are received from at least one of the parties by the date that is 15 days from the date that this judgment is released to the parties, costs shall be deemed to have been settled, neither party shall be entitled to an order for costs, and no such order shall thereafter be made.

Justice T. Price
Date: March 17, 2025

[1] Given the time difference between St. Thomas and Europe, it is unclear which occurred first – Mr. Hollmeyer’s rescheduling of the flight or L.’s text to him telling him that she refused to travel to Europe.