Superior Court of Justice – Ontario

Court File No.: CV-18-00604716-0000
Date: 2025-03-06

Re: Abdulkader Haj Younes et al v. Fast to Canada et al

Before: Associate Justice Michael Rappos

Counsel:
Colette Koopman, for the Plaintiffs
Osama Ebid, self-represented Defendant
Aaron Pipersberg, for Mr. Ebid (on a limited scope retainer)
Mark Stewart, for the Defendant Abeer Qita

Heard: 2024-11-18 (via videoconference)

Reasons for Decision

Overview

[1] This lawsuit was commenced in September 2018. The nine individual Plaintiffs, each of whom claim to be refugees from Syria or Iraq, retained the Defendant 7932278 Canada Inc. (o/a Fast to Canada) to assist them in applying for permanent Canadian residency under a private sponsorship program. The Defendant Canada Newcomers & Immigration Association (CNIA) was to be the sponsor for the Plaintiffs under the program. The Defendant Osama Ebid is a director and CEO of Fast to Canada. Abeer Qita was a registered immigration consultant for Fast to Canada and was a director of the company.

[2] Each of the Plaintiffs’ permanent residency applications was unsuccessful. The Plaintiffs seek $85,091 in damages from the Defendants based on a number of causes of action. This amount represents the difference between what the Plaintiffs paid to Fast to Canada and what was refunded to them when the Plaintiffs terminated their retainers and signed releases. The Plaintiffs also seek $400,000 in punitive damages from the Defendants.

[3] Mr. Ebid, Fast to Canada, and Ms. Qita have defended the action and issued counterclaims against the Plaintiffs for $450,000 in damages for defamation. CNIA has been noted in default and did not appear on this motion.

[4] Mr. Ebid and Fast to Canada bring a motion for an order requiring the Plaintiffs to post $45,000 as security for costs in this action. Mr. Ebid argues that such an order is warranted given, among other things, that the Plaintiffs are resident outside of Ontario, and that the action is frivolous and vexatious and the Plaintiffs have insufficient assets in Ontario to pay his costs if he is successful in defending the action.

[5] The Plaintiffs argue that it would be unjust for the Court to order the posting of security for costs as, among other things, Mr. Ebid failed to bring the motion in a timely manner and knew that the Plaintiffs were non-residents since before the start of the action. The Plaintiffs also argue that there is merit to their case, and that it would be contrary to the principles of access to justice to order them to post costs given their individual circumstances as refugees.

[6] For the reasons that follow, the interests of justice require that the Plaintiffs provide security for costs in connection with this litigation. As a result, I am exercising my discretion to grant the motion and direct the Plaintiffs to post $45,000 as security for costs.

Legal Principles for Security for Costs Motions

[7] Subrule 56.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure permits a defendant in an action to bring a motion requesting an order that the plaintiff post security for costs. The Court may make such order as is just, and the subrule identifies six factors for the Court to consider on the motion.

[8] As a result, an order to grant security for costs is a discretionary decision.

[9] Based on the submissions of the parties, the factors at issue are subrules 56.01(1)(a) “the plaintiff is ordinarily resident outside Ontario” and (e) “there is good reason to believe that the action is frivolous and vexatious and that the plaintiff has insufficient assets in Ontario to pay the costs of the defendant.”

[10] The Court is obliged to first consider the specific provisions of subrule 56.01(1) and then effectively take a step back and consider the justness of the order sought in all the circumstances of the case, with the interests of justice at the forefront. [1]

[11] Additional factors are to be considered in determining the justness of a security for costs order, such as the merits of the claim, delay in bringing the motion, the impact of actionable conduct by the defendants on the available assets of the plaintiffs, access to justice concerns and the public importance of the litigation. [2]

[12] Each case must be considered on its own facts. It is neither helpful nor just to compose a static list of factors to be used in all cases in determining the justness of a security for costs order. There is no utility in imposing rigid criteria on top of the criteria already provided for in the Rules. The correct approach is for the Court to consider the justness of the order holistically, examining all the circumstances of the case and guided by the overriding interests of justice to determine whether it is just that the order be made. [3]

[13] Courts must be vigilant to ensure an order that is designed to be protective in nature is not used as a litigation tactic to prevent a case from being heard on its merits, even in circumstances where the other provisions of subrule 56.01(1) have been met. [4]

[14] In terms of the timing of the motion, a defendant should be required to bring a motion as soon as it becomes aware of the grounds for doing so. This is because it allows the plaintiff to make an informed decision about whether to invest time and money in the litigation, knowing that it may have to post such security as a condition of proceeding to trial. [5]

Analysis

Residence of the Plaintiffs and Their Assets

[15] It is not disputed by the Plaintiffs that they do not reside in Ontario. In the statement of claim the Plaintiffs say that they are Syrian and Iraqi refugees currently living in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and UAE. In the examinations for discovery held in May 2023, the Plaintiffs that were examined confirmed that they still live in one of those countries.

[16] Mr. Ebid claims that the Plaintiffs have no assets in Ontario. There is nothing in the record that says otherwise, and the Plaintiffs did not argue that they had assets in Ontario.

[17] The Plaintiffs had the opportunity to show that they have sufficient assets in a reciprocating jurisdiction to satisfy a costs order to respond to this motion and the subrule 56.01(e) factor. [6] They also had the opportunity to lead evidence that they are impecunious and that it would be unjust to make an award for security for costs. [7] The Plaintiffs filed no evidence for this motion regarding their assets.

[18] Mr. Ebid also alleges that the Plaintiffs have stable financial situations and high salaries while residing outside of Canada. The five Plaintiffs that were examined for discovery confirmed they were an accountant, a dentist, an electrical engineer, an English teacher (although unemployed), and a finance manager at a construction company.

[19] As a result, I find that the Plaintiffs neither reside, nor have any assets, in Ontario. I also believe it is reasonable to draw a negative inference in response to the Plaintiffs failing to provide any evidence with respect to their assets, and conclude that the Plaintiffs are not impecunious.

[20] These factors weigh in favour of granting Mr. Ebid’s motion.

Timing of the Motion

[21] A key point of contention between the parties is the timing of this motion. The Plaintiffs argue this issue on two fronts.

[22] Firstly, they argue that Mr. Ebid failed to schedule this motion in accordance with a Court-ordered timetable. And secondly, they argue that the motion has been brought on far too late in the litigation, as: (a) the parties exchanged affidavits of documents by October 2020; (b) Ms. Qita was examined in August 2021, with the remaining parties being examined in May 2023; (c) mediation was held on September 25, 2023; (d) the action was set down for trial on January 30, 2024; (e) requests to admit were exchanged by April 23, 2024; (f) a pre-trial conference is scheduled for July 17, 2025; and (g) the trial is scheduled to start on September 8, 2025.

[23] With respect to the first argument, the Plaintiffs arranged a case conference for March 9, 2023 to discuss setting a timetable for the remaining steps in the action. In anticipation of the case conference, Mr. Ebid filed a brief where he indicated that security for costs should be ordered against the Plaintiffs.

[24] In the Endorsement of Associate Justice McAfee dated March 9, 2023, a consent timetable was ordered, which provided that “motions for security for costs, if any, shall be scheduled or requisitioned on or before August 31, 2023”.

[25] I have reviewed all of the e-mails contained in the motion records concerning the scheduling of the motion. Given that this is a contentious issue for the parties, I have set out the content of the e-mails below.

[26] The parties exchanged e-mails on May 15 and 16, 2023, and counsel to the Plaintiffs confirmed that they would provide available hearing dates for a security for costs motion. They also stated that they would be opposing the motion.

[27] The next e-mail is from Mr. Pipersberg, on behalf of Mr. Ebid, on June 23, 2023 indicating that Mr. Ebid wished to bring the security for costs motion at the same time as a request to amend his pleadings. The next e-mail is dated July 17, 2023, where Mr. Pipersberg set out potential dates for the hearing that he received from the court. Counsel to the Plaintiffs responded on July 25, 2023 with their available dates.

[28] Mr. Pipersberg e-mailed again on August 3, 2023 and noted that, due to the Plaintiffs’ slowness to respond, the previously mentioned dates had been booked up, and proposed new dates in November 2023. Counsel for the Plaintiffs responded with the dates that worked for them on August 4, 2023.

[29] There is nothing in the record that explains why the motion was not booked at this time.

[30] The next correspondence in the record that discusses the security for costs motion was sent on November 10, 2023 by Mr. Ebid, when he referenced the motion. Counsel for the Plaintiffs responded on November 17, 2023 by saying that Mr. Ebid chose not to bring a motion before the deadline set out by Associate Justice McAfee and cannot now bring the motion.

[31] On November 22, 2023, Mr. Ebid indicated the importance of the motion and that it was due to the delayed response by the Plaintiffs that the motion had not been scheduled by that time. Counsel to the Plaintiffs responded on November 23, 2023 that Mr. Ebid must prepare and file the requisite materials for a security for cost motion, which the Plaintiffs would be objecting to and was out of time.

[32] In an e-mail dated December 20, 2023, Mr. Ebid indicated that he was continuing with his request for the security for costs motion.

[33] In an e-mail dated January 30, 2024, counsel to the Plaintiffs noted that they had not received any new dates for the proposed motion, which had been referred to during a call that took place on January 22, 2024.

[34] On February 8, 2024, Mr. Pipersberg confirmed Mr. Ebid’s intention to proceed with the motion, and provided available hearing dates. On that same day counsel to the Plaintiffs confirmed that they were available on the proposed dates, and reiterated their position that the motion was out of time.

[35] In an e-mail dated March 12, 2024, Mr. Ebid stated that “Unfortunately, it seems there was an oversight on the part of my agent, and the dates we previously discussed for booking have passed. I apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused. However, I am eager to proceed with the necessary steps in our case”.

[36] It appears that the hearing date was scheduled on March 18, 2024.

[37] As a result, the Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Ebid failed to schedule the motion in accordance with the Endorsement of Associate Justice McAfee by scheduling the motion almost seven months past the deadline. The Plaintiffs stress the importance of parties in litigation adhering to Court-ordered timetables.

[38] Mr. Ebid’s response is focused on the one-week delay in Plaintiffs’ counsel’s response in July 2023, which he says was the cause of the delay in scheduling the motion.

[39] However, there is nothing in the record that shows why the motion was not scheduled in early August 2023 when the parties exchanged motion dates. There is also no explanation as to why six (6) months passed (August 4 to November 10, 2023, November 23 to December 20, 2023, December 20, 2023 to January 22, 2024, and February 12 to March 8, 2024) without any reference to the motion being made by Mr. Ebid or his lawyer/agent, nor about the many months delay in discussing the motion following the March 9, 2023 case conference (no correspondence between March 9 and May 15, 2023, May 16 to June 23, 2023, and June 23 to July 27, 2023).

[40] As a result, I find that Mr. Ebid failed to bring his motion for security for costs in accordance with the consent timetable set out in Associate Justice McAfee’s Endorsement.

[41] The Plaintiffs ask that the Court take into consideration that subrule 3.04(4)(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provide that if a party fails to comply with a timetable, the Court, may, on any other party’s motion (a) stay the party’s proceeding; (b) dismiss the party’s proceeding or strike out the party’s defence; or (c) make such other order as is just. The Plaintiffs note that failure to comply with deadlines in timetables are done so at the peril of the parties. [8]

[42] The Plaintiffs also argue that Mr. Ebid was aware of the grounds for his motion (that the Plaintiffs were not resident in Ontario and do not have assets here) since 2016 when the Defendants were first in contact with the Plaintiffs. They point to the following exchange of e-mails:

April 11, 2019 – Mr. Ebid: “Are you willing to agree for security of cost from the Plaintiffs for any damages?”
April 12, 2019 – Counsel to the Plaintiffs: “We will not agree to security for costs. If you wish to spend additional resources, you are free to bring a motion for security for costs in the consolidated action”.
December 19, 2019 – Mr. Ebid: “I am in process of bringing a motion for security deposit to be placed in the court for any costs order on our favour as your clients living overseas mostly in Dubai and may be hard to enforce any financial court order on them”.
January 8, 2020 – Counsel to the Plaintiffs: “We would strongly oppose any motion for security for costs that you may bring, and our position is that the circumstances do not warrant such relief. If you have prepared motion materials for this or any other motion please serve them to my attention as soon as possible.”
March 16, 2020 – Then counsel/agent to Mr. Ebid, Mr. Chaudhry: “I also see that your client’s are not based in Canada. Do you have a proposal in regards to security for costs?”.
March 19, 2020 – Counsel to the Plaintiffs: “In terms of security for costs, it is our position that they are not necessary or appropriate in this matter…”
April 22, 2020 – Mr. Chaudhry: “we have a real concern in regards to the security for costs”.
April 28, 2020 – Counsel to the Plaintiffs: “To be clear on our position, we will resist any motion for security for costs”.
March 9, 2021 – Mr. Ebid: “I need under taking for the cost as they all live outside Canada and think that their will be no liability on them raising such a case if they lost it”.
March 12, 2021 – Counsel to the Plaintiffs: “We will not be providing an undertaking as to costs”.
May 3, 2021 – Mr. Ebid: “I will put motion for security of cost and damage related to my counterclaim…”.
May 11, 2021 – Counsel to the Plaintiffs: “you would like our clients to provide you with security for costs in the event they lose at trial, we will not consent to that…To be clear, our position is that there is no basis for security for costs against our clients…”.

[43] Based on the evidence contained in the record, I find that Mr. Ebid was aware that the Plaintiffs did not reside in Ontario or have any assets here prior to the time this lawsuit started in September 2018, and that Mr. Ebid turned his mind to bringing a security for costs motion as early as April 2019 and referred to it many times over the following two-year period.

[44] Mr. Ebid argues that a lawyer advised him not to bring a motion until after discoveries had been completed. During a cross-examination on his affidavit, Mr. Ebid claimed that “there’s no rules about timing” for security for costs motions, and that “I can ask any time when I figure, or I have the time to get this”.

[45] The case law is clear that a motion for security for costs must be brought promptly upon the party discovering that it has a reasonable basis for bringing the motion. [9]

[46] In this case, Mr. Ebid’s motion was not scheduled until almost five (5) years after he first mentioned his intention to bring such a motion, and 6.5 years after the start of the litigation, at which time Mr. Ebid already had the knowledge for the reasons why he is bringing the motion.

[47] A defendant should not be entitled to an order for security for costs where there is evidence that the delay in bringing the motion caused prejudice to the Plaintiff. [10]

[48] There is no direct evidence from any of the Plaintiffs on this motion regarding prejudice they have suffered in connection with the timing of this motion. However, given that in the period from April 2019 to March 2024 the parties completed documentary discovery, examinations for discovery and mediation, I believe there is a reasonable inference to be drawn that the Plaintiffs were prejudiced by the timing this motion was brought by Mr. Ebid, as they may have changed their position in this litigation if security for costs had been sought at an earlier stage.

[49] Additionally, even in the absence of prejudice to the Plaintiffs, Mr. Ebid has failed, in my view, to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay, and that by itself may be fatal to his motion. [11]

[50] As a result, the timing of Mr. Ebid bringing this motion favours dismissing the motion.

Status of Counsel to the Plaintiffs

[51] Mr. Ebid alleges that counsel to the Plaintiffs is providing services to them on a pro bono basis. He believes this supports the need for security for costs to be posted, as without it the Plaintiffs would otherwise suffer no costs in litigating their claim.

[52] The Plaintiffs have filed an affidavit from an assistant that works for their lawyers. The affidavit does not respond to the pro bono allegation.

[53] In their factum, the Plaintiffs argue that there is no evidence of the financial arrangement between the Plaintiffs and their lawyers beyond statements made by Mr. Ebid.

[54] I have reviewed the transcripts from the examinations for discovery conducted by Mr. Ebid of five of the Plaintiffs. I was unable to find any instance where he questioned the Plaintiffs about their counsel providing services on a pro bono basis. As well, Mr. Ebid did not cross-examine the Plaintiffs’ witness on her affidavit filed on this motion.

[55] Mr. Ebid cites Ritter v. Hoag [12], Hallum v. Canadian Memorial Chiropractic College [13], and Canasia Sales Corp. v. Colson [14] in support of his argument that security for costs may be more reasonable if the plaintiff faces no personal cost in litigation, such as those represented on a pro bono basis, and the plaintiffs may be more inclined to pursue weak or vexatious claims.

[56] I have reviewed these decisions and was unable to find any discussion that stands for the point Mr. Ebid says the cases stand for.

[57] As a result, based on the record before me, I am not prepared to find that the Plaintiffs are being represented by counsel on a pro bono basis for the purposes of this motion.

Knowledge of the Plaintiffs

[58] Mr. Ebid argues that the Plaintiffs have not been advised by their counsel that they may be personally liable for costs if they are unsuccessful with their claim, or that there is a counterclaim against them.

[59] Mr. Ebid relies on the following exchange during the examination for discovery of the Plaintiff Ibrahim Yousef Al-Qadi held on May 31, 2023:

Q. Mr. Ibrahim, do you know there is costs related to this case if you lose and have to pay it?
A. No, I swear to God, I don’t know.
Q. Are you available to pay the costs if ordered by the Court?
Ms. Koopman: Mr. Ebid, that’s not a relevant question to the merits of this action.
Mr. Ebid: It’s very relevant. He doesn’t know that there’s costs. How come? You’re a counsel for him, you should advise him. This is misleading for your client. I’m going to ask again and you can refuse.
Q. Are you available to pay the costs if ordered by the Court?
Ms. Koopman: Mr. Ebid, the Plaintiffs will comply with Court Orders.
Mr. Ebid: I need answer from him.
Ms. Koopman: Mr. Ebid, you have our position.
Q. Okay, other question. Do you know that there is counterclaim against you in the same case?
A. No, I’m not aware of that.

[60] The Plaintiffs argue that they are aware of the potential for costs orders to be issued against them, as was reflected by the answers provided to certain of the Plaintiffs during their examinations. As well, with respect to Mr. Al-Qadi, an answer to an undertaking he provided confirmed his knowledge of potential cost consequences. Counsel to the Plaintiffs argue that the Plaintiffs will abide by any Court orders issued against them.

[61] Mr. Ebid questions the truthfulness of the position of the Plaintiffs, arguing that the Plaintiffs do not have knowledge of the potential cost consequences and counterclaim issued against them.

[62] Based on the submissions of the parties, I am satisfied that counsel to the Plaintiffs have advised the Plaintiffs of the counterclaim, which has been defended, as well as the possibility of costs being awarded against the Plaintiffs if they are unsuccessful at trial.

[63] In my view, this issue does not factor into the consideration of the justness of ordering security for costs.

Mr. Ebid’s Status

[64] Mr. Ebid asks the Court to take into account his personal situation in considering whether to grant his motion. Mr. Ebid has largely self-represented himself during this litigation. Mr. Ebid was a regulated Canadian Immigration Consultant. His membership with the Immigration Consultants of Canada Regulatory Council (“ICCRC”) was revoked pursuant to the Decision of the Discipline Committee of the ICCRC dated May 26, 2021.

[65] In his affidavit affirmed March 25, 2024 he claims that the “defamation propagated by the plaintiff has caused irreparable damage to my reputation and has resulted in the loss of my license as an immigration consultant, leading to a complete cessation of income”.

[66] I have reviewed the decisions of the Discipline Committee of the ICCRC concerning Mr. Ebid. The decision to revoke his membership was not related to the claim of the Plaintiffs.

[67] As for his business, during cross-examination Mr. Ebid did not clearly state that Fast to Canada was no longer in operations. He did suggest that he had other business ventures. As well, Mr. Ebid had the opportunity to provide greater detail in his affidavit as to his financial situation, other than unsupported statements. He chose not to provide such details.

[68] Mr. Ebid also notes that certain of Fast to Canada’s funds were frozen pursuant to a Mareva injunction granted in a different proceeding. In that proceeding, the sole plaintiff is Hasan Wahib. The defendants are the same ones as in this proceeding, and the relief sought is also the same. The key difference is that Mr. Wahib did not receive a refund from the Defendants, nor did he sign a release in favour of the Defendants.

[69] A Mareva injunction was granted pursuant to the Order of Justice B. Dietrich dated May 18, 2018. The order was granted without notice to the Defendants. As part of the order, $54,750 held in bank accounts in the name of the Defendants was frozen.

[70] On consent of the Defendants, the Mareva injunction was continued pursuant to the Order of Dietrich J. dated May 28, 2018.

[71] The Defendants brought a motion to set aside the Mareva injunction. Pursuant to the Endorsement of Justice Steele dated January 8, 2021, the motion was dismissed. Steele J. held that the Defendants failed to demonstrate that the Mareva injunction had caused them to suffer harm, as they continued to have access to their accounts subject to maintaining at least $54,750 in the accounts. Justice Steele found that the factual underpinnings of the Mareva injunction order may have become more compelling given the findings of the ICCRC.

[72] In my view, these factors raised by Mr. Ebid do not support the granting of the motion. The funds remain frozen because he was unable to satisfy a Court that it was appropriate to lift the Mareva injunction. He has not provided sufficient evidence as to his financial affairs to establish that he is unable to pay to continue to defend this action.

Merits of the Litigation

[73] As detailed in the Statement of Claim, the Plaintiffs seek:

(a) damages of $85,091 from the Defendants on a joint and several basis for fraud and unjust enrichment, and the tort of civil conspiracy;
(b) in the alternative, damages of $85,091 from Fast to Canada for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty;
(c) in the further alternative, damages of $85,091 from Fast to Canada and Ms. Qita for breach of fiduciary duty; and
(d) punitive damages of $400,000 from the Defendants on a joint and several basis.

[74] Each of the Plaintiffs executed a retainer agreement with Fast to Canada with respect to the private sponsorship program. There was also a Memorandum of Understanding between Fast to Canada and CNIA with respect to the applications for the Plaintiffs.

[75] The Plaintiffs collectively paid over $335,000 to Fast to Canada in connection with their applications. Approximately $83,000 was paid to Fast to Canada for fees, and the remaining approximately $252,000 was paid to Fast to Canada to be held in trust for CNIA as the sponsor organization.

[76] Once the Plaintiffs’ applications for residency were determined to be unsuccessful, they each asked that their retainer agreements with Fast to Canada be terminated, that the memoranda of understanding be cancelled, and that they receive a refund of all amounts they paid to Fast to Canada with respect to the program.

[77] Fast to Canada agreed to refund certain amounts to the Plaintiffs, provided that the Plaintiffs each signed a release in favour of the Fast to Canada, Mr. Ebid and Ms. Qita. Fast to Canada refunded approximately $251,000 to the Plaintiffs, but did not refund approximately $85,000. That is the amount of the non-punitive damages claimed made by the Plaintiffs in this litigation. Mr. Ebid and Fast to Canada allege that this amount represents fees properly earned by Fast to Canada in connection with the services provided to the Plaintiffs.

[78] The Plaintiffs allege that Fast to Canada breached and repudiated the retainer agreements because, among other things, Fast to Canada was never a registered representative for their applications with the Government of Canada. The Plaintiffs say that Fast to Canada orchestrated a fraudulent scheme and made false representations, which they relied on to their detriment. The Plaintiffs also allege breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment, and that the releases signed by the Plaintiffs are unenforceable. Lastly, they make a claim for punitive damages due to what they believe to be improper conduct of the Defendants.

[79] Mr. Ebid argues that the Plaintiffs’ claim is frivolous, vexatious, baseless and malicious. He believes that this claim has been orchestrated by counsel to the Plaintiffs. He points to answers provided during examinations for discovery where certain of the Plaintiffs say they do not believe the Defendants to have acted in a fraudulent manner and that they are focused on getting a full refund of the amounts they paid to Fast to Canada.

[80] Mr. Ebid also argues that the Plaintiffs are prohibited from pursuing this action as a result of the releases they signed, that this action is a form of extortion by the Plaintiffs, that he has been defamed and threatened by the Plaintiffs in letters, and that he and Fast to Canada were able to successfully get over 30 individuals’ permanent residency as part of the program.

[81] Lastly, Mr. Ebid relies on the case of Ibid v. Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship) in support of his argument that the claim of the Plaintiffs is frivolous and vexatious. That case dealt with a judicial review of decisions of an Officer of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada that dismissed 22 residency applications under a special sponsorship program. That case involved all of the Defendants other than CNIA. One of the issues was whether a claimant could pay the cost of its own sponsorship. Justice Brown held that there was no issue with a claimant providing his or her own funds for the settlement. [15]

[82] Mr. Ebid argues that this decision defeats the arguments made by the Plaintiffs as to how the private sponsorship program was run by the Defendants.

[83] The Plaintiffs point at the fact that both Mr. Ebid and Ms. Qita have had their licenses as immigration consultants revoked, and that there was a CBC investigation into the activities of Fast to Canada and CNIA.

[84] In considering the merits of the action, the court is not required to embark upon an analysis such as in a motion for summary judgment. The analysis is primarily on the pleadings with recourse to the evidence filed on the motion, and in appropriate cases, to selective references to excerpts of the examination for discovery where it is available. [16]

[85] I accept the submission of the Plaintiffs that the granting of the Mareva Order in the Wahib action supports their argument that they have a prima facie case as against the Defendants in this action. Although no Mareva order was granted in this proceeding, as the Plaintiffs decided not to pursue it, the allegations against the Defendants in the Wahib action are almost identical to the ones in this action (other than with respect to the releases). Notwithstanding that there are no written reasons from Justice Dietrich with respect to her granting of the Mareva Order, it can be inferred that Justice Dietrich was satisfied that Mr. Wahib had a prima facie case as against the Defendants, as the well-known test for obtaining a Mareva order requires the moving party to establish that it has such a case. [17] Additionally, Justice Steele refused Mr. Ebid’s request to set aside the Mareva Order in the Wahib case.

[86] The issues regarding the relationship between Fast to Canada and the Plaintiffs, the representations, if any, made by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs, the terms of the program and whether it was compliant with the Government of Canada’s requirements for private sponsorship programs, the propriety of the Plaintiffs paying their own settlement funds, and rejection of the applications and the enforceability of the releases are all live issues that will be vigorously contested by all parties at the trial.

[87] The result is not a foregone conclusion either for the plaintiff or the defendants.

[88] I also agree with the submissions of the Plaintiffs that the Ibid case is distinguishable, as it did not involve CNIA and does not deal with the matters raised in this action that go beyond whether refugees are prohibited from being required to pay their own settlement funds.

[89] Based on my review of the evidence before me, which includes the pleadings, the transcripts from the examinations for discovery of five of the Plaintiffs, and the transcript for the cross-examination of Mr. Ebid, I do not believe that the action can be said to be wholly without merit, as claimed by Mr. Ebid.

[90] As a result, the potential merits of the litigation do not weigh in favour of granting the security for costs motion.

Further Arguments from the Plaintiffs

[91] The Plaintiffs argue that it would be unjust to require refugees to pay security for costs in order to pursue claims against the consultants whom they allege are responsible for critical failures in their residency applications. They also argue that the motion has been brought by Mr. Ebid as a litigation tactic, and that to grant his motion would be contrary to ensuring refugees have access to justice and would be contrary to the public interest.

Consideration of All Factors and the Interests of Justice

[92] I have considered each of the factors set out above, as well as all arguments and evidence from each of the parties, even if it is not set out in detail in these reasons. In my view, the interest of justice requires that the motion brought by Mr. Ebid and Fast to Canada for security of costs of $45,000 be granted.

[93] In weighing all of the factors, the fact that the nine Plaintiffs have no existing connection to Canada whatsoever, and the reasonableness of the amount sought for security, overcome the issues that Mr. Ebid has with the timing of his motion and the merits of the litigation.

[94] Notwithstanding counsel to the Plaintiffs’ submission that the Plaintiffs will abide by any order of the Court, it is difficult to see how Mr. Ebid and Fast to Canada would be able to realistically enforce and collect on any costs order issued by the trial judge in the foreign countries where the Plaintiffs currently live.

[95] As well, the Plaintiffs have put forward no evidence that says that they would be unable to pay a security for costs order. As the total amount sought is $45,000, across nine Plaintiffs, that does not appear to me to be an unreasonable burden to place on them. This is especially so given that the Plaintiffs are currently represented by counsel that, based on their cost outline, spent almost $85,000 in actual fees and disbursements for this 1-hour motion. This is almost double the amount sought for security by Mr. Ebid and Fast to Canada to complete the trial. I note that the Plaintiffs contested Mr. Ebid’s position that legal services were being provided to the Plaintiffs on a pro bono basis.

[96] With respect to the timing of the motion, while clearly it was brought late in the process and many years after Mr. Ebid was aware of the key issues, I do not believe it is reasonable to infer that the landscape of this litigation would have changed had Mr. Ebid and Fast to Canada brought the motion at an earlier stage. The Plaintiffs’ focus on the importance of this litigation to them personally supports my view that they have not actually been prejudiced by the timing and would have likely continued on with this litigation in the same manner even if the motion had been brought in 2019 when Mr. Ebid first raised the issue to counsel for the Plaintiffs. As a result, the timing of the motion is not as prejudicial as it was held to be in cases relied on by the Plaintiffs where the Court dismissed security for costs motions that were brought at an earlier stage than the current motion before the Court.

[97] I believe the amount sought by Mr. Ebid and Fast to Canada is reasonable and proportionate and provides him with a level of security that they can look to satisfy any costs awards that they may obtain if they are successful with their defence, without being prejudicial to the Plaintiffs.

Disposition

[98] For the reasons set out above, I am of the view that the interests of justice require an order of security for costs to be issued in this proceeding. As a result, the motion for security for costs is hereby granted. The Plaintiffs shall pay $45,000 to the Accountant of the Superior Court of Justice to be held with respect to this action within 30 days.

[99] With respect to costs, the parties shall prepare written submissions of no more than 10 pages plus a costs outline. The submissions must be served and filed with the Judicial Services Online portal, and then e-mailed to my Assistant Trial Coordinator for my review. Mr. Ebid shall serve and file his written submissions by March 14, 2025. The Plaintiffs shall serve and file their responding written submissions by March 28, 2025.

[100] I strongly urge Mr. Ebid to consider speaking to a lawyer or obtaining advice from Pro Bono Ontario in connection with his cost submissions. Mr. Ebid shall also review the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Girao v. Cunningham, 2021 ONCA 18 and Benarroch v. Fred Tayar & Associates P.C., 2019 ONCA 228, which set out the situations where a self-represented litigant may be entitled to costs and what Mr. Ebid has to establish as a self-represented litigant to receive an award of costs.

Younes v. Fast to Canada, 2025 ONSC 1150

Case Summary

Superior Court of Justice – Ontario

Reasons for Decision

Overview

Legal Principles for Security for Costs Motions

Analysis

Residence of the Plaintiffs and Their Assets

Timing of the Motion

Status of Counsel to the Plaintiffs

Knowledge of the Plaintiffs

Mr. Ebid’s Status

Merits of the Litigation

Further Arguments from the Plaintiffs

Consideration of All Factors and the Interests of Justice

Disposition

Cited Authorities

Legislation

Case Law

Judge

Counsel

Parties

Areas of Law

Legislation 1