SCJ 2024

This judgment addresses various parenting and child support issues between former spouses.

The Father sought a declaration of primary residence for the children, retroactive child support from the Mother, and sole decision-making for the youngest child.

The Mother sought joint decision-making, a shared parenting schedule, and arrears from the Father.

The court found a material change in circumstances, imputed income to the Mother, and ordered her to pay retroactive child support to the Father.

For the youngest child, Hannah, the court ordered joint decision-making and a shared parenting schedule.

The Mother's claim for pre-July 2021 arrears from the Father was dismissed due to insufficient evidence.

The court also clarified the allocation of Section 7 expenses and Canada Child Benefit eligibility in shared parenting arrangements.

The applicant father, a civil litigation lawyer with no family law experience, sought to adjourn his family court trial to retain new counsel after his previous lawyer was removed from the record.

The respondent mother opposed a lengthy adjournment, emphasizing the need for timely resolution, particularly concerning the child's proposed relocation to Ireland and the upcoming school year.

The court granted a shorter adjournment than requested by the father, rescheduling the trial to June 2024, making it peremptory on the father, and conditionally delaying the sale of the matrimonial home to align with the new trial date, balancing the father's need for representation with the child's best interests and the mother's right to timely resolution.

The Applicant Father sought the return of his son to Balch Springs, Texas, U.S.A., under Article 12 of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, alleging wrongful removal and retention by the Respondent Mother in Toronto.

The Mother relied on Article 13 exceptions, asserting the Father's subsequent acquiescence to the child's retention or, alternatively, a grave risk of harm upon return.

The court found that while Texas was the child's habitual residence and the Father did not initially consent to the removal, he subsequently unequivocally acquiesced to the child's retention in Ontario through his conduct and communications over several months.

The Mother's alternative argument regarding grave risk of harm was not proven to meet the high threshold required by the Convention.

Consequently, the Father's application for the child's return was dismissed based on the finding of acquiescence.

This motion concerned a dispute between two defendant insurers, Pafco Insurance Company and Kent and Essex Mutual Insurance Company, regarding Kent's obligation to contribute to a $950,000 settlement paid by Pafco.

The settlement satisfied claims made by the plaintiffs under the OPCF 44R Family Protection Coverage endorsement, following the death of Ashley Kerr in a car accident caused by an uninsured motorist.

The central issue was whether Ashley Kerr qualified as an "insured person" under Joe Hesch's (her common-law spouse) 44R policy with Kent, which would trigger Kent's contribution.

The court found that Ashley did not meet the definition of an "insured person" under Joe's policy because she owned the "other automobile" she was occupying at the time of the accident, an exclusion explicitly stated in the 44R endorsement and reinforced by the OAP 1 policy.

Consequently, Kent was not obligated to contribute to the settlement.

The court also granted Pafco a subrogated judgment against the at-fault uninsured motorist.

The defendant Metrolinx brought a motion seeking an order to compel the injured plaintiff, J.E., to attend an in-person psychiatric assessment.

Metrolinx argued this was necessary to respond to evidence regarding J.E.'s psychiatric conditions, including a recent schizophrenia diagnosis.

The plaintiffs opposed, arguing their pleadings did not attribute the recent psychiatric conditions to the incident and that their expert, a neuropsychologist, could address the diagnoses.

The court dismissed Metrolinx's motion, finding that Metrolinx had not established the necessity of the in-person assessment to level the playing field, especially since their own psychiatrist had already provided a paper review report addressing causation.

The court emphasized that the plaintiff's pleadings did not allege the 2017 incident caused the 2023 psychiatric conditions and that the role of treating healthcare professionals as participant experts is limited by the court's gatekeeper function.

This decision addresses cross-motions concerning undertakings and refusals arising from examinations for discovery in a property damage action.

The defendant sought to compel answers from the plaintiff regarding the incident, damages, and insurance, while the plaintiff brought a cross-motion seeking the defendant's corporate tax returns.

The court largely granted the defendant's requests for further answers from the plaintiff, including details about her son's involvement as a witness, the use of a home equity line of credit, her current address, and visitors who saw the damage.

However, the court dismissed the defendant's request for detailed time estimates on the plaintiff's use of damaged areas, deeming it disproportionate.

The plaintiff's cross-motion for the defendant's tax returns was dismissed as irrelevant.

Both parties were ordered to bear their own costs due to procedural non-compliance.

The applicant sought to recognize and enforce a Chinese arbitral award against the respondent for unpaid automotive parts.

The respondent opposed, arguing it was denied the opportunity to present its case when the arbitral tribunal refused its request to retain appraisers, and that enforcement would violate public policy.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the application, finding the tribunal's procedural decisions did not offend basic notions of justice and the public policy exception was not met.

The court also struck out portions of the respondent's affidavit evidence as inadmissible hearsay and strongly reprimanded the applicant's counsel for uncivil courtroom behaviour.

The applicant, Brenda Andrew, brought a s. 11(b) Charter application alleging a violation of her right to trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 43 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling from R. v. Jordan.

The court identified nine months of "defence delay" attributable to the applicant's repeated requests for time to retain counsel and to raise restitution funds for a failed resolution agreement.

This reduced the net delay for Jordan purposes to 34 months.

The Crown argued that the remaining delay beyond the ceiling was due to the COVID-19 pandemic backlog, an "exceptional circumstance." The court found that approximately ten months of the delay in setting the trial date was attributable to the pandemic backlog, bringing the net delay to 24 months, which is below the Jordan ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants sought an order declaring a condominium lien invalid and requiring its discharge, arguing they were not responsible for water damage from an overflowing toilet, that the respondent engaged in oppressive conduct (unreasonable deductible, overcharging), and that the lien was untimely.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicants responsible for the damage due to their act or omission (clogged toilet and broken shut-off valve), that the respondent's conduct was not oppressive, and that the lien was registered within the statutory timeframe.

The Business Development Bank of Canada moved for summary judgment against a corporate borrower and its individual guarantors for defaulted loans.

The defendants admitted the facts of the debt but presented an "incomprehensible" defence based on a "sovereign citizen" type argument regarding their legal persona and "securities" derived from their names.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, ruling that the defendants' arguments were legally untenable and did not constitute a valid defence.

Summary judgment was granted to the Bank for the full outstanding loan amounts, interest, and partial indemnity costs.

This application concerned the enforceability of Minutes of Settlement regarding the sale of a farm property within an estate.

The applicants sought to enforce the Minutes of Settlement to purchase the farm, while the respondents sought to have the property sold on the open market.

The court determined that the Minutes of Settlement constituted a contract, not a judgment.

It found that the applicants had repudiated the contract through extreme and inordinate delays in fulfilling their obligations, including failing to obtain an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) or an Environmental Site Assessment (ESA) which they unilaterally imposed as conditions.

The respondents validly accepted this repudiation.

Consequently, the applicants were no longer entitled to purchase the farm property under the Minutes of Settlement, and the estate trustee was directed to sell the farm on the open market, with proceeds distributed according to the will.

The Bank of Nova Scotia ("BNS") sought summary judgment against former spouses Danilo Milosevic and Dusica Grabovica for a joint line of credit debt.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding Mr. Milosevic's liability for the debt itself, affirming joint and several liability.

However, a genuine issue was found regarding the precise accounting of the debt, specifically the applicable interest rate and calculation of accrued interest, which was ordered to proceed to a trial of the issue.

Ms. Grabovica's liability was already set for a mini-trial concerning her signature's authenticity.

Costs were reserved to the trial judge.

The accused was charged with multiple firearm offences after a .22 calibre rifle was discharged four times in a hospital parking lot, striking the tires of three parked vehicles.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including video surveillance tracking the accused's vehicle and expert forensic evidence matching the spent casings to a rifle found in the accused's possession upon arrest.

The court found the circumstantial evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the shooter.

The accused was found guilty of careless use of a firearm and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, while the charge of discharging a firearm with recklessness was adjourned to address an error in the indictment.

The applicants sought an order directing the registrar of personal property security to discharge PPSA registrations made by the respondent against them, arguing no valid security interest existed.

The respondent, a former employee, had registered liens after being placed on unpaid leave due to a vaccination policy.

The court found no valid security interest, granted the order to discharge the registrations, imposed a statutory penalty of $500 per applicant under the PPSA, and awarded full indemnity costs to the applicants due to the respondent's reprehensible conduct in abusing the PPSA system.

The applicant, Jermaine Watson, charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking, brought an application to exclude evidence seized by police following his arrest and searches of his person and vehicle, alleging breaches of his Charter rights (ss. 7, 8, 9).

The court found that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the warrantless arrest, making the subsequent searches unlawful.

Applying the Grant analysis, the court determined that the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct (arrest without reasonable grounds, public search) and the significant impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits, despite the reliability of the evidence.

The application to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter was granted.

The applicant company sought an interim and interlocutory injunction to enforce a standstill agreement against its founder and largest shareholder, pending arbitration.

The respondent had issued a press release calling for the replacement of the board of directors, which the applicant argued breached the negative covenants in the agreement.

The respondent brought a cross-motion to dismiss the application under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court granted the injunction, finding a serious issue to be tried regarding the breach of negative covenants, irreparable harm to the company's goodwill, and a balance of convenience favoring the applicant.

The anti-SLAPP motion was dismissed because the application had substantial merit and the public interest in enforcing commercial contracts outweighed the protection of the expression.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment regarding a disputed legacy in her late father's will, the court determined the issue of costs.

The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the traditional estate costs rules should apply, finding that the litigation was caused by the drafting solicitor's error, not the testator's actions.

Applying normal civil costs rules, the court ordered the plaintiff to bear her own costs due to her tactical conduct, ordered the drafting solicitor to bear his own costs because his error caused the litigation, and ordered the plaintiff to pay the partial indemnity costs of the estate and foundation.

The defendants brought a motion to compel the plaintiff, Tristian Howell, to produce private electronic communications exchanged with the deceased, Sean McDonnell, to challenge Howell's status as a "spouse" under the Family Law Act for a damages claim.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the potential probative value of the messages was minimal compared to the significant time, expense, and undue prejudice to the plaintiff.

The decision emphasized the high expectation of privacy for intimate communications and the ample existing evidence supporting the cohabitation period.

This criminal case from the Ontario Superior Court of Justice has no reasons available at this time.

The decision merely notes the case citation and file number without providing any details on the proceedings or outcome.

The Receiver brought an unopposed motion for an order approving a Claims Adjudication Process, appointing a Claims Officer, and approving its Twentieth Report.

The court granted the motion but modified the proposed order to remove limitations on appeal rights and standard of review, noting that such issues remain to be determined by the court hearing any appeal, not by the Claims Officer.