Reasons for Judgment
Court File No.: CR-20-10-2020-0000
Date: March 3, 2025
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Between:
His Majesty the King
and
Rebecca Horton
Appearances:
Monica Gharabaway, for the Crown
Tania Bariteau and Malaika Henriques, for the accused, Rebecca Horton
Heard: September 25-28, October 3-4, 10-11, 16-20, 23-27, 2023, and December 9-13, 18-19, 2024
Subject to any further Order of a court of competent jurisdiction, an Order has been made in this proceeding, pursuant to s. 486.4 of the Criminal Code, directing that the identity of the complainants and any information that could disclose such identity shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.
I. Introduction and Overview
1The accused, Rebecca Horton, is currently indicted on various charges connected to the alleged “human trafficking” of two female complainants (R.W. and M.D.).
[2] More particularly, the accused is charged with the following eleven offences, namely:
(1) exercising control over R.W., for the purpose of exploiting her, contrary to s. 279.01(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46;
(2) exercising control over R.W., for the purpose of facilitating the commission of an offence under s. 286.1(1), contrary to s. 286.3(1) of the Criminal Code;
(3) receiving a financial benefit knowing that it was obtained by the commission of an offence under s. 279.01(1), contrary to s. 279.02(1) of the Criminal Code;
(4) receiving a financial benefit from the sexual services of R.W., knowing that it was obtained by the commission of an offence under s. 286.1(1), contrary to s. 286.2(1) of the Criminal Code;
(5) assaulting R.W., contrary to s. 266 of the Criminal Code;
(6) exercising control over M.D., a person under the age of 18 years, for the purpose of exploiting her, contrary to s. 279.011(1) of the Criminal Code;
(7) procuring M.D., a person under the age of 18 years, for the purpose of facilitating an offence under s. 286.1(2) of the Criminal Code, contrary to s. 286.3(2) of the Criminal Code;
(8) exercising control over M.D., a person under the age of 18 years, for the purpose of facilitating an offence under s. 286.1(2) of the Criminal Code, contrary to s. 286.3(2) of the Criminal Code;
(9) receiving a financial benefit from the sexual services of M.D., knowing that it was obtained by the commission of an offence under s. 286.1(2), contrary to s. 286.2(2) of the Criminal Code;
(10) receiving a financial benefit knowing that it was obtained by the commission of an offence under s. 279.011(1), contrary to s. 279.02(2) of the Criminal Code; and
(11) sexually assaulting M.D., contrary to s. 271 of the Criminal Code.
All of these offences are alleged to have been committed by the accused in Toronto and elsewhere in Ontario between the dates of March 1 and April 21, 2018.
3The trial of this matter started on September 11, 2023, with some pre-trial motions, and two other accused persons, namely, her then boyfriend, Daylo Robinson (also known as “Preem”) and his best friend, Tyler Vickers. The trial of this matter, on a 17-count indictment, was then scheduled to last for approximately two months, beginning with one or two weeks of motions, followed by a jury trial lasting approximately a further four or five weeks. The jury trial started on September 25, 2023, but the jury did not reach its verdict (in relation to the charges against the other two accused) until November 29, 2023. Accordingly, the jury trial itself lasted for more than two months.
4On October 27, 2023, more than a month into the jury trial, Ms. Horton re-elected trial by judge alone (before me), and she was severed from the other two accused, with the evidence heard up to that point continuing to apply, to her judge-alone trial, that was eventually scheduled to resume on December 9, 2024. This severance/adjournment took place when one of her lawyers, for personal reasons, could understandably no longer continue with the joint jury trial. As part of this aspect of the proceedings, Ms. Horton also expressly waived her right to be tried within a reasonable time, pursuant to s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
5The judge-alone proceedings before me in relation to the charges against Ms. Horton have now been completed. After the Crown’s case was completed, Ms. Horton testified, at some length, in her own defence. After hearing the closing submissions of counsel, today was scheduled for judgment.
II. The General Positions of the Parties
6The Crown’s theory of the case is, essentially, that Mr. Robinson, Ms. Horton and Mr. Vickers decided to begin working in the sex trade in Toronto. Originally, all three individuals came from the east coast of Canada. Ms. Horton had earlier worked in the sex trade on her own in this east coast geographical area. However, the Crown’s theory was that Ms. Horton decided to work with her then boyfriend, and his friend, in the sex industry in Toronto. According to the Crown, R.W. and M.D. were procured into this sex trade business, where they effectively worked for the three accused persons. M.D. was clearly less than 18 years of age at the time. Mr. Robinson was the organizational head of this small sex industry business, helping to recruit young women to work in the sex trade for them, creating the general “price list” for their sexual services (individually or in “duos”), and ultimately preparing and placing advertisements for the three female sex workers. Mr. Vickers was alleged to be the “muscle” or “enforcer” of the business, to the extent that it was needed. Finally, Ms. Horton was allegedly the “Queen of the Preem Team.” She was allegedly Mr. Robinson’s “main girl” and the female lead of this small stable of female sex workers. She was responsible for grooming the other women, making them comfortable, and showing them “the life” in the sex industry. All three women (including Ms. Horton) performed in the sex trade industry in financial support of all of them. The Crown alleged, more specifically, that Ms. Horton was one of the accused who benefitted financially from the sex work of the two female complainants.
7The defence theory of the case is, essentially, that Ms. Horton was just another one of the “victims” of these “human trafficking” offences by Mr. Robinson and Mr. Vickers, in that she was simply one of the three sex industry workers, who did as she was told by Mr. Robinson. Essentially, according to Ms. Horton, she would usually just go along with whatever Mr. Robinson said, as she was afraid of him, and she did not want to inspire his anger by any type of disagreement or confrontation. Ms. Horton denied that she was in any way involved in the management of this little sex industry business, and she denied the commission of any of the alleged offences. Instead, Ms. Horton suggested that she was just another one of its exploited sex workers. She agreed, however, that throughout the time of the alleged offences, she was romantically involved in a personal relationship with Mr. Robinson.
III. The Presumption of Innocence and the Burden of Proof on the Crown
8The accused is, of course, presumed to be innocent. That presumption of innocence has been with the accused throughout the trial and remains with her unless and until the Crown establishes her guilt for these alleged offences beyond a reasonable doubt. That heavy burden of proof never shifts. The accused has no obligation to establish her innocence. This important and long-standing principle of our criminal law is constitutionally entrenched in s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See: R. v. Dubois, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 350; R. v. Pearson, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 665.
9It is also important to recall the nature of the heavy burden of proof on the Crown. As juries are typically instructed, a reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, far-fetched or frivolous doubt, or a doubt based on sympathy or prejudice. Rather, it is a doubt based on reason and common sense. It is a doubt that logically arises from the evidence, or the lack of evidence. Of course, it is not enough for a trier of fact, whether it be judge or jury, to believe that an accused is probably guilty or likely guilty, as that is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the Crown is not obliged to establish, with absolute certainty, the alleged guilt of an accused, as such a standard of proof is impossibly high. Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court of Canada stated in R. v. Starr, 2000 SCC 40, para 242, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is much closer to proof of absolute certainty than it is to proof of probable guilt. At the end of the case, after considering all of the evidence, a trier of fact must be sure that an accused committed the alleged offence before finding him or her guilty of that offence, because it is only at that point that the trier of fact can be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. See also: R. v. Lifchus, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320, paras 13-43.
10Further, as Ms. Horton testified in this case and denied her alleged guilt, in assessing whether or not the Crown has proven her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in relation to these alleged offences, I must apply the three important principles articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742. In other words: (1) if I believe the testimony of the accused that she did not commit the alleged offences I must find her not guilty; (2) even if I do not believe the testimony of the accused that she did not commit the alleged offences, if her testimony leaves me with a reasonable doubt as to her guilt regarding these offences, I must find her not guilty; and (3) even if the testimony of the accused does not leave me with any reasonable doubt as to her guilt regarding these alleged offences, I may only properly find her guilty if, based on the evidence that I do accept, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of her guilt regarding these offences. The application of these principles ensures that reaching a verdict does not devolve into a mere credibility contest between the Crown’s main witnesses and the accused – and ensures that the presumption of innocence and the Crown’s burden of establishing the alleged guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt properly operate. See also: R. v. Y.(C.L.), 2008 SCC 2, paras 6-8; R. v. Vuradin, 2013 SCC 38, paras 20-28.
11Moreover, in a case such as the present one, where the Crown’s case depends, at least in part, upon circumstantial evidence, the application of this burden of proof requires that the trier of fact must be satisfied that the only reasonable or rational inference that can be drawn from all of the circumstantial evidence is that the accused is guilty. If there are reasonable inferences other than guilt, the Crown’s evidence does not establish the alleged guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. See: R. v. Griffin, 2009 SCC 28, para 33; R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, paras 17-22; R. v. Pearle, 2016 ONCA 954, para 7; R. v. Biggs, 2016 ONCA 910, para 17. Of course, the circumstantial case against the accused must be considered as a whole. It is only the cumulative effect of all of the evidence that must satisfy the Crown’s heavy burden of proof in order to justify conviction. Individual items of circumstantial evidence must not be subjected to isolated scrutiny in a piecemeal analysis, as they are merely links in the chain of ultimate proof. See: R. v. Morin, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 345; R. v. Uhrig, 2012 ONCA 470, para 13; R. v. Smith, 2016 ONCA 25, paras 81-82.
IV. Some Preliminary Matters and Uncontroversial Background Facts
12There were countless text messages between Ms. Horton and Mr. Robinson (and others) on a variety of subjects. Of course, given that the Crown expressly declined any reliance on the co-conspirator’s exception to the rule against hearsay, only the statements (oral or electronic) authored by Ms. Horton are admissible in relation to the case against her. Accordingly, any statements made by Mr. Robinson (or anyone else for that matter) are not admissible for the truth of their contents, but rather are only admissible for the fact that they were made, and to provide the necessary factual context to understand the meaning of the statements made in response directly by Ms. Horton. See: R. v. Carter, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 938; R. v. Evans, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 653; R. v. Foreman, para 37; R. v. Osmar, 2007 ONCA 50, para 53; R. v. Bridgman, 2017 ONCA 940, paras 10-11.
13It remains noteworthy, however, that according to the phone that belonged to Ms. Horton, the messages of Mr. Robinson came from “My Daddy King,” while her own text messages were sent, mostly, by “Preems Bitch.” Further, the romantic nature of their personal relationship was permanently proclaimed by the large heart-shaped tattoo that was placed on the buttocks of Ms. Horton, which covered the entirety of the right cheek of her buttocks, and which constantly proclaimed that she was the “Property of Preem.” A photograph of this tattoo was made an exhibit in these proceedings. Other exhibits that were also filed in this case established that Ms. Horton, with some regularity, voluntarily proclaimed her eternal love for Mr. Robinson, and said that she would do “anything” for Mr. Robinson, to ensure that they have a “good life” together.
14I note in passing, however, that the romantic relationship between Ms. Horton and Mr. Robinson, that spanned the course of all of the alleged offences, is now over.
V. Some of the Text Message Conversations
1. The Plan to Organize Their Sex Trade Business in Toronto
15In a series of text messages from Mr. Robinson on November 7, 2017, he told Ms. Horton that the three of them (i.e. Mr. Robinson, Ms. Horton and Mr. Vickers) had the expenses to “get back out to Toronto,” and that he had a “solid opportunity” to “double [his] income” and to “make their name and team bigger.” Mr. Robinson said that this “opportunity” made it possible for them to “come back” to the east coast “in a month for a visit instead of struggling.” Mr. Robinson suggested that it made sense for them to take this opportunity now, which would “set [them] on a path to live,” and that this was his “shot” to get to where he wanted to be, and to “put” Ms. Horton where she wanted to be. Mr. Robinson said that they had to “take” this opportunity. Mr. Robinson asked his “baby gurl” to text him back to confirm she got his message. Mr. Robinson then said that he had just added up the numbers, and that with all of their “expenses,” they had enough money to get to Toronto, and have a “good drink the first night” and “maybe run a couple of calls” to get to the weekend. Mr. Robinson indicated, in this series of text messages, that he was giving her “enough respect as a main girl” to hear [his] plans, and that he wanted to know her “honest opinion” as to what was best for their “growth.”
16Ms. Horton responded, in her own series of text messages, “whatever you say” and she reiterated that she did not have any opinion because “whatever” he said “goes.” Ms. Horton did say that it hurt to leave her daughter, and to just go back to how they were living before, having a “bunch of girls around,” even if Mr. Robinson had “money” this time. Nonetheless, Ms. Horton agreed with the plan proposed by her boyfriend, Mr. Robinson.
2. The Important Role of Ms. Horton as “Queen of the Preem Team”
17After they arrived in Toronto, and set up their business in the sex trade, the role of Ms. Horton became clearer, and it became apparent that she was responsible for grooming the young females who had been procured into their sex trade business. Of course, this conduct by Ms. Horton, who was also engaged personally in providing her own sexual services for money, in this sex trade business, was critical in the exploitation of the other young women – R.W. and M.D.
18Mr. Robinson sent Ms. Horton text messages telling her to make one of the other young women her “bitch” and her “wifey.” He told Ms. Horton to tell the other woman that they were going to get their hair and nails done together. Mr. Robinson also encouraged Ms. Horton to be “more interactive” with the other women. Ms. Horton responded positively to these suggestions, indicating among other things, “OK daddy I will.” Ms. Horton said that she was already being “interactive” and advised Mr. Robinson that she had invited one of the young women into “the bathroom with [her] to shower,” where they “talked about going to get piercings and stuff.” Ms. Horton also provided advice about what to do if the young women were ever approached by the “cops” to talk about what was going on.
19Ms. Horton spent considerable time in the company of the other women when they were not on “calls,” providing their sexual services to others for money. Mr. Robinson told Ms. Horton repeatedly that she was “in charge” of the other women, and Ms. Horton acknowledged her understanding of this role in the organization.
20In his text messages to Ms. Horton, Mr. Robinson called her the “cute” and “pretty” “Queen of the Preem team” and his “main girl.” In response, Ms. Horton replied affirmatively and said “Thank you” to Mr. Robinson.
VI. The Offences Relating to R.W.
1. Introduction
21Ms. Horton is charged with having committed five offences in relation to the complainant, R.W. More specifically, the accused is charged with: (1) exercising control over R.W., for the purpose of exploiting her, contrary to s. 279.01(1) of the Criminal Code; (2) exercising control over R.W., for the purpose of facilitating an offence under s. 286.1(1), contrary to s. 286.3(1) of the Code; (3) receiving a financial benefit knowing that it was obtained by an offence under s. 279.01(1), contrary to s. 279.02(1) of the Criminal Code; (4) receiving a financial benefit from the sexual services of R.W., knowing it was obtained by an offence under s. 286.1(1), contrary to s. 286.2(1) of the Code; and (5) assaulting R.W., contrary to s. 266 of the Code.
22Following her extensive, periodic testimony, by zoom, at the preliminary hearing in this case, R.W. fled to the United States and steadfastly refused to return to Canada. R.W. similarly refused to provide any further testimony in this case, either in person or virtually. However, her lengthy April 23, 2018 video-recorded interview statement to the police was ultimately admitted in this case for the truth of its contents, with the parties being permitted to file any excerpts they wished from her preliminary inquiry testimony, to be taken into account in assessing her reliability and/or credibility as a witness. See: R. v. Robinson, 2022 ONSC 6667; R. v. Robinson, 2023 ONSC 5257. Substantial portions of her preliminary inquiry testimony were, in fact, tendered into evidence in this case, in furtherance of this aspect of the ruling substantively admitting her police interview statement.
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Released: March 3, 2025
K.L. Campbell
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