Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CV-23-00706376-0000 Date: 2024-10-08 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Re: Ahmad Mohammad, Plaintiff And: Executive Director of Secretariat on Responsible Conduct of Research / Government of Canada (Karen Wallace), Defendant

Before: Robert Centa J.

Counsel: Ahmad Mohammad, self-represented plaintiff Rebecca Ro and Renuka Koilpillai, for the defendant

Heard: October 2, 2024 (in writing)

Endorsement

[1] Ahmad Mohammad commenced this action against Karen Wallace, the Executive Director of the Secretariat on Responsible Conduct of Research. Ms. Wallace is a Federal Crown Servant. This is yet another proceeding arising out of Mr. Mohammad’s troubled relationship with McMaster University.

[2] The defendant brings this motion pursuant to rules 21.01(1)(b) and 25.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, seeking to strike out the plaintiff’s statement of claim, without leave to amend. Having reviewed the latest version of the statement of claim, it is plain and obvious that it cannot succeed. The plaintiff has already been given two chances to amend the claim. I see no prospect that the claim can be improved by further amendment. I deny leave to amend the claim.

Procedural history

[3] It will be helpful to first set out the background to this motion. This background is particularly relevant to my decision not to grant leave to the plaintiff to amend his statement of claim again.

[4] The plaintiff served a statement of claim on September 25, 2023. The Attorney General of Canada sent a letter to the registrar of the court requesting an order pursuant to rule 2.1.01(6) to dismiss the claim as frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of process. Justice Dow dismissed the request, but noted “obvious significant problems with the form and content of the Statement of Claim,” including the plaintiff’s “failure to plead an intentional tort.” Justice Dow encouraged the plaintiff to seek legal advice. I pause here to address one issue raised by the plaintiff on this motion. The plaintiff submits that the decision of Dow J. “confirm[ed] that the Plaintiff’s claim has substantial merit.” It did not. Justice Dow determined only that he would not strike the statement of claim as obviously frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process. Nothing in the decision of Dow J. suggests that the statement of claim has any merit, much less substantial merit.

[5] On October 20, 2023, the plaintiff served an amended statement of claim, which he described as a “fresh as amendment statement of claim.”

[6] On November 14, 2023, the defendant requested to book a short motion to have the amended statement of claim dismissed pursuant to rule 21.01(1)(b) as disclosing no reasonable cause of action. That request came before me as the triage judge. I directed that the matter proceed to a case conference.

[7] On November 15, 2024, the plaintiff appeared in Civil Practice Court and requested to book a motion for summary judgment. Justice Callaghan declined to schedule the motion and ordered that the plaintiff’s request also be considered at the case conference that had been ordered to address the defendant’s motion to strike out the statement of claim.

[8] I was assigned to hear the case conference on April 8, 2024. At the case conference, I scheduled the defendant’s motion to strike the claim and declined to schedule the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. I also addressed the plaintiff’s concern about my presiding over the case conference and addressed his behaviour during that attendance. My endorsement read, in part, as follows:

Mr. Mohammad expressed concern over my presiding over this case conference. Viewed generously, he was raising an issue of a reasonable apprehension of bias. Although I have presided over a number of matters involving Mr. Mohammad, I have and am capable of deciding his matters fairly and impartially. I see no reasonable apprehension of bias.

I am scheduling the defendants’ motion to strike the “fresh as amendment [sic] statement of claim” pursuant to rule 21.01(1)(b) to be heard in writing by me on the following schedule:

• The defendants to deliver their motion record and factum on or before May 10, 2024
• The plaintiff shall deliver his factum on or before on or before June 7, 2024

The material shall be delivered to [my judicial assistant]. I will then decide the matter in writing.

I direct that the Registrar shall not accept any filings in this proceeding other than the motion material described above until I determine this motion. In particular, the plaintiff is not permitted to note the defendants in default.

I am not prepared to schedule the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment at this time. Whether or not to schedule that motion can only be decided after the determination of the defendants’ motion to strike the statement of claim.

Finally, I note that Mr. Mohammad was very disruptive during this call. He became increasingly agitated to the point where I directed the Registrar to mute his microphone. Despite this, he continued to unmute his microphone and continued to yell things at me including “What is your net wealth?” and “You are a criminal.” This behaviour was unacceptable and cannot be repeated.

[9] The plaintiff did not deliver his materials in accordance with the timeline I ordered him to follow. Instead, on June 7, 2024, the plaintiff delivered what he described as a “brief factum” and a letter from his psychiatrist requesting certain accommodations, including that the plaintiff be permitted to provide oral submissions. Given the plaintiff’s behaviour at the prior case conference, I declined to grant him the opportunity to make oral submissions. In my endorsement dated June 10, 2024, I did extend the time for him to deliver his written submissions and indicated that he could request a further extension if required. I recommended that the plaintiff obtain assistance and support.

[10] On July 5, 2024, the plaintiff delivered a third version of his statement of claim. The defendant objected to the delivery of a further pleading, which was not contemplated in any of my prior endorsements. Nevertheless, in an endorsement dated July 17, 2024, I decided that the defendant’s motion to strike the claim should proceed on the basis of the most recent claim. My endorsement read as follows:

On April 8, 2024, I set a timetable for the determination in writing of the defendants’ motion to strike out the statement of claim under rule 21.01(1)(b). I amended that timetable on June 10, 2024.

Although my timetable did not contemplate the delivery of a revised pleading, on July 5, 2024, the plaintiff delivered a “fresh as amended statement of claim.” In my view, the defendant’s rule 21 motion should proceed on the basis of the fresh as amended claim. This will allow the entirety of the claim to be considered at once and will inform my decision on whether or not to grant leave to the plaintiff to amend the fresh as amended claim, should it be struck.

The defendant has requested the right to provide supplementary submissions to address the new issues raised in the fresh as amended statement of claim. This is fair. I direct the defendant to deliver supplementary submissions on or before July 31, 2024.

I order that the plaintiff may not deliver any further amendments to the fresh as amended statement of claim pending the final determination of the motion to strike.

I extend the time for the plaintiff to deliver his submissions from August 10, 2024, to September 13, 2024. If Mr. Mohammad requires a further extension of time to complete his submissions, he may request an extension by writing to [my judicial assistant] on or before September 12, 2024.

[11] Mr. Mohammad brought a motion for leave to appeal my scheduling order dated July 17, 2024, to the Divisional Court. Justice Matheson dismissed the motion for leave to appeal pursuant to rule 2.1 and imposed terms on Mr. Mohammad commencing any further proceeding in the Divisional Court. See Mohammad v. Executive Director, 2024 ONSC 4492, at para. 2.

[12] I have now reviewed the submissions of the defendant, including the supplementary submissions addressing the second amended statement of claim, and the submissions of the plaintiff.

The test under rule 21.01(1)(b)

[13] The proper approach on a rule 21.01(1)(b) motion is well settled. See R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2011 SCC 42, at para. 22; Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, at p. 455; Atlantic Lottery Corp. Inc. v. Babstock, 2020 SCC 19, at para. 14; FNF Enterprises Inc. v. Wag and Train Inc., 2023 ONCA 92, at para. 12; Fernandez Leon v. Bayer Inc., 2023 ONCA 629, at para 8; Asghar v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2019 ONCA 479, at para. 8; MacKinnon v. Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement Board, 2007 ONCA 874, at para. 19; Tran v. University of Western Ontario, 2015 ONCA 295, at para. 16; Stronach v. York Region, 2023 ONSC 1264, at para. 12; MacLean v. National CarWash Solutions, 2020 ONSC 6032, at para. 22; and Region Plaza Inc. v Hamilton - Wentworth (Regional Municipality) (1990), 12 O.R. (3d) 750 (Ont. S.C.). I am to take the facts asserted in the statement of claim as true, unless they are patently incapable of proof or are merely bald conclusory statements of fact, unsupported by material facts. See Trillium Power Wind Corp. v. Ontario (Ministry of Natural Resources), 2013 ONCA 683, at para. 31; Balanyk v. University of Toronto, at para. 29. I am to read the statement of claim generously. The ultimate question is whether it is plain and obvious, assuming the facts pleaded to be true, that each of the pleaded claims discloses no reasonable cause of action. This is true where:

a. the allegations do not give rise to a cause of action;

b. the plaintiff fails to plead a necessary element of a cause of action; or

c. the allegations in the pleading are conjecture, assumptions, or speculation unsupported by material facts.

[14] This is a stringent test, and the moving party must satisfy a very high threshold. See PMC York Properties Inc. v. Siudak, 2022 ONCA 635, at para. 30. However, if the claim has no reasonable prospect of success, where it is plain and obvious that the action cannot succeed, it should not be allowed to proceed to trial. A plaintiff may not plead bald conclusions. If a plaintiff lacks knowledge of the facts necessary to support the causes of action, they ought not to make the allegation in the statement of claim.

[15] In the latest version of the claim, the plaintiff alleges unspecified torts against the defendant Karen Wallace, the Executive Director of the Secretariat on Responsible Conduct of Research. The defendant explained the role of the Secretariat as follows:

The Secretariat is part of the federal government and is comprised of employees of the Canadian Institutes of Health Research, the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (he “Tri-Agencies”). The Secretariat’s mandate includes promoting the responsible conduct of research by institutions receiving federal funding. The Secretariat provides substantive and administrative support for the Panel on Responsible Conduct of Research (“PCRC”) with respect to the Tri-Agency Framework Responsible Conduct of Research (“Tri-Agency Framework”). The Tri-Agency Framework describes Agency policies and requirements related to applying for and managing Agency funds, performing research and disseminating results. It also explains what constitutes a breach in these responsibilities and outlines the process institutions and agencies follow in the event of an allegation of a breach. The defendant’s explanation is drawn from a document referred to by the plaintiff in the statement of claim. I accept this explanation is admissible on a Rule 21 motion: White Point Capital Inc v. Communitylend Holdings Inc., 2022 ONSC 5146, at para 25.

[16] The claim is very difficult to understand. Under the heading “Background” the claim pleads as follows:

1. Since the end of 2020, I initiated communications with the Secretariat on Responsible Conduct of Research (Government of Canada) complaining against restrictions which includes unconstitutional detention against me (the plaintiff) by McMaster university administration to disallow fulsome investigations regarding my two reports of research misconducts by Robert Bruce Milliken. Milliken "at the time of reporting'' chairs the department of psychology and neuroscience and was the previous dean of McMaster school for graduate studies. The two reports are articulated in 2019, see enclosed; and they clearly show serious violations of sections 2 and 3 of the Tri-Agency Framework: Responsible Conduct of Research (the framework), see enclosed. The university, however, intentionally manipulated the system through bad-faith tactics to inhibit the delivery of the reports so that the investigations will be halted. I therefore requested from the defendant to apply section 5 of the framework, but the defendant ignored my request. To clarify, justice must comprehend the following:

2. The university uses psychiatric and strategic games; in short, the administration enemizes me because Bruce Milliken "at the time of reporting" chairs of the department (psychology and neuroscience); nonetheless, he was previous dean of the school of graduate studies!

3. The university administration realized that the nine pieces of evidence in addition to the forty-seven eyewitnesses will ensure an absolute win for my case, see enclosed; and therefore, the university initiates a plan to terminate my complaint without investigations.

4. To annihilate my complaint, the university administration relies on five pillars as follows: generating poverty; isolation; producing defamation; banning and/or terrorizing the witness experts and the eyewitnesses; and finally idling the delivery of the reports. a. Generating poverty: The annual scholarship "thirty-seven thousand dollars" is cut immediately after I requested for IT and security cards investigations against Bruce Milliken on February 3rd, 2019,see enclosed. b. Isolation: Shockingly, without achieving tlie requested IT and security cards investigations; on February 5th, 2019, the university issued a vague letter disallowing to communicate with any member of McMaster university; see enclosed. The administration also starts to threaten me of sending me back to Egypt. Nonetheless, the administration wishes to cut my relationships with all of the eyewitnesses at McMaster. Eventually, the requested investigations never took place; to rephrase, this administration believe in the militarized power over the law! c. Producing defamation: Through Glenn Decaire, unwelcomed but also uneducated guests from McMaster security and Hamilton police start to seriously harass me bi-weekly during the year of 2019.Many of them insisted that I must withdraw my allegations against Bruce Milliken. Two secret police officers (no badges) visited my place [address omitted], Hamilton, ON) threatening me just after meeting with the journalist Shamir Malik. d. Banning and/or terrorizing the eyewitnesses and the witness experts: When Esraa Mohammed, an expert in vision research, tried to handle the matter with Steve Bray ( the chair of McMaster Ethics board) and Kimmberly Mason (the research integrity officer) on April 25th, 2019; Glenn Decaire (the ex-chief of Hamilton police) banned her from the university, see enclosed. e. Idling the delivery: After conveying the aforementioned information to the secretariat; McMaster insisted that if I want to deliver the two reports; this will never be through mail or email, but through a hyperlink. I tried to use that hyper link but encountered technical difficulties. I requested to send the two reports by email or mail; but my request is neglected by the secretariat. I afterwards lost the hope, because the secretariat is clearly biased! The communications are returned later; hoping that the secretariat to deliver the reports through her office directly to McMaster.

[17] I pause here to note that the only defendant to this claim is Ms. Wallace. The plaintiff returns to Ms. Wallace’s role later in the claim:

10. In another word, I requested from Karen Wallace to deliver my two reports to the university, and I attached the two reports in my correspondence, see enclosed. Instead of forwarding my two reports to the university; the Executive Director told me that I must submit them by myself, despite knowing about the unconstitutional bad-faith detentions; but in her email, she thanked me for being patient, see enclosed.

11. Based on the aforementioned, the Secretariat including but not limited to Karen Wallace is idling the Tri-Agency Framework:Responsible Conduct of Research (Government of Canada) by every possible mean. To rephrase, the director allows McMaster to apply the most famous theory in political sciences to serve McMaster, which is, procrastination until termination! Such a policy- over the Canadian soil-will achieve nothing but scientific and ethical collapses against our lovely Canada!

12. Needless to say, this matter perfectly violates section 5 of the framework by the secretariat since 2020; but my lack of legal knowledge coupled with my PTSD led to full evaporation of my typical superlative movements.

[18] The plaintiff’s claim seeks the following relief:

13. I therefore request to access all the communications concerning me between the Secretariat and McMaster university.

14. I also request to apply immediate sanctions against McMaster university administration pursuant to the Tri-Agency Framework: Responsible Conduct of Research (Government of Canada).

15. Since this matter is under rule 76; I therefore request for two hundreds thousands Canadian dollars as compensation of the torts.

[19] In my view, the statement of claim has no reasonable prospect of success for several reasons: a. The plaintiff cannot obtain sanctions against the “McMaster university administration,” because only Ms. Wallace is a defendant to the proceeding. Moreover, even if officials at McMaster University breached the Tri-Agency Framework, a matter that I am not deciding, the court would not have jurisdiction to impose sanctions against McMaster University pursuant to the Framework. I do not accept the plaintiff’s submissions to the contrary; b. The plaintiff has not pleaded material facts that could give rise to a private law duty of care owed to him. Even if Ms. Wallace breached the Framework, and I am not deciding that she did, that would not give the plaintiff a private cause of action against Ms. Wallace. I do not accept the plaintiff’s submissions that Ms. Wallace could be found to have caused any harm to him on the facts asserted; c. The plaintiff has not pleaded any material facts to support any cause of action in tort, contract, or otherwise against Ms. Wallace. The claim does not contain the basic elements of a recognized cause of action against Ms. Wallace; d. The plaintiff has pleaded no material facts to demonstrate that Ms. Wallace could be liable for any of the alleged misconduct that other persons committed against the plaintiff; and e. The pleading generally consists of bald, conclusory statements that are not supported by material facts capable of supporting a cause of action.

[20] For these reasons, I strike out the statement of claim in its entirety.

Leave to amend the statement of claim should not be granted

[21] Leave to amend a claim should be denied only in the clearest of cases. See South Holly Holdings Limited. v. The Toronto-Dominion Bank, 2007 ONCA 456, at para. 6. I am satisfied that this is such a case.

[22] The plaintiff has already amended this statement of claim twice. He has not fixed any of the glaring deficiencies in his claim. I see no prospect that the plaintiff will be able to cure these defects if I grant him leave to try again. I do not grant the plaintiff leave to amend the claim. The action is dismissed.

[23] The defendant is presumptively entitled to costs of the proceeding and may email her costs submission of no more than three double-spaced pages to my judicial assistant on or before October 15, 2024. The plaintiff may deliver his responding submission of no more than three double-spaced pages on or before October 22, 2024. No reply submissions are to be delivered without leave.

Robert Centa J.

Date: October 8, 2024