Court File and Parties

Court File No.: FS-23-107119-0000 Date: 2024-10-08 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between: Bikramjit Singh Rana, Applicant Counsel: Vic Sehdev, for the Applicant

- and -

Tanvir Kaur Rana, Respondent Counsel: Ravinder Mann, for the Respondent

Heard: September 11, 2024

Reasons for Judgment

Lemay J.

[1] The Applicant father, Bikramjit Singh Rana and the Respondent mother, Tanvir Kaur Rana were married in India on February 27th, 2021. They did not live together until 2022. The parties have one child of the marriage, who was born on February 14th, 2023. The parties separated on June 27th, 2023.

[2] The Applicant was criminally charged very shortly after separation. As a result, the Respondent has had de facto sole possession of the matrimonial home, although the property is owned by the Respondent. The Respondent has brought this motion seeking sole possession of the matrimonial home, an order requiring him to pay the Applicant child support and parenting time with the child of the marriage.

[3] The parenting time issues were addressed, mostly on consent, at the hearing of the motion. In respect of the other relief sought, I am ordering that the Respondent shall have sole possession of the matrimonial home commencing December 1st, 2024. I am also ordering the payment of the sum of $5,000.00 to the Respondent as an undifferentiated sum to cover expenses pending the resolution of this matter. I have ordered that child support be paid, on an interim basis, in the sum of $745.00 per month, commencing on November 1st, 2024. There shall be no order as to spousal support at this point.

[4] I will now set out my reasons for reaching these conclusions.

Background Facts

a) The Parties and the Marriage

[5] The Applicant and the Respondent got married on February 27th, 2021. It was an arranged marriage. At the time of the marriage, the Applicant lived in Canada while the Respondent lived in India. The Applicant remained in India for a couple of months after the wedding and returned to Canada around April of 2021.

[6] The Respondent moved from India to Canada on March 30th, 2022, and was sponsored by the Applicant under the spousal sponsorship program.

[7] The child of the marriage, Anahad Kaur Rania, was born on February 14th, 2023. There is some dispute as to which parent provided care to the child prior to separation. The Applicant says that he was quite engaged as a parent. The Respondent says that the Applicant was not engaged at all as a parent, as he was a truck driver and was away for significant portions of the week. The Applicant also advises that his mother, who lived with the parties until the date of separation, cared for the child.

[8] The Applicant is self-employed as a truck driver but has had difficulties working regular hours over the last year. In June of 2023, the Applicant suffered an injury to his foot. He alleges that he was unable to work. He says that his left pinky toe remains fractured, and that he has a fracture remaining in his foot. I will return to this evidence in my discussion about income below.

[9] The Respondent alleges that she has had significant difficulties finding work. However, there is some information in the record that suggests that the Respondent has been receiving an income. The Respondent’s brother is also living with her in the matrimonial home. There is no evidence before me as to whether he is paying rent to his sister.

[10] In any event, on June 27th, 2023, the parties separated. The next day, the Applicant was criminally charged with a number of serious offences. Those charges are still pending before the Court. The Respondent has, in her materials, advanced allegations of significant and ongoing domestic abuse on the part of the Applicant.

[11] The child of the marriage continued to live with the Respondent in the matrimonial home. Up to the date of the hearing before me, the Applicant has had almost no parenting time with the child of the marriage.

[12] I also note that the Applicant has not yet paid any child or spousal support. He is, however, solely paying the carrying costs of the matrimonial home.

b) Litigation History

[13] The Applicant commenced this application shortly after separation, on October 2nd, 2023. A response was duly filed and an early case conference was held before McGee J. on January 4th, 2024. The Applicant was seeking leave to bring a motion for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home. At that point, the motion was denied.

[14] Instead, McGee J. directed that an Order should be made for the payment of child and spousal support, and that this Order should commence on the first day of the month in which the Respondent moves out of the home. McGee J. also noted that the Applicant needed to disclose further information in respect of his income, and especially in respect of the rental income that was being earned from the matrimonial home.

[15] The parties subsequently attended at a DRO meeting. However, as far as I can tell, no progress was made on resolving the issues at that time. The Applicant has provided additional disclosure since the Early Case Conference before McGee J., and he sought some disclosure from the Respondent. I will return to the disclosure issue below.

[16] The Applicant brought a motion seeking to pay child and spousal support to the Respondent, as well as for an order for parenting time and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home. That motion was before Emery J. on July 9th, 2024. At that time, the parties consented to some disclosure orders as well as an order requiring an appraisal of the matrimonial home. Emery J. adjourned the balance of the motion to triage Court to be scheduled as a long motion.

[17] The matter came before me on September 11th, 2024. After hearing argument from the parties, I provided immediate directions (mostly on consent) in respect of the parenting time. I reserved the balance of the issues to these reasons. I now turn to the issues that were raised.

Issues

[18] The following issues were before me for determination: a) The parenting schedule for the parents. b) The income for the Applicant and the Respondent. c) The calculation of child support. d) The calculation of spousal support. e) Exclusive possession of the matrimonial home. f) Disclosure issues.

[19] I will deal with each issue in turn. At the outset, I would note that there may be an argument that the Applicant requires leave to bring motions in respect of anything other than the child and spousal support issues. This issue was not argued by the parties. However, for completeness, I will note that if leave is required to address the other issues, then I am granting it.

[20] I have decided, if it was necessary, that leave should be granted for two reasons. First, a DRO meeting has been held in this matter, so the principle that the parties need to conference issues before bringing motions on them has been addressed. Second, the matter has been before the Courts for well in excess of a year. At this point, the issues between the parties need to be resolved.

Issue #1 - Parenting Time

[21] After discussing the parenting time issue with the parties, I was able to make the following Orders without any opposition: a. Supervised access is to begin on the later of the weekend of September 21 and 22, 2024 or the day that the supervised access centre proposed by the Applicant is available. b. The supervised access visits will be for a period of one and a half hours every second weekend, with the first two visits to take place in the supervised access centre. All visits will be on Saturday or Sunday with the time to be set by the Supervised Access centre. c. After the first two visits, the supervised access visits can be moved to the community and can include the Applicant’s mother unless the supervision centre has concerns. d. The Applicant shall be responsible for transporting the child to and from the supervised access visits. e. The supervised access centre is Renew Supervision, and it is located in Brampton. f. Once these six visits have taken place, the Applicant may bring a further motion seeking an expansion of his parenting time, including unsupervised visits. g. While the motion described in paragraph (f) is pending, the supervised access is to be continued on the schedule set out above. h. The costs of the supervised visits are to be borne by the Applicant in the first instance. They may be discussed at trial

[22] I confirm that those Orders remain in place. For clarity, I also note that the order in terms of costs of the supervised visits is intended to ensure that the responsibility for paying the costs associated with the supervision shall be a triable issue.

Issue #2 - The Income of the Parties

[23] There is an issue of the imputation of income to both parties. Therefore, I will briefly set out the law on imputing income and then provide some conclusions on the imputation of income for both parties.

a) The Law on Imputation of Income

[24] The law in this area is well-settled. For the purposes of child support orders, income can be imputed in accordance with section 19 of the Child Support Guidelines SOR/97-175. That section states:

19 (1) The court may impute such amount of income to a spouse as it considers appropriate in the circumstances, which circumstances include the following: (a) the spouse is intentionally under-employed or unemployed, other than where the under-employment or unemployment is required by the needs of a child of the marriage or any child under the age of majority or by the reasonable educational or health needs of the spouse; (b) the spouse is exempt from paying federal or provincial income tax; (c) the spouse lives in a country that has effective rates of income tax that are significantly lower than those in Canada; (d) it appears that income has been diverted which would affect the level of child support to be determined under these Guidelines; (e) the spouse’s property is not reasonably utilized to generate income; (f) the spouse has failed to provide income information when under a legal obligation to do so; (g) the spouse unreasonably deducts expenses from income; (h) the spouse derives a significant portion of income from dividends, capital gains or other sources that are taxed at a lower rate than employment or business income or that are exempt from tax; and (i) the spouse is a beneficiary under a trust and is or will be in receipt of income or other benefits from the trust.

(2) For the purpose of paragraph (1)(g), the reasonableness of an expense deduction is not solely governed by whether the deduction is permitted under the Income Tax Act.

[25] This section allows the Court to impute income to a party as it considers appropriate. Counsel for the Applicant referred me to the decision in Riddolls v. Barrett, 2023 ONCJ 506. In that decision, Sherr J. sets out (at paragraph 24) a detailed list of the factors that should be considered in imputing income. I have kept those factors in mind in reaching my decision.

[26] In this case, for the Applicant, his income is likely higher than reported because of the deductions he can take as a truck owner/driver and the rental income he is earning. Similarly, the Respondent has other issues that I will address when considering her circumstances, and whether income should be imputed to her.

b) The Applicant’s Income

[27] The Applicant’s personal income for 2023 was $51,469.00. His corporate tax returns suggest an income of $55,816.00. He also earns rental income from the matrimonial home. The precise amount of that rental income was not quantified in the materials before me by way of a receipt. However, the Applicant’s materials suggest that it is approximately $1,700. per month.

[28] The Applicant has also recently suffered an injury to his foot. In her factum, the Respondent argues that, while he claims he has suffered an injury to his left foot, “the Applicant has failed to provide a medical report indicating the Applicant’s diagnosis, prognosis and his ability to work.” The problem with this argument is that there are medical notes that indicate that the Applicant has some limitations on how much work he can do. However, I also note that those medical notes suggest that the limitations will be temporary rather than permanent. The Applicant is young, so I would not (at this point) expect those restrictions to be permanent.

[29] The Respondent seeks to have income imputed to the Applicant in the sum of $100,000 per year. I am of the view that, given the medical issues the Respondent has with his left foot, this amount is too high at least on an interim basis. I would also note that the Applicant has disclosed a considerable amount of documentation, and this sum is not entirely supported by the documentation that I have reviewed.

[30] That being said, a claim that the Applicant’s income should be imputed at his income tax amount of approximately $50,000 is also not sustainable as it is too low. In my view, the rental income from the property (which is probably in excess of $20,000 gross) combined with the Applicant’s work as a truck driver will likely produce an income of at least $80,000.00, even with the Applicant’s injury. Therefore, I find that the Applicant should have this amount of income imputed to him.

[31] I note that this is a preliminary determination and that it does not bind the trial judge, as I do not have a full evidentiary record on this motion.

c) The Respondent’s Income

[32] The Respondent suggests that she has been unable to work, and unable to earn an income. I reject that assertion and, for the purposes of this interim motion, impute an income (on an interim basis) of $25,000 per year to the Respondent. I reach this conclusion for a number of reasons.

[33] First, there is evidence that the Respondent has been working. While she claims that she is not currently working, she certainly has the capacity to work. Her statement that “I am attempting to better myself so that I will be in a position to find employment eventually” is vague and unsupported. There is no indication from the Respondent as to what she is actually doing, except that there have been a number of jobs that she has started and not continued at.

[34] The Applicant, on the other hand, has provided evidence that the Respondent is dropping the child of the marriage off with someone else in the mornings and is engaging in training of some sort, perhaps driver’s training. This suggests that the Applicant may actually be working. There is no evidence, from the Applicant, of her income beyond her 2023 tax return.

[35] Second, the Respondent is capable of earning at least minimum wage. I had no explanation for why she would not have been able to earn at least that amount in a job that employed her full time. Given the hourly rate for minimum wage in Ontario is currently $17.20 per hour. For a forty hour a week work week, that produces an income in excess of $35,000.

[36] Third, there are significant gaps in the Respondent’s financial evidence that suggest that the Respondent is, in fact, earning an income. In this regard, the Applicant points to the evidence from the Respondent’s Scotiabank account. Once deposits for Ontario Works and various short stints of employment were deducted, there was a total of $36,543.15 that was deposited to the account without explanation over an approximately fifteen month period, ending this past June.

[37] The Respondent says that these are loans from family and friends. However, those loans do not appear on her financial statements, at least not that I have been able to find. There is also a lack of disclosure on these issues and, as counsel for the Respondent noted in his factum, “disclosure is particularly critical where there are significant credibility issues.” Bardouniotis v. Trypis 2010 ONSC 4466 at para. 9. In this case, there are significant unexplained financial transactions that cause concern about whether the Respondent is earning an income.

[38] In addition, the Respondent appears to have purchased a car. Her position is that this is her brother’s car, and that he is here on a student visa. However, the documentation outlining how the car loan was obtained was not provided. That documentation will be of assistance in resolving the merits of this case at trial. In the meantime, however, these facts suggest that the Respondent is earning an income. She is certainly capable of earning one.

[39] Ultimately, I conclude that the Respondent should be imputed with an income of $25,000.00 for the purposes of this motion. This is below minimum wage for a full time job. That is intentional, and it takes into account the fact that the child of the marriage is only about 20 months old at this point. That number will likely be adjusted at trial depending on the evidence, and my findings in this motion do not bind the trial judge.

Issues #3 and #4 - Child and Spousal Support

[40] The calculation of child and spousal support is a mathematical exercise that is based on the findings of income that I have made in the previous section. I note that the calculation of child support should be done before the calculation of spousal support.

[41] In this case, the child support calculation produces a table amount of $745.00 per month. In my view, this amount should start being paid by the Applicant on November 1st, 2024, as that will provide an additional cushion for the Respondent to manage the transition from the matrimonial home to other accommodations.

[42] Then, there is spousal support. This was a very short marriage. The divorcemate calculation that I performed revealed support payments between $0 at the low end and $479 at the high end. I have determined that, on an interim basis, there should be no order as to spousal support for the following reasons: a) As discussed below, I am requiring (with his consent) the Applicant to pay the Respondent $5,000 in an undifferentiated payment. This may end up being spousal support. b) This was a very short marriage, and there are issues in terms of various calculations as a result of the shortness of the marriage. c) The evidence seems to suggest that the Respondent has been earning an income, and it is possible that my calculation underestimates the Respondent’s income.

[43] In both cases, my findings are interim only and do not bind the trial judge.

Issue #5 - The Matrimonial Home

a) The Law

[44] The statutory provisions that govern the issue of who should have exclusive possession of the matrimonial home are set out in sections 19, 23 and 24 of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3. Section 19 of the FLA states that both spouses have an equal right to the possession of the matrimonial home. However, given that the Applicant has been criminally charged, neither he nor his mother are permitted to come to the matrimonial home while the Respondent is there. In other words, the Respondent has de facto exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

[45] The Applicant is moving for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, so it is useful to set out the provisions of section 24(3), which set out the criteria that the Court should consider. Those criteria are:

24 (3) In determining whether to make an order for exclusive possession, the court shall consider, (a) the best interests of the children affected; (b) any existing orders under Part I (Family Property) and any existing support orders or other enforceable support obligations; (c) the financial position of both spouses; (d) any written agreement between the parties; (e) the availability of other suitable and affordable accommodation; and (f) any violence committed by a spouse against the other spouse or the children

[46] These criteria require me to consider a series of factual issues. However, the parties have both referred me to case-law that assists in that determination. The Applicant has referred me to Harper v. Harper 2010 ONSC 4845. This was a case of a short marriage, where there had been allegations of domestic violence against the Respondent father, and where the Respondent father had owned the matrimonial home prior to the marriage.

[47] In that decision, the Court stated (at paras. 30-32):

[30] The real issue before me is whether or not at trial the court would likely order the sale of the matrimonial home and who should have exclusive possession of the matrimonial home pending trial. The Applicant commenced this proceeding, but apart from her motion for interim spousal support, she has no interest in bringing this matter to trial quickly. In fact, as set out below, her refusal to submit to being questioned and her failure to make disclosure is consistent with her interest to delay this proceeding. She has already been able to delay the hearing of this motion. This case strikes me as one where the Applicant is trying to use her de facto possession of the matrimonial home for leverage against the Respondent. In my view, provided the court ensures that the Respondent does not delay in bringing this matter to trial, she should not be permitted to do so.

[31] The Respondent does not want to sell the condominium as he owned it prior to the parties meeting. Although the condominium is a matrimonial home and the Applicant has an interest in it, based on the undisputed facts, even if the prenuptial agreement is found to be unenforceable with respect to the matrimonial home, in my view the Respondent would have a very strong claim to unequal division of the matrimonial home given the short duration of the marriage, the fact that he owned the matrimonial home before marriage and the lack of financial contribution to the purchase and carrying costs of the condominium by the Applicant. At trial, the Applicant is not likely to recover more than one half of any increase in value of the condominium from the time of marriage to the time of separation. She would not likely obtain an order for the sale of the condominium. The Respondent has ample other assets to satisfy any judgment in this regard. If the Applicant is bound to the prenuptial agreement, it is the Respondent’s position that the condominium did not increase in value between the date of marriage and the date of separation and so the Applicant is not entitled to any money from the condominium. Either way, the Applicant’s claim is a financial one. In my view there would be absolutely no basis to award the Applicant exclusive possession of the matrimonial home at trial or order the sale of the matrimonial home.

[32] Both parties agree that the separation date was August 28, 2009 and that they have, therefore, been separated for more than one year. The Respondent submits that as a result, the Applicant no longer has a right to exclusive possession of the matrimonial home as she is no longer a spouse. Although no divorce has yet been granted, in my view the fact the Applicant has enjoyed exclusive possession to the matrimonial home for over one year and the Respondent is now entitled to a divorce are factors to consider.

[48] The Respondent directed my attention to the decision in Reshetnikova v. Reshetnikova 2020 ONSC 7988. In that case, the husband was excluded from the matrimonial home as a result of assault charges in March of 2020. The husband’s mother had continued to live in the matrimonial home. In November of 2020, the wife brought an ex parte motion for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home on the basis of the mother’s conduct. It was granted on a temporary basis. The parties returned to Court, with the husband’s mother seeking to have the Order set aside.

[49] The Court maintained the Order for exclusive possession to remain with the wife, even after reviewing the mother’s evidence and hearing her submissions. In that decision, the Court stated (at paras 57, 58 and 60):

[57] The husband is the registered owner of the matrimonial home where he lived from the time it was purchased until he was charged except for a four-year period. While his mother may have lived in the home throughout those years, the length of time in which she lived in the property is not, on its own, or together with the other evidence she has adduced, proof that she had the right to possession of the house. If a balance of convenience test is considered, the balance of convenience in this case favours the wife and two children. There is no evidence that the wife has any ability to move into alternate suitable accommodation, even on a temporary basis. The husband has yet to file a financial statement and thus, there is no evidence of the wife’s ability to successfully claim support that would enable her to move. There is evidence before the court that the husband’s mother is now the sole registered owner of the Dufferin St. property although she and the husband take the position that that property is owned solely by his sister. While the husband’s mother asserts that she cannot afford reasonable alternate accommodation, she also asserts that she cannot move into the basement of the house because she runs her catering business out of the kitchen on the main floor. The husband’s mother, however, does not claim any income from the catering business in her sworn financial statement. Further, while the husband’s mother has referred to the lack of options she has, she has not given any evidence as to why she would not be able to reside with one of her other three sons or many adult grandchildren. On the basis of the untested record before me, I am not satisfied that the husband’s mother claim prevents the wife from obtaining the order she seeks.

[58] I am not satisfied that the husband’s mother has a right to possess the matrimonial home that deprives the wife of her clear statutory right to possess the matrimonial home. Pursuant to s.24(3) of the Family Law Act, the wife has established that she is entitled to an order for temporary exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

[60] The wife clearly established that it was in the best interests of both children that she have exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, particularly, given how Ailita and Sofia were suffering as a result of the husband’s mother conduct. The wife has some savings of approximately $9,000. She has no source of income and no alternate, appropriate accommodation available to her and the children. The wife does not work and she is solely responsible for looking after her infant and 10-year-old. It was clearly in the best interests of Ailita and Sofia to remain in the matrimonial home given the circumstances. Ailita exhibited signs of distress and fear of the husband’s mother, so much so, that she was scared to leave her room, go into the kitchen and eat for fear of being reprimanded and screamed at.

[50] These cases are both determined on their own individual facts. While they are both helpful to my understanding as to how to apply section 24(3), it is primarily a factual exercise, and I turn to that exercise now.

b) Application to the Facts

[51] The question is whether the Applicant or the Respondent should have exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

[52] I start by observing that the title to the matrimonial home is solely held in the Applicant’s name. The Respondent asserts, therefore, that “the applicant there irrespective of the situation would have an obligation to upkeep the property and pay all expenses relating to the matrimonial home.”

[53] While that is true, the Respondent might also be responsible for occupation rent, as she has lived rent-free in an asset owned solely by the Applicant. The Respondent is clearly not paying any of the expenses associated with her accommodation, and this state of affairs has existed for more than a year. It is for this reason that McGee J. confirmed that spousal support should start the day that the Respondent moved out of the property.

[54] The fact that the Applicant has sole title to the matrimonial home is actually a factor that weighs in favour of him being given exclusive possession of the home in the circumstances of this case. He has pre-existing equity in the home and, as noted in the Harper decision, it is difficult to see how he would be forced to sell the home at trial.

[55] Then, there is the fact that the Applicant is absorbing all of the carrying costs of the matrimonial home. This is another factor that supports an argument that the Applicant ought to have exclusive possession of the matrimonial home. Those carrying costs are a significant burden, and that burden is more significant when the Applicant is also paying rent somewhere else.

[56] In addition, this has been a short marriage. As a result, the equalization payment may not be large. In addition, it is quite possible that the occupation rent claim may end up being larger than the equalization payment. Either way, this is a factor that favours permitting the Applicant to have exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

[57] Finally, the Applicant has provided photographs that suggest that the Respondent is not maintaining the property. Although this is a less significant factor, it is also a factor that supports the Applicant’s position that he should have exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

[58] As part of the Applicant’s position on this motion, he was willing to pay the Respondent the sum of $5,000 within seven (7) calendar days of an Order granting him possession of the matrimonial home being issued. In my view, this offer will assist in addressing the principal factor favoring permitting the Respondent to remain in the home. The Respondent and the child of the marriage will need somewhere to stay and it will be difficult for them to afford a place.

[59] Counsel for the Respondent argues that she needs time to be able to find a job and know that she is going to be able to sustain herself and the child. While I am sympathetic to that argument, on the facts of this case, there are three reasons why I do not accept it: a) The Respondent has already had considerable time. The parties have been separated for more than fifteen months and the Respondent has been aware of the Applicant’s position on the issue of the matrimonial home since January of this year. b) The Respondent has the capacity to earn an income, and there is no real explanation in the materials before me as to why she is not earning an income. Indeed, there is some evidence that she is actually earning an income, and I have imputed her with one. c) The Respondent has been given both some child support and a fairly significant lump sum in order to alleviate the transition issues.

[60] The other issue that I must address is the allegations of domestic violence that the Respondent has made against the Applicant. Those are an important factor to consider in determining exclusive possession of the matrimonial home. However, I note two points. First, the charges against the Applicant’s mother have been withdrawn, and there has been no finding of guilt as against the Applicant. Second, on the facts of this case, I am not persuaded that this factor outweighs all of the other factors that support granting the Applicant exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

[61] For the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that the balance of convenience favours giving the Applicant exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, and I so order. That Order is effective December 1st, 2024, which will provide the Respondent with additional time to get her affairs in order and find somewhere else to live.

[62] The $5000. transitional payment is to be paid by the Applicant to the Respondent within seven (7) calendar days of today’s date. It is not, at this point to be attributed to any specific category of expense.

Issue #6 - Disclosure Issues

[63] The most contentious issue in respect of disclosure was the question of whether the Applicant should be required to produce a comprehensive business valuation for his trucking business. The Respondent is seeking this valuation. The Applicant is opposed to this valuation because of the nature of the business. The Applicant owns and operates his own truck. It is not a complicated business.

[64] In my view, the Applicant should not, at this stage, be required to produce that type of business valuation. I see no basis for it in the records, and I note that there is no expert report that suggests that a valuation of this nature is required. Instead, he should simply be required to update disclosure that has already been provided on these issues and, perhaps, respond to other requests.

[65] I also note that a request for documents has been served on the Respondent. The Applicant’s Affidavit suggests that there are significant gaps that remain in this disclosure. In addition, I have identified some concerns in terms of missing documents from the Respondent in the section on the calculation of income.

[66] I note that these gaps continue to remain in spite of the July 10th, 2024 Order of Emery J. that required the Respondent to “provide disclosure as set out in the Applicant’s Request for Information dated January 9, 2024 and January 16, 2024.” Disclosure is an essential part of the family law process.

[67] As a result, I am directing as follows: a) Each party shall serve on the other party an updated request for information. This shall be done within twenty-one (21) days of the release of these reasons. It shall include any requests that have not been responded to. b) Each party shall provide their response to the request for information within twenty-eight (28) days of receiving it. That response shall include either the documents requested, or an Affidavit outlining either the steps that have been taken to find the document and producing any requesting letters, or an explanation as to why the document is not being produced. c) Once the materials in paragraphs (a) and (b) are provided, then any party that remains unsatisfied as to the production of the documents is free to bring a motion. d) Any motion for further production must include a chart outlining the document sought, the reason for seeking it and the other side’s response to the request.

[68] At this point, I do not intend to review the Applicant’s Request for Information in a granular fashion. However, I will make one observation about the Applicant’s request for information and the chart that are contained in the materials. The Applicant seeks “proof of all allegations made by the Respondent in her answer dated December 19th, 2023.” I agree with the Respondent that this request is somewhat vague. However, it should be viewed as a blanket request to produce the documents that are relevant to the allegations, and with that limitation, should be answered.

[69] The rather dilatory approach to disclosure also suggests to me that the parties would benefit from a timetable. I am also of that view, as this action has been before the Courts for a year. To that end, I am directing as follows: a) The parties are to agree on a timetable within fourteen (14) days from today’s date and submit it to my judicial assistant (Samantha.alves@ontario.ca) for signature. It is also to be filed with the Court office and uploaded to CaseLines. b) In the event that the parties cannot agree on the timetable, then they are to each submit their proposed timetable to Ms. Alves and file same in accordance with the directions in paragraph (a). I will then impose a timetable on the parties.

[70] In order to assist the parties in formulating that timetable, it would appear to me reasonable to expect that the parties should be in a position to proceed to trial well before this time next year.

Conclusion

[71] For the foregoing reasons, I have issued the following orders on consent, on an interim basis, in respect of parenting: a) Supervised access is to begin on the later of the weekend of September 21 and 22, 2024 or the day that the supervised access centre proposed by the Applicant is available. b) The supervised access visits will be for a period of one and a half hours every second weekend, with the first two visits to take place in the supervised access centre. All visits will be on Saturday or Sunday with the time to be set by the Supervised Access centre. c) After the first two visits, the supervised access visits can be moved to the community and can include the Applicant’s mother unless the supervision centre has concerns. d) The Applicant shall be responsible for transporting the child to and from the supervised access visits. e) The supervised access centre is Renew Supervision, and it is located in Brampton. f) Once these six visits have taken place, the Applicant may bring a further motion seeking an expansion of his parenting time, including unsupervised visits. g) While the motion described in paragraph (f) is pending, the supervised access is to be continued on the schedule set out above. h) The costs of the supervised visits are to be borne by the Applicant in the first instance. They may be discussed at trial

[72] In addition, I have issued the following orders not on consent, on an interim basis, in respect of the other issues that were argued on the motion: a) I have, on an interim basis, imputed income to the Applicant in the sum of $80,000 per year. b) I have on an interim basis, imputed income to the Respondent in the sum of $25,000 per year. c) On an interim basis, the Applicant shall pay the sum of $745.00 to the Respondent on account of child support, commencing on November 1st, 2024. d) Within seven (7) calendar days of the release of these reasons, the Applicant shall pay the sum of $5000 to the Respondent. This is an undifferentiated payment that will be categorized at trial. e) On December 1st, 2024 the Applicant shall have exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, and the Respondent shall move out of it. f) Each party shall serve on the other party an updated request for information. This shall be done within twenty-one (21) days of the release of these reasons. It shall include any requests that have not been responded to. g) Each party shall provide their response to the request for information within twenty-eight (28) days of receiving it. That response shall include either the documents requested, or an Affidavit outlining either the steps that have been taken to find the document and producing any requesting letters, or an explanation as to why the document is not being produced. h) Once the materials in paragraphs (a) and (b) are provided, then any party that remains unsatisfied as to the production of the documents is free to bring a motion. i) Any motion for further production must include a chart outlining the document sought, the reason for seeking it and the other side’s response to the request. j) The parties are to agree on a timetable within fourteen (14) days from today’s date and submit it to my judicial assistant (Samantha.alves@ontario.ca) for signature. It is also to be filed with the Court office and uploaded to CaseLines. k) In the event that the parties cannot agree on the timetable, then they are to each submit their proposed timetable to Ms. Alves and file same in accordance with the directions in paragraph (a). I will then impose a timetable on the parties.

[73] This brings me to the issue of costs. The parties are encouraged to agree on the costs of this motion. If they are unable to agree, then each side may serve, file and upload costs submissions not to exceed three (3) single-spaced pages, exclusive of bills of costs, offers to settle and case-law within fourteen (14) calendar days of today’s date.

[74] Each side may then serve, file and upload responding costs submissions not to exceed two (2) single-spaced pages, exclusive of bills of costs, offers to settle and case-law within seven (7) calendar days thereafter.

[75] In addition to filing and uploading the costs submissions, counsel are directed to provide an electronic copy of them to my judicial assistant, Samantha Alves (Samantha.alves@ontario.ca). This is not in lieu of filing those submissions and Ms. Alves will not assist in the filing or uploading exercise.

[76] There are to be no extensions on the timelines for the costs submissions, even on consent, without my leave. In the event that the costs submissions are not made in accordance with the timetable set out above, there shall be no order as to costs.

Lemay J. Released: October 8, 2024