Court File and Parties
COURT FILE NO.: FS-12-2897 DATE: January 22, 2024
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
Denise D’Mello Self-represented Applicant
- and -
Roy Ramsunahi Self-represented Respondent
HEARD: January 9, 10, 11, 12, 2024
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MANDHANE J.
INTRODUCTION
[1] The Applicant Mother, Denise D’Mello (née Ramsunahi), and the Respondent Father, Roy Ramsunahi, were married on May 23, 2004. They have three daughters: A.R. (born November 27, 2009), I.R. (born July 2, 2010), and R.R. (born December 17, 2011).
[2] The parties marriage started to breakdown in and around 2009 when the Father stopped working at Canada Post. Between 2009 and 2012, the parties’ over-leveraged the matrimonial home in order to invest in three additional properties (including a family cottage). The Father also made business decisions that over-extended the family’s finances. For example, he launched a snowplowing business that saw him trade in his Chevy for a Hummer, while claiming significant business losses on his income tax returns. As the family’s debts mounted and lenders became insistent on being repaid, the parties learned that they could not file for bankruptcy because there was too much equity in the properties. The Mother was concerned about the Father’s financial decision-making and the impact it was having on their young family.
[3] As tensions mounted, the Father left the matrimonial home in and around January 2012, went to live at the family cottage, and ceded all financial decision-making to the Mother. From then on, he stopped making contributions towards the parties’ liabilities and debts. He retained the family’s minivan, which was eventually repossessed, as well as gold coins that were bought for about $2000 according to the receipts proffered by the Mother.
[4] The parties officially separated on April 23, 2012 and the Mother filed this Application on July 9, 2012. She seeks sole decision-making authority in relation to the children, retroactive and ongoing child support, equalization of net family property (“NFP”), and reimbursement for post-separation expenses. The parties divorced on December 15, 2017 and the Mother remarried in May 2018.
[5] Given the delays in bringing this matter to trial, this Court has already made numerous interim orders and two final orders. The parties agree that the only outstanding issues are determination of their equity in various properties for the purposes of equalization, the Father’s income for the purposes of retroactive and ongoing child support, and decision-making authority in relation to the three children.
[6] On equalization, both parties claim that they are owed an equalization payment. The Mother also says she is entitled to reimbursement for post-separation adjustments that she incurred to ready the properties for sale and to deal with the parties’ debts.
[7] On child support, the Mother says that the Father should pay child support based on an imputed income of $60,000 from 2012 through 2020, and that he should pay support based on his reported income from 2020 onwards. She says that the Father owes significant child support arrears. The Father opposes any imputation of income and asks for an order that support be payable pursuant to his actual income.
[8] On the issue of decision-making, the Mother says that her having sole decision-making authority is in the child’s best interests because it is consistent with the status quo, because the Father is not able to communicate in a child-focused way, and because he does not make sound financial decisions. The Father says joint decision-making responsibility is in the children’s best interests because he has significant parenting time with the children, he is an involved and engaged Father, and because he is now a successful business owner. He admits that the parties have communication issues but says that these go both ways and that the issues have been improving over time.
PROCEEDINGS TO DATE
[9] The Mother issued her Application and served it on the Respondent on July 9, 2012. The Father did not file an Answer and was noted in default on July 2, 2013. The Mother brought three motions between July 13, 2012 and January 15, 2013, all of which proceeded on an uncontested basis. These motions are summarized as follows:
a) On December 13, 2012, Justice Andre ordered that the Mother receive $10,000 as an advance against equalization.
b) On January 16, 2013, on a temporary basis, Justice Snowie ordered that the Mother have “sole custody” (i.e. primary decision-making authority and primary parenting time), that the Father pay child support based on an imputed income of $60,000, that child support be enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office (FRO), and that the parties exchange annual income information.
c) On August 28, 2013, on a temporary basis, Justice Herold ordered that the Father obtain life insurance to secure his child support obligations. On a final basis, he ordered that the Mother have exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and its contents, and vested all the parties’ properties (including the matrimonial home) in the Mother as sole owner.
[10] The Father only became engaged in this litigation after the FRO commenced enforcement action against him for payment of child support arrears. His first step in this action was to bring a refraining motion on July 19, 2016. He filed his Answer to the Mother’s Application on October 4, 2016. After that, the Court made the following orders:
a) On January 18, 2017, on a temporary basis, Justice Gordon ordered that the Father have access to the children on Wednesday evenings and Saturdays during the day, and that he ensure that his employment health benefits were extended to the children.
b) On April 10, 2017, on a temporary basis, Justice Snowie ordered that a Certificate of Pending Litigation be registered against the matrimonial home.
c) On November 23, 2017, Justice Coroza ordered that the Mother be allowed to travel to India with the children. On a temporary basis, he also expanded the Father’s parenting time to include one additional evening and daily phone calls.
d) On July 24, 2018, Justice Bloom ordered that the Father be allowed to travel to Cuba with the children, and that the Mother pay $5000 in costs.
e) On September 10, 2018, on a temporary basis, Justice Ricchetti ordered that the Father pay child support consistent with his 2017 income of $52,568.
f) On October 23, 2018, Justice Bloom ordered that the FRO stop garnishing the Father’s wages and stay its enforcement of arrears pending a final order on retroactive child support.
g) On March 22, 2019, Justice Emery varied Justice Ricchetti’s child support order to account for an overpayment by the Father.
h) On June 4, 2019, Justice André expanded the Father’s parenting time to include an alternating weekend overnight and one week of summer parenting time, allowed the Mother to travel to India with the children, and ordered that the parties retain Stephen Cross to provide an assessment in relation to the children. The Mother was to pay the costs of the assessment up front, subject to apportionment of 50% of the cost to the Father at trial.
i) On July 8, and 26 2021, Justice Emery expanded the Father’s summer parenting time but refused his motion for regular week-about parenting time. He awarded costs to the Mother in the amount of $10,400.
j) On April 20, 2022, based on final minutes of settlement, Justice Fowler-Byrne ordered on a final basis that the Father have parenting time with the children every other Friday after-school to the following Wednesday morning before-school, alternating Wednesday evenings from 5:00 p.m. to 7:30 p.m., and on a week-about basis during the summer; and that, “for the purposes of trial, the value of the home on the date of vesting was $595,000.”
k) On March 2, 2022, Justice Kumaranayke ordered that the Father provide all outstanding disclosure by March 30, 2022.
l) On January 8, 2023, Justice McGee ordered that the Father disclose his 2020, 2021 and 2022 tax returns by the next day (the first day of trial), and that “one half equity of the home on the vesting date shall be a credit to any final determination.”
EQUALIZATION
[11] The Family Law Act (the “FLA”) requires that the spouse whose NFP is lesser of the two NFPs receive one-half of the difference between them as an equalization payment: s. 5(1). The purpose of the equalization provisions is to “recognize that child care, household management and financial provision are the joint responsibilities of the spouses and that inherent in the marital relationship there is equal contribution, whether financial or otherwise”: FLA, s. 5(7). Section 4(1) of the FLA defines “net family property” as the value of all the property that the spouse owns on the valuation date, after deducting the spouse’s debts and other liabilities, as well as the value of property already owned on the date of the marriage.
[12] The person claiming the deduction or exclusion has the onus of proving it on a balance of probabilities: FLA, s.4(3). In deciding whether it is more likely than not that the claimed deduction or exclusion is genuine, I must scrutinize the evidence as a whole, consider any inherent improbabilities, address any inconsistencies that go to a central issue, and only rely on evidence that is clear, convincing, and cogent: F.H. v. McDougall, 2008 SCC 53, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 41, at paras. 40-73. Here, there were 86 exhibits entered at trial, including banking records, property records, trust ledgers, income tax returns, and other business records such that there was ample, reliable evidence before me.
[13] The main issues on equalization relate to the proper valuation of the four properties owned on the date of separation, and the Mother’s entitlement to post-separation adjustments. On the whole, I prefer the Mother’s evidence and reject the Father’s evidence. Foremost, the Mother has provided the trust ledgers and supporting business documents for all of the real estate transactions, and has provided receipts for each post-separation deduction that she claims. She has meticulously documented every step she has taken in relation to the parties’ joint assets. In contrast, the Father failed to produce any documentary evidence to support his contention that there was more equity in the properties than the business documents clearly state.
[14] To the extent that my findings depend on an assessment of credibility, I find that the Father was not a credible witness because he purposefully misled the Court in order to paint himself in favourable light. For example, in chief, he testified at length about his meteoric rise into a supervisory position at Canada Post, how he relinquished his supervisory role in order to spend more time with the children, and how he was eventually laid off because his department was eliminated in a staff restructuring. Under cross-examination, after being presented with his termination documents from Canada Post, the Father reluctantly admitted that he had actually be demoted from the position of supervisor because he was surfing the internet at work, and that he was eventually terminated for the same reason.
[15] The Father was also an argumentative witness who refused to concede basic facts. Up until trial, the Father refused to accept the accounting in the trust ledgers provided by real estate lawyers, even after the Mother provided him with the primary source business documents showing how the proceeds of sale for each property were disbursed. It was only after a time-consuming and meticulous cross-examination by the Mother, that the Father conceded that it was “possible” that the proceeds of sale were used to pay off the parties’ debts, to pay off some of his personal debts, to pay off fines and penalties owed to the lenders, to pay for real estate lawyers, to satisfy costs orders made against him, and to provide the Mother with a without prejudice disbursement of $10,000. Even in his closing submissions, the Father maintained that I should rely entirely on the Mother’s 2012 pleadings to find that there was $400,000 in equity in the properties as of the valuation date, even though the properties were disposed of after her pleadings were filed.
[16] I turn now to the evidence before me. On the date of separation, the parties owned four properties: 19 Clydesdale Circle, Brampton (purchased August 2007) (“Clydesdale”); 199 Montmorency Drive, Hamilton (purchased June 2008) (“Montmorency”); 1110 Stoney Point, Innisfil (purchased June 2010) (“Stoney Point”); and 5557 Whistler Crescent, Mississauga (purchased February 10, 2005) (“Whistler”). Whistler was the matrimonial home, Stoney Point was the cottage, while the other two properties were investment properties that were tenanted. The Mother and the children have continued to reside in the matrimonial home post-separation.
[17] When the Mother launched this application in July 2012, she estimated that the jointly-owned properties had equity totalling about $440,000. As she uncovered more about the parties’ debts and liabilities, and as the mortgagees started to foreclose on the properties, the Mother had no choice but to seek orders from the Court to deal with the properties unilaterally. The Father was repeatedly served with court documents at the cottage but refused to engage in the process. The Mother sought emergency orders from this Court to deal with the properties unilaterally after the Father signed an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for the cottage property but withheld his signature on the closing date. All the properties besides the matrimonial home were eventually sold.
[18] In relation to the matrimonial home, Justice Fowler-Byrne ordered that, for the purposes of trial, the matrimonial home was valued as $555,000 on the date of separation and $595,000 on August 28, 2013 when it was vested in the Mother’s name by court order (“vesting date”). Pursuant to Justice McGee’s order, the parties agree that the Father is only entitled to the equity in the home on the date of separation, plus the increased equity in the home from the date of separation to the vesting date (which totals $40,000). The Father admits that he stopped paying the mortgage for Whistler after losing his job in 2009, and that he stopped paying any expenses in relation to the property after January 2012. The Mother says that there no equity remaining in the home after accounting for post-separation deductions from the date of separation to the vesting date. These include deductions for mortgage payments, property taxes, house insurances, and necessary upgrades to the matrimonial home between the date of separation and the date of vesting (i.e. new windows and a new roof). The Mother provided bank records and receipts to prove the amounts she says she has spent. I find that these expenses were reasonably incurred to maintain the value of the matrimonial home.
[19] The Father stopped paying the mortgage, property taxes and house insurance for Clydesdale in 2012. A foreclosure notice was issued for the Clydesdale property and it was sold in July 2012 for $440,000 and the proceeds of sale of $35,000 were put in trust. The Mother says that the proceeds of sale were then used to pay off outstanding mortgages, to pay off the Father’s debts, to pay outstanding property taxes and utilities, to pay lawyers fees, to satisfy three costs orders payable to the Mother, and to provide her a $10,000 advance against equalization. She provides business records to support all of the deductions. In addition, the Mother also says that the Father has never paid for expenses she incurred post-separation to ready Clydesdale for sale, which totaled over $25,000 (and for which receipts were provided). The Mother is entitled to claim $10,000 in post-separation deductions, after accounting for the $5,000 owed to the Father on account of her receiving an advance on equalization.
[20] The Stoney Point property was a jointly owned cottage that was purchased in 2010 for about $405,000. It was partly purchased by securing a second mortgage on the Whistler property for $125,000. The Father resided at the Stoney Point property from January 2012 until it was sold by Home Trust on February 25, 2014 under foreclosure. Both the Mother and Father stopped paying the mortgage, property taxes and house insurance for Stoney Point in 2012. Even still, the Father refused to vacate the property for the purposes of sale such that the locks had to be changed, his items had to be placed in storage, and bills had to be paid.
[21] On closing, Stoney Point was sold for $330,000 such that there was a shortfall on the property of about $25,000 which have been steadily accruing such that the debt now totals over $75,000. The post-separation joint debt must be split between the parties such that the Father owes the Mother $37,500 as of the date of trial. Moreover, the Mother paid about $13,000 in post-separation amounts in relation to this property (i.e. mortgage arrears, utility payments, locksmiths, etc.), for which the Father is responsible for half (or $7,500).
[22] Montmorency was a rental property and it was sold under foreclosure on April 28, 2014 for $320,000. Despite collecting monthly rent from tenants, the Father stopped making any payments towards the property such that there was a foreclosure notice on this property as of January 25, 2012. Prior to separation, the Mother borrowed $7,500 from her family members to pay off the arrears and stave off a forced sale. Again, she provided banking records to support these loans being made. The net proceeds of sale were $57,000. The Mother provides business records to show that, post-separation, she used the $57,000 in proceeds to pay off the parties’ joint debts and liabilities (lines of credit, water heater rental arrears, shortfall of mortgage payments, etc.). The Father owes the Mother half of these post-separation amounts, which totalled $5,000 on the vesting date.
[23] Overall, both parties’ net family property on the date of separation was zero because they each had more liabilities than assets. There is no equalization payment owing. The Father owes the Mother $60,000 in post-separation adjustments.
CHILD SUPPORT
[24] The parties agree that the Father has paid $94,083.09 in child support to date. Based on his tax returns, the Father’s income in the years before and after separation can be summarized as follows:
| Year | Total Income ($) | Net Income ($) | Imputed Income |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2005 | 70,216 | 58,464 | N/A |
| 2006 | 58,995 | 54,651 | N/A |
| 2007 | 58,513 | 43,594 | N/A |
| 2008 | 61,127 | 50,957 | N/A |
| 2009 | 204,656 (including employment income, EI, rental income and business income) | 52,847 | N/A |
| 2010 | 139,982 (including EI, child benefit, rental income, and business income) | 19,290 | N/A |
| 2011 | 78,168 | 18,472 | N/A |
| 2012 | No evidence | No evidence | No evidence |
| 2013 | 13,819 | 13,819 | 60,000 |
| 2014 | 35,111 | 35,111 | 60,000 |
| 2015 | 31,719 | 30,960 | 60,000 |
| 2016 | 43,958 | 42,792 | 60,000 |
| 2017 | 52,568 | 52,568 | 60,000 |
| 2018 | 104,952 | 103,324 | 52,568 |
| 2019 | 78,407 | 78,363 | 52,568 |
| 2020 | 104,951 | 103,324 | 52,568 |
| 2021 | 102,241 | 100,434 | 52,568 |
| 2022 | No evidence | 104,443 | 52,568 |
[25] In terms of ongoing support, consistent with s. 16 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175, the Father should pay child support based on his total income. Based on his 2022 income of $104,443, the Father should be paying $1,990 per month in support going forward. This amount should be adjusted after an exchange of 2023 income tax information, and on an annual basis going forward.
[26] Working backwards, I find that the Father should have paid child support consistent with his actual income from 2018 onwards. This means that he owed the following amounts for those years:
| Year | Total income ($) | Monthly child support payable ($) | Annual child support due ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2018 | 104,952 | 1,998.04 | 23,976.48 |
| 2019 | 78,407 | 1,553.65 | 18,643.80 |
| 2020 | 104,951 | 1,998.03 | 23,976.36 |
| 2021 | 102,241 | 1,955.66 | 23,467.92 |
| 2022 | 104,443 | 1,990 | 23,880.00 |
| TOTAL | 113,944.56 |
[27] Continuing to work backwards, I now consider the arrears owing for the years 2012 through 2017. The Mother says that I should impute the Father’s income for child support purposes at $60,000 (consistent with Justice Snowie’s temporary order), while the Father says that he should only pay child support based on his actual income in those years.
[28] Section 19(1) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines (“Guidelines”) allow me to impute income in “appropriate circumstances,” including where a spouse is intentionally unemployed or under-employed, where it appears that income has been diverted, or where the spouse has failed to provide the required financial disclosure: s. 19(1)(a), (d), (f). Even still, I cannot select an arbitrary amount as imputed income: Drygala v. Pauli (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 711 (C.A.), at para. 44. Instead, “there must be a rational basis underlying the selection of any such figure. The amount selected as an exercise of the court’s discretion must be grounded in the evidence” and be “reasonable in the circumstances:” Drygala, at paras. 44, 45. The evidence need not be perfect, but it must be sufficient to allow me to judicially exercise my discretion: Michaud v. Kasali, 2016 ONSC 443, 74 R.F.L. (7th) 119, at para. 51.
[29] Here, the Mother says that the Father was intentionally under-employed between 2012 and 2017. She says that despite being able to earn $60,000 in his job at Canada Post until his termination in 2009, the Father has not adduced any evidence of his efforts to obtain comparable employment post-separation. She says that, rather than get a job that was commensurate with his management and language skills, the Father decided to engage in risky business ventures that saw his income drop significantly post-separation. For his part, the Father says that he was too depressed post-separation to secure full-time employment.
[30] I reject the Father’s evidence that he was unable to work at full capacity in the five years post-separation. There are no medical records before me to establish that the Father was suffering from a mental health disability that impacted his ability to work. Based on his pattern of income before and after separation, I find that it is appropriate to impute the Father’s income between 2012 and 2017 to be $55,000. I am confident that, given his previous work experience and the fact that he is tri-lingual, the Father could have obtained income that earned him at least this amount in the years post-separation. Indeed, since 2017, he has been able to earn much more than that. Based on an imputed income of $55,000 for the years 2012 through 2017, the Father owes the following in retroactive child support:
| Year | Imputed income ($) | Monthly child support payable ($) | Total child support owed ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2012 | 55,000 | 1,068 from May 1, 2012 to December 31, 2012 (8 months) | 8,544 |
| 2013 | 55,000 | 1,068 | 12,816 |
| 2014 | 55,000 | 1,068 | 12,816 |
| 2015 | 55,000 | 1,068 | 12,816 |
| 2016 | 55,000 | 1,068 | 12,816 |
| 2017 | 55,000 | 1068 to November 30, 2017 (11 months based on the 2011 Guidelines) | 11,748 |
| 1,081 to December 31, 2017 (1 month based on the 2017 Guidelines) | 1,081 | ||
| TOTAL | 72,637 |
[31] Taking into account the amounts that the Father has paid in child support since 2016, he owes the following in retroactive child support.
| Amount ($) |
|---|
| Child support owing (2012-2017) |
| Child support owing (2018-2022) |
| Child support paid to date |
| Retroactive child support due |
PARENTING
[32] By way of temporary orders, the Mother has had primary parenting time and sole decision-making authority since 2013. That said, the Father’s parenting time has been consistently expanded since separation. On consent, and by way of Final Order by Justice Fowler-Byrne, the parties agreed to the final parenting time schedule such that the Father has parenting time with the children every second from Friday after-school to the following Wednesday morning before-school, and alternating Wednesday evenings from 5:00 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. In short, the Father has the children in his care for about five days in every two-week cycle. The parties share the children's summer equally on a rotating weekly schedule Friday to Friday. Holidays are celebrated with whichever parent has parenting time on that day.
[33] The parties have been abiding by the final parenting order. While the Father wishes he had equal parenting time with the children, he admits that he consented to the final order, never appealed it, and has never brought a motion to change. The parties agree that they are each engaged in the children’s lives and provide the children with different but complementary experiences. The children are thriving and are motivated in both academics and extracurriculars.
[34] The only issue before me is whether I should disrupt the long-standing status quo around decision-making and order joint decision-making. The Father says that he has a considerable presence in the children’s lives and should be involved in decisions about their education, religious upbringing, and health. He does not dispute that the Mother is a very involved and active parent and that the daughters are thriving, but he says that the Mother does not seek his input or provide him with relevant information about major decisions for the children. While the Mother admits that she rarely involves the Father in decision-making about the children, she says that this is because she is unable to communicate with him effectively and because she worries about his ability to make decisions that are in the best interest of the children.
[35] I am only to consider the best interests of the children when making parenting orders. Subsection 16.1(1) of Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), allows me to make an order providing for decision-making responsibility by either parent, which is defined in s. 2(1) as the “responsibility for making significant decisions about a child’s well-being, including in respect of (a) health; (b) education; (c) culture, language, religion and spirituality; and (d) significant extra-curricular activities.” My powers under s.16 are broad and purposive. I can allocate decision-making authority between the parents, provide for the means of communication to be used by the parents, and make any other orders that I consider appropriate to secure the child’s best interests: Divorce Act, ss. 16, 16.1, 16.2.
[36] To determine the children’s best interests, I must first consider their current circumstances. By all accounts, the children do not have any special needs or disabilities. To the contrary, the children are doing extremely well in school and are involved in various clubs and activities. They are close with both parents and spend quality time with both of them. The parents live close to each other and to the children’s schools. Both parents are involved in the children’s extracurricular activities and homework. Both parents are raising the children in the Catholic faith.
[37] It is clear that the parents struggle to communicate with one another. Over the years, the Father has sent the Mother long and rambling texts that question her morals and which are clearly not child-focused. For her part, the Mother has effectively “written off” the Father such that she refuses to engage with him on simple matters, such as choosing the children’s dentist or enrolling them in extracurriculars. The Mother admitted that she has listed the children’s maternal grandfather as the secondary emergency contact at their respective schools rather than listing the Father. She testified that she had more trust in the grandfather to handle an emergency involving the children than she does in the Father. This is despite the Father having the children in his care for more than 35% of the time during the school months, and 50% of the time in the summer.
[38] Given the Father’s regular presence in the children’s lives and his clear abilities as a parent, I find that it is in their best interests that he play a greater role in parental decision-making. For example, I see no reason why the Mother cannot seek the Father’s input prior to making major decisions about the children. This will ensure that the Father is able to provide feedback on how the Mother’s proposed decision might impact his parenting time, his relationship with the children, and/or their well-being. That said, I would not order joint decision-making because I am concerned about the Father’s lingering animosity towards the Mother and his resort to inappropriate text diatribes as recently as this past summer. Given the parties’ finances, it is not reasonable to require the parties to engage a parenting coordinator or mediator to resolve parenting disputes.
[39] Consistent with the recommendation of the assessor, Stephen Cross, I find that it is in the children’s best interests that the Mother make all major decisions with to the children, but that she consult with and allow reasonable input from the Father before doing so. I would also order that the Mother include the Father as the secondary emergency contact with all schools and programs involving the children. In the event of a medical or other emergency involving the children, where the Mother is not available, it is the Father who should make decisions about the children and not another member of the Mother’s extended family.
FINAL ORDER
[40] The parents shall keep one another apprised on all matters related to the Children’s health, welfare, education, religion, and recreational activities. All communication in relation to the children should take place via email and should be child-focused.
[41] Either parent shall be able to obtain information about the children directly from their schools, health care providers, etc. Both parties shall provide the necessary consents to allow the other parent to access information about the children.
[42] Both parents can register the children for extracurricular activities during their parenting time at their sole cost. Neither parent shall register the children in extracurricular activities during the other parent’s parenting time.
[43] The children shall be free to take their belongings (including electronic devices) with them between each parent’s home.
[44] The parties shall not speak negatively about each other in the children’s presence or expose them to parental conflict.
[45] The Mother shall make all major decisions with regards to the children after consulting with the Father. Before making a major decision, the Mother shall seek the Father’s input via email in a timely manner and no less than 48 hours before a decision has to be made (except in the case of emergencies). The Father shall provide his feedback in writing via email within 24 hours of receiving the Mother’s request for input. The Mother shall take the Father’s input into account when making a decision, but shall be at liberty to make major decisions in the event of disagreement.
[46] The Mother is permitted to obtain personal documents for the children, including passports, without the signature of the Father. The Mother shall keep the children’s personal documents in her possession and shall provide them to the Father should he require them for travel purposes or otherwise.
[47] Neither parent requires a signed travel consent to travel with the children provided that a full written itinerary of travel, including contact information, has been provided at least three days in advance of departure.
[48] The Mother shall list the Father as the secondary emergency contact with all schools and programs involving the children.
[49] On an ongoing basis, the Father shall pay child support based on an imputed income of $55,000 or his actual income, whichever is higher. The parties shall exchange income information each year for the purposes of determining child support. If either party claims a contribution towards s. 7 expenses, the total cost of the expense shall be divided proportionally based on their respective incomes. There shall be no retroactive s. 7 expenses payable.
[50] So long as the Father is paying child support, he shall carry life insurance to secure his child support obligation and shall name the Mother as the irrevocable beneficiary in trust for the children in the amount of $200,000 and shall provide proof of the same within 60 days.
[51] The Certificate of Pending Litigation registered on the Whistler property shall be discharged, with the cost born by the Father. The Father shall also sign whatever documents are necessary to remove any liens, claims, mortgages, certificates, or encumbrances on the Whistler property.
[52] The Father shall pay the Mother a total of $165,589, based on the following amounts within 30 days:
a) Post-separation expenses in the amount of $60,000;
b) Half of the total cost of the s. 30 assessment by Stephen Cross, in the amount of $5,191;
c) Child support arrears in the amount of $92,498.47;
d) Costs order of Justice Price dated August 11, 2016, in the amount of $2,500; and
e) Costs order of Justice Emery dated October 5, 2021, in the amount of $5,400 (being the amount remaining after taking into account the costs of $5000 ordered against the Mother by Justice Bloom on July 24, 2018).
[53] The child support orders (arrears and ongoing) shall be enforced by the Family Responsibility Office unless both parties agree to opt out.
[54] This order bears post-judgment interest at a rate of 5.3% per annum from the date of the final order.
COSTS
[55] The Mother was more successful on the Application and is entitled to costs. The parties shall endeavour to agree on the matter of costs. If they are unable to agree, they shall both send their Bill of Costs, Costs submissions (maximum 5 pages, double-spaced, 12-point font), and relevant offers to settle to my assistant (Aleisha.Salim@ontario.ca) on or before February 2, 2024. There shall be no right of reply.
[56] I remain seized pending issuance of my Final Order.
Mandhane J. Released: January 22, 2024