COURT FILE NO.: FC-12-1007-02 DATE: 20241023 CORRECTED DATE: 20241023

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

M.M.B. Applicant – and – C.M.V. Respondent

Counsel: Unrepresented (for the Applicant) Kristin Normandin and Jared Teitel, for the Respondent

HEARD: June 5, 2024

Corrected Decision: The text of the original decision was corrected on October 23, 2024 and the description of the correction is appended.

REASONS FOR DECISION

J.P.L. McDermot

Introduction

[1] This is the latest chapter in long and tortuous litigation that these parties have undergone over the years since they separated in 2011 after an 11 year marriage. It is hoped that it is the last although I am not optimistic. They are not the only ones who have been affected by this battle; they have three children, two of whom are now adults. These children, A.I. born June 13, 2003 (now 21 years of age), A.C. born July 13, 2005 (now 19 years of age) and R.E. born May 7, 2007 (now 17 years of age) have also remained involved in the ongoing war between these parents as evidenced by affidavits sworn by A.I. and A.C. in this proceeding and filed by C.M.V. as part of his evidence.

[2] The Applicant, M.M.B. is the mother of the three children and the original applicant in these proceedings; the Respondent, C.M.V. is the father of the children. The Applicant presently works as a teacher for the Simcoe County Board of Education; the father is the chief of the Mississauga Fire Department.

[3] Notwithstanding the long duration of this litigation, there are only two extensions to this file. In the first, the parties originally settled their parenting issues by final court order of Corkery J. dated November 15, 2013. Although largely irrelevant today, that order provided for shared care of the children and for a parenting coordinator (who quickly resigned after the Respondent lost faith in him). Child support was also settled by final consent order of Wildman J. dated April 28, 2014. Post separation adjustments and equalization were referred to an arbitrator but that process also collapsed.

[4] The parenting arrangement arrived at in the Corkery J. order, which was a shared care arrangement, also did not last. The children became increasingly estranged from their mother to the point that they were insulting and abusive to her and refused to see her. The Applicant Mother brought a motion to change the final parenting order of Corkery J. and child support under the second order of Wildman J. Bennett J. heard a 14 day trial in Barrie in May and June, 2017. He did not make a final order; he found that the Respondent Father had seriously alienated the children and, on a temporary basis, imposed what is sometimes referred to as the nuclear option, a complete break by the children from their father and sole custody and decision making to the Applicant Mother. Bennett J. seized himself of the matter and, over the course of the next five years, issued some 40 different endorsements in the matter. Throughout much of this time, the children were restricted to three hour visits with their father; eventually at the request of their lawyer appointed through the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, the children’s parenting time to their father was increased to every second weekend.

[5] The Respondent Father lost faith in Bennett J. to make objective decisions and withdrew from the process although he brought the matter before the Divisional Court on two occasions, one of which was a request by him for Bennett J. to be recused from the process. Those attempts were rebuffed, and the Divisional Court refused to intervene. Eventually, however, Bennett J. stepped back and a final focused hearing on parenting issues and support was held before Justice Sutherland of this court on December 9, 10 and 15, 2021 with a final order finally being made in that motion to change on February 7, 2022.

[6] By the time of that decision, A.I. was an adult and not subject to any parenting order. A.C. was 17 and was permitted by Sutherland J. to withdraw from the parenting regime as ordered by the court. Sutherland J. ordered that the shared care regime set out in the original order of Corkery J. resume concerning R.E., who was not permitted to withdraw from that order until he entered Grade 12, due to take place in September, 2024 when he was 17 years of age. Significantly, Sutherland J. determined that R.E. could not unilaterally withdraw from the parenting order at age 17; he ordered that a motion to allow him to withdraw should be brought by either party on or after August 1, 2023, the month prior to R.E. entering Grade 11:

R.E. will be subject to the regular parenting schedule in paragraph (a) above until further Order of this Court. The parents and/or R.E. may bring a Motion to Change to attempt to have R.E. released from the schedule after August 1st of the year that R.E. is entering grade 11. [1]

[7] As was the case with many other orders of this court, that provision was not followed by either party. R.E. determined during the summer or fall of 2023 (depending upon whose version is to be believed), that he would reside full time at his father’s residence. M.M.B. says that this occurred at the suggestion of the Respondent; the Respondent denies this in his materials and he was never cross examined on that issue. In any event, R.E. has been living primarily at his father’s since sometime between June and November, 2023. As pointed out by M.M.B. wherever she can, this residency is contrary to the shared care orders of Corkery J. made in 2014 and Sutherland J. made in 2022.

[8] When Sutherland J. addressed this matter, A.I. was attending university and he found that she would live in both parties’ care during the summer months. He assumed the same for A.C. who was released from the parenting order and was then entering Grade 12. He had ordered R.E. to remain in a shared care arrangement until further order and his child support order was based upon the children remaining in the parties’ shared care. The Respondent Father had nearly two times the Applicant’s income and he was ordered to pay differential child support in the amount of $1,850 per month commencing January 1, 2022.

[9] No one has brought any sort of proceeding to address the issue of R.E.’s residency. C.M.V. says that he attempted to renegotiate child support on numerous occasions beginning on November 9, 2022; because the Applicant was unresponsive, he commenced this motion to change child support on August 21, 2023. He did not request a change in R.E.’s residency; he only asked for child support to address the change in his residency. M.M.B. also did not ask for any relief on the parenting issues; specifically, she did not agree with or request any change in the parenting regime for R.E. or seek to enforce Justice Sutherland’s shared care order. She again only responded to the request for a change in child support, stating that because the parenting order was not changed and due to the behavior of the Respondent Father, the child support should not be changed. The parenting issues concerning R.E. are not an issue for this court. The other two children are now adults; no parenting order can or will be made concerning those children.

[10] Unfortunately, M.M.B. also did not agree to adjusting support on an interim basis. Since the change in residency, C.M.V. has been paying child support to the Applicant even though the children are all living in his care, the two adult children during their summer months away from university and the youngest child full time. The Respondent only obtained a stay in the child support that he was paying on consent at the settlement conference on August 4, 2024 (even though this issue was addressed much earlier by the Dispute Resolution Officer on November 1, 2023). From the Respondent’s perspective, this means that, not only has he significantly overpaid child support; he also is owed child support for the time that the three children have been in his care by reason of their decisions to live with him.

[11] M.M.B. says that the Respondent, by his bad faith behavior, cannot seek child support from this court. Although she is now acknowledging that no child support is payable, she seeks an order that there should be no overpayment and no arrears of base guideline child support. She bases this on:

a. The Respondent’s failure to bring a motion to release R.E. from the order of Justice Sutherland; b. The fact that she paid the child support that she received to the children, leaving her to cover the costs of the children and the home that she maintains for the children from her own resources; and c. The issue of hardship: she says that the litigation has been financially exhausting to her and that she now has two mortgages and a line of credit resulting from the Respondent’s bad litigation conduct throughout and was unable to afford counsel for this trial. d. Regarding the s. 7 university expenses, she notes that the Respondent relies upon his RESPs to pay his share of the expenses, RESPs that were accumulated by reason of his underpayment of child support in the past and his failure to pay his costs of the trial on a timely basis.

[12] The Respondent responds by saying that this case should be nothing other than a mathematical exercise and that the recent changes in the children’s care were not a result of his behavior and in any event is irrelevant to the issue of child support. Moreover, he says that he eventually paid all amounts due under the costs awards and child support awards of Bennett J. and the Applicant therefore has nothing to complain about. He says that what the Applicant spent the child support on was her business; his job was to pay the support (which he continued to do notwithstanding the children living with him) and what the Applicant did with it was her business. Her hardship is not the result of anything other than the protracted nature of the litigation and he has paid everything owing under the orders to the Applicant.

Issues

[13] The issues in this case resolve themselves down to the following:

a. Is there a material change in circumstances since the order of Sutherland J. dated February 7, 2022? b. Does the Respondent’s behavior, even if it is in bad faith, affect the payment of child support by the Applicant? c. If not, is there a right to a retroactive award, both as to section 7 expenses and as to base child support, including an an adjustment for an overpayment of support by the Respondent? d. What is the ongoing base child support payable? e. What are the ongoing s. 7 contributions by each of the parties?

Analysis

[14] This endorsement will firstly review the statutory foundation for this motion to change. Once done, the specific issues will be addressed in turn.

Statutory Framework

[15] These parties are divorced. As discussed by Sutherland J. in his endorsement, the jurisdiction for this motion to change lies under s. 17 of the Divorce Act. [2]

[16] The provisions relevant to the variation of child support in this case in s. 17 are as follows:

17 (1) A court of competent jurisdiction may make an order varying, rescinding or suspending, retroactively or prospectively,

(a) a support order or any provision of one, on application by either or both former spouses;

(3) The court may include in a variation order any provision that under this Act could have been included in the order in respect of which the variation order is sought, and the court has the same powers and obligations that it would have when making that order.

(4) Before the court makes a variation order in respect of a child support order, the court shall satisfy itself that a change of circumstances as provided for in the applicable guidelines has occurred since the making of the child support order or the last variation order made in respect of that order.

(6) In making a variation order, the court shall not take into consideration any conduct that under this Act could not have been considered in making the order in respect of which the variation order is sought.

(6.1) A court making a variation order in respect of a child support order shall do so in accordance with the applicable guidelines.

(6.2) Notwithstanding subsection (6.1), in making a variation order in respect of a child support order, a court may award an amount that is different from the amount that would be determined in accordance with the applicable guidelines if the court is satisfied

(a) that special provisions in an order, a judgment or a written agreement respecting the financial obligations of the spouses, or the division or transfer of their property, directly or indirectly benefit a child, or that special provisions have otherwise been made for the benefit of a child; and

(b) that the application of the applicable guidelines would result in an amount of child support that is inequitable given those special provisions.

(6.3) Where the court awards, pursuant to subsection (6.2), an amount that is different from the amount that would be determined in accordance with the applicable guidelines, the court shall record its reasons for having done so.

[17] Under this section, unless s. 17(6.2) applies, the court is bound to make a support order in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines [3] (the “Guidelines” or “CSGs”). Moreover, the section provides that the conduct of the parties is irrelevant to a child support order.

[18] There were no special provisions agreed to between the parties and therefore s. 17(6.2) is inapplicable.

[19] As set out in s. 3, the CSGs provide that child support shall be paid according to the table amounts appended to the Guidelines as well as the s. 7 expenses. A relevant provision of the CSGs is s. 3(2) which provides that support for a child over the age of majority shall be according to the table amount, or, “if the court considers that approach to be inappropriate, the amount that it considers appropriate, having regard to the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the child and the financial ability of each spouse to contribute to the support of the child.”

[20] The decision of Sutherland J. contained an extensive analysis of the factors for support in shared care arrangements as set out in s. 9 of the CSGs and Contino v. Leonelli-Contino, 2005 SCC 63, [2005] S.C.J. No. 65. However, subject to the conduct issues to be discussed below, the issue of shared care is no longer relevant as the children now live full time with the Respondent Father. Shared care can only be characterized, at best, as to what the arrangement should be rather than what is actually is.

Change in Circumstances

[21] It is clear from s. 17(4) of the Divorce Act that the court must find a material change in circumstances before a variation proceeding can go ahead on the merits.

[22] Although the order of Sutherland J. provides an annual review by the parties of child support and for the calculation of s. 7 expenses, it does not provide for the support to be reviewable by the court. The furthest it goes is to allow for the matter be dealt with by the case management judge (Neither party requested the appointment of a case management judge as permitted by the Sutherland J. order and Justice Krause case managed this case only to the extent that she conducted a settlement conference and set it down for trial).

[23] M.M.B. says that there has been no change in her circumstances since the Sutherland J. order. She says that the children continue to come for overnight visits and she still has to maintain a home that the children can come to. She says that she purchased the home that she is in, which has four bedrooms, so that the children can each have their own room when in her care.

[24] The financial circumstances of one party are only one material change which may affect support. In the present case, there have been a number of departures from the assumptions made by Sutherland J. since the order was made. The first is that the children are all residing with the Respondent, the older two children in the summer and R.E. since 2023. That significantly changes the complexion of the child support payable; in fact, C.M.V. has been continuing to pay base child support for children who are living with him. The second is that the parties have been unable to agree on s. 7 expenses for the university expenses for A.I. and A.C. Because of this, the case management judge set the issue down for trial.

[25] M.M.B. says there cannot be a change in circumstances as the order has not been varied by the Respondent as he was obliged to do under the Sutherland J. final order. She says that, as the order has not been varied, the care of the children therefore remains shared and there has been no change which would permit a change in the final order.

[26] Regarding the older two children, they are now residing with their father during the summer months as disclosed in their affidavits. Although they do acknowledge overnight visits to their mother’s home, there is little doubt that their primary residence is with their father during the summer months. Justice Sutherland’s order presumed that they would continue to live in a shared arrangement during the summer but that did not occur. Both of the older two children are now adults and the parenting orders have no bearing on their situation. This alone would be a sufficient change in circumstances concerning the order.

[27] Regarding R.E., I will review this situation in depth under the issues concerning the Respondent’s conduct, an issue which is extremely important for the Applicant. However, although the de jure parenting of R.E. remains shared, that is not factually the case. R.E. exercised his own autonomy in deciding to live at his father’s home and it may very well be that forcing the Respondent to bring proceedings to change the parenting order may have been a waste of money and judicial resources considering the child’s age of 16 years when he made that choice. As stated by Perkins J. in L.(N.) v. M(R.R.), 2016 ONSC 809 at para. 137:

If it is not already apparent from the preceding pages, I will say so expressly here: I have been struggling with how to balance or reconcile the powers and duties of the court under the Divorce Act to make custody and access orders in the best interests of the children, on the one hand, with, on the other hand, the children’s growing entitlement to personal autonomy and respect of their views and preferences.

[28] The views and preferences of an older child often therefore result in an order that is not necessarily in that child’s best interests. The court must recognize that a 16 year old child has a great deal of autonomy and can make decisions that may not be best for him or her. However, the legislature in this province has confirmed the autonomy of a 16 year old child in legislation affecting children: for example under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, [4] the court’s ability to make a residential placement or an access order concerning a child over the age of 16 years is quite limited and most often requires the consent of the child.

[29] Moreover, even if the court order provides for shared care, the wording in s. 17(4) only requires a “change of circumstances as provided for in the applicable guidelines”. In my view, the word “circumstances” refers to the factual circumstances concerning the child’s residency, which is what governs payment of child support under those Guidelines irrespective of the outstanding court order. The section read with the Guidelines is intended to address changes in the actual circumstances of the child and not necessarily in the outstanding court order. For example, it may take some time to get before a court to confirm a change in the residential arrangements concerning a child and it would work an injustice to delay an interim adjustment of child support to reflect the new residential status because of those delays.

[30] I therefore find that there has been a material change in circumstances which permits the court to proceed with this motion to change.

Conduct Issues

[31] The Applicant’s position regarding conduct can be best summarized by the Applicant’s own words in para. 19 of her written final submissions:

There should be not back support or changes for [R.E.]. [C.M.V.] chose not to appeal the order of Justice Sutherland which very clearly stated only the court could release [R.E.] from the Order. [C.M.V.] couldn’t file a Motion to Change Parenting because his own nefarious behaviour and defiance of court orders would have not likely granted him success in doing so, because he has not changed his behaviour as he said he would. This is the exact continued behaviour Justice Sutherland was concerned about and why only the court could release [R.E.] from the Order without agreement. Yet [C.M.V.] went against the Order anyway and released [R.E.] himself. During my testimony I said I was still asking why [C.M.V.] had not returned [R.E]. as per the order in October 2023, [R.E.] was still spending time at both homes then, albeit not on a week-on week-off basis at that point but on his own varied schedule.

[32] For the Applicant, alienation and the influence brought to bear on the children by the Respondent are not limited to R.E. The Applicant also alleges that the two older children, A.I. and A.E., are alienated from her and that their affidavits be given no weight. She says that A.I. complained that her job (which she obtained through the Respondent’s wife) was threatened by the Applicant’s court materials and she demanded a “retraction”. She also refused to provide her university expenses to the Applicant directly. M.M.B. says that both of these events were a result of influence and alienation by the Respondent. She fails to account for the fact that the affidavits produced by the children were prepared by their own lawyer (the children’s lawyer in the last variation proceedings) and that they were prompted by the Applicant’s refusal to provide a detailed and meaningful response to the Respondent’s request to admit which was directed at establishing the children’s residency.

[33] The issue of parental alienation therefore looms large in the affidavits filed by the Applicant. The word often used by the Applicant in her affidavits in connection with the Respondent’s actions is “nefarious”, which appears multiple times in both her affidavits. And it does appear that the Respondent was in breach of the order of Sutherland J., in failing to bring an application to release R.E. from the order and apparently telling the Applicant and R.E. that R.E. was released from the order upon turning 16. It may very well be inferred that this gave R.E. the encouragement and incentive he needed to move in with his father, which was his preferred residence at this time.

[34] There are other examples of breaches by the Respondent of the order of Sutherland J., often respecting holiday time and regarding drop offs for family holidays. One example is last Easter, when the Respondent decided to take the children on Thursday night even though the Easter break belonged to M.M.B. this year. He was unrepentant about this, asking M.M.B., in an email “Where in the order does it say that the Easter exchange is Thursday? Which paragraph?” However, he ignores the fact that M.M.B. was given the Easter weekend this year and it is not the order but the calendar which says that the Easter weekend begins with the Good Friday holiday and a plain reading of the order confirms that the exchange should have been the Thursday night prior to the commencement of the holiday.

[35] M.M.B. is also correct that the emails and communications by the Respondent Father are insulting and disrespectful to her. My review of those emails confirms that Justice Sutherland was correct when he expressed doubts about whether C.M.V. had actually changed and was remorseful as he expressed during the focused trial in December, 2021. I agree that C.M.V. considers himself a gatekeeper and continues to control the s. 7 university expenses as he has always tried to control things throughout. In essence, I agree with the Applicant that the Respondent continues to act poorly and pays little attention to the court orders that have been made by this court which confirms the findings made by Bennett J. and the ongoing concerns of Sutherland J.

[36] The real issue, however, is whether this affects base child support. It is without a doubt that the two older children have been living with their father when they return for their summer break from university. I do not choose to disregard their affidavits which speak to this issue; they are adults and they had the assistance of their own lawyer, someone they trusted and who had assisted them through very difficult litigation, in preparing those affidavits. They confirm that they were not prompted or influenced by their father when they prepared those affidavits. Under the circumstances, I am prepared to take them at their word when they provide evidence to the court regarding their residential arrangements.

[37] It is also without a doubt that R.E. is living primarily with his father. It is correct that the Respondent did not take steps as ordered by Justice Sutherland to release R.E. from the order. However, the failure to do so does not change R.E.’s de facto residence even though his de jure residence remains with both parents. It is not as if the child’s expenses remain with the Applicant even when R.E., howsoever improperly, moved in with his father. And although the Respondent should have brought the parenting proceedings contemplated by Sutherland J., the Applicant also failed to bring enforcement proceedings concerning that order.

[38] Therefore, the issue is whether, at law and considering that R.E.’s residence has not been sanctioned by the courts, child support is now payable by the Applicant Mother to C.M.V. I believe that it is.

[39] The starting point is that child support does not belong to the primary residence parent; it is the right and entitlement of the child as it enriches the household in which the child lives in. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada has long confirmed and on several occasions that child support is the right of the child and not the parent: see Richardson v. Richardson, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 857 at para. 13. Although Richardson was decided more than 30 years ago, it remains good law today. It was cited with approval in the seminal case of S. (D.B.) v. G. (S.R.), 2006 SCC 37 by Basterache J. who, writing for the majority, stated [at para. 38]:

These core principles animate the support obligations that parents have towards their children. They include: child support is the right of the child; the right to support survives the breakdown of a child's parents' marriage; child support should, as much as possible, provide children with the same standard of living they enjoyed when their parents were together; and finally, the specific amounts of child support owed will vary based upon the income of the payor parent.

[40] Moreover, ensuring payment of the proper amount of child support is seen as the responsibility of both parents and not as an entitlement to either: at para. 60, Basterache stated that:

No child support analysis should ever lose sight of the fact that support is the right of the child: Richardson, at p. 869. Where one or both parents fail to vigilantly monitor child support payment amounts, the child should not be left to suffer without a remedy.

[41] Therefore, if the child is a “child of the marriage” within the meaning of the Divorce Act, child support is not seen as a benefit to the recipient parent. The recipient, in seeking child support, is effectively acting on behalf of the child to enforce the child’s rights to support. Wilson J. confirmed at para. 14 in Richardson that “the fact that child support will indirectly benefit the spouse cannot decrease the quantum awarded to the child.” Irrespective of his poor conduct, C.M.V. is still responsible to collect and obtain for R.E. the child support that he is entitled to under the Divorce Act and the CSGs. No one else is.

[42] The Applicant insists that, prior to changing child support, C.M.V. should have brought the proceedings under which R.E. would be released from the shared care arrangement ordered by Justice Sutherland. However, as noted above, the Applicant speaks a lot in her materials of the Respondent’s “contempt” under the order yet does not seek a finding of contempt in this proceeding or try to enforce in any way Justice Sutherland’s parenting order. She does not seek in her Response to the Motion to Change a stay of C.M.V.’s proceedings pursuant to rule 1(8) although she again mentions this in her evidence and in her factum. In fact, in explaining why she did not seek to enforce the order, she also confirms the inevitability of R.E. exercising his autonomy to reside with his father:

I did express concern and take action, which can be seen in my many emails to [C.M.V.] asking for our children to be returned for my parenting time. Unfortunately, I can't ask for a court order to make [C.M.V.] follow an existing court order, so I didn't feel there was anything I could take it back to court for other than police enforcement on the existing order, which would obviously not be possible with [R.E.'s] age. [5]

[43] M.M.B. said the same thing during her cross examination by Ms. Normandin.

[44] Those statements were incorrect. The exact point of attempting to enforce the order is to have a party comply with an existing court order. However, M.M.B. also confirmed that R.E.’s own views and preferences made enforcement of the order by the police impractical. It would presumably be the same result if the court ordered R.E. to live with both partie; he may very well ignore that order. R.E. wants to live with his father and may do so irrespective of what the court orders. As succinctly stated by Justice Sutherland in his endorsement regarding A.C.,

He then will be making good and bad decisions. Decisions that he will have to live with and deal with. That is life. This is the ongoing maturity of individuals. The Court sees A.C. as no different [from A.I.]. [6]

[45] M.M.B. says that, in fact, R.E. has no autonomy because he is so heavily influenced by the alienating behaviour of his father. However, again I respectfully disagree. As stated by Perkins J. in L. (N.) v. M. (R.R.), supra [at para. 140], when considering a 15 year old child who was homeless because he refused to comply with an order that he live with his father, “ [t] he wishes of an alienated child may be warped and misconceived, but they are nonetheless real.” Children over 16 have a great deal of autonomy and, as stated by Sutherland J., sometimes make bad decisions. However, they make decisions and R.E. has made his.

[46] Notably, I also cannot make a finding on whether R.E. is heavily influenced because neither parent has brought any claim concerning R.E.’s residence. There is no evidence before the court as to the independence of R.E.’s views and preferences other than the competing and contradictory evidence of each of the parents. Because of the lack of a parenting claim by either party, there is no evidence from the Office of the Children’s Lawyer or otherwise as to whether the Respondent’s influence is sufficient to ignore R.E.’s views and preferences. I am therefore not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that R.E.’s views and preferences are not independent.

[47] I also have some doubts that these children are in fact, “alienated” within the classic definition of the term. These children are not in the place that they were in in 2017. They are seeing both parents and both A.C. and R.E. spend overnights at their mother’s home. There was evidence that M.M.B. plays golf with A.I. and sees her regularly. The two older children confirmed this in their affidavits. The Applicant says that she needs to retain the home she has so that the children can spend overnights in her care. These children do not appear to be alienated from their mother; they appear to prefer to live at their father’s residence for their own reasons and to see their mother when they want.

[48] And even if they were alienated, conduct has little to do with payment of child support. In Starr v. Starr, 2008 MBQB 305, Rivoalen J. considered cross-motions to vary child support. In this case, the parties had nominal joint custody pursuant to a consent agreed upon when the two children were minors. Despite this agreement, the children resided exclusively with their mother. Their father made many unsuccessful attempts to reestablish contact. All of the independent witnesses and experts shared the view that the mother had contributed to the children’s alienation from their father: at para. 41. Each parent applied for retroactive changes of support.

[49] The court held estrangement and alienation issues are irrelevant to the payment of support concerning a minor child: at para. 32, Rivoalen J. states:

Arguments based on estrangement have no place in cases where the support of a minor child is concerned. In this context the relationship that exists between a parent and his or her child has no bearing on the obligation to pay support. The quality of the child-parent relationship, or even its non-existence, is irrelevant to the obligation. The interests of the parent give way to interests of the child.

[50] This was, strictly speaking, a statement made in obiter as the children in this case were adults. However, the issue of the adult children is relevant to this case as well; Rivoalen says that the issue of estrangement for adult children is relevant but only to a degree: at para. 35, she stated:

There is no quid pro quo; child support is not exchanged for access. When dealing with adult children, this remains true. This is one reason why the estrangement of an adult child does not operate automatically or inevitably to extinguish the support obligation for that child. A non-custodial parent may have no access to an estranged adult child, and yet the law will in appropriate circumstances recognize and impose a support obligation. The furtherance of an adult child's education is just one easily identified societal goal that is fostered by the imposition of such an obligation.

[51] Similarly, in D’Silva v. King, 2017 ONSC 6932, LaLiberté J. considered the applicant mother’s claim for retroactive child support increases. The respondent father’s ability to communicate with or visit the children, who lived out of province with the mother, was frustrated by their mother’s lack of cooperation and refusal to facilitate. Nevertheless, the court found that there was no link between child support obligations and access. At para. 21, the court confirmed that “Conduct respecting access is not relevant to child support.”

[52] In the present case, there is no estrangement and all of their children have, from the evidence, a positive relationship with the Applicant Mother. For the older children, Sutherland J. determined in 2022 their entitlement to child support when in university. However, because they are adults, it is their behaviour, not the Respondent’s, that is important. In the present case, they have not repudiated the relationship between themselves and the Respondent Mother which is a high bar and a requirement for their support to end because of their behaviour: see Makdissi v. Masson, 2017 ONSC 6498 at para. 30 and Beach v. Tolstoy, 2015 ONSC 7248, at para. 39.

[53] I therefore do not find that the Respondent’s conduct, howsoever objectionable, is relevant to child support. The support that is payable for the children belongs to the children and should not be affected by parental conduct. Moreover, these children are not “alienated” in my opinion; although the Respondent may influence them, the children still see their mother and have a good relationship with her. The fact that the parenting order for shared care has not been changed, the reality of the situation is that the youngest child, still a minor, lives with the father and support is payable for him by the Applicant Mother.

[54] This is relevant to the case cited by M.M.B. respecting conduct, Colford v. Colford, [2005] O.J. No. 1537 (S.C.J.). In her factum, she cites this as a case that supports the proposition that a recipient parent’s alienating conduct can result in a reduction or elimination of a child support obligation. That case is distinguishable from the present case. Firstly, it concerns support payable to an adult child and does not speak to the base child support payable in respect of R.E. which constitutes the lion’s share of the arrears claimed against the Applicant. Moreover, much lies in the first lines of paragraph 96 of that decision cited by the Applicant where Goodman J. states that the cases show that “ where one parent had contributed to the other’s parent’s (sic.) lack of a relationship with the child, the court either (1) ordered no child support at all or (2) required the payer parent to contribute toward the child’s post-secondary education in some respect, but did not order that an ongoing monthly amount be paid toward the interfering parent’s household…” In the Colford case, there was evidence of vitriolic exchanges between the payor and the child, whose behaviour the judge called “hateful”; even then Goodman J. was not prepared to blame the child for the estrangement. That is not the situation in the present case where the children have not repudiated their relationship with their mother. They have not come near to crossing the line where the payment of support in respect of an adult child would be affected by their behaviour. I do not find that this case supports the proposition that the Respondent’s conduct, on its own, would affect the payment of base child support under the Guidelines.

[55] I do not find that the conduct of the Respondent affects his right to base child support concerning the children in his care. The children in this case are therefore entitled to the base child support owed to them at law as prescribed by the Divorce Act and the Guidelines.

Retroactive Child Support

[56] The Respondent claims a large retroactive award of child support which includes a claim for repayment of the support that the Respondent paid to the Applicant when the children were living with him. These claims for retroactive child support include claims for both base guideline child support and for s. 7 expenses. I will address those in turn.

Base Guideline Child Support

[57] There are a number of issues under this heading. The first is when the support award should kick in and the retroactivity of that award. The court must then make findings as to the residency of the children. Finally, the court must consider the hardship arguments raised by the Applicant after which the support must be quantified.

Retroactivity

[58] The first major issue respecting base Guideline child support is when the Respondent gave “effective notice” of his request to change the child support ordered by Sutherland J. on February 7, 2022. Pursuant to S.(D.B.) v.G.(S.R.), supra, effective notice is the date from which child support can be adjusted. Bastarache J. stated [at para. 121],

By “effective notice”, I am referring to any indication by the recipient parent that child support should be paid, or if it already is, that the current amount of child support needs to be re-negotiated. Thus, effective notice does not require the recipient parent to take any legal action; all that is required is that the topic be broached. Once that has occurred, the payor parent can no longer assume that the status quo is fair, and his/her interest in certainty becomes less compelling.

[59] The evidence shows that effective notice of the change in the status quo, presumably that the two older children were now living with the Respondent during the summer months rather than being in a shared arrangement, took place through an Our Family Wizard message sent by the Respondent to the Applicant on November 9, 2022. [7]

[60] However, it is clear from Justice Sutherland’s order that the parties should have reviewed the support in May, 2022 with a change effective June 1 of that year. However, at the time of that review the only change was in the incomes of the parties and the other changes in residency, that of A.I. living for the summer at her father’s residence, and A.C.’s change in residency which only took place in August, 2022, had not then taken place. The changes in residency would not have been reflected in the annual review that would have taken place in May, 2022.

[61] I therefore find that the earliest date for the adjustment of base child support is November 9, 2022 which is the date of effective notice by the Respondent.

Residency of the Children

[62] The second issue to be determined is when R.E. moved in full time with his father. Unlike the two older children, who have confirmed that they live with their father in their respective affidavits, R.E. has not done this. Because neither party raised the issue of R.E.’s residency in this motion to change, there is no independent verification by counsel or by the OCL as to R.E.’s residency or when that changed.

[63] C.M.V. has confirmed in his materials that R.E. has been living with him since June, 2023. He provided detailed charts as to the residency of the children which indicated that R.E. had, been living with him on a full time basis in May, 2023 when R.E. turned 16 and he had finished Grade 10 and was going into Grade 11. [8] This was when Sutherland J. indicated in his decision that either party could bring proceedings so that R.E. could be released from the order (which was to take place no earlier than when R.E. was entering Grade 12 in 2024); however, as noted above, no one brought an application to change R.E.’s residence (and M.M.B. says that the Respondent “released” R.E. from the order himself without permission from the court).

[64] Moreover, in the Applicant’s own evidence, she says that R.E. told her in May, 2023 that he did not have to pay attention to the court order of Sutherland J. because he had turned 16. In the same month, C.M.V. wrote her on OFW stating that, “[R.E.] will be 16 in two weeks, beyond the reach of everyone and this kind of drama.” [9] It appears that a change in residency of R.E. was imminent in May, 2023 which corroborates the evidence of C.M.V. that the change took place in June, 2023.

[65] M.M.B. says in her testimony that R.E.’s change in residency did not take place until October or November of 2023. She provides no specifics as to why this was the date other than her evidence that R.E. drifted into full time residential parenting time with the Respondent over the summer of 2023 and was residing with the Respondent only from October or November onward. She also disagrees with the charts provided by the Respondent; however, she offers no specifics of that disagreement other than to say that R.E. (as well as the other two older children) stay at her place or with friends on an ad hoc basis, again with no specifics other than evidence about the time sharing of the week prior to the trial commencing. She does not confirm that any of the children spend more than 40% of their time at her residence which is the basis upon which the court may have discretion to order a lesser amount of base monthly child support under s. 9 of the CSGs.

[66] The two older children have filed affidavits that state that they are living primarily with their father during the summer months. M.M.B. says that, due to the history of alienation, that evidence is unreliable. She does not state that the children did not live with their father; she does say that they stay both with herself and friends on occasion and are not there “full time”.

[67] On the balance of probabilities, I find that the children have their primary residence with their father. Regarding R.E., the Applicant’s evidence lacks specificity and I prefer the evidence of the Respondent to her vague statement that R.E. did not reside with him full time until after the summer of 2023. In fact, the communications between R.E. and the Applicant as well as the OFW message from the Respondent corroborate the evidence that R.E. was intent upon changing his residency in May, 2023.

[68] I also prefer the evidence of the two older children as to their residency. They obtained their own lawyer to prepare the affidavits and that lawyer had acted for them during the first motion to change up to and including the focused trial before Sutherland J. The fact that these children may have been alienated as young children does not, for this court, determine that their evidence as adults lacks credibility. And other than the ad hoc evidence offered by the Applicant noted above, the Applicant offers no specifics of the residency of the older children other than her assertion that the Respondent’s alienating behaviour of many years ago affect those children’s evidence today.

[69] I therefore find that the children are residing with the Respondent as set out in his affidavits and that child support follows the residency of those children.

Hardship Issues

[70] C.B.B. argues that if she is ordered to pay child support, the court should take into account her financial circumstances. She says that she has been put in the poor house by the Respondent’s actions and that this litigation has been ruinous. She has mortgaged her home to pay the children’s expenses and her legal fees and was not able to afford trial counsel. She also says that the Respondent, by failing to promptly pay the money owed to her by Justice Bennett, was able to put money into RESPs which are available to him to pay the children’s university costs while she was left with nothing. She also says that she has to maintain the home that she is in so that the children can come there for overnights and that her standard of living is significantly worse than that of the Respondent who makes more than two times her income.

[71] Justice Sutherland did not order straight set off support for the shared care arrangement. Because care of the children was presumed to be shared, he had the discretion to do so under s. 9 of the CSGs. However, by June 2023, there was no shared care of the children. They were all in the primary care of the Respondent and because of that, and subject to a valid hardship argument, the court loses the discretion and flexibility it would have had under s. 9 if the parties shared parenting time.

[72] Moreover, if the Applicant wished to make a hardship argument, she must, as part of the analysis, undergo a standard of living test to confirm that her household’s standard of living is less than that of the Respondent’s: see s. 10 of the CSGs. To determine the relative standards of living, as noted by Justice Sutherland, she had to provide the income of her partner. She failed to do that at the focused trial and she has again failed to do so in the financial statement filed by her in this trial. The standard of living analysis is necessary to a determination of undue hardship: see Matthew v. Mathews (2001), 14, R.F.L. (5th) 129 (Ont. S.C.J.).

[73] The court also has the discretion to reduce child support concerning children over the age of 18 years. Most of the support for the older children consists of s. 7 expenses for the children’s post-secondary education as A.I. and A.C. are largely living outside of the home. The only months for which support is sought for these two children is the four month period between May and August of each year. Both of the older children have confirmed that they live at their father’s home during the summer months and that they do not pay rent. As a result of this, both of the older children have contributed significant amounts towards their post-secondary schooling from their summer employment, contributions which would be the envy of most other families.

[74] Those amounts being contributed by the children, largely because the Respondent does not charge the children room and board during the summer, have saved the Applicant and the Respondent a significant amount of funds. For example, in 2023/24, A.I. paid the whole amount for her first semester in the amount of $4,400. A.C. paid, according to his affidavit, all of his food and personal expenses while at university and contributed $10,000 towards his tuition and other university costs for his engineering program (which total $33,000 per year).

[75] Because of this, it is only fair that the court follow the approach of having base support payable for the adult children while in the care of the father during the four summer months: see Lewi v. Lewi (2006), 80 O.R. (3d) 321 (C.A.). This is a departure from the Guidelines, but I find it to be appropriate under s. 3(2) of those Guidelines in view of the fact that the children contribute a certain amount to their living expenses during the school year through money saved up while in their father’s care.

[76] Finally, I must address the allegation of the Applicant that the father’s litigation strategy is responsible for her present financial situation. She describes the Respondent as a “serial litigator” and says that his lack of cooperation and his failure to pay child support resulted in her having to mortgage her home and take out a line of credit. She says that she is near a financial tipping point as a result.

[77] The difficulty I have with this argument is that the Respondent has now brought all of the payments that he owed into good standing. There was no allegation that the Respondent was presently in default of his financial obligations under the orders that were given. I agree that this litigation was long and protracted, but that was presumably addressed by costs awards made throughout which have now been satisfied in full. The financial responsibilities of the Respondent for the litigation have been addressed through the costs awards granted throughout which were paid by the Respondent. It is not for this court to revisit that issue.

[78] I also note, as far as the Respondent’s litigation strategy is concerned, there has been no finding that the Respondent is a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act. [10] Moreover, the Applicant has made no request in this proceeding to declare the Respondent to be a vexatious litigant. Further, as far as litigation strategy is concerned, there is evidence that, after November 9, 2022, the Applicant was unresponsive to the Respondent’s requests to negotiate a change in the support based upon the change in the children’s residency. Until shortly before trial, the Applicant was apparently taking the position that the Respondent should continue to pay the Applicant child support for children no longer in her care. Moreover, the Applicant did not provide a meaningful response to the Respondent’s request to admit, requiring the older children to file affidavits proving their residency. I do not find the Respondent responsible for the Applicant’s present financial circumstances and I do not find that those consequences warrant in any way a reduction in child support.

[79] I therefore do not find undue hardship to ameliorate the Applicant’s base child support amount. Moreover, the court has no other discretion to reduce the child support payable once the children were residing, one way or another, with the Respondent (other than under ss. 3(2) and 10 of the Guidelines as discussed above).

[80] I am going to approach the matter on the basis of straight setoff during time periods when the children are shared. I am also going to order full base Guideline support based upon the children’s residency during the summer months only.

Calculation of Base Child Support

[81] The next issue is the calculation of base child support since November, 2022 to the date of trial and ongoing.

[82] The Respondent says that the Applicant owes him $50,478 in arrears and support overpayments as disclosed in the table attached to his affidavit sworn on May 6, 2024. [11] On the other hand, the Applicant says that, based upon the order for the shared care of both A.C. and R.E., the Respondent actually owes her money because of his increases in income. [12] I have already addressed whether support will be paid on the de jure shared care arrangement or the de facto primary residence of both A.C. and R.E. with the Respondent and I have determined that child support will follow the residency of the child irrespective of the court orders that are in place. I reject the suggestion that the Respondent owes the Applicant base child support as suggested by the Applicant.

[83] The support ordered by Sutherland J. was ordered based upon a presumption that the children would continue to be shared for the foreseeable future. However, the evidence is that A.C. upon being released from the order, began living with the Respondent in August, 2022. As well, after A.C. began university in September, 2023, he began residing with his father during the summer. As discussed above, the court has already determined that R.E. changed residency in June, 2023.

[84] Sutherland J. determined that the oldest child, A.I., would be living with both parents during her summer school holidays and based his support award, in part, on that. A.I. has deposed that because of COVID, she was actually living primarily with her father in December, 2021 when the trial took place. If that was true, her actual residency should have been addressed with Justice Sutherland and was not. Even though she would have been living with her father at the time of the annual review, I have concerns about her residency in 2022 and her evidence that she was living with her father since before the trial before Sutherland J. took place. I am not willing to take any change in the children’s residency into account until after the date of effective notice, which thereafter permits a variation in child support.

[85] Sutherland J. exercised his discretion in ordering $1,850 per month for support. He based the support amount on the presumption that parenting time for all of the children would be, more or less, equally divided. That assumption was, unfortunately, incorrect.

[86] Justice Sutherland did not base the support, strictly speaking, on a pure differential amount of support; he exercised his discretion based upon the Applicant’s standard of living, the fact that her expenses had not changed substantially because of the shared arrangement and both parties’ failures to provide a budget for the children while in their care.

[87] The incomes of the parties as disclosed in the attachments to their financial statements filed for trial since 2022 are as follows:

Year	Applicant’s Income	Respondent’s Income
2022	$101,346	$247,318
2023	$100,455	$250,863

[88] There is no income disclosure by either party as to their 2024 incomes although some pay stubs were supplied by both parties. These pay stubs were all issued prior to trial early in 2024. I find that the parties’ 2023 incomes are the best measure of income for child support for the child support payable in 2024.

(a) 2022

[89] In 2022, the arrears would be calculated according to the effective notice date of November, 2022. Although a review should have taken place in May of that year, I have already discussed the fact that, other than any changes in income, there was no change in circumstances at the time of that review.

[90] The effective notice date post dates A.I’s residency with the Respondent during that summer which would therefore not be taken into account in calculating child support for 2022. For the last two months of 2022, the child support would be based upon R.E.’s shared residency and A.C.’s residency with the Applicant which began, according to A.C.’s affidavit, in August, 2022.

[91] The parties’ incomes are from employment. The parties have each filed Notices of Assessment for that year which are determinative of their incomes for support purposes.

[92] Therefore, for 2022, we are only dealing with two months, November and December, 2022. Differential support would have been payable for R.E. and the Applicant would owe base child support for A.C. who was, by then, living full time with his father.

[93] Based upon the Divorcemate calculation attached as Schedule A, the Respondent should have been paying the Applicant $512 per month instead of the $1,850 per month that he was paying. The monthly overpayment is the difference between those amounts or $2,676 for the year.

(b) 2023

[94] The Respondent did not have his 2023 Notice of Assessment for trial, a fact that the Applicant was critical of; however, neither did she produce her 2023 Notice of Assessment. I am not willing to reopen the evidence to obtain those NOAs. The Applicant says in her materials that she suspects that the Respondent has other income sources but fails to lay any sort of evidentiary foundation for this. I have therefore based the parties’ respective incomes on their T4 slips for 2023.

[95] There were three different parenting scenarios in 2023, each of which gives rise to a different calculation of child support. They are as follows:

a. January – May, 2023: during this time period, A.I. was living with the Respondent and R.E. was shared between the parties. A.C. was attending McMaster and the summer parenting time of A.C. at the Respondent’s residence would also be averaged in. As set out in the Divorcemate calculation attached as Schedule B, the Respondent should have been paying $312 per month during this five month period. He continued to pay $1,850 and the overpayment is therefore $1,538 per month. The overpayment for this five-month period is therefore $7,690 owing by the Applicant to the Respondent. b. June – August, 2023: during this time period, A.I. and R.E. were living with the Respondent. As well, A.C.’s summer parenting time with the Respondent would continue to be averaged in. According to the Sutherland J. order, the parties’ would have adjusted their support according to their 2023 incomes by this time as well. According to the Divorcemate calculation attached as Schedule C, the Applicant should have been paying base child support of $1,627 per month for this three month period. The Respondent continued to pay $1,850 per month and the overpayment plus the support payable for this time period is $3,477 per month. The Applicant owes $10,431 for this three month period. c. September – December, 2023: In September, 2023, A.I. went to Kingston to pursue engineering at Queens. Therefore, there was one child living with the Respondent and A.C.’s summer parenting time would continue to be averaged. According to the Divorcemate calculation attached as Schedule D, the Applicant should have been paying base child support of $1,101 per month for support. In fact, she continued to collect $1,850 for child support notwithstanding the fact that none of the children lived with her. The overpayment plus the support payable total $2,951 per month. Therefore, the Applicant owes the Respondent for this four-month period the sum of $11,804.

[96] During 2023, M.M.B. made four payments of $207 which total $828 which would be credited to the arrears. The total owing by the Applicant to the Respondent for 2023 is therefore $29,097 in overpayments and arrears. [13]

(c) 2024 and Ongoing

[97] Between January and May (when the trial took place), R.E. continued to live with the Respondent. A.I. and A.C. were attending university. They presumably would be, according to their affidavits, living with their father for the summer months and the support for those four months would be averaged for the entire year. Accordingly, R.E. should be paying guideline support of $1,251 per month as set out in the Divorcemate calculation attached as Schedule E.

[98] Up to the date of trial, one payment was made by M.M.B. of $207 which is to be credited to the arrears.

[99] The support order requiring C.M.V. to pay $1,850 per month was stayed at the Settlement Conference which took place on March 3, 2024. A support deduction order was filed. C.M.V. says that the Director continued to collect the support under the Sutherland J. order through March and April. [14] In her reply affidavit, the Applicant says that the support paid by the Respondent stopped in March, 2024 and the funds may therefore be held in suspense by the Director because of the stay of the support order. I am going to assume this to be the case and that these funds will be returned to the Respondent upon this endorsement and order being released. I am therefore going to allow for the Respondent’s overpayment of support for January and February, 2024 after which the support that has been collected from him after the stay will be returned to the Respondent. Therefore, I find that there has been an overpayment of base support by the Respondent in the amount of $3,700.

[100] Therefore, the Applicant owes child support of $1,251 for five months, or $6,255. Taking into account the payment made by the Applicant, she owes child support of $6,048. She also owes $3,700 being the overpayments by the Respondent for support, and therefore the arrears for 2024 up to the date of trial are quantified as $9,748.

[101] The ongoing support should be quantified at the same level to $1,251 per month payable by the Applicant to the Respondent.

(d) Total Arrears and Ongoing Child Support

[102] Therefore, the total arrears in base support owing by the Applicant to the date of trial are $40,921.00. [15]

[103] Commencing June 1, 2024, the Applicant shall pay the Respondent $1,251 per month for the one child of the marriage, R.E., who continues to live with the Respondent. Included in this figure is summer support for the two children in university, A.I. and A.C.

[104] There are two changes in circumstances foreseeable at this time:

a. R.E. is in grade 12 now, and will be presumably going to university if he follows in his siblings’ footsteps. The issue is whether he will remain dependent upon the parties and a “child of the marriage” once he finishes high school. b. A.I. is obtaining her Bachelor’s degree in psychology in May, 2025. Her plans are fluid. As of the date of trial, she said that she has not yet chosen her post graduate program which she says is expected to take up to seven years in order to become a psychologist. According to the Applicant, A.I. will also be travelling in Europe during the summer of 2025 and it is unclear as to whether she will be residing in the care of the Respondent during this summer.

[105] There was little evidence led as to either of these issues, both of which are due to take place in May, 2025. In light of the intense conflict between these parties especially over university costs, it may very well be that support should terminate as of the children achieving their first undergraduate degree. That issue was not part of the record in this motion to change and no evidence was led or submissions made as to termination of child support. Therefore, the court is not in a position to decide that particular issue and it would be unfair to do so without giving either party the right to provide evidence on that topic. Although the Court of Appeal has suggested that reviews are inappropriate under most circumstances (especially in a high conflict situation as in the present case), they are called for where there is a foreseeable change in circumstances which cannot be addressed at trial: see Fisher v. Fisher, 2008 ONCA 11, [2008] O.J. No. 38 (C.A.). Therefore, there shall be a review of the child support concerning both R.E. and A.I. which can be brought by either party in May, 2025 when it is clearer as to the plans of these two children and to review whether:

a. The residency of A.I. during the summer of 2025 would warrant continued summer guideline support for her; b. Whether it is appropriate for the child support for the children to come to an end with their first undergraduate degree; and c. R.E.’s plans for his post secondary education and the support payable for him if he does continue with his post secondary education including summer guideline support as with the other children.

Section 7 Expenses for the Children

[106] As was the case before Justice Sutherland in December, 2021, there was a great deal of conflict over the s. 7 expenses owing for the children. The major areas of conflict are concerning the children’s sports activities and the post-secondary costs of the children.

[107] The starting point is, of course, the judgment of Sutherland J. In February, 2022, he determined in his order as follows:

10. Section 7 expenses will be paid by the parents on a percentage basis of 29% to the Applicant and 71 % to the Respondent commencing January 1, 2022.

11. The terms concerning section 7 expenses as set out in Schedule "C" attached hereto.

12. The parents, with input from [A.I.], will attempt to resolve the amount of [A.I.]'s post secondary expenses and [A.I.]'s and each parent's contribution, present and ongoing, for that expense. If the parties cannot resolve the issue, they may seek the assistance of a mediator or the Case Management Judge.

13. For the anticipated university costs for [A.C.] commencing September 2022, the parents may follow the same process used for [A.I.].

SCHEDULE “C” Section 7 Expenses - Current Expenses

1. The following expenses shall automatically qualify: b. [A.I.]: University expenses: i. Tuition, rent, books, phone plan, direct University charges (e.g. transponder, fees); ii. These costs will be paid based on the actual cost. c. [A.C.] and [R.E.]: i. School expenses over and above the day-to-day school expenses (e.g. expenses over $100.00); ii. Team Registrations; iii. Team Fees; iv. Equipment (reasonable expenses).

Child Support – Annual Review

2. The parents shall exchange their Tl Income Tax Returns and Notices of Assessment or Reassessment to determine the Table Amount of child support and their respective contributions to the children's section 7 expenses, by May 1st of each year, starting in 2022.

3. Based on this information, starting in 2022, the parties shall prospectively adjust the Table Amount of support payable, and their proportions to the children's section 7 expenses, in accordance with their incomes from the previous year, with any change to come into effect on June 1st.

4. Both parents shall provide the other with confirmation and supporting documents of their section 7 expenses incurred in the prior year by no· later than May 1st of each year. They shall reconcile them by no later than June 1st of each year (i.e.: if one party incurred a greater portion of these expenses in the prior year, the other party shall pay the outstanding balance to the other by June 1st.)

[108] These clauses remain largely applicable today. The percentage shares of the parties’ respective incomes remain the same as it was in 2021 and continues to apply. The provisions were intended to allow the prompt payment of the children’s expenses as negotiated between the parties. Unfortunately, these parties have been unable to negotiate anything.

[109] As pointed out by Justice Sutherland, these parents have remarkable children. They are high achieving academically and in their sports activities and, not surprisingly, there are significant extraordinary expenses. Notwithstanding Justice Sutherland’s clear directions as to how to address their children’s extra costs, these parties have been unable to negotiate these expenses to the detriment of the children.

[110] The reason for this is not hard to determine. Firstly, the Respondent, with whom the children reside, has assumed control over the extra expenses. The Applicant on the other hand has sent the Respondent reconciliation statements, only paying what she says she owed according to those statements even if the Respondent disagreed with items that she said that she paid. Nothing was negotiated on either end. The children’s affidavits confirm, however, that the Respondent arranged for the children’s contributions, collected the money from the children to pay those expenses and doled it out as arranged between himself and the children. He determined what the children would pay towards their tuition, then, in respect of A.I., demanding that the Applicant pay her share of those expenses without providing proof of the tuition; that was a clear breach of paragraph 4 of Schedule C to the order set out above. The Applicant was left in a situation where she has to take the Respondent’s word as to the expenses that she has to pay because she is kept out of the loop by the Respondent and the children. The Respondent was left, on the other hand, with payments from the Applicant according to reconciliation statements that he disagreed with.

[111] I note that the Respondent says in his affidavit that the Applicant was assuming the role of “gatekeeper” for the extra expenses. This appears to be because the Applicant refuses to pay the Respondent’s submissions for the children’s expenses but he pays what she requests from him. However, the affidavits of A.I. and A.C. confirm to me that the vast majority of the arrangements for their expenses are made between themselves and their father. That makes it difficult for the parties to negotiate and address the children’s expenses for university. Both parties have acted as gatekeepers to some extent.

[112] To be sure, however, the issue of which parent is in control should take second place to the children’s expenses being paid promptly so that they are not left with unpaid university or activity costs. The children’s rent must be paid when it is due as should their tuition payments. However, the affidavits of the children confirm to me that, to some extent, the Applicant is correct when she says that the decisions on these expenses were to be made by the parties and the children and this is not happening; at the moment, the Respondent and the children decide and the Applicant pays. However, there is evidence that the Applicant refused to participate in the annual review set out in Schedule C to the order which resulted in the failure of the parties to negotiate those expenses as well. As well, since most of the payments came from the Applicant, she decided on the amount of the payments according only to the expenses that she agreed to pay or that she had made.

[113] This has left the parties unable to determine the expenses payable for the children and these expenses have therefore been left with the court through this trial. It is costly and inconvenient for the parties to have to resort to the courts to set the s. 7 expenses for the children.

[114] I note that the lists provided include expenses that predate the focused trial before Sutherland J. The Respondent says that by making these requests, the Applicant “opened the door” by demanding expenses prior to the December 2021 focused trial. I am not going behind the order or consider any expenses that predate the trial that took place in December, 2021. The expenses that arose after that date could legitimately have been addressed in the annual child support review contemplated in Schedule C of the final order. The trial decision provided for payment of retroactive arrears of special expenses and those expenses were paid. In the interests of finality, the court cannot go behind the final order of Sutherland J. and address expenses that should have been properly submitted in evidence of payment of arrears adjudicated at that focused trial: see Gray v. Rizzi, 2016 ONCA 152, [2016] O.J. No. 958 (C.A.) and s. 17(4) of the Divorce Act. I will therefore not consider any expenses that predate that trial.

[115] The evidence clarifies that the Applicant is satisfied with the reconciliation statements that she provided and she says that she does not owe any s. 7 expenses and none are owed to her. The Respondent disagrees. In reconciling the expenses, M.M.B. would send monthly reconciliation statements to C.M.V. and then would reimburse according to those statements. C.M.V. says that he was given little choice as to the reimbursement from M.M.B. and this is why he says that she was a “gatekeeper”. He has submitted a list of what he says are inappropriate items that he said that he “paid” through the items being imposed on him through those monthly reconciliation statements. He asks for that money back as these were improper s. 7 expenses and he should not have been forced to pay them.

[116] He has also submitted a second list of s. 7 expenses for which he says that C.M.V. has refused to reimburse. And the Applicant acknowledges refusing to pay those expenses largely, she says, because they were not included as s. 7 expenses in Schedule C of the order. However, the s. 7 expenses delineated in that schedule were not exhaustive. Justice Sutherland set out expenses that would “automatically qualify” as s. 7 expenses. His inclusion of these expenses did not necessarily exclude other legitimate s. 7 expenses for the children.

[117] Bearing this in mind, my analysis of the claimed s. 7 reimbursements and expenses follows.

Claim by Respondent for the Return of Improper s. 7 Expenses

[118] I make the following findings regarding the first list of expenses to be reimbursed by the Applicant as improperly claimed s. 7 expenses:

• Roam from Home Charges: a number of the charges reimbursed by the Respondent though the reconciliation statements are for the Roam from Home charges for the cell phone of A.I. The Respondent says that the parties had agreed to pay the children’s cell phone bills, but any extra charges for data or Roam from Home are to the account of the children. The Applicant did not respond to this statement in her affidavit. Even though the schedule to the order requires the parents to pay for the children’s “phone plan”, the uncontradicted evidence of the Respondent is that the children were to contribute to the cost by paying additional expenses for the phones. The Roam from Home charges should not have been charged to the Respondent in the reconciliation statements and the Respondent should be reimbursed his contribution to these charges which total $406.80.
• October 2022 Baseball Instalment: M.M.B. says that she paid this instalment, but the Respondent responds by saying that he also paid the instalment and that M.M.B. was reimbursed by the league as a result. The Applicant only says in her affidavit that she paid the instalment but does not address the issue of the reimbursement. The Respondent’s evidence is therefore uncontradicted. The Applicant should reimburse the Respondent $213 for that expense which was repaid to her.
• Football Supplies October, 2022: these are smaller items purchased for football but qualify as “equipment” which automatically qualifies as a s. 7 expense. The cost of these items were properly claimed by the Respondent against the Applicant.
• Football Team Fees for A.C. September, 2022: The Respondent says that these fees were paid but then A.C. withdrew and the Applicant was refunded the fees. The Applicant does not deny this to be the case in her materials and the Respondent’s allegations are therefore uncontradicted. The Respondent is to be reimbursed $106.50 for those fees.
• Miscellaneous baseball supplies December 15, 2021: the Respondent says that these were Christmas gifts and not properly an expense that he should be charged for. Even if these are Christmas gifts, they qualify automatically for reimbursement under the Sutherland J. order. They do not qualify as an overpayment of s. 7 expenses.
• Math Tutor for R.E.: The Respondent says that the Applicant was reimbursed for these expenses by the Ontario Government’s Catch Up program. The Applicant does not deny this to be the case; however, she says that she had earlier reimbursed the Respondent for tutoring that was also reimbursed by the Government of Ontario. However, two wrongs do not make a right and the earlier tutoring costs should have been accounted for, one way or another, in Justice Sutherland’s decision. These were not net expenses to the Applicant and should not have been reimbursed. The Respondent is owed $198.80 for his contribution to these expenses.
• Football Accessories June, 2023: these costs are again automatically included as a s. 7 expense under the Sutherland J. order. The Applicant does not have to pay the Respondent’s contribution back for these expenses.
• Young Driver’s Expenses: these costs predate the Sutherland J. order and should have been submitted to him for reconciliation of the support obligations as part of the focused trial. The Applicant notes that she never charged for these expenses when she paid them and now the Respondent is charging for R.E.’s driving school. That may be but again, two wrongs don’t make a right and the costs of the Young Driver’s education should have been placed before Sutherland J. at the focused trial. These expenses were improperly claimed by the Applicant and she owes back to the Respondent $1,594.97 for this expense.

[119] Based upon the above, the Respondent paid $2,520.17 in expenses that he should not have paid. He is to be reimbursed in this amount.

Claim by Respondent for Expenses that the Applicant Refused to Pay

[120] This is my analysis of the expenses for the children that the Applicant refused to pay the Respondent.

• School Supplies February, 2022: Back to school supplies are generally included in the base child support payable. I have ordered a retroactive adjustment of base child support for R.E. (which was shared in February, 2022), this would have been taken into account in Justice Sutherland’s analysis. I disallow these expenses as a s. 7 expense.
• Baseball Supplies April May, 2022: As determined above, these automatically qualify for reimbursement under the Sutherland J. order. M.M.B. owes the Respondent $52.23 for this expense.
• Desk for A.I.: This cost was refused by M.M.B. because she said that she had a perfectly suitable desk for A.I.’s use. However, M.M.B. did not respond to the allegation that this was never communicated to A.I. and she can hardly be expected to use that desk if she was not told about it. A desk is necessary for a university student for obvious reasons. M.M.B. should reimburse C.M.V. for this expense in the amount of $95.36.
• Household Supplies Purchased for A.I.: M.M.B. says that these expenses are not permitted under the order of Sutherland J. However, as pointed out above, that order was not intended to be an exhaustive list of s. 7 expenses for the children. It was intended to ensure that the parties not question the expenses contained in the order. Other reasonable post secondary expenses are permitted and should be paid. In this case, the household supplies for A.I.’s first residence outside of her parents’ homes are reasonable. The same would apply to the desk chair purchased for A.I. in October, 2022. The Respondent is owed $334.51 for her proportionate share of these expenses.
• Baseball Registration Fees October, 2022: these were the expenses that both the Respondent and the Applicant paid and for which the Applicant received a refund. The Applicant still has to pay her proportionate share of the expense that was paid by the Respondent in the amount of $87.00.
• iPad and Case: this expense is a legitimate school supply for A.C. who is studying engineering. This appears to be a Christmas gift as it was provided “after the Christmas Break” but again, that does not matter if it is a legitimate school supply. The Respondent owes the Respondent her proportionate share of the iPad and case in the amount of $382.10.
• Vehicle Insurance 2022 and 2023: this is a large amount for annual insurance because A.I. had an accident and a speeding ticket. Vehicle expenses for adult children are not generally a permitted s. 7 expense. However, the uncontradicted evidence is that A.I. needs the vehicle to get back and forth from school and to go to work in the summers. A.I. makes a significant contribution through that work to her university expenses of around $4,000 per year. I find this to be a reasonable expense for her post secondary education. Moreover, the combined income of the parties is well over $350,000 per year and although the Applicant says that her income does not allow her to bear her proportionate share of this expense, I note that both of these parties have income well beyond the median income in Canada. The expense is reasonable and affordable by these parties. The Respondent is entitled to be reimbursed by the Applicant for this expense in the amount of $2,310.72.
• Household Supplies for A.C.: See above re A.I. The Applicant must reimburse the Respondent the sum of $277.67 for her share of this expense.
• Text books: this expense is one of the expenses that the Sutherland J. decision noted as being automatic. The Applicant gives no explanation as to why she did not pay this expense. The Applicant owes the Respondent $80.74 for this expense.
• Dell Computer: As I understand it, the Respondent bought a MacBook for A.C. who then discovered he required a PC for his courses. The Applicant paid her share for the second computer, but deducted what she had paid for the MacBook. That was legitimate because the Respondent has not explained in his material what happened to the original laptop and the Applicant says that the Respondent ended up with the computer.
• Rent April, 2024: assuming this was still not paid, the Respondent owes her share of this expense, another automatic expense under the Sutherland J. order. That share is $188.50.

[121] The Applicant therefore owes the Respondent the sum of $3,808.83 for the children’s expenses which were not reimbursed as set out in his materials.

[122] The total owed by the Applicant to the Respondent is therefore $6,329.00 for her share of the children’s s. 7 expenses which have accrued since Sutherland J. conducted the focused trial in December, 2021.

[123] The total child support owing by the Applicant to the Respondent including overpayments of support by the Respondent is $47,256. [16]

Miscellaneous Issues

[124] Both parties accuse the other of being “gatekeepers” of the s. 7 expense. That can be explained by the lack of communication between these parties. However, both parties were surprisingly able to agree on most of the expenses as well as the contributions to be made by both of the children to their university costs.

[125] The Respondent has asked that I vary the Sutherland J. order to clarify what expenses qualify as s. 7 post secondary expenses. I decline to change the order. The order provided for a number of “automatic” costs that cannot be questioned. The parties have been able to agree on others and it is hoped that my findings in this matter will provide clarity and guidance. The Respondent’s request to vary Schedule C of the order is dismissed.

[126] The Applicant has asked that I continue to involve myself in this matter as did Justice Bennett who made a temporary order after trial. That was addressed by Justice Sutherland who ordered that either party could move to appoint a case management judge. However, this will be another final order and once a final order is made, it has to be questioned what the case management justice will manage. There will be no ongoing issues before the court and the court does not have resources to appoint a judge to monitor the parties’ ongoing disputes as to the support issues. The parenting issues are nearly at an end as R.E. will soon be 18 and no longer subject to any parenting order. The Applicant’s request to have a justice continue managing this file is dismissed.

[127] I am going to order that the tuition receipts that the Applicant is expected to contribute to be provided before the payment is to be made by the Applicant. Once provided, the Applicant can either pay the children directly or pay the university directly.

[128] I am also going to amortize the payments of the Applicant’s arrears to be fixed in this case over the next three years. This is because to order immediate payment would cause a hardship; moreover, the Respondent made the Applicant wait for her costs and support payments to be made over a number of years while his unsuccessful appeals to the Divisional Court wound their way through. In light of this and the Applicant’s financial situation, there shall be no interest payable by the Applicant on those arrears.

Order

[129] There shall therefore be a final order as follows:

a. The Applicant, M.M.B, shall pay $47,256 to the Respondent, C.M.V., in satisfaction of all table child support arrears, s. 7 expenses and overpayments as at May 31, 2024. b. The arrears shall be repaid in instalments of $1,312.67 commencing December 1, 2024 with the intention of this amount being repaid in full after three years from the commencement date of these payments. Provided that the Applicant may pay the arrears by partial or full lump sum at any time. c. Any and all amounts held by the Director of the Family Responsibility Office on account of support payable under the order of Sutherland J. dated February 7, 2022 shall be returned to the Respondent. d. Paragraph 6 of the order of Sutherland J. dated February 7, 2022 shall be varied to provide that commencing June 1, 2024, and payable on the first of each month thereafter, the Applicant shall pay table child support of $1,261.00 per month to the Respondent for the parties’ three children pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines. Table support is based on the Applicant’s 2023 income of $100,455 and comprised of summer table support for A.I. (born June 13, 2003), summer table support for A.C. (born July 13, 2005), and full table support for R.E. (born May 7, 2007). e. There shall be a review of child support for A.I. and R.E. commencing as of May, 2025 to address the following issues: i. Whether the residency of A.I. during the summer of 2025 would warrant continued summer guideline support for her; ii. Whether it is appropriate for the child support for the children to come to an end with their first undergraduate degree; and iii. R.E.’s plans for his post secondary education and the support payable for him if he does proceed with post secondary education at either college or university including summer guideline support as with the other children. f. The parties shall continue to proportionately share the children’s Section 7 expenses pursuant to the final order of February 7, 2022 provided that prior to contributing to the children’s tuition expenses, the Applicant shall be provided with a tuition statement of account or receipt after which she shall pay her proportionate share of the tuition payment either directly to the university or the child. g. All other terms of the said final order not specifically addressed herein shall remain in full force and effect.

[130] Subject to any offers to settle, it appears by any measure that the Respondent is the successful party and will be making a claim for costs. If the parties cannot settle the issue of costs, they may provide written costs submissions to the judicial assistant, first by the Respondent and then the Applicant on a ten-day turnaround. Costs submissions to be no more than 7 pages in length not including offers to settle and bills of costs.

Justice J.P.L. McDermot

Corrected: October 23, 2024

October 23, 2024 – Corrections:

1. Para. 123 now says: The total child support owing by the Applicant to the Respondent including overpayments of support by the Respondent is $ 47,256.
2. Footnote 16 now says: 40,291 + $6329 = $47,256
3. Para. 129 a. now says: The Applicant, M.M.B, shall pay $47,256 to the Respondent…
4. Para. 129 b. now says: The arrears shall be repaid in instalments of $1,312.67 …

Tools One 2024 : Schedule A Prepared by: October 23 2024

M.M.B. 51, Resident of ON Income Employment income 101,346

C.M.V. 53, Resident of ON Income Employment income 247,318

Children Age Lives with Table Amt Claimed by A.I. 21 C.M..V. No N/A A.C. 19 C.M..V. Yes N/A R.E. 17 Shared Yes M.M.B. Youngest child finishes high school 1 year from the date of separation. Dependant credit claimed by M.M.B..

Cautions/Overrides Child Support (Table) - Child(ren) the age of majority or over; CSG Table Amount may be inappropriate Child Support (Table) - C.M..V.'s Income over $150,000; CSG Table Amount may be inappropriate.

Child Support Guidelines (CSG) Monthly $ Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAG) Monthly $ Length of marriage/cohabitation: 0 years Recipient's age at separation: 53 years

“With Child Support” Formula

Required input for duration: Length of Marriage SSAG Considerations: The results of the SSAG formula must be interpreted with regard to: Entitlement; Location within the Ranges; Restructuring; Ceilings and Floors; and Exceptions.

Support Scenarios Monthly $	A. SSAG Low	B. SSAG Mid	C. SSAG High
M.M.B.
C.M..V.
M.M.B.
C.M..V.
M.M.B.	C.M..V.
Gross Income	8,446	20,610	8,446
Taxes and Deductions	(1,964)	(7,785)	(1,964)
Benefits and Credits	182	41	182
Spousal Support	0	0	0
Child Support (Table)	512	(512)	512
Net Disposable Income (NDI)	7,176	12,354	7,176
adult in household
child in household
shared/summer child in household Payor's NDI/Contribution
Percent of NDI	34.56	43.36	34.56
CSG Special Expenses Apportioning %	29.1%	70.9%	29.1%
After-tax Cost/Benefit of Spousal Support	0	0	0

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Tools One 2024 Schedule B Prepared by: October 23 2024

M.M.B. 51, Resident of ON Income Employment income 101,346

C.M.V. 53, Resident of ON Income Employment income 247,318

Children Age Lives with Table Amt Claimed by A.I. 21 C.M.V. Summer N/A A.C. 19 C.M.V. Yes N/A *.E. 17 Shared Yes M.M.B. Youngest child finishes high school 1 year from the date of separation.

Child Support (Table) - CSG Table Amount payable for child(ren) during 4 summer months only Child Support (Table) - Child(ren) the age of ma5ority or over; CSG Table Amount may be inappropriate Child Support (Table) - C.M.V.'s Income over $150,000; CSG Table Amount may be inappropriate.

Child Support Guidelines (CSG) Monthly $

M.M.B.	C.M.V.
Annual Guidelines Income	101,346
CSG Table Amount (current)	1,639
Child Support (Table)	0

Dependant credit claimed by M.M.B.. Length of marriage/cohabitation: 0 years Recipient's age at separation: 53 years

"With Child Support" Formula

Required input for duration: Length of Marriage SSAG Considerations: The results of the SSAG formula must be interpreted with regard to: Entitlement; Location within the Ranges; Restructuring; Ceilings and Floors; and Exceptions.

Support Scenarios Monthly $	A. SSAG Low	B. SSAG Mid	C. SSAG High
M.M.B.
C.M.V.
M.M.B.
C.M.V.
M.M.B.	C.M.V.
Gross Income	8,446	20,610	8,446
Taxes and Deductions	(1,964)	(7,785)	(1,964)
Benefits and Credits	182	41	182
Spousal Support	0	0	0
Child Support (Table)	361	(361)	361
Net Disposable Income (NDI)	7,025	12,505	7,025
adult in household
child in household
shared/summer child in household Payor's NDI/Contribution
Percent of NDI	36.04	64.04	36.04
CSG Special Expenses Apportioning %	29.1%	70.9%	29.1%
After-tax Cost/Benefit of Spousal Support	0	0	0

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M.M.B. 51, Resident of ON Income Employment income 100,455

C.M.V. 53, Resident of ON Income Employment income 250,863

Children Age Lives with Table Amt Claimed by A.I. 21 C.M..V. Summer N/A A.C. 19 C.M..V. Yes N/A *.E. 17 C.M..V. Yes C.M..V. Youngest child finishes high school 1 year from the date of separation. Dependant credit claimed by C.M..V..

Tools One 2024 Schedule C Prepared by: October 23 2024

Cautions/Overrides Child Support (Table) - CSG Table Amount payable for child(ren) during 4 summer months only Child Support (Table) - Child(ren) the age of majority or over; CSG Table Amount may be inappropriate

Child Support Guidelines (CSG) Monthly $ Spousal Support Advisor( Guidelines (SSAG) Monthly $ Length of marriage/cohabitation: 13 years Recipient's age at separation: 53 years

“With Child Support” Formula

The formula results in a range for spousal support of $0 to $0 per month for an indefinite (unspecified) duration, subject to variation and possibly review.

SSAG Considerations: The results of the SSAG formula must be interpreted with regard to: Entitlement; Location within the Ranges; Restructuring; Ceilings and Floors; and Exceptions.

Support Scenarios Monthly $	A. SSAG Low	B. SSAG Mid	C. SSAG High
M.M.B.
C.M..V.
M.M.B.
C.M..V.
M.M.B.	C.M..V.
Gross Income	8,371	20,905	8,371
Taxes and Deductions	(2,190)	(7,696)	(2,190)
Benefits and Credits	41	61	41
Spousal Support	0	0	0
Child Support (Table)	(1,627)	1,627	(1,627)
Net Disposable Income (NDI)	4,595	14,897	4,595
adult in household
child in household
shared/summer child in household Payor's NDI/Contribution
Percent of NDI	25.66	76.46	25.66
CSG Special Expenses Apportioning %	28.6%	71.4%	28.6%
After-tax Cost/Benefit of Spousal Support	0	0	0

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M.M.B. 51, Resident of ON Income Employment income 100,455

C.M.V. 53, Resident of ON Income Employment income 250,863

Children Age Lives with Table Amt Claimed by A.I. 21 C.M.V. Summer N/A A.C. 19 C.M.V. No C.M.V. (.E. 17 C.M.V. Yes C.M.V. Youngest child finishes high school 1 year from the date of separation. Dependant credit claimed by C.M.V..

Tools One 2024 Schedule D Prepared by: October 23 2024

Cautions/Overrides Child Support (Table) - CSG Table Amount payable for child(ren) during 4 summer months only Child Support (Table) - Child(ren) the age of majority or over; CSG Table Amount may be inappropriate

Child Support Guidelines (CSG) Monthly $ Spousal Support Advisor' Guidelines (SSAG) Monthly $ Length of marriage/cohabitation: 13 years Recipient's age at separation: 53 years

“With Child Support” Formula

The formula results in a range for spousal support of $0 to $0 per month for an indefinite (unspecified) duration, subject to variation and possibly review.

SSAG Considerations: The results of the SSAG formula must be interpreted with regard to: Entitlement; Location within the Ranges; Restructuring; Ceilings and Floors; and Exceptions.

Support Scenarios Monthly $	A. SSAG Low	B. SSAG Mid	C. SSAG High
M.M.B.
C.M.V.
M.M.B.
C.M.V.
M.M.B.	C.M.V.
Gross Income	8,371	20,905	8,371
Taxes and Deductions	(2,190)	(7,696)	(2,190)
Benefits and Credits	41	61	41
Spousal Support	0	0	0
Child Support (Table)	(1,101)	1,101	(1,101)
Net Disposable Income (NDI)	5,121	14,371	5,121
adult in household
child in household
shared/summer child in household Payor's NDI/Contribution
Percent of NDl	26.3%	73.7%	26.3%
CSG Special Expenses Apportioning %	28.6%	71.4%	28.6%
After-tax Cost/Benefit of Spousal Support	0	0	0

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M.M.B. 51, Resident of ON Income Employment income 100,455

C.M.V. 53, Resident of ON Income Employment income 250,863

Children Age Lives with Table Amt Claimed by A.I. 21 C.M.V. Summer N/A A.C. 19 C.M.V. Summer C.M.V. (.E. 17 C.M.V. Yes C.M.V. Youngest child finishes high school 1 year from the date of separation. Dependant credit claimed by C.M.V..

Tools One 2024 Schedule E Prepared by: October 23 2024

Cautions/Overrides Child Support (Table) - CSG Table Amount payable for child(ren) during 4 summer months only Child Support (Table) - Child(ren) the age of majority or over; CSG Table Amount may be inappropriate

Child Support Guidelines (CSG) Monthly $ Spousal Support Advisor( Guidelines (SSAG) Monthly $ Length of marriage/cohabitation: 13 years Recipient's age at separation: 53 years

“With Child Support” Formula

The formula results in a range for spousal support of $0 to $0 per month for an indefinite (unspecified) duration, subject to variation and possibly review.

SSAG Considerations: The results of the SSAG formula must be interpreted with regard to: Entitlement; Location within the Ranges; Restructuring; Ceilings and Floors; and Exceptions.

Support Scenarios Monthly $	A. SSAG Low	B. SSAG Mid	C. SSAG High
M.M.B.
C.M.V.
M.M.B.
C.M.V.
M.M.B.	C.M.V.
Gross Income	8,371	20,905	8,371
Taxes and Deductions	(2,190)	(7,696)	(2,190)
Benefits and Credits	41	61	41
Spousal Support	0	0	0
Child Support (Table)	(1,251)	1,251	(1,251)
Net Disposable Income (NDI)	4,971	14,521	4,971
adult in household
child in household
shared/summer child in household Payor's NDI/Contribution
Percent of NDl	25.5%	74.5%	25.5%
CSG Special Expenses Apportioning %	28.6%	71.4%	28.6%
After-tax Cost/Benefit of Spousal Support	0	0	0

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