Court File and Parties
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: GINA LABOS ANAYAN, ALMIRA ABDULKAREEM, A MINOR BY HER LITIGATION, GINA LABOS ANAYAN, HANNELL ANAYAN, A MINOR BY HER LITIGATION GUARDIAN, GINA LABOS ANAYAN AND SHARAL ABDULKAREEM, A MINOR, BY HER LITIGATION GUARDIAN, GINA LABOS ANAYAN, Plaintiffs
AND:
MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE, Defendant
BEFORE: Akazaki J.
COUNSEL: Sarah Mackenzie and Wendy Linden, for the Defendant
HEARD: September 13, 2024
REASONS FOR DECISION
OVERVIEW
1The Minister for National Revenue moved to strike the statement of claim, on the following grounds: (a) it discloses no reasonable cause of action; and (b) the Superior Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate matters involving taxation and review of federal administrative bodies. The moving party also required that the plaintiffs be denied leave to amend the statement of claim, due to the long passage of time and because the essence of the pleadings cannot conceivably be saved by an amendment.
2The plaintiffs did not appear to respond to the motion but also declined to advise defence counsel whether they intended to abandon the lawsuit.
3In the context of the claim as stated in the statement of claim, the defendant was misnamed as the Minister for National Revenue. The proper entity is Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”). Section 69 of the Canada Revenue Agency Act, S.C. 1999, c. 17, provides that legal proceedings may be brought or taken by or against the Agency in the name of the Agency. No substantive issue on the motion turns on this misnomer. For ease of following these reasons, I will refer to CRA as the defendant, because it was the federal government agency of whose conduct the plaintiffs complain.
4The statement of claim alleges that CRA imputed an excessive amount of taxable income to the plaintiff and instituted wrongful collection measures. The plaintiffs claim damages because Gina Labos Anayan had to take on additional work to pay for the income tax liability and thereby became alienated from her children and developed carpal tunnel syndrome. The other plaintiffs are the dependents of Ms. Anayan, and they claim under s. 61 of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 (FLA).
5There is no cause of action by a taxpayer, in tort or otherwise, for the hardship resulting from taxation, or for the financial or other consequences that could result from such hardship. Disputes regarding the assessment of income tax are the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Court of Canada. Review of administrative conduct of federal agencies is also the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Canada. The statement of claim contains no allegation that one or more CRA employees targeted Ms. Anayan for some purpose other than administration of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.). If there had been an intention to make that allegation, to allow amendment of the pleadings to assert such a claim would be unfair to the defendant and would amount to a new cause of action barred by the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B.
6Because Ms. Anayan cannot maintain her claim in this court, the derivative FLA claims must also fail.
7For these, and the detailed reasons that follow, I hereby strike the statement of claim and dismiss the action, without leave to amend.
PLEADINGS IN THE STATEMENT OF CLAIM
8The statement of claim contains the following prayer for relief:
i) an unspecified claim for general and special damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, for carpal tunnel syndrome resulting from additional work performed to make up for tax liability, and for alienation from her children
ii) $50,000 as aggravated, punitive, and exemplary damages
iii) an injunction prohibiting further tax enforcement proceedings
iv) setting aside tax garnishment of Ms. Anayan’s wages
v) an order removing any tax lien against Ms. Anayan’s home
vi) interest and costs
9The root allegation is that since the 2012 tax year, the CRA has knowingly imputed an exaggerated amount of net taxable income and assessed her income tax accordingly.
10Based on the above allegation of excessive taxation, the statement of claim then alleges that CRA illegally garnished 100 percent of Ms. Anayan’s wages and withheld her child tax benefits by setting them off against her income tax liability.
11The statement of claim alleges that the consequence of being overtaxed and subjected to aggressive collection measures was that the plaintiff had to take on extra work as a professional housekeeper. This, she alleges, resulted in her carpal tunnel syndrome. She alleges she also became alienated from her children because she could not look after them as much and could not take part in their school-related activities.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
12The lawyer who drafted and issued the statement of claim for the plaintiffs has been disbarred, for reasons unrelated to this proceeding. I was advised by counsel that he may be appealing the Law Society Tribunal’s revocation of his licence. The only real significance of this was that counsel for the CRA had consented to numerous delays in the plaintiffs’ failure to prosecute the action since 2018. This motion was scheduled by Merritt J. over a year ago, on July 24, 2023. Notably, she ordered that any amended statement of claim be served and filed by October 23, 2023.
13On June 18, 2018, the plaintiffs’ lawyer provided a draft amended statement of claim. It was never issued. The draft did not provide additional pleadings but rather simply purported to withdraw the injunctive relief, the termination of garnishment, and the removal of liens, from the prayer for relief. No other amendment or proposed amendment has since come to light.
14Counsel for CRA provided an extensive record of communications with various persons on the plaintiffs’ side, including the plaintiffs’ original lawyer (who is technically still on the record), the Law Society of Ontario’s trusteeship department, and a lawyer appointed by the LSO for some of the disbarred lawyer’s files. As late as the end of August 2024, defence counsel was still trying to ascertain from Ms. Anayan whether she planned to continue her proceeding, and from the LSO whether a lawyer would be appointed.
15Unopposed procedural motions tend to be summarily granted. In this instance, counsel for the CRA engaged in a dialogue with me about the arguments that could be made had the plaintiffs been at the motion and represented by counsel, similar to the discharge of obligations of a party moving ex parte. Since there is no rule specifically dealing with the scenario, under r. 1.04(2) I am obliged to draw an analogy to r. 19.06 (default judgments) and adjudicate the motion based on the CRA’s arguments on their full legal merits, including the high burden imposed on a party moving for dismissal of an action at the pleadings stage.
PROCEDURE ON THE MOTION
16Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, allows a defendant to move to strike a statement of claim on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action. Similarly, r. 21.01(3)(a) allows a defendant to move to have an action stayed or dismissed on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. CRA relied on both these rules, in the notice of motion as amended.
17Counsel also submitted that the action could be dismissed for delay under rule 24, because it was now over five years since commencement. Since this ground was not specified in the amended notice of motion, I declined to hear argument on it. The only relevance of delay is the issue of prejudice the defendant could suffer if I granted leave to amend. Rule 24 entails a different set of considerations, and it would not have been fair to the absent plaintiffs to hear this argument.
18A motion to strike a pleading requires the court to proceed on the basis that the facts as pleaded are true or capable of being proven at trial, unless they are manifestly incapable of proof: R. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2011 SCC 42, [2011] 3 S.C.R 45, at para. 22. Then, in applying the law to those facts, it must be “plain and obvious” that the case cannot succeed at trial: Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., [1990] 2 SCR 959, at p. 980. In plain language, the court is obliged to read the statement of claim generously and determine whether the facts can support any possible legal interpretation that could allow the court to grant the remedy sought by the plaintiff. If there is no reasonable chance of success, there would be no point to allowing the case to continue.
19The jurisdictional issue under r. 21.01(3) is less frequently invoked, but the same “plain and obvious” test applies: TeleZone Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) (2007), 88 O.R. (3d) 173, (Ont. S.C.), at para. 60.
20When presented with a jurisdictional attack on a party’s action, it is best to deal with the jurisdiction issue first because of the analytical framing of what the court can and cannot adjudicate.
SUPERIOR COURT JURISDICTION
21Provincial superior courts have inherent jurisdiction to deal with common law and equitable claims: Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc., 2010 SCC 62, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 585, at para. 6.
22The Federal Court has exclusive jurisdiction to issue an injunction or grant a remedy in relation to judicial review of a federal board, commission, or tribunal. The CRA, exercising its tax collection authority, is such a body: 861808 Ontario Inc. v. Canada (Revenue Agency), 2013 ONCA 604, 118 O.R. (3d) 501, at para. 11. The injunctive relief, and the reversal of garnishments and other administrative actions by the CRA pursuant to its legislated mandate could only be pursued in Federal Court.
23Similarly, the Tax Court of Canada is the court of exclusive original jurisdiction to review income tax assessments: Krahn v. Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), 2005 FC 471, [2005] 2 C.T.C. 214, at para. 10. The issue of the offset of the child tax benefit properly resided there, as did the imputation of income.
24Taking the statement of claim at face value, I glean from the prayer for relief that Ms. Anayan did not seek to lower her income tax assessment. However, the injunctive relief against CRA cannot be pursued in this court. Her claim for damages for the mental and physical harm suffered from being overtaxed and from the aggressive collection measures could, from a jurisdictional perspective, be adjudicated here. Where a party seeks a private common-law remedy against a public entity, such as a cause of action founded in contract, tort, or equity, the Superior Court has jurisdiction. The proper characterization of the substance of the claim governs: TeleZone (SCC), at paras. 43 and 79-80.
25It remains somewhat of an imponderable how such a private law cause of action could be maintained or proven if Ms. Anayan has pleaded no determination by the Tax Court overturning the validity of her tax assessments, or a determination by the Federal Court disallowing the garnishment or other collections measures. Looking more closely at the statement of claim, it asserts a tort claim based on “illegal” taxation measures and not on a contract or a special relationship in tort law or equity. Where the claim for damages is rooted so fundamentally in questions of mixed fact and law that this court lacks jurisdiction to answer, the Superior Court cannot properly adjudicate.
26Accordingly, I conclude that this court lacks jurisdiction to try the case outlined in the statement of claim. This does not preclude the possibility of another case against CRA for damages in this court, on the right facts. My conclusion is based solely on the facts as pleaded in the statement of claim, read generously with any ambiguity resolved in favour of the court keeping jurisdiction.
DOES THE PLEADING DISCLOSE A REASONABLE CAUSE OF ACTION?
27Since it was pleaded as the basis for awarding damages, and because other causes of action do not leap from the page, the focus on this motion is the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress. I will also deal with misfeasance in public office, although not expressly pleaded, because it was raised in authorities submitted by counsel and because the words “illegal” and “illegally” could connote the misfeasance tort. If there are other nominate torts woven into the text of the statement of claim, my broader comments regarding the intersection of private causes of action and public duties will capture them.
Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress
28The three elements of this tort, as recognized in modern common law, are the following: (1) flagrant or outrageous conduct; (2) calculated to produce harm; and (3) resulting in a visible and provable illness: Colistro v. Tbaytel, 2019 ONCA 197, 145 O.R. (3d) 538, at para. 14.
29The fact that the plaintiffs have pleaded illegality or high-handed conduct does not mean the statement of claim has properly disclosed facts supporting the first element of the cause of action. The fact that a taxpayer might subjectively be outraged by a large tax bill or by aggressive collection measures does not qualify under the first part of the test. Indeed, the first and second elements go hand in hand in this case when one explores the nature of the CRA’s statutory mandate to do the things of which the plaintiffs complain.
30Under s. 5 of the Canada Revenue Agency Act, the CRA’s mandate includes support for the administration and enforcement of “program legislation.” That legislation entails 11 taxing statutes, including the Income Tax Act. One need not scratch the surface of this mandate to observe that it is the CRA’s duty to assess income tax obligations and to collect it. If the CRA did not perform this duty, the country could run out of money.
31A fair reading of paragraph 4 of the statement of claim is that the CRA had imputed income to Ms. Anayan because the agency disputed her declared income. I accept for the purposes of the r. 21 analysis that there was a dispute between her and the agency of sufficient magnitude that it was causing her distress, as she has alleged. A taxpayer’s distress in a confrontation with CRA is not so far-fetched that I cannot assume it is true or capable of proof.
32The aversion of many to taxes does not give rise to common-law duties about the way it is calculated or collected. The statement of claim puts to this court that tax, and the collection of it, caused Ms. Anayan emotional distress and financial hardship. The subjective outrage of Ms. Anayan does not render these steps by CRA objectively flagrant or outrageous, or calculated to cause her harm. The statement of claim, read in its totality, complains that CRA assessed and collected tax from her too aggressively and “illegally.” But the statement of claim does not state that the real reason for doing so was anything other than to collect taxes.
33Even with a generous reading of the pleading, including the statement in paragraph 10 that the CRA carried out the taxation measures “with a callous disregard for the plaintiffs’ rights,” I cannot see an interpretation that the aim was to cause injury. Foreseeability or disregard for rights, defining the scope of duty of care in other torts such as negligence, is insufficient for an intentional tort. Like conspiracy or interference with economic relations, the infliction of mental suffering requires an explicit and detailed pleading that hurting the plaintiffs was the CRA’s intent, as opposed to aggressively collecting taxes. The statement of claim therefore falls short of pleading facts supporting the second element of the tort.
34Counsel also argued that the claim against the CRA for infliction of mental suffering could not be sustained in the absence of a recognized psychiatric illness: McCreight et al. v. Attorney-General (Canada), 2013 ONCA 483, 116 O.R. (3d) 429, at para. 69. They also relied on Mustapha v. Culligan of Canada Ltd., 2008 SCC 27, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 114, at paras. 15-16, for the proposition that the pleaded conduct of the CRA in assessing and collecting tax from Ms. Anayan could not foreseeably result in mental harm to her. Further still, the claim for carpal tunnel syndrome was even less foreseeable. I agree with these submissions to the extent that the statement of claim does not disclose a set of facts that is likely to succeed at trial.
35On a pleadings motion, I cannot say that the plaintiffs will not be able prove some kind of recognized illness such as the clinical depression and anxiety suffered by Mr. Mustapha. Because the pleading fails to meet the requirements of the first two elements, the resolution of ambiguity in the plaintiffs’ favour on this point does not assist them. I therefore find that the statement of claim fails to disclose a tenable case against CRA for intentional infliction of mental distress, because it does not properly plead the first two required elements to prove the tort. I need not decide the motion based on the third issue.
Misfeasance in Public Office
36In exceptional cases, the courts have recognized misfeasance in public office as a stand-alone tort: Alberta v. Elder Advocates of Alberta Society, 2011 SCC 24, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 261, at para. 78. This cause of action is also considered an intentional tort, in that the conduct or failure by the public official must have been deliberate. At the very least, there must be wilful blindness or subjective recklessness from the perpetrator’s vantage – meaning that even knowledge of likely injury is insufficient to uphold the claim: Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263, at para. 38.
37As in the pleading of the intentional infliction of mental distress, the pleading that the CRA knowingly took “illegal” tax measures cannot sustain the cause of action without further specifying the facts of the illegality or the subjective wilfulness of the unnamed perpetrators. Six years after the issuance of the statement of claim, there have been no discovery proceedings and no particulars of the claim. At this stage, the fact that counsel for CRA could conceive of such causes of action specifically pleaded does not mean the court is “obliged to divine causes of action apart from those deliberately pleaded and argued by a party”: Elder Advocates, at para. 79. The statement of claim does not disclose a case based on this tort.
Public Policy Imperative to Specify the Intentional Torts
38Because the plaintiffs were not represented by anyone at trial, including self-representation, there remains the possibility that they or a lawyer acting for them could have divined a cause of action other than the ones considered above. For the following reasons, it is important that a damages claim against CRA be held to a high standard of specificity to avoid the natural inference that the proceeding is a collateral attack on a tax determination or some other form of abuse of process.
39The CRA’s duty to assess and collect taxes entails conflict between the individual and the state. The courts must be mindful not to allow damages claims to be used as a collateral attack on tax assessments: Canada v. Roitman, 2006 FCA 266, [2006] 5 C.T.C. 142, at para. 20. As stated earlier, tax assessments, including setoffs against benefits, can only be challenged in the Tax Court, and collection efforts are subject to review by the Federal Court. If the assessments or collection efforts are “illegal” in the sense of being incorrect application or implementation of tax laws, judicial review is the recourse, not a common-law damages claim. Canadian tax law provides lawful recourses for taxpayers to challenge tax assessments and collections measures.
40The difficulty with vague allegations of illegality is that they can be entirely consistent with the lawful and dutiful activities of public officials. The CRA is a government agency employing many. Several employees could have been involved in Ms. Anayan’s tax file. That did not make them conspirators, in the tort law meaning. Nor can one infer an intention to do her harm. To distinguish the suit from a collateral attack, the plaintiffs must plead the specific facts of the intention and illegality of the conduct beyond the use of the label “illegal” to describe what are otherwise lawful and dutiful activities by CRA personnel.
41The intersection of tort law and public duty requires the court to consider the effect of private law on the ability of public agencies to perform duties for the public good: Kamloops v. Nielsen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2, at pp. 26-27 and 33-34. The court must consider whether the imposition would interfere with the defendant’s public duties. In Kamloops, the court made the distinction between operational and policy-driven actions of a municipality that exposed it to tort liability. In rejecting the “floodgates” argument, the court considered tort liability as a “a useful protection to the citizen whose ever-increasing reliance on public officials is a feature of our age”: at p. 27. The availability of civil remedies against public officials is rooted in the principle that there is no immunity accorded to unlawful activities committed in the course of public duties: Douglas Aircraft Co. of Canada v. McConnell, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 245, at p. 257-258.
42The application of tort law to the tax-collection activities of CRA employees is different from the professional duty of care of building inspectors in Kamloops. The assessment and collection of taxes are lawful duties. Errors in either, even egregious ones, can be challenged and corrected such that the taxpayer’s liability or deprivation of property rights is suspended until determined by the appropriate court. This is different from a property owner or road user suffering injury due to a poor inspection by a municipal official. The proper analogy to the Kamloops analysis would be that the availability of civil remedies for torts committed in the operational context do not assist plaintiffs seeking to undo the operations. A building inspector who is overly zealous in applying building codes cannot be sued simply for doing so, even if the owner or contractor is likely to suffer economic loss from the work orders or from the delay in completion.
43In the case of tax collectors, undoubtedly some cases require aggressive and stringent measures. If these public officials can be readily vexed by lawsuits stating no specifics of unlawful conduct, the greater good and the will of Parliament would be frustrated. This is not to say that CRA employees cannot exercise some discretion in considering the taxpayer’s circumstances, to settle a tax debt, or to defer collection measures. However, it would be contrary to public policy and the legislation to allow taxpayers to sue CRA and its employees for financial or other hardship resulting from presumptively lawful tax collection.
44At a very basic level, the courts must not apply a private law duty if it would conflict with a public duty: Jayco Inc. v. Canada (Revenue Agency), 2022 ONCA 277, 468 D.L.R. (4th) 676, at paras. 22-23. In Ms. Anayan’s suit, the premise that taxation and collection of taxes caused her financial hardship, emotional harm, alienation from her children, and carpal tunnel syndrome would open the civil process up for tax evaders to use personal sensitivity or infirmity as a reason not to have their taxes collected. It is not to dismiss or minimize her distress in being pursued by CRA, to include her among the many whose tax affairs have been subject to varying levels of scrutiny and confrontation.
45In summary, the foregoing tort law analysis does not mean CRA or other public officials are immune from civil suits for damages. It means the statement of claim falls well short of the pleading requirements of the intentional torts I have discussed, and short of demonstrating that this case is not a collateral attack against legislated taxing and collection measures.
LEAVE TO AMEND
46If a court strikes the parties’ pleading, it is generally required to grant leave to amend unless it is plain and obvious that no tenable cause of action is possible on the facts as alleged: Allan Etherington v. National Hockey League, 2020 ONSC 5789, at para. 12. The plaintiffs did not appear at the motion to request such leave, however. There were therefore no means to ascertain how the plaintiffs could ameliorate their pleadings from a legal perspective. Even if leave to amend usually entails imposing a low burden on the seeker, there still must be a seeker.
47In this instance, the plaintiffs could have had an opportunity to explain how the statement of claim could be augmented both to make it tenable in law and to bring the subject matter into the provincial Superior Court’s jurisdiction. Even if the plaintiffs had been at the hearing to make submissions, the only imaginable scenario in which the claim could be recognized in law was one in which a specific CRA employee had embarked on some personal campaign against Ms. Anayan and thus abused the official role of tax assessor and collector.
48The absence of the plaintiffs at the hearing of the motion makes it hard to apply rule 1.04 - the principle of interpretation favouring just, most expeditious, and least expensive determination of the case on its merits - in the plaintiffs’ favour. The six-year history of this case, without positive feedback from the plaintiffs of their intention to proceed despite repeated communications and indulgences, does not suggest they are working diligently toward having their day in court. The court-ordered deadline to amend the statement of claim came and went almost a year ago. The plaintiffs have filed no written response to the motion. The case appears all but abandoned, save for the formality of a notice of discontinuance. The courts recognize a basic principle of finality to prevent the perpetuation of litigation where a party could have taken proper steps to keep it alive: R. v. Perkins, 2017 ONCA 152, at para. 18.
49The foregoing factors militate against granting leave to amend, and I do find that the absence of an appearance by the plaintiff to ask for leave to be a deciding factor is significant. In the event I am wrong in the exercise of discretion to decline leave, there is a further, more technical reason to deny leave.
50In instances where the party fails to plead every element of a claim or defence, it is conceivable that the party could save the pleading with an amendment. In such instances, the facts of the cause of action require gaps to be filled, but it is not hard to connect the dots. The problem with this case is that the factual gaps in the intentional torts are not so easily filled in, where essentially the pleading has disclosed nothing but the label of illegality attaching to CRA’s legislated activities. Here, it is not a matter of filling gaps, but of inserting a previously undisclosed set of facts, what the courts frequently call the “factual matrix.”
51There is nothing in the case or the pleading to suggest Ms. Anayan or her lawyer investigated the case to find out the names of individuals handling her file, to determine whether they did or have any reason to cause her distress or hardship. Without details of such file handling, any case of that nature introduced now would amount to a previously undisclosed cause of action. It is trite law that a cause of action defining a tort arises from the factual allegations and not from the labels attached to it: Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd's of London v. Scalera, 2000 SCC 24, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 551, at para. 50.
52Before an amendment can be directed after expiry of the limitation period, the court must satisfy itself that the existing pleading contains all the facts necessary to support the amendment: Klassen v. Beausoleil, 2019 ONCA 407, 34 C.P.C. (8th) 180, at para. 27. To support the pleading of a tort of misfeasance in public office, the plaintiff must plead facts tying in the state of mind of the official and particulars of the specific allegations. Simply pleading the unlawfulness of the agency’s conduct, without such particulars, is fatal: Merchant Law Group v. Canada Revenue Agency, 2010 FCA 184, [2010] F.C.J. No. 898, at para. 35. A label that the conduct of the CRA was illegal is insufficient. The pleadings must disclose material facts supporting the label.
53In the circumstances of this case, where CRA’s counsel have attempted repeatedly to point out the defects of the claim as pleaded, it would be unfair to leave it open to the plaintiffs to assert the claim based on a previously undisclosed set of facts. The fact that it seems unlikely that the plaintiffs would act on such leave also persuades me that granting leave seems pointless.
COSTS AND CONCLUSION
54The defendant is wholly successful in the motion and the action. It is entitled to costs. Defence counsel provided a costs outline showing partial indemnity costs incurred of over $19,000, based on the monetized value of in-house legal services. However, they limited CRA’s costs demand to $7,000, all-inclusive. I find this to be a generous reduction and fix the costs in that amount.
55Defence counsel also asked that the order leave it open to seek costs against the disbarred lawyer. He is, despite the loss of his licence, still the lawyer of record in this action. Under r. 57.07(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, no costs order can be made against the lawyer personally without affording the lawyer a reasonable opportunity to make representations on his own behalf. I will therefore leave the issue of the lawyer’s liability for costs open for 30 days from the date of this order, to allow the defendant to serve the former lawyer with a notice of motion and motion record seeking that relief.
56Otherwise, if the CRA does not pursue the former lawyer, an order shall issue striking out the statement of claim without leave to amend, dismissing the action, and requiring the plaintiffs to pay the defendant costs in the sum of $7,000, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and taxes. The approval of the plaintiffs for the signing and entry of a formal order is not required.
Akazaki J.
Date: September 27, 2024