WARNING

This is a case under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 and subject to subsections 87(8) and 87(9) of this legislation. These subsections and subsection 142(3) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows:

87(8) Prohibition re identifying child — No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.

87(9) Prohibition re identifying person charged — The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.

142(3) Offences re publication — A person who contravenes subsection 87(8) or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)(c) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.

Court File No.: FC-21-0062
Date: 2025/04/17
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
In the matter of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sched. 1
And in the matter of S.T. (D.O.B. August 2017)

BETWEEN:
Family and Children’s Services of Lanark, Leeds and Grenville, Applicant
– and –
B.W. and M.T., Respondents

Heather Morrison, for the Applicant
Steven J. Edgley, for the Respondent, B.W.
Gregory Best, for the Respondent, M.T.

Heard: February 11, 2025

Amended Reasons for Decision

(Motion for Summary Judgment)

The text of the original Reasons for Decision, dated March 12, 2025, was amended on April 17, 2025, and the description is appended.

Corthorn J.

Introduction

[1] Family and Children’s Services of Lanark, Leeds and Grenville (“the Society”) brings this motion for summary judgment on a status review application. The child who is the subject of the application is S.T. (born in August 2017). S.T. has been in the care of his father, the respondent M.T., since May 2021. The child’s mother, B.W., has had parenting time with S.T. on a sporadic basis during the past three years and ten months.

[2] The Society requests an order pursuant to s. 102 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sched 1 (“the Act”). Specifically, the Society asks the court to (a) find that S.T. is not in need of protection related to M.T.; (b) grant M.T. custody of S.T.; (c) grant M.T. sole decision-making responsibility for S.T.; and (d) order that B.W. shall have parenting time with S.T., by virtual visits or telephone call, at least once a month.

[3] Both respondents were served with the Society’s motion materials and were aware of the return date for the motion. M.T. consents to the relief sought, as confirmed by his counsel on the return of the motion. B.W.’s counsel did not receive sufficient instructions from B.W. to permit him to present a responding position; as a result, B.W. takes no position on the motion.

[4] M.T. consents to the relief sought and the motion is otherwise unopposed. The court must undertake a best interests analysis and take a cautious approach when determining a summary judgment motion in a child protection proceeding: Kawartha-Haliburton Children’s Aid Society v. M.W., 2019 ONCA 316, 432 D.L.R (4th) 497, at paras. 31, 49, 63, and 70-79.

[5] The issues to be determined on this motion are as follows:

1. Is it possible to determine, on this summary proceeding, one or more of Issue Nos. 2, 3 and 4 listed below?
2. Does S.T. continue to be in need of protection?
3. Is it in S.T.’s best interests for custody, with sole decision-making responsibility, to be granted to M.T.?
4. Is it in S.T.’s best interests for B.W. to have access/parenting time with S.T., by virtual visit or telephone, at a minimum of once per week?

Background

a) The Society’s Involvement with S.T.

[6] The Society became involved with B.W. in June 2020. At that time, there were concerns about the ability of B.W. and her then partner, A.B., to parent both their child (S.T.’s half-sibling born in 2020) and S.T. The Society’s attempts to create safety via a family support network were not successful.

[7] In January 2021, an Infant and Child Development Worker saw S.T. That individual reported that S.T. was not meeting his milestones in language or other markers for a two-year-old child. Of note, S.T. was three years old at the time.

[8] The Society continued to work with B.W. and A.B., throughout the winter and spring of 2021, specifically to create a safety plan. In early March 2021, after S.T. and his half-sibling were returned to B.W.’s care, B.W. expressed that she did not agree with the safety plan. On March 5, 2021, the Society relied on a warrant to remove S.T. from B.W.’s care.

[9] S.T. was initially placed with his maternal grandmother. On May 12, 2021, a temporary supervision order was made, placing S.T. with M.T. in Hamilton, Ontario. S.T. has resided with M.T. and paternal kin since that date.

[10] Pursuant to a final order made on April 27, 2022, S.T. was found to be a child in need of protection. The issues identified were physical and emotional harm—specifically, a concern that emotional harm was causing S.T. to experience delayed development. S.T. was placed in the care and custody of M.T. for six months subject to a supervision on terms and conditions.

[11] On October 11, 2022, the Society commenced the status review application now before the court. The first return date for the application was October 19, 2022.

[12] Before reviewing what has transpired since October 2022, I pause to note that, in May 2022, B.W. and A.B. had a second child. The Society became involved with B.W. and A.B. regarding their two children.

b) April 2022 to the Present (for S.T., M.T., and B.W.)

[13] As of the spring of 2022, S.T. was residing with M.T. in Hamilton, Ontario; B.W. continued to reside in the counties of Leeds, Lanark and Grenville.

[14] In July 2022, B.W. and M.T. attended mediation, following which an agreement was reached regarding B.W.’s parenting time. The parents agreed that M.T. would encourage S.T. to have virtual visits with B.W. on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday and, if agreed in advance, on the weekend.

[15] B.W. also had in-person, extended parenting time with S.T. on the following dates in 2022, 2023, and 2024:

• August 13 to 15, 2022;
• December 27, 2022 to January 3, 2023;
• March 11 to 20, 2023;
• December 22, 2023 to January 5, 2024; and
• July 7 to 17, 2024.

[16] The March 2023 parenting time did not occur without incident. B.W. was to travel by train with S.T. on March 18, 2023, to return him to M.T. B.W. refused to take S.T. on the train. B.W. also refused to permit a volunteer driver, organised by the Society, to drive S.T. to Hamilton. Ultimately, on March 20, 2023, M.T. drove with his mother, from Hamilton to Brockville, and returned to Hamilton with S.T.

[17] The evidence of the Child Protection Worker, Rebecca Helmer, is that during the parenting time from late December 2023 to early January 2024, B.W. struggled to care for S.T. and his two younger half-siblings.

[18] B.W.’s most recent in-person parenting time with S.T. was during the summer of 2024. Pursuant to a consent order made by Williams J. in June 2024, B.W. was to have parenting time with S.T. from July 7, 2024, to August 4, 2024. B.W. was unable to keep S.T. with her for the entire period.

[19] Between July 7 and 16, 2024, B.W. (a) had to leave her apartment because of mould issues; (b) moved with S.T. and his two half-siblings to Interval House; (c) was required to leave Interval House because the operator had concerns about B.W. and her children remaining at that location; and (d) moved, with the three children, to her mother’s home. By July 16, 2024, the maternal grandmother informed B.W. that S.T. could not remain in the former’s home. The maternal grandmother reported concerns about S.T. having conflict with a “brother” (it is unclear from the description of the conflict, whether that term is intended to mean S.T.’s maternal uncle or one of S.T.’s half-siblings).

[20] Ms. Helmer’s evidence is that B.W. was reluctant to have her summer vacation parenting time with S.T. end after the first of the four consecutive weeks agreed upon. However, S.T. was missing his father; both B.W. and her mother were having difficulty managing S.T.; and B.W.’s support network was not assisting. In the end, on July 17, 2024, M.T. travelled to Brockville and picked S.T. up.

[21] Throughout July and August 2024, both the Society and M.T. communicated with B.W. regarding her virtual visits with S.T. That communication was challenging for both the Society and M.T. because of either B.W.’s aggressive tone or B.W.’s failure to be available at the agreed upon time for the visits.

[22] Since August 2024, the Society has continued its involvement with B.W. related to concerns about S.T.’s two younger half-siblings. Throughout that involvement, B.W. continued to have unstable housing—moving from Interval House in Kingston to Red Cedar Shelter in Shannonville, Ontario.

[23] More recently, B.W. reported that, in the fall of 2024, she married an American citizen; she would be moving to and remain in Buffalo, N.Y. (where her husband resides); and she is pregnant. The couple’s child is due in the spring of 2025. By early 2025, B.W. had moved to Buffalo with S.T.’s two half-siblings. B.W.’s husband is not the father of the half-siblings.

[24] By late January 2025, a child protection agency in the Buffalo area had become involved with B.W. and the two children living with her and her husband. B.W.’s mother-in-law is said to have reported child protection concerns to that agency.

[25] The Society is one of two child protection agencies to be involved with S.T. In September 2022, following S.T.’s move to Hamilton, the Hamilton Child and Family Services (“HCFS”) began to work with S.T., M.T., and the paternal grandparents. At the Society’s request, HCFS assisted by supervising and monitoring S.T.’s placement with M.T.

[26] Rose Acheampong, a Child Protection Worker with HCFS, provided evidence regarding S.T.’s life with his father and paternal grandparents in Hamilton. Since September 2022, Ms. Acheampong has had regular monthly contact with S.T., M.T., and members of the paternal extended family.

[27] Ms. Acheampong describes S.T. as having settled well in the home that he shares with his father and paternal grandparents. Ms. Acheampong’s evidence is that M.T. is attentive to and plans for S.T.’s needs. The paternal grandparents are said to be very supportive of both S.T. and M.T. The paternal grandmother and S.T. are particularly close.

[28] In summary, the HCFS supports the relief sought by the Society on this motion.

[29] Before dealing with the substance of the application, it is important to consider the principles applicable generally to motions for summary judgment under the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99 (“FLR”). It is also important to consider the principles applicable specifically to motions for summary judgment under the Act.

Summary Judgment

a) General Principles

[30] It is well-established that a summary judgment motion may be brought in a proceeding under the Act. The governing two-part test was articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87. First, the judge must determine, based only on the evidence in the record, if there is a genuine issue requiring a trial. Resort to additional fact-finding powers is not permitted at this first stage. If there is no genuine issue requiring a trial, then the matter may be summarily determined.

[31] If there appears to be a genuine issue requiring a trial, then the second step requires the judge to look beyond the evidence in the record. At this stage, the judge determines whether the need for a trial can be avoided by utilizing the additional fact-finding powers available to the judge under the relevant procedural rules. If it can, then it may, at the discretion of the judge, be summarily determined. If not, then summary judgment is not granted (Hryniak, at para. 67).

[32] Rule 16 of the FLR governs motions for summary judgment in family law proceedings. The additional fact-finding powers discussed in Hryniak are found in r. 16(6.1). Those powers permit the judge hearing a motion for summary judgment to weigh evidence, evaluate the credibility of a deponent, and draw any reasonable inference from the evidence, unless it is in the interests of justice that such powers be exercised only at trial.

[33] Pursuant to r. 16(4), the burden of proof rests with the moving party to set out “specific facts showing there is no genuine issue requiring a trial.” A party responding to a motion for summary judgment is not entitled to “rest on mere allegations or denials” (r. 16(4.1)). A responding party is required, through affidavit or other evidence, to set out specific facts that demonstrate there is a genuine issue requiring a trial. In summary, each party on a motion for summary judgment is required to put their best foot forward.

b) Child Protection Matters

[34] In Kawartha-Haliburton Children’s Aid Society v. M.W., the Court of Appeal for Ontario sets out “the proper approach to summary judgment in child protection matters” (2019 ONCA 316, 432 D.L.R. (4th) 40 at para 1). The Court of Appeal identifies a number of principles to be applied on motions for summary judgment in child protection cases. Those principles are summarized at para. 80 of the decision:

1. Hryniak’s fairness principles for summary judgment must be applied recognizing the distinctive features of a child protection proceeding. In determining whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial the court must exercise caution and apply the objectives of the Act including the best interests of the child.
2. The burden of proof is on the party moving for summary judgment. Although r. 16(4.1) sets out the obligation of the respondent to the motion to provide “in an affidavit or other evidence, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” this does not shift the ultimate burden of proof. Even if the respondent’s evidence does not establish a genuine issue for trial, the court must still be satisfied on the evidence before it that the moving party has established that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial.
3. The court must conduct a careful screening of the evidence to eliminate inadmissible evidence. The court should not give weight to evidence on a summary judgment motion that would be inadmissible at trial.
4. Judicial assistance must be provided for self-represented litigants. In particular, judges must engage in managing the matter and must provide assistance in accordance with the principles set out in the Statement of Principles on Self-represented Litigants and Accused Persons (2006) (online) established by the Canadian Judicial Council.
5. The special considerations that apply to Indigenous children must be part of every decision involving Indigenous children.

[35] In Kawartha-Haliburton, the Court of Appeal directs that judges on motions for summary judgment in child protection proceedings undertake a best interests analysis (paras. 31 and 49). Above all, a cautious approach should be taken on motions for summary judgment in child proceedings (paras. 63 and 70-79). The Court of Appeal describes the requisite approach as “highly cautionary” (para. 74).

[36] I turn next to the principles to be applied in determining a status review application.

Status Review Application

[37] This status review application is not a re-hearing of the original protection application, determined in the spring of 2022. The task for the court on this application is to assess what, if anything, has changed since the April 2022 order, finding S.T. in need of protection, was made: C.A.S. v. M.W. and M.S., 2020 ONSC 1847, at para. 51. On a status review application, the court has the authority to make an order, pursuant to s. 102 of the Act to grant “custody of the child to one or more persons, other than a foster parent of the child, with the consent of the person”: C.A.S. v. M.W. and M.S., at para. 73.

[38] The purpose of the Act is reflected in s. 102(1): “The child’s best interests” are the determinative factors. Section 73(4) of the Act sets out a non-exhaustive list of the factors to be listed in s. 74(3). The factors relevant to the motion before this court are identified and discussed below.

[39] As set out in para. 83 of the decision in Catholic Children’s Aid Society v. S. (B.L.), 2014 ONSC 5513, on a status review application the following factors are considered:

a) The original order is presumed to be correct. The status review application is not a re-hearing of the order previously made;
b) Does the child continue to be in need of protection and, if so, is a court order required for the child’s protection?
c) To what degree do the risk concerns that formed the basis for the original order still exist? The existence or absence of those concerns may trigger need for continued protection. Circumstances that have arisen since the date on which the original order made may also contribute to the need for continued protection;
d) What order is in the best interests of the child?
e) The analysis must be carried out from the child’s perspective.

[40] I shall first address whether the Issue Nos. 2, 3, and 4 listed in paragraph 5, above, can be determined on this summary proceeding.

Issue No. 1 – The Application can be Determined Summarily

[41] The evidence before the court consists of an affidavit from each of the two afore-mentioned Child Protection Workers, Ms. Helmer and Ms. Acheampong. As is required for an order to be made pursuant to s. 102(1) of the Act, the person to whom it is requested that custody be granted (i.e., M.T.) consents to such an order being made.

[42] B.W. is represented in the proceeding. Her counsel was unable to secure instructions sufficient to permit him to inform the court of B.W.’s position on the motion. No responding materials were filed by B.W. or on her behalf. B.W. did not personally attend on the return of the motion.

[43] The affidavits from each of Ms. Helmer and Ms. Acheampong are detailed. The affidavits set out specific facts related to the Society’s and HCFS’s respective involvement with S.T., M.T., B.W., and S.T.’s half-siblings. I am satisfied that there are no genuine issues requiring a trial with respect to the existence of protection concerns, custody, decision-making responsibility, and access/parenting time. I am able to summarily determine Issue Nos. 2, 3, and 4, without resort to the additional fact-finding powers found in s. 16(6.1) of the FLR.

Issue No. 2 – Does S.T. Continue to be in Need of Protection?

[44] In April 2022, Johnston J. made a final order that S.T. was in need of protection because he was, when in his mother’s care, at risk of physical and emotional harm. The Society’s position on this motion is that protection concerns do not exist related to M.T.; that S.T. is in the care of his father; and that, while in his father’s care, S.T.’s physical, mental, and emotional needs are met. For the following reasons, I agree with the Society and find that there are no protection concerns related to M.T.

[45] In her affidavit, Ms. Acheampong expresses a belief that S.T. “has settled in well” with M.T. and the paternal grandparents. That belief is based on Ms. Acheampong’s observations and on information Ms. Acheampong received from M.T. and the paternal grandparents.

[46] Based on the affidavit evidence before the court, I make the following findings:

• S.T. has been diagnosed with ADHD and global development delay.
• M.T. has taken the steps necessary to ensure that S.T. has access to the medical, dental, and therapeutic services he requires (s. 74(3)(c)(i) of the Act).
• M.T., his parents, and his brother (who also resides with the family) are committed to S.T. following a planned routine which supports his learning, development, and understanding (ss. 74(3)(c)(ii), (iii), and (ix)).
• The paternal grandparents have modified and intend to further modify their home to provide a sleep area and a bedroom for S.T. and M.T., respectively.
• S.T. benefits from the traditional cultural (Portuguese) values followed by M.T. and his family, including seasonal celebrations (s. 74(3)(c)(iii), and (ix)).
• S.T. has a strong bond with M.T.’s family and specifically with his paternal grandmother (ss. 74(3)(c)(v) and (vi)).

[47] It is significant that M.T. and his family members both recognise and understand that S.T. is a child with special needs. During the almost four years that S.T. has been living in Hamilton, M.T. and the paternal grandparents have responded in a timely and appropriate manner to S.T.’s needs. M.T. and his mother ensure that S.T. receives services when he requires them (ss. 73(c)(i) and (ii)).

[48] A result of the quality of the care and home environment provided to/for S.T. by M.T. and his family is that S.T.’s behaviours and language outcomes have significantly improved. Such outcomes represent a significant turnaround for S.T., who was non-verbal when, at age four, he was placed with M.T. and his family.

[49] M.T. is sensitive to S.T.’s needs. M.T. approaches his relationship with his romantic partner responsibly, pursuing all aspects of that relationship outside the family home.

[50] In summary, there are no protection concerns for S.T. when he is in M.T.’s care. I find that there continue to be protection concerns for S.T. when he is in B.W.’s care. I base my finding in that regard on B.W.’s conduct described in the Background section of these reasons and for the reasons given below related to B.W.’s access/parenting time with S.T. I next determine Issue No. 3 and whether it is in S.T.’s best interests that M.T. is granted custody of and sole decision-making responsibility for S.T.

[51] The references, in paragraphs 46 and 47, above, to subsections of s. 74(3)(c) of the Act, are included to identify best interest factors to which the findings relate for the purpose of Issue Nos. 2, 3, and 4.

Issue No. 3 – Custody and Decision-Making

[52] Based on the evidence summarized in paragraphs 45-49, above, I find that it is in S.T.’s best interests that the relief requested regarding custody and decision-making is granted.

Issue No. 4 – Access/Parenting Time

[53] Based on Ms. Helmer’s affidavit evidence, I find that B.W. has not demonstrated that she is capable of either (a) completing in-person visits with S.T. in her home pursuant to an agreed-upon schedule, or (b) arranging and attending virtual visits with S.T. on a weekly basis.

[54] On at least two occasions on which B.W. was to have in-person parenting time with S.T. for a period of several weeks, B.W. was unable to manage caring for S.T. On those two occasions, S.T. was returned to M.T.’s care, with M.T. required to pick S.T. up from the Brockville area and drive S.T. back to Hamilton. B.W. has not demonstrated that she is reliable regarding the weekly virtual visits she was granted with S.T.

[55] I also consider that the Society had concerns about the well-being of S.T.’s half-siblings when in their mother’s care in the Brockville area; child protection concerns for the half-siblings have been raised in the Buffalo, N.Y. area, where B.W. and those two children are said to now reside; and B.W. is pregnant, with another child due in the spring of 2025.

[56] Despite her shortcomings, historically, regarding both in-person and virtual visits, B.W. is adamant that S.T. be brought to Buffalo, by M.T., for in-person visits in the home B.W. shares with her husband and S.T.’s two half-siblings (with a third half-sibling expected in the spring of 2025).

[57] The evidence before this court is that B.W.’s telephone access with S.T. continues “pretty regularly”. B.W. has, however, to date refused to use a parenting application for communication with M.T. regarding S.T. and to schedule parenting time.

[58] I accept Ms. Acheampong’s evidence that S.T.’s expressed preference is for weekly virtual visits with B.W. S.T. is specific in his stated preference that visits with his mother do not occur in her home. S.T. appears to harbour concerns that, if he visits B.W. in her home, he might not return to Hamilton and the home he shares with M.T. and his extended family.

[59] Given the care, attention, and support that S.T. receives from M.T. and his Hamilton family, it is not surprising that S.T. would prefer to avoid chaotic and dysfunctional events, such as those that occurred during previous in-person visits with B.W.

[60] With B.W. having disengaged from the existing plan for virtual visits and from the proceeding more broadly, any access plan which provides for more than weekly virtual visits would contribute to uncertainty and instability in S.T.’s life.

[61] For those reasons, I find that it is in S.T.’s best interests that the relief requested regarding access/parenting time be granted.

Disposition

[62] For the reasons set out in the preceding sections of this ruling, I find that S.T. is not in need of protection regarding M.T. and continues to be in need of protection regarding B.W. I make the following order:

1. Custody of the child, S.T. (born August 2017), is granted to M.T., who shall have sole decision-making responsibility.
2. M.T. shall, through email or an online platform, communicate monthly updates, regarding the child, to B.W., by the 30th day of each month, including as to S.T.’s general health, welfare, and education. M.T. shall inform B.W. within 48 hours of S.T. receiving urgent medical care or treatment.
3. M.T. and B.W. shall communicate about the child and plan access using a parenting application.
4. Virtual visits and telephone calls shall occur a minimum of once per week at an agreed time between the parties, with consideration of S.T.’s routine and school schedule.
5. In-person access between B.W. and S.T. shall occur in the child’s home community in a safe, secure setting, as arranged and agreed between B.W. and M.T.
6. This order shall, in its entirety, be deemed to be a parenting order under s. 28 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12.

[63] The court commends M.T. and his extended family for their commitment to S.T. and for the steps they are taking to foster his development. The court’s wish for S.T. is that he continues to flourish in the care of M.T. and his extended family. The court encourages B.W. to take the steps necessary to develop and maintain a meaningful relationship with S.T.

________________________________________
Madam Justice Sylvia Corthorn

Released: April 17, 2025

Appendix

Paragraph [2] previously stated:

[2] The Society requests an order pursuant to s. 102 of the Child Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sched 1 (“the Act”). Specifically, the Society asks the court to (a) find that S.T. is no longer in need of protection; (b) grant M.T. custody of S.T.; (c) grant M.T. sole decision-making responsibility for S.T.; and (d) order that B.W. shall have parenting time with S.T., by virtual visits or telephone call, at least once a month.

Paragraph [2] now reads:

[2] The Society requests an order pursuant to s. 102 of the Child Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sched 1 (“the Act”). Specifically, the Society asks the court to (a) find that S.T. is not in need of protection related to M.T.; (b) grant M.T. custody of S.T.; (c) grant M.T. sole decision-making responsibility for S.T.; and (d) order that B.W. shall have parenting time with S.T., by virtual visits or telephone call, at least once a month.

Issue No. 2 and Paragraph [44] previously stated:

Issue No. 2 - S.T. is no Longer in Need of Protection?

[44] In April 2022, Johnston J. made a final order that S.T. was in need of protection because he was, when in his mother’s care, at risk of physical and emotional harm. The Society’s position on this motion is that protection concerns no longer exist; that S.T. is in the care of his father; and that, while in his father’s care, S.T.’s physical, mental, and emotional needs are met. For the following reasons, I agree with the Society and find that S.T. is no longer in need of protection.

Issue No. 2 and Paragraph [44] now reads:

Issue No. 2 - Does S.T. continue to be in need of protection?

[44] In April 2022, Johnston J. made a final order that S.T. was in need of protection because he was, when in his mother’s care, at risk of physical and emotional harm. The Society’s position on this motion is that protection concerns do not exist related to M.T.; that S.T. is in the care of his father; and that, while in his father’s care, S.T.’s physical, mental, and emotional needs are met. For the following reasons, I agree with the Society and find that there are no protection concerns related to M.T.

Paragraph [50] previously stated:

[50] In summary, there are no protection concerns for S.T. when he is in M.T.’s care. I next determine Issue No. 2 and whether it is in S.T.’s best interests that M.T. is granted custody of and sole decision-making responsibility for S.T.

Paragraph [50] now reads:

[50] In summary, there are no protection concerns for S.T. when he is in M.T.’s care. I find that there continue to be protection concerns for S.T. when he is in B.W.’s care. I base my finding in that regard on B.W.’s conduct described in the Background section of these reasons and for the reasons given below related to B.W.’s access/parenting time with S.T. I next determine Issue No. 3 and whether it is in S.T.’s best interests that M.T. is granted custody of and sole decision-making responsibility for S.T.

Paragraph [62] previously stated:

[62] For the reasons set out in the preceding sections of this ruling, I find that S.T. is not in need of protection and make the following order:

Paragraph [62] now reads:

[62] For the reasons set out in the preceding sections of this ruling, I find that S.T. is not in need of protection regarding M.T. and continues to be in need of protection regarding B.W. I make the following order:

Court File No.: FC-21-0062
Date: 2025/04/17
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
In the matter of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sched. 1
And in the matter of S.T. (D.O.B. August 2017)
BETWEEN:
Family and Children’s Services of Lanark, Leeds and Grenville, Applicant
– and –
B.W. and M.T., Respondents

Amended Reasons for Decision (Motion for Summary Judgment)
Madam Justice Sylvia Corthorn

Released: April 17, 2025