Wilson v. Wilson, 2025 ONSC 1561

Date: 2025/03/11
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Re: Misty Wilson, Applicant
-and-
Dan Wilson, Respondent

Counsel:
Bryan Delaney for the Applicant
Cheryl Payette for the Respondent

Heard: October 1, 2024

Decision

[1] This is my decision on the Applicant’s Motion to Change heard on October 1, 2024.

[2] This Motion to Change was commenced on May 9, 2023. The Applicant, Ms. Wilson, seeks to change the spousal support terms of the parties’ separation agreement signed by the parties on October 23 and 24, 2018, and filed with the court under s.35 of the Family Law Act (“FLA”) on January 24, 2023.

[3] Under the 2018 agreement, Ms. Wilson receives spousal support of $500 per month, plus 25% of Mr. Wilson’s net bonuses. Mr. Wilson received two bonuses after the agreement was signed, which he shared. He no longer receives bonuses.

[4] Ms. Wilson seeks to retroactively vary spousal support to 2019, being shortly after the 2018 agreement was signed, to an amount that reflects the mid to high end of the SSAG ranges for support, based on Mr. Wilson’s actual income earned in each year. She also seeks life insurance to secure the spousal support obligation.

[5] Mr. Wilson was not served with Ms. Wilson’s Motion to Change until August 14, 2023.

[6] Mr. Wilson’s position in his Response to the Motion to Change, filed in September 2023, was that there had not been any material change in circumstances and that the motion to change should be dismissed. On the final hearing on this motion to change, Mr. Wilson’s position was that he was willing to increase spousal support to $775 per month as of January 1, 2023 [1], but he opposed a higher, or earlier, increase.

[7] For the reasons set out below, I am varying the spousal support terms in the agreement to increase spousal support to $1,000 per month, commencing January 1, 2023.

Background

[8] The parties were divorced after the agreement was filed under s.35 of the FLA, by Divorce Order dated October 17, 2023. The Divorce Order is silent as to corollary relief. This is, therefore, a motion to change spousal support under the FLA.

[9] The parties were married for 19 years and separated on August 15, 2015. They have two children, who were 16 and 19 years old when the separation agreement was signed. The youngest child has some special needs.

[10] The agreement provides for the children to primarily reside with the Respondent, Mr. Wilson.

[11] Concerning support, the agreement provides:

“4. The wife owes the husband guideline child support of approximately $131.00 each month for the two children. This amount has been taken into account with providing for a set-off amount of spousal support as addressed below in paragraph 5(1).

“5. (1) Commencing January 1, 2018, the husband shall pay spousal support to the wife in the amount of $500 per month (payable in two equal installments each month). This amount is based on the husband’s regular annual income of $77,800 and the wife’s annual income of approximately $16,000 from all sources. In addition, the amount is partially a set-off of the wife’s child support obligation as identified in paragraph 4., above.

(2) The husband is up-to-date in his spousal support payments. The parties acknowledge that the payment for some of the earlier months of 2018 was partially paid by the husband paying the wife’s cell phone bill.

(3) In addition to the monthly spousal support provided in paragraph 5(1) above, the husband shall also pay the wife 25% of the net amount of any bonuses he receives from his employer. The husband shall pay the wife within 14 days of receiving the bonus pay.

“7(1) Only paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 may be varied if there is a material change in circumstances. If such change occurs the husband and wife seeking the variation shall give the other written notice of the variation he or she is seeking, and the husband and the wife shall confer personally or through their respective lawyers to settle, what, if any variation should be made.

(2) If no agreement has been reached within twenty-one (21) clear days after notice has been given under subsection (1), variation may be determined at the instance of either the husband or the wife in a court proceeding under the Family Law Act, the Children’s Law Reform Act, or the Divorce Act.”

[12] The agreement does not contain any provisions for the annual adjustment of child or spousal support, or for yearly income disclosure between the parties. It does not require security for support, including through life insurance.

[13] Ms. Wilson is not seeking to set aside the 2018 agreement.

Legal Framework

[14] Under section 35 of the FLA, a person who was a party to a domestic contract may file the contract with the court together with their affidavit stating that the contract is in effect and has not been set aside or varied by court order or agreement. The effect of filing the domestic contract under the FLA is that the contract may be enforced or varied as if it were an order of the court.

[15] Under section 37(2) of the FLA, the court may vary the terms of the spousal support order if it is satisfied that there has been a material change in the dependents or respondent’s circumstances or that evidence not available at the previous hearing has become available.

[16] Under section 33(8) of the FLA, an order for spousal support should:

a. recognize the spouse’s contribution to the relationship and the economic consequences of the relationship for the spouse;
b. share the economic burden of child support equitably;
c. make a fair provision to assist the spouse to become able to contribute to his or her own support; and
d. relieve financial hardship, if this has not been done by orders under Parts I and II of the Act.

[17] Section 33(9) directs that in determining the amount and duration of spousal support, the court shall consider all of the circumstances of the parties but specifically, with respect to spousal support,

a. the dependent’s and respondent’s current assets and means;
b. the assets and means that the dependent and respondent are likely to have in the future;
c. the dependent’s capacity to contribute to his or her own support;
d. the respondent’s capacity to provide support;
e. the dependent’s and respondent’s age and physical and mental health;
f. the dependent’s needs, in determining which the court will have regard to the accustomed standard of living while the parties resided together;
g. the measures available for the dependent to become able to provide for his or her own support and the length of time and cost involved to enable the dependent to take those measures;
h. any legal obligation of the respondent or dependent to provide support for another person;
i. the desirability of the dependent or respondent remaining at home to care for a child;
j. a contribution by the dependent to the realization of the respondent’s career potential;
k. the length of time the dependent and respondent cohabitated,
l. the effect on the spouse’s earning capacity of the responsibilities assumed during cohabitation;
m. whether the spouse has undertaken the care of a child who is of the age of 18 years or over and unable by reason of illness, disability or other cause to withdraw from the charge of his or her parents;
n. whether the spouse has undertaken to assist in the contribution of a program of education for a child 18 years of age or over who was unable for that reason to withdraw from the charge of his or her parents,
o. any housekeeping, childcare or other domestic services performed by the spouse for the family, as if the spouses were devoting the time spent in performing that service in remunerative employment and were contributing the earnings to the family support,
p. the effect on the spouse’s earnings and career development of the responsibility of caring for a child; and
q. any other legal right of the dependent to support other than of public money.

[18] When determining a request to vary, the following principles apply (L.M.P. v. L.S., 2011 SCC 64):

a. A material change is a change that, had it been known at the time, would likely have resulted in different terms.
b. The focus is on whether there has been a material change since the order was made.
c. The analysis focuses on the previous order (in this case, the agreement is now variable as an order under the FLA) and its circumstances.
d. The court ought not to consider the correctness of that order. The court must assume that the prior order was made by applying the objectives for spousal support set out under the Act.
e. The onus is on the party seeking a variation to establish that there has been a material change in circumstances.
f. Once the material change threshold is met, the court must determine what variation needs to be made in light of the change in circumstances. The court should limit itself to only making the variation justified by that change.
g. A variation is neither an appeal of the original order nor a de novo hearing.

[19] Where the priority given to child support impacts on spousal support, section 38.1(3) of the FLA provides:

“Where as a result of giving priority to the support of a child, an order for the support of a spouse is not made or the amount of the order for the support of a spouse is less than it otherwise would have been, any material reduction or termination of the support for the child constitutes a material change of circumstances for the purposes of an application for the support of the spouse or for variation of an order for the support of the spouse.”

Analysis

Commencement Date of Varying Spousal Support

[20] Mr. Wilson’s position – that he is willing to increase spousal support as of January 1, 2023 to $775 per month – although premised on his good graces, effectively means that he does not contest that there has been a material change that warrants increasing spousal support to $775 per month as of January 1, 2023. This position also implies that to the extent a material change occurred prior to January 1, 2023, there is no basis for a retroactive change prior to January 1, 2023, given that Ms. Wilson did not commence this motion to change until May 9, 2023, and did not serve Mr. Wilson until August 14, 2023.

[21] I find that Ms. Wilson has not established, on a balance of probabilities, a basis for varying spousal support prior to January 1, 2023.

[22] The date of formal notice is the presumptive date for when support should be varied if there has been a material change. Ms. Wilson’s evidence is that she filed the motion to change to be issued in January of 2023, but due to issues with filing, it was not issued until May of 2023. It was not served until August of 2023.

[23] Ms. Wilson provided limited evidence supporting her claim for a retroactive increase, such as evidence that she gave Mr. Wilson effective notice that she sought increased spousal support before starting her motion to change. At the hearing, Mr. Wilson’s counsel advised that they received correspondence from Ms. Wilson’s lawyer seeking increased spousal support in January of 2023. This was not contested.

[24] I do not find that Mr. Wilson’s statement in paragraph 34 of his affidavit that referred to Ms. Wilson’s regular texts for support infer that these texts were seeking increased support, particularly given the absence of any other evidence supporting this. Ms. Wilson was of the view that Mr. Wilson paid the support late (which is contested by Mr. Wilson). In this context, it is more probable that Ms. Wilson was asking for the existing support payments, not an increase. This is also consistent with Ms. Wilson’s evidence that she delayed seeking increased support because she could not afford a lawyer, and she did not retain a lawyer to seek increased support until November of 2022.

[25] I have considered the DBS factors. I do not find any basis for changing support before January 1, 2023.

[26] I do not find that Mr. Wilson acted in a blameworthy manner. The 2018 agreement does not require annual income disclosure by either party; there is no evidence that either did so. To the extent that in some circumstances, a payor of child support may have a responsibility to proactively disclose increases in income to the recipient regardless of a request or notice, I do not find that this applies here, where the issue is spousal support and Ms. Wilson is the one required to pay child support, although the spousal support payment offsets this.

[27] Ms. Wilson has provided little evidence to explain her delay in seeking increased spousal support. Her evidence is, in effect, that she was unable to seek a variation earlier due to her health and limited finances.

[28] On a balance of probabilities, I do not find that Ms. Wilson’s health issues prevented her from asking Mr. Wilson for increased spousal support or his income information. The evidence also does not support that Ms. Wilson could not seek a variation earlier due to her financial circumstances. The court’s rules and available resources are designed to assist unrepresented parties through the legal process. Ms. Wilson did not provide evidence of efforts to inform herself through free resources about options for increasing spousal support or accessing legal services, such as by applying for legal aid. Ms. Wilson’s position that she would have asked to increase support earlier if she had funds to do so is also inconsistent with the fact that she received approximately $19,500 from a personal injury settlement in May of 2022. Still, her bank records do not reflect that she spent these funds on legal advice. I also note that Ms. Wilson filed for bankruptcy in 2021, which reflects that her health and financial situation did not prevent her from managing financial and legal paperwork in 2021.

[29] Also, the evidence in support of any material change taking place before January of 2023 is limited, which I have also weighed in balancing the DBS factors. The material change issue is addressed more fully below.

The Previous Order and Its Circumstances

[30] Determining whether there has been a material change and what that material change is starts with considering the terms of the parties' 2018 separation agreement and its circumstances.

[31] The evidence before me concerning the circumstances that underlie the agreement's support terms is limited.

[32] Ms. Wilson explained that this lack of evidence was due to her previous lawyer’s office being flooded, so she could not obtain a complete copy of her previous legal file. Ms. Wilson did, however, receive some legal documents from her lawyer, none of which were filed in court except for a copy of Ms. Wilson’s financial statement sworn on August 31, 2017.

[33] The evidence before me is limited on the basis for Ms. Wilson’s entitlement to spousal support in the 2018 agreement, including the parties’ respective roles during the marriage and the other factors under s.33(8) and (9) of the FLA. The primary evidence that I have that relates to entitlement is the parties’ ages at the time of separation, that they have two children who were in the primary care of Mr. Wilson, their respective incomes at the time the agreement was signed, the length of their marriage, and that Ms. Wilson was unable to work due to disability at the time that the agreement was signed.

[34] I find that spousal support was payable under the 2018 agreement based on entitlement due to need. This is because:

a. The 2018 agreement does not state the basis for entitlement to spousal support.
b. The parties have not filed the support calculations used to arrive at the support amounts in the 2018 agreement. These can be recreated roughly using Divorcemate, using a 2018 tax year. The parties did not do this, but I have, and I have attached a copy as a Schedule hereto. At the motion hearing, I told counsel I had done this and asked if they had any objections to me doing so. They did not.
c. In recreating the support amounts from 2018, there is uncertainty about Ms. Wilson’s income. The agreement states that her income “from all sources” was $16,000. Ms. Wilson’s evidence is that her “annual income” at the time of the agreement was $13,000, based on her August 31, 2017, financial statement that reflects she was receiving social assistance of $406 per month and CPP income of $721 per month, for a total yearly income of $13,536. Still, she has not provided a copy of this 2017 or 2018 income tax return or CRA summary income information.
d. The uncertainty surrounding Ms. Wilson’s income is compounded given that Ms. Wilson is not a reliable narrator with respect to her financial matters. Much of the income information provided by Ms. Wilson was inaccurate, confusing, or unexplained, such as, for example, her 2021 and 2022 income tax filings that did not report her spousal support income. Ms. Wilson said she corrected this by refiling her taxes, but she filed with the court only a 2023 notice of assessment showing spousal support included. She did not file a re-assessment for 2021 or 2022. She also attached only one notice of assessment for 2021 to her affidavit when she received two for 2021 for the pre- and post-bankruptcy periods. In Ms. Wilson’s Form 15, sworn on January 3, 2023, she swore that Mr. Wilson had not paid her any spousal support in 2019, which was not true.
e. It is difficult to reconcile the evidence concerning Ms. Wilson’s income at the time the 2018 agreement was signed. The child support amount set out in the agreement ($131 per month) corresponds to Ms. Wilson having an income of $13,920 per year. Ms. Wilson argues that the $16,000 amount for her income set out in the agreement supports her position that the agreement was based on her continuing to receive the child tax benefit for the children, even though the children primarily resided with Mr. Wilson, but this is inconsistent with her evidence that the child tax benefit was $500 per month. If her income was $13,920/yr at the time of the agreement without including the child tax benefit, then it would be almost $20,000/yr with the child tax benefit included, not $16,000.
f. On a balance of probabilities, considering the above factors, I find that Ms. Wilson’s income at the time she signed the 2018 agreement was $16,000, not including the child tax benefit.
g. Under the SSAGs [2], assuming:
i. A 2018 tax year for residents of Ontario;
ii. Ms. Wilson’s income was $16,000 per year;
iii. Mr. Wilson’s employment income was $77,800;
iv. The parties cohabitated for 19 years, and both were 47 in 2018;
v. The two children (ages 16 and 19) primarily resided with Mr. Wilson, and
vi. Ms. Wilson had a child support obligation for two children based on her income that she was not paying but was instead factored into the spousal support amount.
The SSAG ranges are $950/m (low), $1,108/m (mid), and $1,266/m (high).
h. I also considered the SSAG ranges for 2018, assuming part of Ms. Wilson’s income was made up of social assistance income clawed back when spousal support was paid. Assuming $6,000 per year of Ms. Wilson’s income was from clawed back social assistance [3], the SSAG ranges increased to $1,092 (low), $1,272 (mid), and $1,456 (high).
i. The 2018 agreement does not state how the amount of spousal support in the agreement was calculated, other than it was based on the parties’ respective incomes as set out in the agreement and “partially set-off” by Ms. Wilson’s child support obligation. The precise meaning of “partially set-off”, or how the partial set-off was calculated, is not specified.
j. The parties agree Ms. Wilson never paid child support but that her obligation to do so was considered, at least “partially”, in setting a reduced spousal support payment of $500 per month. If the parties had not reduced spousal support to account for the unpaid child support, I find that the spousal support amount agreed to in the 2018 agreement would have been no more than $680 per month. This is based on adding the $131 per month in child support, grossed up to reflect the different tax treatment between child and spousal support, to the $500 spousal support amount [4].
k. The onus is on Ms. Wilson to provide evidence regarding the circumstances that underlie the agreement. If she does not meet this onus, her claim fails. I do not find that she has met her evidentiary onus to establish that spousal support is payable to her under the 2018 agreement on a compensatory basis. A compensatory entitlement is not supported by the evidence on the s.33(8) and (9) factors, nor the amount of spousal support agreed to.
l. I find that the spousal support payable in the 2018 agreement reflects a lower-than-low SSAG amount, which reflects a needs-based, not compensatory-based, entitlement.

Material Change

[35] I find that there has been a material change in circumstances since the 2018 agreement because Ms. Wilson’s child support obligation has materially changed, and Mr. Wilson’s income has materially increased.

[36] The onus is on Ms. Wilson, the party seeking the variation, to establish that there has been a material change in circumstances.

[37] Concerning child support, although both children continue to live with Mr. Wilson and benefit from his financial support, I find, on a balance of probabilities, on the evidence before me, that:

a. E ceased being entitled to child support as of December of 2023, when she was 21 years old, and began to receive ODSP of $1,095 per month. E turned 18 in July 2020, left college in the winter of 2021, and worked approximately 4 hours per week part-time. E is a disabled adult child, although she functions reasonably well. Although I accept that E’s expenses likely exceed her income, which arguably gives rise to her parents having a support obligation towards her deficit, Mr. Wilson did not provide evidence to calculate such a deficit, just his and E’s affidavit that there was one, which I do not find sufficient.

b. As of January 1, 2023, J was not entitled to child support. To the extent that J may have ceased being entitled to child support before January 1, 2023:

i. I am unable to determine this on the record before me; and
ii. For the same reasons as set out above, I do not find a basis for varying child support before January 1, 2023.

I have limited evidence to determine when J ceased being entitled to child support, although I find that she was no longer entitled as of January 1, 2023. Ms. Wilson asserts that child support ended for both children in July of 2022, which correlates with E’s 18th birthday. Still, she does not explain why E’s 18th birthday relates to J ceasing to be a child entitled to support under the FLA (s.31). J was already 18 years old when the 2018 agreement was signed, which means that Ms. Wilson agreed that J continued to be eligible for child support even though she was over 18. The evidence reflects that J’s entitlement to support changed at some point and that J is no longer entitled to child support, but neither party provided clear evidence of when this change occurred. J attended postsecondary education after finishing high school, changing programs twice. She was enrolled in Algonquin College for September 2023 but withdrew before the school term started. She has been employed for several years, and as of Ms. Wilson’s April 15, 2024, affidavit, she was working 35 hours per week. She has contributed to her expenses through student loans and employment income. However, she has not been financially independent, and I accept that she still receives financial benefits through Mr. Wilson.

[38] I also find that, as of January 1, 2025, there has been a material change in circumstances based on Mr. Wilson’s income, based on the following:

a. In 2021 and 2022, Mr. Wilson’s income increased because of his workload during the COVID-19 pandemic, as he was a manager at a retirement home. In 2021, his income was $109,958. In 2022, his income was $100,094. Generally, a material change must have some degree of continuity and not merely be due to a temporary set of circumstances. I do not find that Mr. Wilson’s increase in income in 2021 and 2022 has the degree of continuity required to constitute a material change. The evidence is that the circumstances that gave rise to his increase in income were exceptional, time-limited, and unsustainable.

b. Because of workload and stress, Mr. Wilson left his employment in 2022 and took a job working for the LCBO at $80,000 per year. Ms. Wilson does not dispute Mr. Wilson’s current income or seek to impute additional income to him. In 2023, Mr. Wilson’s income was $82,867, which I do not find a material increase. Mr. Wilson’s income was reduced due to surgery for part of 2024, so he anticipated his income for 2024 to be $76,444. In 2025, he expects his income to return to his base salary of $85,000.

c. I find that Mr. Wilson’s annual income increase from $77,800 at the time of the 2018 agreement to approximately $85,000 as of January 1, 2025, is material. I accept that such an increase, to some people, is not material. However, in these circumstances, given the amount of spousal support in issue, and in particular, Ms. Wilson’s limited financial situation, I find that this is a material change.

[39] Ms. Wilson argues that other material changes have impacted spousal support since the 2018 agreement. I disagree, and my reasons are set out below.

a. Child Tax Benefit:

i. I do not find that Ms. Wilson ceasing to receive the child tax benefit for E earlier than July 2020 is a material change.
ii. I find, based on the statements from the CRA that were filed, that Mr. Wilson did receive the child tax benefit (or CCB/CCTB) for E based on a shared parenting arrangement until July 2020, when E turned 18. However, the amounts payable to her were clawed back because she owed money to the CRA. The difference is that she did not receive the benefit based on E primarily living with her, but instead based on E being in a shared parenting arrangement.
iii. Although the filed CRA statements confirm that Ms. Wilson owed CRA approximately $15,759 in January of 2020, these statements do not prove that this amount was owed due to the overpayments of the child tax benefit. For this decision, I assume this debt is related to child tax benefit overpayments.
iv. I do not accept Ms. Wilson’s evidence that part of the 2018 agreement included that she continues to receive the full child tax benefit for E until E turned 18 in July of 2020, even though E was not primarily residing with her. At other places in her evidence, Ms. Wilson refers to this as not an express agreement, but rather, her “impression”. I do not find Ms. Wilson’s evidence on this point credible. Such an agreement would be inconsistent with CRA’s policies. Mr. Wilson denies there was an agreement to this effect. The separation agreement, which includes in paragraph 12(2) that there are no representations, collateral agreement, or conditions affecting this agreement other than as expressed in the agreement, does not refer to any obligation regarding who will receive the child tax benefit.
v. I do not find Ms. Wilson's debt to CRA is a material change for the same reason. I also note that during her bankruptcy, or shortly after, in May 2022, she received approximately $19,500 for a personal injury settlement for an incident from 2008, which exceeded her debt to CRA.

b. Bankruptcy:

i. Ms. Wilson declared bankruptcy in 2021. I do not find that this is a material change. While Ms. Wilson’s evidence is that her bankruptcy reduced her access to credit and increased her living expenses, the evidence does not support that it increased her nondiscretionary expenses. Instead, the bankruptcy benefitted her cash flow by addressing approximately $23,000 in debt.

c. Inflation:

i. While I accept that there has been inflation since 2017, I do not have evidence to conclude that this has impacted the parties differently in a nondiscretionary way. I do not have evidence that Ms. Wilson incurs nondiscretionary expenses that have inflated due to the cost of living, materially higher than Mr. Wilson’s nondiscretionary expenses. Ms. Wilson’s August 31, 2017 financial statement, which, according to her evidence, represents her financial circumstances at the time of the agreement, reflects modest expenses of approximately $13,000 per year. She continues to pay the same rent of $600 per month. Ms. Wilson’s arguments that her rental situation may change in the future do not establish a material change now.

[40] Ms. Wilson did not argue that Mr. Wilson no longer receiving bonuses was a material change, so I have not considered this issue.

[41] Ms. Wilson also did not argue that there has been a material change in her income other than due to the Child Tax Benefit and debt to CRA, which are addressed above.

What Variation Needs to be Made in Light of the Material Changes

[42] Given the material change in the children’s entitlement to support and Mr. Wilson’s income, I find that increasing spousal support to $1,000 per month, effective January 1, 2023, is appropriate.

[43] In determining this amount, I have considered the SSAG ranges based on the only changes in income being Mr. Wilson’s income increasing to $85,000 per year as of January 1, 2025. I have also considered the SSAG ranges when there is no ongoing entitlement to child support as of January 1, 2023, which positively impacts both parties’ financial positions. However, I have also considered that Mr. Wilson continues to provide financial support to the children, the youngest of whom has special needs although is high functioning.

[44] I have also considered that the 2018 agreement provided spousal support at roughly 70% of the SSAG’s low range. The 2025 SSAG calculations provide a SSAG low range of approximately $1,639 if Mr. Wilson’s income is $85,000; 70% of this is $1,147/m. At $77,800 (before his income materially changed), the low range is approximately $1,468; 70% is $1,027/m.

[45] The 2018 agreement was based on a lower-than-low SSAG range. I do not find that there has been a material change that warrants spousal support at a different location in the range.

[46] While I acknowledge that the spousal support Ms. Wilson agreed to in 2018 was very low, a motion to change is not an opportunity for a new determination of her spousal support entitlement – this is not a trial de novo. Ms. Wilson is only entitled to a variation in spousal support based on material changes since the time the agreement was signed. This is what I have attempted to do for the reasons set out above.

Life Insurance

[47] Ms. Wilson sought an order requiring Mr. Wilson to maintain life insurance of $270,000 and to designate her as the irrevocable beneficiary of this policy, as security for his spousal support obligation.

[48] The 2018 agreement did not require either party to provide life insurance to secure support. I do not find that there has been a material change that warrants making such an order now.

Orders

Accordingly, I make the following orders under the Family Law Act:

[49] The support terms of the Separation Agreement signed by the parties on October 23 and 24, 2018, and filed with the court under section 35 of the Family Law Act on January 24, 2023, are hereby varied as follows:

a. Paragraphs four and five are removed and replaced with the following:

i. Commencing January 1, 2023, Mr. Wilson shall pay Ms. Wilson spousal support of $1,000 per month, payable in two equal installments each month, which payments shall continue subject to further court order in the event of a material change in circumstances.

[50] If the parties are unable to agree on costs, they may file submissions on costs in accordance with Rule 24.

Justice P. MacEachern
Date: March 11, 2025

Court File No.: FC-23-140-01
Released: March 11, 2025

Footnotes

[1] Mr. Wilson’s draft order filed at the final hearing
[2] The Final Version of the Spousal Support Guidelines was published in July of 2008
[3] That part of Ms. Wilson’s $16,000 per year income was from social assistance is supported by her August 31, 2017 financial statement, and paragraph 29 of her affidavit sworn March 26, 2024
[4] Based on support calculations using Ms. Wilson’s income at $16,000 per year