COURT FILE NO.: CV-21-123 (Owen Sound) DATE: 2024 09 16
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Maureen Elizabeth Tucker, Applicant – and – Edward Allan Hopkins, Respondent
COUNSEL: A. Wilford for the Applicant A. Shahabi for the Respondent
HEARD: April 10, 2024, with written submissions received April 30, May 14, and May 21, 2024.
REASONS FOR DECISION
Justice R. Chown
[1] The remaining issue in this application is how to divide the proceeds of sale from the home the parties jointly owned at the end of their relationship. This issue was the subject of a one-day trial on April 10, 2024.
Background
[2] The parties were in a common law relationship from August 2009 until January 2019. During the relationship, Ms. Tucker worked in housekeeping with the Brightshores Health System and Mr. Hopkins was self-employed, primarily doing plumbing contracting. The parties lived together in a house on Dawson Street in Wiarton. For the first year and a half of the relationship, that is, until January 28, 2011, Mr. Hopkins and his ex-wife, Tracey Hopkins, jointly owned the property. At that point, Ms. Tucker and Mr. Hopkins took out a line of credit and bought out Ms. Hopkins’ share. Ms. Tucker replaced Ms. Hopkins on title but did not contribute any capital.
[3] The parties’ relationship broke down and the parties separated on January 13, 2019.
2011 Joint Line of Credit
[4] The line of credit the parties obtained on January 28, 2011 was for $116,000, secured against the property. Although Ms. Tucker contributed no capital, she did become a joint debtor on the line of credit. She testified, and I accept, that the line of credit was based on her income. Mr. Hopkins had no proof of income because he did not file income taxes, so he did not qualify for credit. Ms. Tucker encouraged the arrangement because Ms. Hopkins was looking for support, and Ms. Tucker thought Mr. Hopkins should pay off his ex-wife from the equity in the house.
[5] The $116,000 line of credit was applied as follows:
| Item | Amount |
|---|---|
| Paid to respondent’s ex-wife Tracey Hopkins | 25,000.00 |
| Paid for property tax arrears | 5,872.25 |
| Paid for utility arrears | 824.01 |
| Paid to discharge existing mortgage | 75,301.04 |
| Legal expenses on the refinancing | 1,120.60 |
| Paid to parties’ joint line of credit | 7,882.10 |
[6] Regarding the $7,882.10 amount, Ms. Tucker says that Mr. Hopkins must have used those funds, as she never went into the account where those funds were deposited.
[7] When the parties obtained the joint line of credit, Ms. Tucker also obtained her own unsecured line of credit for $10,000.
Fire Insurance
[8] Mr. Hopkins did not have fire insurance on the property. Ms. Tucker says it was her suggestion that they get it, but she acknowledges that to get the line of credit they needed to get fire insurance. The parties obtained fire insurance in January 2011 and experienced a serious fire in March 2011.
[9] The failure to have fire insurance earlier demonstrates poor financial judgment on the part of Mr. Hopkins; however, it is not the case that Ms. Tucker gets some kind of extra credit from the insurance payout because she suggested it.
Rebuilding After Fire
[10] The parties moved to Clavering after the fire and rented a house, paid for by their insurer. The insurer did not initially accept that the house in Wiarton was beyond repair and needed to be torn down and rebuilt. However, the parties and their insurer eventually resolved their impasse. The property was torn down and rebuilt, with Mr. Hopkins directing the rebuild and doing some of the work himself. The parties moved in again in February 2013. They acquired new furniture and contents with the insurance proceeds.
The 2013 Refinancing
[11] On September 19, 2012, CRA placed a lien against the property for Mr. Hopkins’ unpaid income taxes. The parties sought refinancing. They secured an increase to their line of credit to $170,000 in February 2013. The CRA debt had grown to $18,972.88 when the parties paid the lien off from the increased line of credit.
Further CRA liens
[12] Mr. Hopkins continued his habit of income tax delinquency. CRA issued further liens against the property. By the time of the eventual sale of the property in 2022, Mr. Hopkins’ outstanding balance to CRA was $55,569.95.
Value of Property
[13] As I will explain, the increase in value of the property from January 2011 to the date it was sold must be shared equally. Therefore, the only two values that matter are the values as of January 2011 and May 2022. However, I will review all the property value evidence as it might be useful as data points in the event of an appeal.
At Start of Relationship
[14] I have no specific evidence of the value of the property at the start of the relationship.
In January 2011
[15] Both sides used and accepted $140,000 as the value of the property as of January 2011. Given that there was a $116,000 line of credit against the property, Mr. Hopkins’ equity in the property was $24,000 at that time. Both sides seemed to accept that figure as well.
In 2013
[16] Mr. Hopkins testified that he was told the value of the property at the time of the 2013 financing was $275,000. This evidence is complete hearsay and not supported with any documentation.
On January 13, 2019
[17] There is no specific evidence as to the value of the property on the separation date.
On January 11, 2021
[18] A January 11, 2021 market comparison found the average sale price of four comparable homes to be $422,000, with the realtor suggesting that the parties list the property for sale at $449,000.
In November 2021
[19] The document brief contains an opinion of market value from November 2021. It suggests a value of $585,000 to $600,000.
On May 31, 2022
[20] The property sold for $650,000 with a closing date of May 31, 2022. The line of credit balance at that time was $170,652.75. There was a CRA lien, unpaid taxes, and water arrears against the property at that time. I will discuss these in more detail below.
The Parties’ Positions
[21] Ms. Tucker claims well over half the net proceeds of the sale of the property. She takes the position that the parties were not in a joint family venture. She claims that she is entitled to half of the sale proceeds plus certain adjustments arising during the 2011 refinancing and the 2013 refinancing. Most significantly, she claims that she is entitled to $25,000 (the amount paid to Ms. Hopkins in 2011) and the payments to CRA ($55,569.95 + $18,972.88 = $74,542.83), because these were the debts of Mr. Hopkins alone. She also claims credit for certain post-separation expenses and legal fees that came out of the sale proceeds.
[22] Mr. Hopkins’ position is that the parties were in a joint family venture. He submits that he must receive credit for his initial equity in the property, while Ms. Tucker initially contributed nothing. He accepts that the parties should share in the net increase in value of the property to the date of separation but says the $25,000 payment to Ms. Hopkins was just her equity in the property. He also says his CRA debts should be treated as a debt of the joint venture. He also says that he is exclusively entitled to the increase in value of the property that took place post-separation, as he was the only one paying the mortgage and living in the property at that time.
Joint Family Venture
[23] I will consider the evidence regarding joint family venture under the four headings suggested by the Supreme Court of Canada in Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10, at paras. 87 to 99.
1. Mutual Effort or Contribution
[24] The parties’ relationship resembled a marriage. The parties agreed that they considered themselves a family unit.
[25] Ms. Tucker’s steady employment income was the basis for the parties obtaining credit. Mr. Hopkins says that he could have had a relative co-sign and could have obtained credit without Ms. Tucker. However, that’s not what he did. In addition, he has not provided adequate evidence to satisfy me he had a relative ready and willing to go on the line of credit. Regardless, Ms. Tucker’s creditworthiness was a significant contribution to the parties’ ability to pay out Ms. Hopkins, and to the parties’ financial well-being.
[26] I have limited evidence as to how the parties shared domestic chores. There is some evidence that Ms. Tucker did the grocery shopping. There is some evidence that Ms. Tucker did the driving because Mr. Hopkins’ licence was suspended, but I do not have specific particulars or dates of his suspension.
[27] Ms. Tucker acknowledged that she did not contribute much labour to re-building the house after the fire. Mr. Hopkins did most of the work or hired out others to do the work. Ms. Tucker did a lot of driving to pick up things that were needed and did assist, such as with clean up. She also continued her part-time employment, working 20 to 30 hours per week. I did not receive a lot of evidence about what reconstruction work Mr. Hopkins did himself and what work he hired out. Similarly, I did not receive much evidence about whether Mr. Hopkins maintained his employment or how Mr. Hopkins’ revenue was affected during the time that he was rebuilding the house. I did not receive any evidence about the amount of the insurance proceeds, or the amounts spent.
[28] Although the evidence is limited, I am satisfied that the parties pooled their efforts towards a common goal of improved economic circumstances. I am further satisfied that Ms. Tucker contributed significantly to this goal, while Mr. Hopkins’ poor money management (discussed in more detail below) harmed the parties’ financial circumstances.
2. Economic Integration
[29] From the time they obtained the joint line of credit, the parties maintained the joint line of credit account and a joint chequing account.
[30] Ms. Tucker said that about two years after she moved in with Mr. Hopkins, the parties agreed that Mr. Hopkins would pay the mortgage, property taxes, and insurance for the property and Ms. Tucker would pay the household bills including the utility bills, cable, and groceries. Mr. Hopkins said, “After living with me for a year-and-a-half and paying off a line of credit that she brought to my house, I finally said to her, it’s about time you started paying for some things. Because she hadn’t.” He says there was no specific agreement reached, but she did start paying some of the bills.
[31] Ms. Tucker said the amount each party paid “worked out to be about the same amount of monies every month.” She acknowledged that sometimes she did not have the funds and he had to pay some of the bills, and Mr. Hopkins would cover them, but she said this did not occur very often. She was not challenged on this evidence by reference to her banking records.
[32] Ms. Tucker ran her $10,000 unsecured line of credit up to its limit during the relationship. She used some of it to pay for the deck they added to the house after the fire.
[33] Ms. Tucker apparently has a pension from her employment, but the details of it are not in evidence. The pension is referenced in correspondence between counsel in the initial application record but was not raised at the hearing or otherwise in the evidence, and it was not raised in the written submissions. No claim for the pension has been advanced.
[34] Ms. Tucker had a separate bank account with Meridian. I did not get particulars of what separate accounts Mr. Hopkins had, but there was evidence that he had separate accounts. Ms. Tucker’s banking records from the accounts solely in her name are in evidence. Mr. Hopkins’ are not.
[35] Mr. Hopkins was a poor money manager. He failed to regularly file his tax returns. He ran up debt to CRA. I do not have precise evidence about the amount of his CRA liabilities at the start of the relationship.
[36] Even though the parties maintained separate bank accounts, and even though they may not have shared all information about their financial lives, their financial goals, benefits, risks and circumstances were significantly intertwined, and they lived like a family unit.
[37] I do not have complete evidence about the parties’ full assets and liabilities at the start and end of the relationship. I am not in a position to do a full analysis that would be equivalent to an NFP calculation in a marriage breakdown. Although Mr. Hopkins asserts there was a joint family venture, he has not put forth the evidence required for a full analysis. I do not understand him to be seeking to claim against Ms. Tucker’s pension or to expose his own financial circumstances to such an analysis. Rather, he seems to want me to divide the amount in trust after analyzing the evidence regarding the subject property, the line of credit, and the CRA debts only.
3. Intention of the Parties
[38] The parties’ actual intent is important in assessing whether they “intended to share in the wealth they jointly created”: Baranow, at para. 95. I have limited evidence on this point. Some of Cromwell J.’s comments in Baranow are applicable. For instance, the parties lived together for a considerable period in a stable relationship, so it is “nearly impossible to engage in a precise weighing of the benefits conferred within the relationship”: Baranow, at para. 95. The fact that the parties held joint title to the house reflects “an intent to share wealth, or some portion of it, equitably”: Baranow, at para. 96. Mr. Hopkins acknowledged that Ms. Tucker paid $2,000 towards the deck when the house was rebuilt. This is an example of evidence that reflects an intention that the parties would both benefit from the increase in value of the property.
4. Priority of the Family
[39] I also have limited evidence on whether the parties gave priority to the family in their decision making. Mr. Hopkins said he provided “some financial assistance” to Ms. Tucker’s daughter. Ms. Tucker said she sometimes paid for Mr. Hopkins’ daughter’s clothing, haircuts, footwear, and other items.
[40] Refinancing the house twice (2011 and 2013) does support the conclusion that the parties prioritized their joint interest in the house. However, there is no evidence that one party relied on the other to their detriment in the sense of foregoing other living arrangements or opportunities.
Conclusion on Joint Family Venture
[41] Weighing the available evidence, I conclude that the parties engaged in a joint family venture from the time that they took out the joint line of credit.
[42] It is possible for parties to engage in a joint family venture for some assets, but to exclude others. This is made clear in Baranow, at para. 97, where the court said, “The parties’ actual intent may also negate the existence of a joint family venture, or support the conclusion that particular assets were to be held independently.” However, I would not treat the house as the only asset that was part of the joint family venture. That would not reflect the deeper integration of the parties’ financial lives. The difficulty I have, however, is that Mr. Hopkins (who promotes the joint family venture argument) has not provided comprehensive evidence covering all the parties’ finances, or even his own. I appreciate that there are proportionality considerations in play in this case. But there is a stark contrast between the financial records Ms. Tucker has provided and those that Mr. Hopkins has provided.
CRA Debt
[43] The CRA liens against the property discharged in the 2013 refinancing and in the 2022 sale are summarized below:
| Date | Amount |
|---|---|
| March 5, 2013 | $18,972.88 |
| May 31, 2022 | $55,569.95 |
[44] Ms. Tucker submits that the $18,972.88 CRA lien is the sole debt of Mr. Hopkins. She further submits that Mr. Hopkins incurred this debt prior to the relationship. However, she offers no evidence to support this latter argument. With that said, it is Mr. Hopkins who had the burden to establish when his indebtedness to CRA arose, since he seeks to benefit from it.
[45] With respect to the $55,569.95 CRA lien, Ms. Tucker’s position is that this is a sole debt of Mr. Hopkins. At the hearing, Mr. Wilford acknowledged that Mr. Hopkins incurred this debt during the relationship.
[46] I have concluded that the CRA debts should be treated as part of the joint family venture. The parties had lived together for three and half years at the time they paid off the $18,972.88 amount. They had seriously intertwined their financial lives for more than two years, since January 2011. It seems likely to me that most, if not all of this was for unpaid taxes during the relationship. Regardless, in the circumstances here, where Ms. Tucker contributed no equity to the house, it would not be just to treat the house (an asset) that Mr. Hopkins brought into the relationship differently than his unpaid taxes (a liability) that he brought into the relationship.
[47] After 2013, Mr. Hopkins again ran up debt to CRA. There is no dispute that Mr. Hopkins incurred the $55,569.95 amount during the relationship. However, he did this within the joint family venture. While he was increasing the family debt, the parties “enjoyed” the lifestyle that came with that debt. I put the word “enjoyed” in quotation marks because the parties characterized the relationship as an unhappy one. That may be, but on balance, the family financial arrangements should be considered a joint family venture meaning both sides take the good with the bad.
[48] Ms. Tucker’s evidence, which I accept, was that she generally paid the bills and there was little money left over, and her bank balance did not increase. As indicated, her personal line of credit increased to its limit.
[49] I do not have equivalent evidence from Mr. Hopkins about his bank balances, savings, or debts, apart from the CRA debt. As indicated, Mr. Hopkins has not included in evidence any of his separate banking records. It would not be fair to allow him to claim CRA debt as a liability to the joint family venture if he was sitting on other assets that may have grown in during the relationship. Similarly, an analysis of his spending might have confirmed Ms. Tucker’s perspective that Mr. Hopkins spent excessive amounts on alcohol. With that said, it is unlikely that Mr. Hopkins has other assets that may have grown in value. Ms. Tucker did not suggest that he did. Indeed, in her January 8, 2022 affidavit, she states, “I knew Hopkins had no money at the time I met him,” and, “Hopkins is an alcoholic with no ability whatsoever to pay me my entitlement.”
[50] In the end, however, I must act on the available evidence and assume that the parties presented the case the way they did for their own reasons. For instance, there may have been proportionality concerns, knowledge that certain aspects were not worth pursuing, or a failure to obtain records. It may also be that, because of the pension Ms. Tucker held, or because of assets Mr. Hopkins held, the parties did not want to expose these assets to a joint family venture claim.
[51] She did not make a claim that she left the relationship with this debt. She did not make a claim for furniture that the parties purchased with the insurance proceeds, or for the value of it.
Ms. Tucker’s $10,000 Unsecured Line of Credit
[52] Ms. Tucker did not argue that I should treat the $10,000 debt from her unsecured line of credit as a debt incurred by the joint family venture. Because this may have been a strategic decision on her part (for instance, so as not to expose her pension to the same argument), I have struggled with how to treat this debt. However, I have decided I should include it in the calculation. I can see no basis for treating this debt differently than the CRA debt, merely because the CRA debt could be registered against the property. Ms. Tucker’s banking records show that the balance was consistently close to the $10,000 limit, including as late as February 2021. All the evidence to address this debt is available in the record. Therefore, I have decided that Ms. Tucker shall receive credit for this debt in the calculation.
Adjustments from the 2011 Refinancing
[53] I do not accept Ms. Tucker’s claim that she should receive an extra credit of $25,000 for the amount paid to Mr. Hopkins’ ex-wife in 2011. I agree with Mr. Hopkins that the $25,000 was his ex-wife’s share of the equity in the home. There is no basis for Ms. Tucker to claim an extra credit for it.
[54] Ms. Tucker also claims that the 2011 tax arrears ($5,872.25) and utility arrears ($824.01) on the property were Mr. Hopkins’ sole debt, and he should be responsible for them. I do not accept this argument for two reasons. First, Ms. Tucker did not contribute any equity to the property. The tax and utility arrears should be considered to have reduced Mr. Hopkins’ equity in the property. Second, there is no evidence regarding any understanding between the parties regarding their financial arrangements before 2011.
Appliances
[55] Mr. Hopkins took the range hood and the dishwasher from the premises when he moved out. This was an irresponsible act. The negotiated Agreement of Purchase and Sale specifically named these items as included in the sale of the house. Mr. Hopkins claimed to be unaware of this, but the Agreement of Purchase and Sale he signed plainly lists these two items first on the list of included chattels. Ms. Tucker paid for new ones to avoid a potential claim against the parties by the purchasers of the property. Mr. Hopkins must reimburse Ms. Tucker $1,859.98 for these items.
Mr. Wilford’s Account
[56] Ms. Tucker claims $4,630.07 in legal fees charged by Mr. Wilford regarding the sale transaction for the property, and claims that Mr. Hopkins should pay the fees of Nicoletta Jenson. Ms. Jenson was the lawyer who ultimately acted for the parties as vendors in the sale of the property. Ms. Tucker claims that Ms. Jensen’s fees were incurred unnecessarily.
[57] Mr. Wilford has acted for Ms. Tucker throughout in this matter. At the time of the hearing in front of Mandhane J., Mr. Hopkins was acting for himself. After Mandhane J. granted the order for partition and sale, and after the property sold, Mr. Hopkins continued to be acting for himself in this proceeding. Mr. Wilford started taking the steps necessary to complete the sale. He began to gather the required documentation including the tax, water, and sewer certificates, a mortgage payout statement and a CRA statement regarding outstanding liens. He responded to the purchasers’ requisition letter and the real estate agent. He prepared the required documentation for the transaction.
[58] Before assuming Mr. Hopkins would agree to have him act for both parties in the sale transaction, despite the obvious conflict, Mr. Wilford should have addressed and resolved the issue with Mr. Hopkins. This was especially so, because the order of Mandhane J. said that the real estate lawyer would hold the funds in trust. It is not surprising that Mr. Hopkins would not agree to have Mr. Wilford hold the funds in trust. On the other hand, Mr. Hopkins did not have a lawyer, and there were tasks that needed to be addressed. This mitigates things to some extent, but not fully.
[59] In the end, the parties agreed to jointly retain Ms. Jensen to act in the sale and hold the proceeds in trust. Because there was some value to the efforts Mr. Wilford took, and because it is likely these reduced the efforts required by Ms. Jenson, $1,000 of Mr. Wilford’s real estate fees should be shared equally by the parties ($500 each).
[60] I do not accept the submission that Mr. Hopkins should solely be responsible for Ms. Jensen’s fees. These should be shared equally.
Post-Separation Increase in Equity
[61] Mr. Hopkins took the position that Ms. Tucker should not benefit from the post-separation increase in equity in the property because she did not contribute to the mortgage payments after separation. In the alternative, he argued that Ms. Tucker should not receive an equal share of the post-separation increase in value. The argument rests on the notion that the joint family venture ended on the date of separation, and that he took on responsibility for the mortgage at that time.
[62] There are two problems with Mr. Hopkins’ position.
[63] The first problem is that I do not have evidence of the value of the property on the date of separation. I do have a few data points for the value on earlier and later dates. Although it would be rough justice, but for the second problem, I might be prepared to infer a value.
[64] The second problem is that Mr. Hopkins did not pay out Ms. Tucker’s equity on the date of separation. She did not get the use of that equity. He continued to enjoy the property. She did not. If Mr. Hopkins were to receive the increase in value of the property, it would be the same as saying he gets the benefit of her investment, and she does not get any benefit for it. It is equivalent to forcing Ms. Tucker to lend money to Mr. Hopkins interest-free. He cannot be permitted to benefit from her equity. This is especially so, because he dragged his feet in cooperating with selling the property. Only after Ms. Tucker brought this application did Mr. Hopkins agree to the sale.
[65] In addition, if the property had gone down in value, Mr. Hopkins would have been free to argue that the parties should share the decrease in equity. He cannot have things both ways. The parties must share the risks and rewards of ownership while they jointly owned the property. Therefore, the parties shall receive an equal share of the post-separation increase in value of the property.
Post-Separation Expenses
[66] The post-separation expenses associated with the property are treated differently. They are exclusively the responsibility of Mr. Hopkins.
[67] Again, Mr. Hopkins used the property exclusively after separation. He cannot say he was entitled to the exclusive benefits of using it but did not have to pay the expenses associated with it. He did not have to rent another property. He enjoyed the lifestyle benefits of owning the property. She did not. She “had to move out and pay rent somewhere else,” as she stated in cross-examination. In this case, Mr. Hopkins cannot even argue that his payments were in part directed towards equity and in part directed towards interest on the loan. The payments made to the line of credit were interest-only payments. The line of credit balance did not materially decrease after 2013.
[68] If he did not want to be responsible for the line of credit payments, Mr. Hopkins could have agreed to sell the property earlier. Instead, Ms. Tucker had to bring this application. If he had agreed to an earlier sale of the property, without the need for Ms. Tucker to bring this application, he would have had a better argument that he should not be fully responsible for the post-separation expenses. Instead, the evidence discloses that he resisted the sale, and even waited until beyond the closing date, to fully vacate the property. He claims there was some confusion on the closing date, but that is not a reasonable excuse. Furthermore, he had agreed as part of the order made by Mandhane J., that he would clean up the property and ready it for sale, but he did not do a good job of this. He was, in fact, less than cooperative with the efforts to sell the property.
[69] In result, Mr. Hopkins shall be responsible for 100% of the post-separation expenses for the property.
Final Calculation
[70] The table in the attached appendix sets out my calculation of how the funds in trust shall be divided between the parties. If there are any arithmetic errors, counsel may write to me.
[71] In result, I determine that Ms. Tucker should receive $139,662.82 from the amount in trust and Mr. Hopkins should receive $136,622.59. This is subject to the determination of the costs of the proceeding and trial.
Costs
[72] If the parties cannot resolve the costs issues, they may make written submissions. I will set a tight timeline because I have been delayed in releasing this decision and I know the parties are anxious to resolve this matter; however, if the parties require an extension, counsel may write to me.
[73] Ms. Tucker shall file her materials by September 23, 2024. Mr. Hopkins shall file his responding materials by September 30, 2024. No reply without leave. Counsel shall limit their costs submissions to two double-spaced pages plus offers to settle, dockets, bills of costs, and any other required reference documents. Counsel shall file the submissions to my attention, and upon confirmation of filing, shall upload them to Case Center.
Appendix - Calculations re Division of Amounts in Trust
Breakdown of Amount in Trust
Sale price 650,000.00 Real estate deposit - kept by realtor for commission -10,000.00 Adjustment - credit vendor for municipal taxes 262.40 Amount received from purchaser on closing 640,262.40 A
Amounts paid from Jensen's trust account Joint costs of sale Remainder of commission - paid to realtor 26,725.00 Fee of Jensen 4,494.01 LSO Real Estate Transaction Levy 65.00 Holdback by Jensen pending final report 150.00 31,434.01 B
Joint debts Paid to discharge line of credit 170,652.75 Paid to discharge CRA liens 55,569.95 226,222.70 C
Net Joint Proceeds of Sale 382,605.69 D=A-B-C
Post-separation expenses - payable by respondent only Water bill 151.11 Municipal tax arrears 6,169.17 Subtotal - to be subtracted from respondent's share 6,320.28 E
Amount initially held in trust by Jensen 376,285.41 F=D-E
June 2023 $50k payment to each party 100,000.00 Amount now in trust 276,285.41
Determining Division of Amount in Trust
Net joint proceeds of sale 382,605.69 D
To be credited to respondent for his initial equity 24,000.00 G
Increase in equity 358,605.69 H=D-G
To applicant To respondent
Divide increase in equity equally 179,302.84 179,302.85 I=H÷2
Subtract June 2023 $50k payment to each party -50,000.00 -50,000.00 Credit respondent for his initial equity 24,000.00 G
Debit respondent for post-separation expenses -6,320.28 E
Subtotal = Amount in trust 129,302.84 146,982.57 J
To be paid to applicant out of respondent's share Half of respondent's $10,000 line of credit 5,000.00 Half of allowed fee of Wilford 500.00 Outstanding costs 3,000.00 Appliances 1,859.98 10,359.98
Amount in trust 129,302.84 146,982.57 J
Amount to be paid out of respondent’s share 10,359.98 -10,359.98
Final amount to each party 139,662.82 136,622.59
Released: 2024 09 16 Chown J.