[CITATION](http://intra.judicialsecurity.jus.gov.on.ca/NeutralCitation/): Belhadj v. Meddah, 2024 ONSC 4904
COURT FILE NO.: FS-19-100-0001
DATE: 2024/09/05
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
BELHADJ, Mohamed
Applicant
– and –
MEDDAH, Imane
Respondent
L. Sangster, for the Applicant
M. Young, for the Respondent
HEARD: July 12, 2024
REASONS FOR DECISION
wilcox, j.
INTRODUCTION
[1] The Respondent’s motion dated June 14, 2024, was dismissed without prejudice to her Motion to Change proceeding, for reasons to follow. These are those reasons.
BACKGROUND
[2] The parties were married in Algeria in 2007, immigrated to Canada in 2009, obtained citizenship in 2013 and separated in 2017.
[3] There are three children, daughters Mouldjilali Belhadj (Lali), born July 22, 2008 and Mayssaa Belhadj, born October 9, 2010, and a son, Ilyess Belhadj, born April 4, 2015.
[4] The final order of August 10, 2021, made per Minutes of Settlement, provided, among other things:
• The parties have joint decision-making responsibility.
• The parties have week-about parenting time and equal holiday time with the children.
• The applicant father is to pay set-off child support.
• The applicant and the respondent pay 68 percent and 32 percent, respectively, of the section 7 expenses.
• The parties shall rotate claiming the children as dependants for tax purposes.
[5] The respondent mother brought a Motion to Change dated February 28, 2024, seeking:
• That she have sole decision-making responsibility.
• That she have primary residence of the children.
• That she be permitted to relocate with the children to the Ottawa area.
• That the applicant father’s parenting time be one weekend per month plus some time on holidays.
• That child support and section 7 expenses be adjusted.
• That the applicant shall claim the children as dependants for tax purposes.
[6] The Motion to Change proposed the mother’s move to Ottawa for a number of reasons. Lali, who is in high school, allegedly wanted to go to the University of Ottawa, preferred to have her family go with her, and wanted to finish high school in Ottawa in 2024-2025, as it might assist her when applying to university for 2025-2026.
[7] Mayssaa, who is entering grade 10, was said to want to go as well.
[8] Notably, the mother sees greater employment opportunities for herself at an increased income. Also, she indicates that there are greater cultural opportunities there. For Ilyess, who allegedly struggles with education, the mother was exploring assessors for psychoeducational assessments.
[9] The applicant father responded, opposing the changes.
[10] A case conference was held on April 4, 2024. Family Law Rule 15(24.1) requires that, at the first attendance of the parties before a judge, the judge shall determine the most appropriate process for reaching a quick and just conclusion of the motion. At the case conference, Ellies J. requested the involvement of the OCL and proposed a further case conference “to deal with the merits” if and when the OCL became involved.
[11] The OCL appointed a lawyer, Ms. Fitzpatrick, to represent the children, with the assistance of a clinical investigator, Katherine Bobula.
[12] The respondent mother then brought a motion dated June 14, 2024 for orders:
• That she be allowed to arrange a psychoeducational assessment of Ilyess without the father’s consent and
• For mobility and parenting time in one of two alternate scenarios:
Scenario one involved her having primary residence of the two younger children and relocating with them to the Ottawa area subject to the father having access one weekend per month and on some holidays. Lali would remain in North Bay with the father subject to the mother’s parenting time one weekend per month and on some holidays.
Scenario two involved the mother having primary residence of all three children and relocating to the Ottawa area subject to the father having parenting time one weekend per month and on some holidays.
[13] The father opposed the motion and sought, among other things, to maintain the existing final order with the children remaining in North Bay, subject to joint decision-making responsibility, equal parenting time, and support remaining as is.
[14] Further, he opposed the psychoeducational assessment of Ilyess unless recommended in writing by a qualified medical professional or educational authority.
[15] The motion was heard on July 12, 2024. By then, the mother deposed, Lali had changed her mind and no longer wanted to move. Therefore, the mother sought to relocate with the children that would like to, with Lali being welcome to if she changed her mind again.
[16] The OCL’s clinical investigator filed an affidavit based on two meetings of her and counsel with each child, plus an interview with Ilyess’s school principal. It notes at paragraph 38 that:
The three siblings involved in this case are all very academically successful, motivated and passionate about their interests. All three children presented as very polite and articulate in the interviews. All three children described both of their parents as loving and attentive. None of the children expressed any glaring parenting concerns.
[17] The OCL took the position that the children’s wishes and preferences should be respected. Lali wants to remain in North Bay to complete high school. She did not know where she wanted to go to university after that. Mayssaa wanted to move to Ottawa. Ilyess expressed liking a number of things about Ottawa as compared to North Bay, but was not willing to move unless all the siblings went together.
LAW
[18] The Divorce Act (the Act) was extensively amended effective March 1, 2021. The relevant sections of the revised act are set out here for ease of reference.
[19] Section 2 includes the following defined terms: decision-making responsibility, parenting order, parenting time, relocation.
decision-making responsibility means the responsibility for making significant decisions about a child’s well-being, including in respect of
(a) health;
(b) education;
(c) culture, language, religion and spirituality; and
(d) significant extra-curricular activities;
parenting order means an order made under subsection 16.1(1);
parenting time means the time that a child of the marriage spends in the care of a person referred to in subsection 16.1(1), whether or not the child is physically with that person during that entire time;
relocation means a change in the place of residence of a child of the marriage or a person who has parenting time or decision-making responsibility — or who has a pending application for a parenting order — that is likely to have a significant impact on the child’s relationship with
(a) a person who has parenting time, decision-making responsibility or an application for a parenting order in respect of that child pending; or
(b) a person who has contact with the child under a contact order;
[20] Parenting orders are provided for in sections 16.1 through 16.4:
16.1 (1) A court of competent jurisdiction may make an order providing for the exercise of parenting time or decision-making responsibility in respect of any child of the marriage, on application by
(a) either or both spouses; or
(b) a person, other than a spouse, who is a parent of the child, stands in the place of a parent or intends to stand in the place of a parent.
Contents of parenting order
(4) The court may, in the order,
(a) allocate parenting time in accordance with section 16.2;
(b) allocate decision-making responsibility in accordance with section 16.3;
(c) include requirements with respect to any means of communication, that is to occur during the parenting time allocated to a person, between a child and another person to whom parenting time or decision-making responsibility is allocated; and
(d) provide for any other matter that the court considers appropriate.
Terms and conditions
(5) The court may make an order for a definite or indefinite period or until a specified event occurs, and may impose any terms, conditions and restrictions that it considers appropriate.
Family dispute resolution process
(6) Subject to provincial law, the order may direct the parties to attend a family dispute resolution process.
Relocation
(7) The order may authorize or prohibit the relocation of the child.
Supervision
(8) The order may require that parenting time or the transfer of the child from one person to another be supervised.
Prohibition on removal of child
(9) The order may prohibit the removal of a child from a specified geographic area without the written consent of any specified person or without a court order authorizing the removal.
Parenting time — schedule
16.2 (1) Parenting time may be allocated by way of a schedule.
Day-to-day decisions
(2) Unless the court orders otherwise, a person to whom parenting time is allocated under paragraph 16.1(4)(a) has exclusive authority to make, during that time, day-to-day decisions affecting the child.
Allocation of decision-making responsibility
16.3 Decision-making responsibility in respect of a child, or any aspect of that responsibility, may be allocated to either spouse, to both spouses, to a person described in paragraph 16.1(1)(b), or to any combination of those persons.
Entitlement to information
16.4 Unless the court orders otherwise, any person to whom parenting time or decision-making responsibility has been allocated is entitled to request from another person to whom parenting time or decision-making responsibility has been allocated information about the child’s well-being, including in respect of their health and education, or from any other person who is likely to have such information, and to be given such information by those persons subject to any applicable laws.
[21] The considerations in making parenting orders are set out in subsections 16(1) through 16(6):
16 (1) The court shall take into consideration only the best interests of the child of the marriage in making a parenting order or a contact order.
Primary consideration
(2) When considering the factors referred to in subsection (3), the court shall give primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being.
Factors to be considered
(3) In determining the best interests of the child, the court shall consider all factors related to the circumstances of the child, including
(a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability;
(b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each spouse, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life;
(c) each spouse’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other spouse;
(d) the history of care of the child;
(e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;
(f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;
(g) any plans for the child’s care;
(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;
(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and cooperate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;
(j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things,
(i) the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and
(ii) the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to cooperate on issues affecting the child; and
(k) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition, or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.
Factors relating to family violence
(4) In considering the impact of any family violence under paragraph (3)(j), the court shall take the following into account:
(a) the nature, seriousness and frequency of the family violence and when it occurred;
(b) whether there is a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour in relation to a family member;
(c) whether the family violence is directed toward the child or whether the child is directly or indirectly exposed to the family violence;
(d) the physical, emotional and psychological harm or risk of harm to the child;
(e) any compromise to the safety of the child or other family member;
(f) whether the family violence causes the child or other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person;
(g) any steps taken by the person engaging in the family violence to prevent further family violence from occurring and improve their ability to care for and meet the needs of the child; and
(h) any other relevant factor.
(5) Past Conduct – In determining what is in the best interests of the child, the court shall not take into consideration the past conduct of any person unless the conduct is relevant to the exercise of their parenting time, decision-making responsibility or contact with the child under a contact order.
(6) Maximum Parenting Time – In allocating parenting time, the court shall give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child.
(7) Parenting Order and Contact Order – In this section, a parenting order includes an interim parenting order and a variation order in respect of a parenting order, and a contact order includes an interim contact order and a variation order in respect of a contact order.
[22] Provisions regarding relocation are set out in sections 16.9, 16.91, 16.92 and 16.93:
16.9 (1) A person who has parenting time or decision-making responsibility in respect of a child of the marriage and who intends to undertake a relocation shall notify, at least 60 days before the expected date of the proposed relocation and in the form prescribed by the regulations, any other person who has parenting time, decision-making responsibility or contact under a contact order in respect of that child of their intention.
Content of notice
(2) The notice must set out
(a) the expected date of the relocation;
(b) the address of the new place of residence and contact information of the person or child, as the case may be;
(c) a proposal as to how parenting time, decision-making responsibility or contact, as the case may be, could be exercised; and
(d) any other information prescribed by the regulations.
Exception
(3) Despite subsections (1) and (2), the court may, on application, provide that the requirements in those subsections, or in the regulations made for the purposes of those subsections, do not apply or may modify them, including where there is a risk of family violence.
Application without notice
(4) An application referred to in subsection (3) may be made without notice to any other party.
Relocation authorized
16.91 (1) A person who has given notice under section 16.9 and who intends to relocate a child may do so as of the date referred to in the notice if
(a) the relocation is authorized by a court; or
(b) the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) the person with parenting time or decision-making responsibility in respect of the child who has received a notice under subsection 16.9(1) does not object to the relocation within 30 days after the day on which the notice is received, by setting out their objection in
(A) a form prescribed by the regulations, or
(B) an application made under subsection 16.1(1) or paragraph 17(1)(b), and
(ii) there is no order prohibiting the relocation.
Content of form
(2) The form must set out
(a) a statement that the person objects to the proposed relocation;
(b) the reasons for the objection;
(c) the person’s views on the proposal for the exercise of parenting time, decision-making responsibility or contact, as the case may be, that is set out in the notice referred to in subsection 16.9(1); and
(d) any other information prescribed by the regulations.
Best interests of child — additional factors to be considered
16.92 (1) In deciding whether to authorize a relocation of a child of the marriage, the court shall, in order to determine what is in the best interests of the child, take into consideration, in addition to the factors referred to in section 16,
(a) the reasons for the relocation;
(b) the impact of the relocation on the child;
(c) the amount of time spent with the child by each person who has parenting time or a pending application for a parenting order and the level of involvement in the child’s life of each of those persons;
(d) whether the person who intends to relocate the child complied with any applicable notice requirement under section 16.9, provincial family law legislation, an order, arbitral award, or agreement;
(e) the existence of an order, arbitral award, or agreement that specifies the geographic area in which the child is to reside;
(f) the reasonableness of the proposal of the person who intends to relocate the child to vary the exercise of parenting time, decision-making responsibility or contact, taking into consideration, among other things, the location of the new place of residence and the travel expenses; and
(g) whether each person who has parenting time or decision-making responsibility or a pending application for a parenting order has complied with their obligations under family law legislation, an order, arbitral award, or agreement, and the likelihood of future compliance.
Factor not to be considered
(2) In deciding whether to authorize a relocation of the child, the court shall not consider, if the child’s relocation was prohibited, whether the person who intends to relocate the child would relocate without the child or not relocate.
Burden of proof — person who intends to relocate child
16.93 (1) If the parties to the proceeding substantially comply with an order, arbitral award, or agreement that provides that a child of the marriage spend substantially equal time in the care of each party, the party who intends to relocate the child has the burden of proving that the relocation would be in the best interests of the child.
Burden of proof — person who objects to relocation
(2) If the parties to the proceeding substantially comply with an order, arbitral award or agreement that provides that a child of the marriage spends the vast majority of their time in the care of the party who intends to relocate the child, the party opposing the relocation has the burden of proving that the relocation would not be in the best interests of the child.
Burden of proof — other cases
(3) In any other case, the parties to the proceeding have the burden of proving whether the relocation is in the best interests of the child.
[23] The Supreme Court of Canada in Barendregt v. Grebliunas[^1], the reasons in which were released on May 20, 2022, set out the framework for determining whether relocation is in the best interests of a child in light of the developments in the case law and legislation since Gordon v. Goertz[^2], was decided. Karakatsanis J, writing for the majority, provided this summary:
[148] More than two decades ago, this Court set out a framework for relocation applications in Gordon: paras. 49-50. It applies to relocation issues that arise at first instance and in the context of applications to vary existing parenting orders.
[149] Since then, our jurisprudence has refined the Gordon framework, and, subject to two notable exceptions, the Divorce Act has largely codified it. Where the Divorce Act departs from Gordon, the changes reflect the collective judicial experience of applying the Gordon factors. While Gordon rejected a legal presumption in favour of either party, the Divorce Act now contains a burden of proof where there is a pre‑existing parenting order, award or agreement: s. 16.93. And although Gordon restricted whether courts could consider a moving party’s reasons for relocating, this is now an express consideration in the best-interests-of-the-child analysis: s. 16.92(1)(a).
[150] The new Divorce Act amendments also respond to issues identified in the case law over the past few decades, which did not arise in Gordon. Section 16.92(2) now provides that trial judges shall not consider a parent’s testimony that they would move with or without the child. Furthermore, ss. 16(3)(j) and 16(4) of the Divorce Act now instruct courts to consider any form of family violence and its impact on the perpetrator’s ability to care for the child.
[151] In light of the jurisprudential and legislative refinements, the common law relocation framework can be restated as follows.
[152] The crucial question is whether relocation is in the best interests of the child, having regard to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being. This inquiry is highly fact-specific and discretionary.
[153] Our jurisprudence and statutes provide a rich foundation for such an inquiry: see, for example, s. 16 of the Divorce Act. A court shall consider all factors related to the circumstances of the child, which may include the child’s views and preferences, the history of caregiving, any incidents of family violence, or a child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage. A court shall also consider each parent’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other parent, and shall give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each parent, as is consistent with the best interests of the child. These examples are illustrative, not exhaustive. While some of these factors were specifically noted under Gordon, they have broad application to the best interests of the child.
[154] However, traditional considerations bearing on the best interests of the child must be considered in the context of the unique challenges posed by relocation cases. In addition to the factors that a court will generally consider when determining the best interests of the child and any applicable notice requirements, a court should also consider:
• the reasons for the relocation;
• the impact of the relocation on the child;
• the amount of time spent with the child by each person who has parenting time or a pending application for a parenting order and the level of involvement in the child’s life of each of those persons;
• the existence of an order, arbitral award, or agreement that specifies the geographic area in which the child is to reside;
• the reasonableness of the proposal of the person who intends to relocate the child to vary the exercise of parenting time, decision making responsibility or contact, taking into consideration, among other things, the location of the new place of residence and the travel expenses; and
• whether each person who has parenting time or decision-making responsibility or a pending application for a parenting order has complied with their obligations under family law legislation, an order, arbitral award, or agreement, and the likelihood of future compliance.
The court should not consider how the outcome of an application would affect either party’s relocation plans — for example, whether the person who intends to move with the child would relocate without the child or not relocate. These factors are drawn from s. 16.92(1) and (2) of the Divorce Act and largely reflect the evolution of the common law for over 25 years.
[155] As I have explained, several pillars underlying the Court’s reasoning in Gordon have shifted over time, leading courts and now legislatures to refine, modify, and supplement the Gordon factors. These refinements leave us with a clear framework going forward.
[24] The Berry v. Berry case [^3] is instructive. In it, the court was dealing with a situation wherein the child had been living approximately half of the time with each parent in Toronto since their separation. The issue was whether a relocation with the mother to Kingston after which he would see his father only every second weekend was in the best interest of the child. The court found that “reducing the time the child lives with the father from approximately one half of the time to every second weekend and shuttling the child back and forth between two cities is “highly disruptive” and “did not attach proper weight to the maximum contact principle”. [^4]
[25] In regard to this, I note that, although the Divorce Act has since been amended, the court is now, as it was then, required to give effect to the principle that a child should have as much contact with each parent as is consistent with the best interest of the child [^5]
[26] The legal principles (first set out in Plumley v. Plumley 1999 13990 (ON SC), [1999] O.J. 3234 at para. 7) applicable to interim motions regarding mobility are: [^6]
A court will be more reluctant to upset the status quo on an interim basis and permit the move when there is a genuine issue for trial.
There can be compelling circumstances that might dictate that a judge ought to allow the move. For example, the move may result in a financial benefit to the family unit, which will be lost if the matter awaits a trial or the best interests of the children might dictate that they commence school at a new location.
Although there may be a genuine issue for trial, the move may be permitted on an interim basis if there is a strong probability that the custodial parent’s position will prevail at a trial.
[27] The importance of maintaining the status quo in interim matters was explained by J. Wright J. in Kimpton v. Kimpton [^7], as follows:
There is a golden rule which implacably governs motions for interim custody: stability is a primary need for children caught in the throes of matrimonial dispute and the de facto custody of children ought not to be disturbed pendente lite, unless there is some compelling reason why in the interests of the children, the parent having de facto custody should be deprived thereof. On this consideration hangs all other considerations. On motions for interim custody the most important factor in considering the best interests of the child has traditionally been the maintenance of the legal status quo. This golden rule was enunciated by Senior Master Roger in Dyment v. Dyment, 1969 544 (ON SC), [1969] 2 O.R. 631, (aff’d by Laskin J.A. at 1969 438 (ON CA), [1969] 2 O.R. 748), by Laskin J.A. again in Papp v. Papp, 1969 219 (ON CA), [1970] 1 O.R. 331 at pp. 344-5 and by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Lancaster v. Lancaster (1992), 1992 14032 (NS CA), 38 R.F.L. (3d) 373. By status quo is meant the primary or legal status quo, not a short lived status quo created to gain tactical advantage. See on this issue Irwin v. Irwin (1986), 1986 6303 (ON SC), 3 R.F.L. (3d) 403 and the annotation of J.G. McLeod to Moggey v. Moggey (1990), 1990 7339 (SK KB), 28 R.F.L. (3d) 416.
Unless the courts insist that they will not disturb the existing arrangements for children on interim motions except in those cases where it is clear that the children are being exposed to danger or there is some other compelling reason, the courts will continue to be confronted with litigants demanding that the court embark upon the impossible task of attempting to assess the relative merits of parties who have filed numerous affidavits contradicting the affidavits of the other.
This passage continues to be referred to in the case law. [^8]
[28] This was explained further by MGJ Quigley J. in Datars v. Graham: [^9]
The problem that this court faces on this motion [mobility]…is that it is difficult if not impossible in most cases to complete the extensive child-focused inquiry required under Gordon v. Goertz on the typically conflicting and incomplete affidavit evidence that is often available to the court on interim motions.
CONCLUSION
[29] The respondent mother has brought a Motion to Change the status quo established by the August 10, 2021 Final Order, made pursuant to Minutes of Settlement, which Motion to Change is opposed. While that motion is being processed, she has brought a Form 14 motion for a temporary order for much of the same relief, involving moving the children from their home, schools and lives in North Bay to new ones in Ottawa.
[30] Whether or not the respondent has strictly followed the Act’s procedural requirements for relocation, I have serious reservations about the appropriateness of this two-track process. It is not like a case where interim orders are needed to organize and stabilize the situation temporarily while the final resolution is being worked toward. Nor is the temporary relief sought a type that can be easily recalculated or adjusted once the facts are finally established. Here, if the temporary relief sought was granted, reversing it, if that was the ultimate decision, would be highly disruptive and impractical. The decision on the temporary basis would create a new status quo which would very likely dictate the final result.
[31] Very consequential relief is being sought in this motion on a rushed timetable such that what objectively would be a long motion was of necessity scheduled as a short motion.
[32] Turning to the merits, the primary impetus for the proposed relocation appears to be the respondent mother’s desire to further her career in Ottawa. The documents at least suggest that, to this end, she has tried to influence the children with a positive comparison of life in Ottawa versus North Bay. The initial justification, to help Lali prepare for and enter the University of Ottawa, fell away when Lali decided that she did not want to move and was not necessarily going to go that university.
[33] Ilyess’s original desire to relocate was for reasons that struck me as beyond the thinking of a nine-year-old child. I would not have given his views and preferences much weight. However, he was surprised to learn that the move would not include Lali. He does not want to go if it means leaving her behind.
[34] Mayssaa is the one of the three children that still wants to go. Her dedication to her education is impressive. She is entering grade 10, in the preparatory program for the International Baccalaureate (IB) program, at Chippewa Secondary School. That is an enhanced program over the standard high school stream. She has the idea that she could attend a higher ranked high school in Ottawa which would assist with her postsecondary aspirations. I see nothing in the evidence to support that idea. She is only entering grade 10. Such considerations strike me as not only questionable but too premature to warrant granting the relief sought at this time.
[35] The suggestion that there would be more cultural opportunities for the family in Ottawa, without more, would not tip the balance at this stage of the proceedings.
[36] Nor does the contention that Ottawa has better shopping!
[37] The children are said to be doing well in North Bay academically, athletically, and otherwise. The proposed move at this time would be disruptive. In particular, the respondent says that Ilyess does not cope well with change, yet she proposes massive changes for him.
[38] The family has a status quo of at least three years duration at this point. The above-noted case law speaks of how disruptive going from the existing parenting time regime to the one proposed by the respondent would be.
[39] Turning to the Plumley test for deciding the mobility issue on an interim basis, I find that there is a genuine issue as to whether the relief sought in the Motion to Change should be granted. Both parents have good incomes. Although the respondent might gain some financial benefit from living and working in Ottawa, the net benefit, if any, has not been established in evidence. Finally, I do not see at this time a strong probability, just some possibility, that the respondent’s position will ultimately prevail. Consequently, the test for allowing the move on an interim basis has not been met.
[40] The remaining issue is whether to order that Ilyess undergo a psychoeducational assessment. The respondent has been pressing for one. The applicant’s position is that it is intrusive, he does not see the need, and it should not be done without a formal recommendation. There are differences between the sides’ affidavits as to whether such an assessment has been recommended by the family doctor, which differences I cannot resolve at this time. The OCL’s affidavit states that the child’s school principal advised that his behaviour did not amount to a concern for the school, nor was there any concern about his academic abilities, and she did not believe that a psychoeducational assessment was needed. Consequently, I would not order such an assessment at this time.
[41] The motion is dismissed.
Wilcox, J.
Released: September 5, 2024
[CITATION](http://intra.judicialsecurity.jus.gov.on.ca/NeutralCitation/): Belhadj v. Meddah, 2024 ONSC 4904
COURT FILE NO.: FS-19-100-0001
DATE: 2024/09/05
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
BELHADJ, Mohamed
Applicant
– and –
MEDDAH, Imane
Respondent
REASONS FOR DECISION
Wilcox, J.
Released: September 5, 2024
[^1]: 2022 SCC 22 [^2]: 1996 191 (SCC), [1996] 2 SCR 27 [^3]: 2011 ONCA 705 [^4]: Berry v. Berry at para. 27 [^5]: See also B.V. v. P.V. 2012 ONCA 262 [^6]: See also Cesare v. Cesare 2024 ONSC 34, para. 70 [^7]: [2002] O.J. 5367 at paras. 1 and 2 [^8]: For example, Garduno v. Golec [2024] O.J. 2735, para. 45. [^9]: (2007), 2007 34430 (ON SC), 41 RFL (6th) 51 (Ontario SCJ), para. 16