Dodla v. Dodla, 2025 ONSC 1234

Dodla v. Dodla, 2025 ONSC 1234

COURT FILE NO. CV-15-541379

DATE: 2025-06-02

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

JOHN-FINNEY EDWIN DODLA

Plaintiff

– and –

ROHANNA DODLA and SRINIVAS BONDAKADI

Defendants

Jordan N. Potasky,

Kenneth Wise, Lawyer for the Plainiff,

HEARD: February 20 and 21, Lawyer for the Plaintiff.

REASONS FOR DECISION

G. DOW, J.

1The plaintiff sought to enforce Minutes of Settlement executed by the parties and their (then) counsel on February 18, 2022. The defendants (sister and brother-in-law to the plaintiff) oppose this request and request the original action be permitted to proceed to trial.

2This matter proceeded as a two-day motion with some oral testimony/cross-examination on affidavits following the in writing decision of Justice Ramsay October 12, 2022 (2022 ONSC 5648) declining to award the plaintiff judgment based on the material before her.

3The plaintiff and the lawyer for the defendants at the time of the purported settlement gave evidence for the plaintiff. Both defendants gave evidence in addition to being cross-examined on their affidavit evidence. There were four exhibits marked and uploaded to Case Center.

BACKGROUND

4From the Amended Statement of Claim, June 4, 2015, the plaintiff (a university professor and residing in Brisbane, Australia) sought declaratory relief and damages arising from his alleged financial contributions to the purchase and maintenance expenses of two Toronto residential condominiums known as 130 Neptune and 150 Neptune Drive purchased in 2005 and 2006.

5Paragraph one of the Amended Statement of Claim makes it clear the legal doctrine of constructive and/or resulting trust were to be used to find that the plaintiff was the beneficial owner of both properties and that title should vest in him. This action, if it did not already exist, created an irreparable rift and dysfunction between the members of this family.

6The undisputed evidence was 130 Neptune was the smaller, less valuable unit (paragraph 7 of Rohanna Dodla’s affidavit sworn June 9, 2022). The plaintiff had two siblings other than the defendant, Rohanna and they along with the parents were, at relevant portions of time, residing in the units.

7After seven years of litigation, this matter was scheduled to proceed to trial on February 22, 2022. The litigation included the discoveries, productions, a security for costs order by (then) Master Abrams July 13, 2016 and an initial pre-trial conference. That pre-trial proceeded on December 2, 2021 at which time Rohanna Dodla deposed “We did not settle the lawsuit” (paragraph 12 of her affidavit).

8A second pre-trial conference was held February 18, 2022, that is, on the Friday before the week in which the trial was to commence.

9The lawyer for the defendants at that time, Mr. E. Battiston gave evidence under summons for the plaintiff. This was done without objection as to what occurred at the pre-trial conference.

10Mr. Battiston requested that he be permitted to refresh his memory by referring to notes he had made in preparation for and at the pre-trial conference. After confirming that he had an independent recollection of the events at the pre-trial conference, that his notes were made contemporaneous to the events and that they have not been altered, and without objection from counsel for the defendants (who was given an opportunity to review these not previously seen notes), I permitted him to do so. The notes were marked as Exhibit 4. Where his evidence differed from that of the defendants, I prefer and accept his evidence based on it being more reliable.

11That is, during the hours utilized to conduct the pretrial conference by Zoom, it began at 11:00 am and it continued for some hours. The defendants had available Mr. Battiston to give them advice and to provide him with instructions. The defendants also had the opportunity to review, discuss and make settlement proposals. As an example of my inability to rely on the evidence of Rohanna Dodla, she deposed that the February 18, 2022 pre-trial conference was to “see if a settlement could be reached” (at paragraph 15 of her affidavit). Her oral evidence was being unaware of this component of that pre-trial conference.

12Proposals were exchanged which resulted in an agreement to remove the uncertainty and expense of proceeding to trial. This occurred by making a compromise. The essential terms of the agreement was that the plaintiff would acquire 130 Neptune. This was to be accomplished by way of transfer of the title from the defendants to the plaintiff. Given the allegations in the action, it was to be done by transfer of title from the defendants, as trustees, to the plaintiff, as a beneficial owner.

13Mr. Battiston was clear and I accept his evidence this method was to minimize tax consequences given this was not a principal residence and this method of transfer was made known to the defendants without their objecting to same.

14Mr. Battiston drafted the Minutes of Settlement which he emailed to the defendants at 4:37 pm (part of Exhibit 2, Case Center, page B-1243). The cover email included the sentence “Call me if you have any questions”.

15The defendants and specifically Rohanna Dodla deposed feeling “rushed” and that she and her spouse were “extremely distressed, and emotions were running high” (paragraphs 16 and 17 of her affidavit). Further, she disposed “Srini and I eventually agreed to give 130 Neptune to John-Finney. We did this only to put an end to the lawsuit and despite our strong belief that John-Finney had no valid claim to either 130 Neptune or 150 Neptune. We just wanted our family back together and for this lawsuit to stop tearing us apart” (at paragraph 18 of her affidavit).

16The evidence of the defendant’s spouse, Mr. Bondakadi essentially attempted to agree with and replicate that given by Rohanna Dodla. Both witnesses went on lengthy, unprompted statements of their dislike of the plaintiff. Their belief was that he was lying, bullying and being unfair to them. At its core, I got the sense that their refusal to complete the settlement they agreed to on February 18, 2022 was based on some point of principle as to perceived ownership of the condominium units and family dynamics.

17This was not substantiated by any independent evidence. Rohanna Dodla was taken through various statements in her affidavit which conflicted with the evidence of Mr. Battiston about:

a) the exposure to pay the plaintiff legal costs if unsuccessful (at paragraph 16 of her affidavit);

b) the lack of any discussions as to how the transfer of 130 Neptune would proceed as trustee to beneficial owner (at paragraph 20 of her affidavit);

c) the time and length of the pre-trial conference (at paragraph 21 of her affidavit);

d) the failure by Mr. Battiston to explain what each paragraph of the Minutes of Settlement meant (at paragraph 26 of her affidavit);

e) the terms of the Minutes of Settlement being “in legal language” which were not explained to her (at paragraph 27 of her affidavit); and

f) not understanding what paragraph 2 of the Minutes of Settlement meant (at paragraph 28 of her affidavit).

18As indicated, I reject the defendants’ evidence and prefer the evidence of Mr. Battiston. Not only was he instructed to complete settlement on the terms indicated in the Minutes of Settlement but made himself available to answer any questions as part of signing the Minutes of Settlement.

ANALYSIS

19Counsel were in general agreement, the law requires the review of two issues. The first is whether the evidence supports of finding of a binding settlement. The second is whether or not the Court should exercise its broad discretion to enforce the settlement.

20Regarding the first issue, the elements to review include whether there was a mutual intention to create a binding agreement and whether that agreement had been reached “on all of the essential terms of the settlement” (Olivier v. Sherman et. al., 2007 ONCA 491 at paragraph 41). Where the agreement is in writing, this Court of Appeal decision indicates it is to be “measured by an objective reading of the language chosen by the parties to reflect their agreement” (at paragraph 44). It is not “an inquiry into the actual state of mind of one of the parties” (also at paragraph 44). As a result, the defendants’ evidence of not understanding on what they were agreeing to is undermined and should be given much less, if any, weight.

21This is reinforced by both the existence of legal counsel for the parties and the need for reliance on the finality of settlements (Deschene v. Lalonde, 2020 ONCA 304 at paragraph 27). There was no dispute that Mr. Battiston was counsel for the defendants and that there was no limitation on his authority to act. His evidence, which I accept, was that he proceeded with the instructions of his clients. The documentary evidence supports his being available to answer questions about the terms and wording of the Minutes of Settlement.

22Regarding whether the agreement had been reached on all essential terms, the Minutes of Settlement were clear and comprehensive. They reflect a compromise between what the plaintiff was seeking (ownership of both properties) and what the defendants disputed (ownership of either property). The transfer of the 130 Neptune property was to be done in a manner which maximized its value to the plaintiff (avoiding Land Transfer Tax) and protected the defendants from their exposure to tax liability (capital gains). As a result, I find a binding agreement occurred.

23Regarding the second issue and whether to exercise the Court’s broad discretion not to enforce the agreement, I am guided by decisions that such instances are “rare cases where compelling circumstances establish that the enforcement of the settlement is not in the interests of justice” (Srebot v. Srebot Farms Ltd., 2013 ONCA 84 at paragraph 6).

24The situation at hand is not like the one in Srebot v. Screbot Farms Ltd., supra where the purported agreement reached at a mediation did not include signed Minutes of Settlement and the moving party believed only a tax rectification issue had been resolved.

25The situation at hand is also not like that in Milios v. Zagas, 1998 CanLII 7119 (ON CA), [1998] O.J. No. 812 where the spouse of the plaintiff misunderstood her husband’s position and gave counsel instructions to accept the defendant’s counter offer. Here, the defendants were present, with counsel to assist as well as an experienced judge to whom they could ask questions, or express any confusion, stress or fears they were having. The situation at hand was not, as relied on by the defendants, in 2169289 Ontario Inc. v. Qumback, 2023 ONSC 3672 (at paragraph 51) where the defendant has purchased a newly constructed home with significant deficiencies and where Minutes of Settlement following a second pre-trial conference were not signed. Further negotiations ensued with the plaintiff offering the defendant an ability to make three and seven year claims under a warranty.

26In conclusion, I am not satisfied there are compelling circumstances where enforcement of the settlement is not in the interests of justice. To the contrary, the stress and duress complained of by the defendants, which arises from the uncertainty of the hoped for result and the costs consequences of an adverse result occurs in most, if not all, civil litigation matters. I agree with the statement of this Court in Thompson v. Broeze, 2018 ONSC 4268 that “Parties must be encouraged to approach settlement discussions carefully and to take settlement agreements seriously, knowing that enforcement of such agreements cannot easily be defeated. The motivation for parties to settle would be eroded if litigants could avoid enforcement of a settlement because they failed to exercise due diligence in protecting their own interests, were influenced by incorrect and unverified assumptions, or simply had second thoughts about the desirability of the resolution reached. The principle of finality in settlements is even more important where the terms of settlement are negotiated with the assistance of counsel, since the opposing party may reasonably assume that the compromise was reached with the benefit of appropriate and independent legal advice” (at paragraph 32).

CONCLUSION

27As a result, the plaintiff’s motion is successful. Counsel raised including a vesting order in anticipation of non-cooperation by the defendants. I am not prepared to anticipate that occurring. I would and expect that the defendants have, likely incurred significant additional expense in the face of legal costs yet to be determined. These Reasons make it known to all that whatever important principle regarding to the true ownership of 130 Neptune and 150 Neptune Drive in issue was not determined in this action. Instead, to the credit of the parties and particularly the defendants, a compromise solution was reached. The compromise and settlement was made for certainty and in an attempt to put family conflict behind them. It was made with the advice of legal counsel, written down and signed.

28The plaintiff shall have judgment in accordance with the terms set out in the Minutes of Settlement. If same cannot be agreed to, a case conference before me may be arranged through my assistant at michelle.giordano@ontario.ca.

COSTS

29I required the parties to provide their demand for costs if successful. In this regard, at the conclusion of the motion in accordance with Rule 57.01(6) the plaintiff’s Costs Outline sought full indemnity fees of $36,850.00 plus HST ($4,828.21) and disbursements ($562.50) for a total of $42,240.71.

30The defendants sought partial indemnity fees of $8,250 which attracts HST of $1,072.50 for a total of $9,322.50.

31I urge the parties to agree on costs. If they cannot, the party seeking costs, presumably the plaintiff, shall submit not more than five double spaced typed written pages in a readable font detailing their position on or before July 7, 2025. The defendants shall have until August 6, 2025 to respond, identically limited. I was advised no formal Offers to Settle that would attract the consequences of Rule 49 were made.