Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: FC-21-166-0000 DATE: 2024/09/26 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Christina Hajak, Applicant – and – Paul Anthony Hemmings, Respondent

Counsel: Matthew Kelly, for the Applicant Self-represented, for the Respondent

HEARD: September 26, 2024

Justice: Mountford

Decision

Overview

[1] This is an unfortunate case to be brought to trial, because to their credit, the parties have resolved the parenting issues by way of a consent order made on October 6, 2023, before Justice Tweedie. With the difficult issues of co-parenting resolved, it is very sad to see the parties in a trial, over financial issues alone, almost a year later. Parenting issues are generally the more likely to cause disputes and these parties have done an admirable job of working those out on consent. They have done their children a great favour by doing so.

[2] Also, to their credit, both parties were very civil to each other in court and were forthright in their evidence. They both appear to be caring and loving parents of two children. Their personal relationship has ended but unlike so many who come to this court, they seem to be able to co-parent peacefully.

[3] Mr. Kelly was exceptionally helpful to the Court, and to the Respondent who was self-represented, and in being so professional he did not create further animosity which so often occurs during a trial. He provided this Court and the Respondent with the appropriate caselaw applicable to the issues, highlighted and filed on Case Center in advance. He is a credit to the profession.

[4] Yet, having said all that about how well everyone behaved, I have to make Orders on support issues which may upset that equilibrium. I urge these parties to maintain their civil approach to co-parenting, regardless of their views of my decision rendered today. By being unable to settle, they have forced a judicial decision to be rendered upon them. And the financial support of children is a very important issue.

Facts

[5] These parties were not married but during their relationship, and in particular during their cohabitation of approximately 4 years, ending in 2014, they had two children, Kingsley Ivan Hajak-Hemmings born June 2, 2010, and Niyah Selah Hajak-Hemmings born November 2, 2013. They are now 14 and 10 respectively and every indication is that they are thriving in the primary care of the Applicant mother and also due to the co-parenting of the parties as described above. They reside primarily with the Applicant mother and with the Respondent father 3 weekends per month.

[6] Again, to their credit, the parties worked out child support issues on their own for several years after separation, and then went to mediation on these issues. This was an impressive step used to resolve matters amicably.

[7] However, the mediation resulted in an agreement for Mr. Hemmings to pay child support of $450/month, although his income at that time would have resulted in payment of $650/month. This was never adequately explained. It seemed to have begun a long journey of Mr. Hemmings believing that child support was a negotiable number, when the child support guidelines are actually quite rigid.

[8] Shortly after mediation, the parties agreed to changing the amount and having Mr. Hemmings pay $650/month. How they arrived at that number is confusing as it would appear to be just a correction of the amount agreed to at mediation, but Mr. Hemmings says that he got a promotion to make considerably more money, orally advised Ms. Hajak of this, and then agreed to the higher child support amount. However, the amount of $650/month was the correct amount for his previous salary of $44,175, significantly lower than he should have been paying based on his much higher income from his promotion. This payment of $650.00/month, despite much higher income, continued for about four years, until mid 2020.

[9] In other words, from the moment that the mediation agreement was made, Mr. Hemmings was never paying child support according to what he should have paid based upon his income and the child support guidelines for two children. He became accustomed to not paying according to the child support guidelines and this is very unfortunate as he seems to have become accustomed to thinking that child support is flexible. This mindset continued to this trial, where he suggested that his ongoing child support should be less than guidelines.

[10] To his credit, Mr. Hemmings did in fact pay the $650/month amount either every month or almost every month, depending on whose calculations one accepts, for 4 years until 2020. The Applicant has provided her calculations and shows a few missed months during those years. The Respondent says he paid every month. But neither party has provided the bank statements which they say support their respective positions. In any event, if there was any shortfall, it was only a few payments totalling several thousand dollars. I will give him credit for paying $650/month for each month of those 4 years.

[11] Then, as of June 1, 2020, he stopped paying child support completely. This is where he really lost his way. There is absolutely no excuse for that.

[12] Therefore, the issues which must be decided are a) should Mr. Hemmings be required to pay retroactively from 2016 to June 2020 based on his actual income, topping up what he actually did pay, and b) what should he have been paying from the time he stopped paying child support altogether in 2020 to present, and then c) what his ongoing child support should be.

[13] This is the appropriate juncture to comment on this stoppage of child support completely as of June 2020. This was wrong and unjustifiable. Mr. Hemmings presented as a very loving caring father, but his actions in ceasing child support completely are in stark contrast to that. His concerns about the maternal grandmother’s lifestyle, posts on Instagram of his daughter, or other child protection concerns do not, and should not ever have, had anything to do with his child support obligations. These children were and are in the primary care of the Applicant mother and they needed to be supported. His failure in this regard is extremely serious. His justifications are hollow. He brought two children into the world who needed to be fed, housed and clothed, and while he earned an income above $70,000 per year, and the Applicant earned about half of that, he paid nothing for over 4 years. He does not come to court with clean hands.

[14] He admitted under oath that he has not even paid any child support since the Order requiring him to do so in January 2024. It is hard to comprehend how he can ignore the Court Order, the financial needs of his children, nor the impact of this attitude upon a Court.

[15] He has not paid his support, nor his costs order, since the order of Justice Breithaupt-Smith in January 2024.

Undue Hardship Claim

[16] The Respondent father has also made references to an undue hardship claim as he has two other children that he has fathered since the end of his relationship with the Applicant. But: a. he did not claim this in his Answer, b. he was given an opportunity to amend his pleadings to claim it from the Order of Justice Tweedie at the Trial Scheduling Conference of March 18, 2024, but did not do so, c. and this issue was addressed by Justice Breithaupt-Smith in her Order of January 17, 2024, where she completed the analysis of the hardship claim under s.10 of the Ontario Child Support Guidelines based on the evidence before her and making assumptions favourable to the Respondent father and still found that there was no undue hardship claim available to the Respondent.

[17] The issue was not elaborated upon any more in the evidence of the Respondent at trial, and in fact the favourable assumptions made by Justice Breithaupt-Smith in favour of the Respondent proved to have been too favourable and not accurate based on the evidence at trial.

[18] In this regard, I draw particular attention to the amount included in Her Honour’s calculations for child support payable for another child at $250/month, when the evidence of the Respondent father is that there is no child support obligation by any court order or domestic contract for him to pay any support for any other child. Additionally, the calculations use incomes for the Respondent father which are less than his actual incomes for those years. The undue hardship claim, even if brought, would therefore be dismissed.

[19] This returns us to the issues of retroactive child support as referenced above.

The Applicable Law

[20] Justice Chappel has helpfully summarized the caselaw relating to child support in A.E v. A.E., 2021 ONSC 8189 at par. 176 as follows:

“Regardless of the governing legislation in any given case, the case-law has established a number of additional foundational principles that must guide the courts in their analysis of child support issues. These can be summarized as follows:

1. Child support is the right of the child that arises upon the child’s birth and exists independent of any statute or court order. It survives the breakdown of the parents’ relationship (D.B.S. v. S.R.G., 2006 SCC 37 (“D.B.S.”), at para. 38; Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24, at paras. 10, 41, 45, 77; Colucci v. Colucci, 2021 SCC 24, at para. 36).

2. Child support should, as much as possible, provide children with the same standard of living they enjoyed when their parents were together (D.B.S., at para. 38; Michel at para. 10).

3. The purpose and promise of child support are to protect the financial entitlements due to children by their parents (Michel, at para. 38). Having regard for this purpose, the law of child support calls for a “fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects” (Chartier v. Chartier, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 242 (S.C.C.), at para. 23, cited in Michel, at para. 40). These objects include serving the best interests of child. Accordingly, the best interests of the child should be at the heart of any interpretation of child support legislation and principles (Michel, at paras. 40, 102-103).

4. The law of child support should also be interpreted in a contextual and purposive approach that takes into account the policies and values of contemporary Canadian society (Michel, at paras, 71-72).

5. The amount of child support owed will vary based upon the income of the payor parent, and it is not confined to furnishing the “necessities of life” (D.B.S., at paras. 38-45; Michel, at para. 10; Colucci, at para. 28).

6. It is the responsibility of both parents to ensure that a payor parent satisfies their actual child support obligation. However, since child support is fundamentally the child’s right, the child should generally not be left to suffer if one or both parent fail to monitor child support payments vigilantly. Where either or both parents fail in their obligation, the court may grant relief to correct the failure (D.S.S.: Michel, at para. 47).

7. Ultimately, the goal in addressing child support issues is to ensure that children benefit from the support they are owed when they are owed it. Accordingly, any incentives for payor parents to be deficient in meeting their child support obligations should be eliminated (D.B.S., at para. 4; Michel, at para. 80; Colucci, at para. 4)”.

[21] In that same decision at paragraph 197, Justice Chappel then addressed and summarized the principles from the three major cases on retroactivity in child support as follows:

“ In D.B.S., Michel and Colucci, the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized that the foundational child support principles outlined above in paragraph 176 apply equally to retroactive child support claims. It also established the following additional core principles that apply to claims for retroactive child support relief:

1. Retroactive awards are not truly “retroactive” as that term is commonly understood, since they are simply a means of holding payors to the legal pre-existing, free standing obligation they always had to pay support commensurate with their income (D.B.S., at para. 2; Michel, at paras. 10, 41, 61, 79; Colucci, at para. 37).

And

“4. Unmet child support obligations are a valid debt, whether they are in the nature of arrears or they have not yet been determined and recognized by the court (Michel, at para. 76). While a child support debt may be forgiven by the court, it is nonetheless owed from the moment that it accrued, no matter the length of the delay in pursuing the debt (Michel, at para. 79). The courts should not treat child support as a lesser form of debt where debtors are entitled to an unusual leniency not afforded in other areas of creditor-debtor law (Michel, at para. 109).

5. Although retroactive child support awards involve the exercise of judicial discretion, they are not confined to exceptional circumstances or rare cases (D.B.S., at para. 97; Michel, at paras. 9, 61; Colucci, at para. 37).

6. While retroactive awards may result in unpredictability, this unpredictability is often justified by the fact that the payor parent chose to bring it upon themself. A retroactive award can always be avoided by appropriate action at the time the obligation to pay the support or increased amount of support first arose (D.B.S., at para. 97).”

[22] Justice Chappel then confirmed Sherr J.’s conclusion in M.A. v. M.E., 2021 ONCJ 555 (OCJ) that the same analytical framework applies to claims for retroactive child support in originating proceedings (as is the case before me).

[23] Further in that case, at paragraph 199, Chappel J. summarized the framework for retroactive child support claims as follows, and applied them to original applications:

“1. A presumption arises in favour of retroactively increasing child support in variation proceedings, or granting retroactive relief in original proceedings, starting from the date when the recipient gave the payor effective notice of their claim for relief, up to a maximum of three years prior to the date when the recipient gave formal notice of the claim to the payor. In claims for retroactive child support, effective notice requires only evidence that the recipient broached the subject of child support with the payor. Cases decided prior to Colucci held that to establish “effective notice,” there must be a reasonably identifiable date when the issue of support was raised. Vague assertions about having talked to the payor about support at some time in the past will not suffice (Hansen v. Clark, 2008 MBQB 324 (Q.B.), aff’d 2009 MBCA 69 (C.A.)).

2. Where no effective notice was given by the recipient, child support should presumptively be increased in variation proceedings, or granted in original proceedings, starting from the date when formal notice to the payor was given. In D.B.S., the court indicated that formal notice is not necessarily the commencement date of the proceeding, and that it could be some other type of formal notification to the payor of the request for support or an increase in support.

3. Once the court determines the presumptive date for the commencement of a retroactive child support award, it must then consider whether a departure from that date is required on the facts of the case to achieve a fair and just result (Colucci, at para. 71). This discretion includes the ability to extend the award further back in time than the soft general limit of three years before formal notice, particularly where a payor has engaged in blameworthy conduct (Colucci, at para. 45). In carrying out this discretionary analysis, the court should strive to achieve a fair balancing of the three interests at play in claims for retroactive relief, namely: the child’s interest in a fair standard of support; the payor’s interest in flexibility; and the interest of the child and recipient in certainty. It should also be guided by the four general considerations set out in D.B.S. (the “D.B.S. factors”), which the court has now elaborated upon and updated. These four factors are as follows: a) Whether the claimant had an understandable reason for the delay in giving effective notice of their claim or in seeking relief from the courts; b) The conduct of the payor parent; c) The circumstances of the child; and d) Any hardship that may result by granting a retroactive award.

4. None of the four discretionary D.B.S. factors are decisive. In weighing the factors, the court must keep in mind that a claim for retroactive support is for a legally enforceable debt, and should not treat child support as a lesser form of debt where debtors are entitled to unusual leniency not present in other areas of debtor-creditor law (see also Michel, at para. 109).

5. Once the court has determined that retroactive child support should be awarded from a particular date, the increase must be quantified. The proper amount of support for each year since the date of retroactivity must be calculated in accordance with the relevant legislation and Guidelines. (see also McMaster-Pereira v. Pereira, 2021 ONCA 547 (C.A.), at para. 23).

The framework set out above should be applied both to retroactive claims respecting the Table amount of support and contribution to section 7 expenses (Heatherington v. Tapping, 2007 BCSC 209 (BCSC), at para. 20; Smith v. Selig, 2008 NSCA 54 (C.A.), at paras. 25 – 26; Domik v. Ronco, 2013 ONCJ 1997 (O.C.J.), at para. 93).

The fact that a temporary order has been made in the court proceeding addressing support does not preclude the trial judge from retroactively adjusting the amount of support based on all of the evidence adduced at trial (Wharry v. Wharry, 2016 ONCA 930 (C.A.), at para. 62). The reason for this principle is that a temporary order is often based on a rough estimate of the payor’s income, without the benefit of full financial disclosure and cross examination at trial (Wharry, at para. 62).

[24] Chappel J. addressed the issue of delay which is a consideration in this case as well, beginning at paragraph 203 as follows:

The reasons for a recipient’s delay in raising the issue of child support and advancing a claim form part of the analysis in retroactive child support cases. In D.B.S., the Supreme Court of Canada held that in considering the issue of delay, the court must be sensitive to the practical concerns associated with pursuing child support proceedings. Subsequently, in McGouran v. Connelly, 2007 ONCA 578 (C.A.), at para. 17, the Ontario Court of Appeal emphasized that since the right to child support is that of the child, delay by the recipient in advancing a claim is merely one factor to consider in balancing the competing interests and determining the most appropriate course of action on the facts of the case (see also Brown v. Kucher, 2016 BCCA 267 (C.A.)).

In Michel, the Supreme Court of Canada clarified that the issue of delay by the recipient parent should not focus on whether there is a reasonable excuse for the claimant’s delay in giving notice of their claim, since “that language works to implicitly attribute blame onto parents who delay applications for child support” (at para. 111). It emphasized that delay in advancing a child support claim is not, in itself, inherently unreasonable, and that the appropriate question is whether the claimant has provided understandable reasons for the delay (at paras. 111, 113). A delay by the recipient will only be prejudicial to their claim if it is deemed to be unreasonable, “taking into account a generous appreciation of the social context in which the claimant’s decision to seek child support was made” including any concerns respecting family violence or access to justice challenges (Michel, at para. 113; see also D.B.S., at para. 101). In this regard, the court noted as follows at paragraph 87:

87 It is generally a good idea to seek child support as soon as practicable, but it is unfair to bar parents from applying for the financial support they are due because they put their safety and that of their children ahead of their financial needs or because they could not access justice earlier. Remember, "courts are not to be discouraged from defending the rights of children when they have the opportunity to do so" (S. (D.B.), at para. 60) and this requires taking into account the realities of those recipient parents for whom it is impossible, impracticable, or unsafe to apply for child support without some delay.

The Supreme Court of Canada has held that understandable reasons for delay in giving effective notice or commencing legal proceedings to advance a child support claim may include the following:

1. Fear of the support payor due to concerns respecting family violence or other factors;
2. Intimidation by the support payor;
3. Reasonable grounds to fear that the payor would react vindictively to raising the support issue, including advancing a claim or primary residence of the child;
4. Lack of financial means to commence a legal proceeding;
5. Mental, emotional or physical health challenges that impacted the recipient’s ability to deal with the child support issues;
6. The recipient’s inability to locate or contact the payor parent;
7. The fact that the support order was assigned to a government agency;
8. Inadequate legal advice; and
9. The conduct of the payor with respect to disclosure issues, since inadequate disclosure may create an information asymmetry that results in the recipient lacking the information required to determine whether action on their part is appropriate. (D.B.S., at para. 101; Michel, at paras. 83-87; Colucci, at para. 98)

[25] In A.E. v. A.E. the Court addressed the conduct of the payor at paragraph 208:

A payor’s efforts to pay what they can, to communicate about child support matters and to disclose income information on an ongoing basis are all factors that may support their position on the retroactive support issue (Colucci, at para. 113 (4)). On the other hand, the court has directed judges to take an expansive view of what constitutes “blameworthy conduct” in the context of analyzing a retroactive support claim, and has characterized the phrase as encompassing “anything that privileges the payor parent’s own interests over his/her child’s right to an appropriate amount of support” (D.B.S., at para. 106; Michel, at para. 115). It has stressed that a payor parent who knowingly avoids or diminishes their support obligation to their children should not be allowed to profit from such irresponsible conduct (D.B.S., at para. 60; Michel, at para. 31).

[209] In Michel, the court emphasized that in assessing a payor parent’s conduct for the purposes of the retroactive analysis, the focus should not be on the payor’s subjective intent in acting as they did in relation to child support issues. The payor’s intent may be a basis on which to increase blameworthiness, but the primary focus must remain on their actions and their consequences and whether they had the effect of privileging their own interests over the child’s right to support (Michel, at para. 118; see also Henderson, at para. 55).

Analysis

[26] The application of the framework set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in the three cases on this subject as summarized in A.E. v. A.E. leads to the inevitable conclusion that the retroactive adjustment of child support to reflect the actual income of the Respondent father, should go back to the mediation report in 2016, or at least to July 1 2017 when by his own agreement with the mediation report he was obligated to disclose his income and adjust child support. However, the Applicant has generously only sought adjustment back to 2018, so that is where it will commence.

[27] Retroactive support calculations will therefore commence from January 1, 2018, and apply to the entire period up to the date of this Final Order in this case, and prospective child support will apply from October 1, 2024, onwards.

[28] The Respondent has to be held responsible and liable to the legal framework for child support that has existed throughout their separation. He has, and has had, an obligation to pay child support based on his income, the number of children and the child support guidelines. It is a mystery how the amount of $450/month was ever used for child support in mediation, but at the time of the mediation the correct child support amount was $650/month, and almost immediately thereafter it was considerably higher. As stated, the Applicant is not seeking an increase for 2016 and 2017 so the Respondent will benefit by many thousands of dollars for this.

[29] Unmet child support obligations are indeed a debt as stated in the caselaw and will not be treated as less of a debt than Mr. Hemming’s BMW loan.

[30] I am not at all concerned with unpredictability occasioned by such an Order and am prepared to use my judicial discretion in these circumstances as the Respondent was earning over $70,000 for the years in question, while paying support in the amount of $650/month, based on an income of less than $45,000 per year. He was paying $7,800/year for two children, earning over $70,000, which was clearly to his benefit, and then he had the gall to stop paying anything and continued that for the past 4 years.

[31] Given the uncertainty and lack of proof of payments made until the Respondent ceased paying altogether, I will give him credit for paying the entire $650 each month in question until the date that he ceased all payments.

[32] I concur with Justice Sherr and Justice Chappel that the statutory framework applies to original applications such as this.

[33] The effective notice of the recipient’s claim could be said to have come at the time of the mediation, or at least as of July 1, 2017. In that mediation report, dated July 29, 2016, the parties agreed that “both parties agree that for as long as the children are eligible to receive child support, Mr. Hemmings shall provide updated income disclosure to the Applicant mother, annually by 30 June, in accordance with section 24.1 of the Ontario Child Support Guidelines……said change shall be implemented on 1 July of that same year”. By this agreement, the Applicant mother had asked for, and the Respondent father had agreed, that the father would provide yearly income disclosure and that child support would then be adjusted by July 1. I find that is notice of a claim.

[34] The agreement laid out in the mediation report is clear on this point. It provided for production of income information and adjustment yearly and this was not provided by the Respondent, nor did he increase his support as his income increased.

[35] In fact, according to the Respondent, when he did advise the Applicant of his increased income shortly after the end of mediation, he did not provide her with any proof of that income. The Applicant testified that she did in fact ask for income disclosure through the years from 2016 to 2020 and was not provided it. This would be effective notice as well. But either way, the onus was on the Respondent to produce his income proof and he clearly did not do so.

[36] The decision in A.E. v. A.E. confirms that “effective notice requires only evidence that the recipient broached the subject of child support with the payor”. I find that this was done repeatedly and effective notice was given, prior to January 1 2018 which is the date on which the Applicant seeks retroactive adjustments.

[37] I also find that the “soft general limit” of three years is inapplicable here. I might have had a very different view of this, but for the Respondent’s blameworthy conduct. Based on some concerns over some parenting issues and his demand upon the Applicant to “come clean” with him, he ceased all payments as of June 2020 and by his own admission has made no child support payments since then. This completely removes him from being given any discretionary relief from this Court.

[38] He has also failed to pay a cost order against him for the past 9 months.

[39] Additionally, the failure to produce income disclosure as is required by the mediation agreement, by law and by common sense, is also blameworthy conduct. He had to have known that his child support payments would increase, and as he had control over that information, his refusal to share it is blameworthy.

[40] His failure to provide timely disclosure throughout the court process, despite several court orders, is further evidence of this blameworthy conduct.

[41] Finally, his own sworn financial statement which was finally produced in May 2024 shows an excess of income over expenses totalling about $10,000 per year, yet he paid no child support.

[42] As of 2020, the Applicant had the primary care of two children, earning far less than the Respondent, and the Respondent ceased paying even the inappropriately low amount of child support that he had been paying. His children undoubtedly suffered financial hardship from this. He is the author of his own misfortune in this regard. In fact, it is unclear whether the Applicant would have ever brought the matter to Court if the respondent had continued paying that very low amount of child support. Certainly, he might have had a better chance at being given some discretionary relief from this Court if he had not engaged in such bad conduct.

[43] It is not even possible to consider the fourth ground of the DBS factors, “hardship that may result from granting a retroactive award”, given that the Respondent has gone over 4 years of paying nothing in child support, thereby benefitting by many thousands of dollars each year. His financial statement show that he has a net gain of income over expenses each year of about $10,000.00. It is time to “pay the piper”.

[44] In fact, the Respondent’s financial statement actually acknowledges a debt of child support to the Applicant in the amount of $40,000, so there is some awareness of this, yet no corresponding payment. If he had paid anything approaching reasonable over the past 4 years, he might have engendered some sympathy. But he has not. Instead, he purchased a BMW automobile. He continues to pay $600/month on this vehicle, even though it is no longer in his possession and he has a company vehicle to drive. He is going to have get his priorities sorted out. Children come first.

[45] The reasons for the delay in proceeding with the Court Application are simple. The Applicant could not have easily afforded legal representation on her income, she was receiving some child support and the conduct of the Respondent in not providing her with financial disclosure ensured that she didn’t know what, if any, increase in child support was applicable, and whether it would be worth the cost of retaining a lawyer to pursue it. She was left blind to this and could not have determined whether pursuing this was appropriate without this information. It was only after the complete termination of support by the Respondent that she was forced to act.

[46] Basing this on the Applicant’s request for retroactivity only to January 1 2018, which as I have stated is quite generous, and based on the Respondent having actually paid $650/month for every month from January 1 2018 until May 2020, which is giving him a significant benefit of the doubt, and based on his income information filed by the Respondent and using the child support guidelines for 2 children on those incomes, I calculate the retroactive child support owing as follows:

2018 $7,800 paid, $12,600 owing – arrears $4,800 2019 $7,800 paid, $13,116 owing – arrears $5,316 2020 $3,250 paid, $13,560 owing – arrears $10,310 2021 $0 paid, $13,392 owing – arrears $13,392 2022 $0 paid, $13,500 owing – arrears $13,500 2023 $0 paid, $14,172 owing – arrears $14,172 2024 $0 paid, $10,629 owing (to September 1) – arrears $10,629

[47] Therefore, the total retroactive arrears of child support payable by the Respondent to the Applicant as of September 2024 are fixed at $72,119.00.

[48] The Applicant generously suggested that payments on arrears be just over $800/month. I disagree. At $1,000 per month these will be paid off in 6 years, which is a more appropriate schedule.

[49] Based on their current incomes but taking into account the uncertainty of the Applicant in calculating her income from gratuities, s.7 expenses which are agreed upon in advance, such agreement not to be unreasonably withheld, shall be apportioned 75% to the Respondent and 25% to the Applicant.

[50] Order to go as follows: a. Respondent shall pay retroactive child support to the Applicant in the amount of $72,119.00, payable at the rate of $1,000.00 per month commencing October 1, 2024. b. Based on his current income of $78,294, as provided by the Respondent’s employer, the guidelines child support for two children is $1,186/month, which he shall pay commencing October 1, 2024. c. S. 7 expenses which are agreed upon in advance, such agreement not to be unreasonably withheld, shall be apportioned 75% to the Respondent and 25% to the Applicant. d. Support Deduction to issue. e. The parties shall exchange Notices of Assessment and Income Tax Returns each year by June 1 with adjustments to child support and/or s.7 apportionment by July 1 each year.

[51] If the parties agree to make costs submissions this day, I will entertain them. Otherwise, a date can be arranged with the trial coordinator for a one-hour time slot to address costs.

Justice Mountford Released: September 26, 2024