Reasons for Decision on Motion

Introduction

1. The applicant, Elizabeth Elisa Dormon, and the respondent, Richard George Dormon, were married for 54 years. Mr. Dormon, who was the primary breadwinner for the family, amassed significant wealth over the course of the marriage. He had been talking for several years about leaving Canada for a country with lower taxes. He told the applicant that it would take him a year to liquidate his assets and permanently leave Canada.

2. The Dormons separated on December 25, 2023. The applicant’s evidence is that in the last year of their marriage, it was clear to her that the respondent was moving funds out of Canada. The respondent now resides full-time in Panama.

3. After separation, the respondent agreed to voluntarily preserve and maintain $10,000,000 in two RBC accounts in Canada to secure the applicant’s equalization, spousal support, and other claims in this proceeding. Despite his representation that he would preserve and maintain $10,000,000 at RBC, the respondent surreptitiously transferred millions of dollars out of those accounts, apparently to Panama. This left only $3,700,000 in the RBC accounts. The respondent also sold an airplane hangar in Ontario owned by one of his corporations, removed (and possibly disposed of) numerous pieces of furniture, art, and clothing from a jointly owned home in Florida, and disposed of all five of the family’s vehicles.

4. The respondent has not filed an answer to the applicant’s application. He has not complied with a number of orders made by Nakonechny J. on December 6, 2024.

5. The applicant now brings a motion seeking a number of orders, including: restraining the respondent Mr. Dormon from depleting his property in Ontario and requiring him to preserve it; a Mareva injunction restraining the respondent from depleting his worldwide assets; a finding that he is in contempt of orders of the court; a finding that he is in breach of orders of the court; and a number of remedies for his contempt and breach of court orders under rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99 (“FLR”).

6. For the following reasons, I allow the applicant’s motion in part. I find that the applicant has met her burden of establishing the following: that preservation and restraining orders over the respondent’s assets in Ontario should issue; that a Mareva injunction over the respondent’s worldwide assets should issue; that the respondent is in breach of court orders; and that as a result of the respondent’s breaches of court orders, he shall be precluded from participating in this case in any way and a date for an uncontested trial shall be set in this matter. I decline to find the respondent in contempt of court orders, or to order that he pay a monetary penalty.

Background, Procedural History, and Evidence

7. On November 28, 2024, Nakonechny J. heard an urgent motion brought by the applicant. On that date, Nakonechny J. made a temporary order securing the applicant’s property and support claims in this proceeding against $10,000,000 held by the respondent in RBC investment account 3864522 and 38724245, and restraining the respondent from withdrawing, encumbering, transferring, or otherwise dealing with those funds. She adjourned the matter for a full hearing before her on December 5, 2025.

8. By the return date, counsel for the applicant learned that the respondent had transferred a total of $5,675,000 out of his RBC accounts. He transferred $4,427,000 out of his RBC investment account in several tranches on November 13, 14, 15, and 25. He transferred $1,248,000 from his RBC RIF on November 22. On December 5, there was a balance of $3,700,000 in the RBC accounts.

9. These transfers occurred after the respondent had represented to the applicant on October 30, through his counsel at the time, that he would “voluntarily preserve and maintain a minimum of $10,000,000 in the RBC accounts” pending mediation. Indeed, on November 13, his then counsel sent applicant’s counsel a screen shot showing a balance of $11,408,374 in the RBC accounts with a promise of regular updates “as a show of good faith.” That same day, November 13, the respondent transferred $1,000,000 from the account. Over the next two days, he transferred out an additional $2,095,000.

10. The respondent filed an affidavit in anticipation of the December 5 return of the applicant’s motion before Nakonechny J. He attended the hearing on that date via zoom.

11. The respondent did not deny that he had instructed his lawyer to agree to preserve and maintain at least $10,000,000 in the RBC account. He did not advise his lawyer that he had transferred so much money out of his account until November 25, by which time, the accounts were significantly depleted.

12. At the December 5 hearing, the respondent admitted that he took money from the RBC accounts in November. He claimed that the funds were in locked-in investments in Panama but provided no proof.

13. Nakonechny J. ordered the respondent to provide same day bank account information and statements to show where he had moved the money. She held the matter down until 2:00 p.m. that day to enable the respondent to obtain and provide this information. When the matter returned, the respondent provided a heavily redacted printout of a bank statement of what the respondent said was his Panama account. In her December 5, 2024 endorsement, Nakonechny J. found that the redacted statement provided no reliable information. She was “not satisfied that this is the only place where funds were transferred or that the funds in this account are inaccessible to the husband.”

14. She further found that the respondent’s actions:

...demonstrate the worst kind of bad faith. Not only did he instruct his counsel to mislead the other side, he also moved with dispatch to transfer funds out of the country while he believed the other side’s concerns were assuaged.

15. By order dated December 6, 2024, Nakonechny J. ordered, inter alia:

4. The applicant’s claims herein (including equalization, support, property division, costs, interest and all other amounts claimed in her Notice of Application or granted by the court that are closely connected to equalization or support) shall be secured, for her sole benefit, pending the final determination of the proceeding, against $10,000,000 of the funds held in Investment Accounts No. 38693522 and 38724245 in the name of the respondent, Richard George Dormon at RBC Dominion (“the Fund”). The Applicant will hereinafter have a secured interest in the Fund as a secured creditor, subject to further order of this court.

5. The respondent, Richard George Dormon (the “respondent”), shall be restrained from transferring, mortgaging, encumbering, or otherwise dealing with the Fund or any part thereof pending the final determination of this proceeding, without the written consent of the applicant by her counsel, or further order of this court, pursuant to section 12 and 40 of the Family Law Act.

6. The respondent shall provide the following information on or before Tuesday, December 10, 2024 at 12 p.m.: a. Confirmation of whether the respondent transferred the Fund from the RBC Dominion Securities account(s); b. The date on which the Fund was transferred; c. The current location of the Fund; and d. Supporting documents evidencing any such transfer(s).

8. The respondent shall provide all bank statements for the last three months of his RBC accounts within 7 days of this order;

9. The respondent shall restore all bank balances immediately, and provide proof that he has done so.

10. The respondent shall pay $200,000 to the applicant as an interim without prejudice uncharacterized advance within 7 days of this order.

11. The respondent shall serve and file a new sworn Form 13.1 financial statement along with all supporting documentation within thirty (30) days of the date of this order.

12. The respondent shall attend a half day cross-examination on his affidavit dated December 4, 2024 from 9 am to 1 pm on Wednesday December 11, 2024 via zoom.

16. On January 21, 2025, the applicant Ms. Dormon brought a motion before me seeking a number of heads of relief. Given the limited time available to the court on that day, the applicant argued her motion for two substantive heads of relief at that time. This included the applicant’s request for an order directing RBC Dominion Securities to release $200,000 to the applicant pursuant to the order of Nakonechny J, and for an order for substituted service of the notice of contempt motion on the respondent via email. Both of these orders were made in my endorsement and order of January 24, 2025. The balance of the heads of relief sought by Ms. Dormon were adjourned to be argued before me on January 30, 2025.

17. At the continuation of the motion on January 30, the applicant sought the following orders:

• an order restraining the respondent from dissipating his assets in Ontario and requiring him to preserve those assets under ss. 12 and 14 of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 (“FLA”);
• a Mareva injunction restraining the respondent from dissipating his worldwide assets and requiring him to preserve those assets;
• a finding that the respondent is in breach of a number of orders made by Nakonechny J. on December 6, 2024;
• a finding that the respondent is in contempt of a number of orders made by Nakonechny J. on December 6, 2024;
• an order that the respondent shall pay a penalty of $1,000 for every day that he remains in non-compliance with the orders made by Nakonechny J. on December 6, 2025;
• an order that the respondent shall no longer be entitled to any further notice of any steps in this case pursuant to rule 1(8.4) of the FLR;
• an order that the respondent shall no longer be entitled to participate in this case in any way, pursuant to rule 1(8.4) of the FLR;
• an order that the court shall deal with this matter in the respondent’s absence, pursuant to rule 1(8.4) of the FLR;
• an order that a date shall be set for an uncontested trial in this matter pursuant to rule 1(8.4) of the FLR; and
• an order for costs of this motion payable by the respondent to the applicant on a full recovery basis.

18. The respondent, who now resides in Panama, was served with motion materials via email (including the notice of contempt motion, as permitted by my January 24, 2025 order authorizing substituted service by email). The motion was returnable at 10:00 a.m. on January 30. When the respondent did not attend at that time, the matter was held down until 10:15 a.m. The respondent did not appear. The motion proceeded in his absence.

19. In her affidavit evidence on this motion, the applicant indicated that the respondent had not:

• restored the money to the RBC accounts;
• provided her with an advance of $200,000, or any sum;
• provided the information required of him by paragraph 6 of Nakonechny’s December 6, 2024 order by December 10, 2024, or at all;
• provided three months of his RBC bank statements within 7 days, or at all; or
• attended for cross-examination on December 11, 2024, or at any time.

20. There was no evidence before the court suggesting that the respondent had done any of these things by the date of this motion.

21. In her affidavits filed on this motion, the applicant provided evidence that the respondent had not paid any spousal support since April 2024. He cut off her credit cards. In December 2024, he disconnected the applicant’s Microsoft account, which was tied to her email account. In January 2025, the respondent disconnected Bell Canada service at the jointly-owned Toronto property where the applicant resides. This left her without internet, television, or telephone service.

22. On December 16, 2024, the applicant visited the jointly-owned home in Florida. She found that numerous pieces of furniture, art, her clothing, and personal documents were removed from or damaged in the Florida house.

23. On December 19, 2024, the applicant was advised that the respondent had sold an airplane hangar owned by his corporation in Ontario. She was told to remove her possessions that had been stored at the hangar. The applicant was in Florida at the time, so she could not attend to collect her possessions from the hangar. They were disposed of.

24. On January 10, 2025, the applicant’s 77th birthday, the Dormons’ daughter-in-law cornered the applicant when she was driving in her townhouse complex and prevented her from moving the car. Police were called. When they arrived, the daughter-in-law presented documents showing that the respondent had transferred ownership of the car to her. The police informed the applicant that the daughter-in-law was the new owner of the car, and that they could not assist the applicant further. The applicant was forced to hand over the car keys. The daughter-in-law drove off with the car. The applicant’s evidence is that this was the last vehicle she had access to in Ontario or Florida. It was a vehicle she had been driving for four years. It was one of five family vehicles, all of which the respondent had disposed of, removed, or sold since separation.

Analysis

A. Orders Restraining Disposition of Assets in Ontario and Requiring Preservation of Assets in Ontario

25. The applicant has established that orders restraining the respondent from depleting all of his assets in Ontario and requiring him to preserve those assets under ss. 12 and 40 of the FLA should be granted.

26. In coming to this conclusion, I have considered whether there will be assets available to satisfy the likely entitlements of the applicant at the end of the trial if preservation and restraining orders are not made. This included consideration of the risk of dissipation of assets by the respondent that could have the effect of preventing the applicant’s entitlements from being satisfied. In particular, I considered the following factors:

(a) Whether there is a serious issue to be tried. In other words, whether it is likely that the applicant will ultimately be entitled to an equalization payment and/or spousal support: Bronfman v. Bronfman, para 19; Bandyopadhyay v. Chakraborty, 2019 ONSC 802, para 41.

(b) The balance of convenience or inconvenience to both parties. In other words, which party will experience greater harm if the order is granted or refused: RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), p. 342; Qureshi v. Qureshi, 2021 ONSC 2750, paras 46, 51, 53-54.

(c) The potential for irreparable harm if the order is not granted. In other words, whether either party will suffer significant harm if the order is or is not granted: Qureshi, para 55. The significant harm I considered under this factor is whether there is a “real risk” that the respondent “is removing or about to remove assets from the jurisdiction to avoid the possibility of a judgment, or is otherwise dissipating or disposing of assets in a manner clearly distinct from the usual course of business or living”: Hekmati v. Oliver, 2012 ONSC 3932, para 12.

(a) Serious issue to be tried

27. I am satisfied that there is a serious issue to be tried in this case.

28. This was already recognized by Nakonechny J. in her December 5, 2024 endorsement. Nakonechny J. found, at paras. 24 and 25, that the applicant had met her onus of demonstrating on a prima facie basis that she is likely to receive an equalization payment such that she had met her onus for an order preserving funds in the RBC accounts as security for her support and property claims.

29. My review of the evidence on this motion also supports a conclusion that there is a serious issue to be tried. A quick estimated, or “back of the napkin,” assessment of the equalization payment owing to the applicant establishes that there is a prima facie case for the preservation and restraining orders she seeks. It establishes that the existing preservation and restraining orders on the RBC Fund will not be adequate to ensure that there are sufficient funds to satisfy the applicant’s claims if she is successful at trial.

30. The respondent’s financial statement (which he marked “N/A – for discussion purposes”) represents that he has assets worth $19,880,000. The applicant’s sworn financial statement represents that she has assets worth $3,785,000. Both parties list the jointly owned home in Toronto and the jointly owned home in Florida as assets (50% of the value of each property to each), but they disagree as to the value of these two properties.

31. If the jointly owned Toronto and Florida properties are backed out of both financial statements (because they are on both financial statements, although at different estimated values), the applicant had assets worth $400,000 and the respondent had assets worth $9,880,000 on the date of separation.

32. A rough calculation of the equalization payment owing to the applicant would be half of the difference between the respondent’s and the applicant’s net worth on valuation day, or $4,740,000.

33. On December 5, 2024, the respondent’s RBC accounts that were frozen as a result of Nakonechny J.’s order had a balance of $3,700,000. This is almost $1,000,000 short of my rough calculation of what the equalization payment owed to the applicant could be, based on the evidence before me. And that is without consideration of the applicant’s spousal support claims.

34. Of course, this is not, and could not be at this early stage of the proceedings, the final word on how much the respondent will owe the applicant as an equalization payment. Moreover, some or all of the shortfall in what is available to satisfy the applicant’s entitlement could be realized through sale of the jointly owned homes. However, there has been no financial disclosure made by the respondent in support of his financial statement. Indeed, the respondent did not formally file his financial statement in these proceedings. Rather, he attached a financial statement that he marked “N/A - for discussion purposes only” as an exhibit to his affidavit on the December 5 motion. As a result, it is not yet known whether the respondent has given accurate and full disclosure of his assets. The respondent may owe the applicant an equalization payment greater than what I have quickly calculated here.

35. In these circumstances, I find that there is a serious issue to be tried in this case.

(b) The balance of convenience or inconvenience to both parties

36. The applicant has established that the harm to the applicant if the preservation and restraining orders are not granted is greater than the harm or inconvenience to the respondent if they are.

37. In his affidavit filed on the December 5, 2024 motion, the respondent’s evidence was that he resides in Panama. The redacted bank statement from a Panama bank account filed by the respondent as Exhibit A at the hearing of the December 5 motion shows a balance of more than $4,700,000 USD.

38. In these circumstances, an order preserving the respondent’s assets in Ontario will not cause him undue inconvenience. He has substantial assets available to him in the jurisdiction in which he resides.

39. I am aware that the respondent told the court at the hearing of the December 5 motion that the money he had transferred from the RBC accounts to Panama was in locked-in investments. However, at para. 23 of her endorsement, Nakonechny J. did not accept either that the funds in the Panama account were inaccessible to the respondent, or that that account was the only place to which funds were transferred. There is no further evidence before me that the respondent does not have access to funds in Panama. Nor is there other evidence that the respondent would be meaningfully harmed or significantly inconvenienced if orders preserving his Ontario assets were made.

40. The balance of convenience supports the issuance of the preservation and restraining orders. Especially when any inconvenience to the respondent is weighed against the significant harm to the applicant if the orders are not granted. The respondent has already transferred millions of dollars out of Ontario, disposed of all of the family’s vehicles, sold his corporation’s airplane hangar, and disposed of furniture, art, and other possessions in the Florida home. There are insufficient assets in the preserved RBC accounts to satisfy the applicant’s equalization and support claims. If orders restraining the respondent from disposing of Ontario assets and requiring their preservation are not made, the applicant may never be able to collect what she is owed. Minimal to non-existent inconvenience to the respondent if the orders are made is outweighed by the significant harm to the applicant if they are not.

(c) Irreparable harm

41. I am satisfied that there is a risk of irreparable harm if the preservation and restraining orders are not granted.

42. The respondent has already transferred millions of dollars out of this jurisdiction and transferred or disposed of many assets. There is a real risk that he will continue to do so if preservation and restraining orders are not made.

43. The applicant has met her onus of establishing that there is a real risk of significant harm to her and her ability to collect on her claims if the orders do not issue.

The remainder of the decision continues with detailed analysis of the Mareva injunction, breach of court orders, remedies, and costs, as set out in the original text. All section and paragraph formatting, as well as links, have been preserved and corrected for clarity and accuracy.

Released: February 18, 2025