COURT FILE NO.: CV-24-87145

DATE: 2024/05/31

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Cavan Construction LTD and Am-Tech Electrical Inc.

Plaintiffs (Responding Parties)

– and –

Marc Lewis, Jessica Fahey, Christopher Keith Everett Stacey, Brodie Spratt, 12278430 Canada Inc., 12048515 Canada Inc., Supreme Yard Mjl Inc., Grand Mortgage Corporation, And Oz Funding

Corporation

Defendants (Moving Parties)

Aaron Rubinoff and Katrina Bekkers, for the Plaintiffs (Responding Parties)

Louis-Pierre Gregoire, for the Defendants Marc Lewis and 12278340 Canada Inc. (Moving Parties)

Andrew Lister, for the Defendant, Jessica Fahey

David Seifer, for the Defendant Brodie Spratt

Ian McBride, for the Defendants Christopher Keith Everett Stacey and 12048515 Canada Inc.

HEARD: February 14, 2024

MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL AND LAW FIRM

FOR CONFLICT OF INTEREST

SOMJI J

[1] The Defendant Marc Lewis engaged Perley-Robertson, Hill and McDougall LLP (“PRHM”) in November 2020 with respect to an employment matter with his former employer MP Lundy Construction (“Lundy action”). Mr. Lewis initially dealt with counsel Keith MacLaren who then passed the file onto his co-counsel Karen Pagé. Ms. Pagé negotiated a confidential settlement with Lundy on behalf of Mr. Lewis.

[2] Mr. Lewis then went on to work for Cavan Construction LTD. in December 2020 as their Vice President. On July 21, 2021, Cavan terminated Mr. Lewis’ employment. Cavan and AM-Tech Electrical (the “Plaintiffs”) also commenced an action on August 6, 2021 against Mr. Lewis alleging that Mr. Lewis, with the assistance of the other defendants, engaged in fraud and theft of company funds during his employment with Cavan (“Cavan action”). Defendant Jessica Fahey and Mr. Lewis brought a counterclaim against James McKellar, the president and CEO of Cavan Construction and Am-Tech Electrical.

[3] The Plaintiffs and Jason McKellar retained counsel MacLaren of PRHM to represent them in the Cavan action. Mr. McKellar has been a long-standing client of PRHM and in fact, referred Mr. Lewis to counsel MacLaren when his employment issues arose with Lundy.

[4] On August 15 and 16, 2023, two years after the litigation commenced, counsel MacLaren cross-examined Mr. Lewis and Jessica Fahey in the context of a summary judgment motion brought by Ms. Fahey (the “questioning”). Mr. Lewis alleges that during the questioning, Mr. Maclaren relied on confidential information that he received from Mr. Lewis during the Lundy action. Consequently, Mr. Lewis now moves to disqualify counsel MacLaren and PRHM as counsel of record for the Plaintiffs on the basis of conflict of interest.

[5] More specifically, Mr. Lewis alleges that PRHM obtained relevant confidential information with respect to his employment with Lundy, and there is a risk that the information has and will be used to prejudice him in the Cavan action thereby constituting a breach of Mr. MacLaren’s duty of confidentiality to Mr. Lewis under to the Rules of Professional Conduct in Ontario (“Rules”). Alternatively, even if the use of Mr. Lewis’ confidential information is not at risk, Mr. MacLaren has a duty under the Rules not to act against a former client on related matters, and the Cavan and Lundy retainers are related so as to give rise to a conflict of interest.

[6] The Plaintiffs oppose the motion. They argue that first, the information that Mr. MacLaren relied on in the questioning was properly and lawfully received from two sources: his own client Mr. McKellar who received it from Sean Lundy and a representative of Brigil Construction, another one of Mr. Lewis’ employers. Second, while PRHM did obtain confidential information from Mr. Lewis as part of the Lundy retainer, the information obtained is not information relevant to the Cavan action. The Lundy action involved negotiation of a fair severance package for Mr. Lewis in a without cause termination and did not explore the reasons for termination of that employment whereas the Cavan action addresses malfeasance during the course of employment. Given the timing of this motion two years into the Cavan action, the Plaintiffs argue this motion is aimed at delaying matters and interfering with Mr. McKellar’s right to counsel of choice.

[7] The central issue to be decided is whether Mr. MacLaren and PRHM ought to be disqualified as counsel of record on the basis of conflict of interest. This requires consideration of the Rules and two-question test set out in MacDonald Estate v Martin, 1990 32 (SCC), [1990] 3 SCR 1235:

1. Did Mr. MacLaren receive confidential information attributable to a solicitor and client relationship relevant to the matter at hand?

2. Is there risk that such confidential information will be used to the prejudice of Mr. Lewis?

Law on the Duty of Confidentiality

[8] As explained by Sopinka J in MacDonald Estate and more recently reiterated by the Ontario Court of Appeal, the preservation of the confidentiality of information between lawyers and their clients is fundamental to the integrity of the administration of justice and the public’s confidence in it: Chapters Inc. v Davies, Ward & Beck LLP, 2001 24189 (ON CA), 52 O.R. (3d) 566 at para 20.

[9] The Rules prescribe upon lawyers a duty of confidentiality toward their current and former clients to hold in strict confidence all information concerning the business and affairs of the client that they may acquire in the course of the professional relationship and not to divulge such information except as authorized by law or with the client’s consent: Rule 3.3-1.

[10] Consequently, there may be circumstances where counsel is restricted from acting in a matter because of a conflict of interest arising from the duty of confidentiality: Rule 3.4-1. A conflict of interest can arise in various circumstances including, as alleged in this case, when there is a substantial risk that a lawyer’s loyalty to a client would be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer’s duty to another client, a former client, or a third person: Rule 1.1-1 and commentary for Rule 3.4-1.

[11] To determine whether a lawyer should be removed because of a conflict of interest on the basis of a lawyer's duty of confidentiality, judges in Ontario must consider the two questions set out in MacDonald Estate v Martin at p. 1260:

a. Did the lawyer receive confidential information attributable to a solicitor and client relationship relevant to the matter at hand?

b. Is there risk that such confidential information will be used to the prejudice of the client?

[12] The exercise of the court’s discretion in determining whether counsel should be disqualified involves balancing a party’s right to select counsel of choice with the public interest in the administration of justice and basic principles of fundamental fairness. A removal order should not be made unless there are compelling reasons to do so: Milicevic v T. Smith Engineering, 2016 ONSC 2166 at para 83.

Issue 1: Did counsel for PRHM receive confidential information attributable to a solicitor and client relationship relevant to the matter at hand?

[13] With respect to the first question, the person seeking to disqualify counsel must establish there is a sufficient relationship between the two retainers to raise a rebuttable presumption that confidential information has been passed to the lawyer pursuant to the first retainer that could be relevant to the current matter: MacDonald Estate at p.1260.

[14] If a person establishes that the retainers are sufficiently similar, the onus shifts to the solicitor to satisfy the court that no relevant information was imparted: MacDonald Estate at p. 1260; Chapters Inc. at para 38. This is a difficult burden to discharge and must be done by the solicitor without revealing the specifics of the privileged communication. As explained in MacDonald Estate at pp. 1260-1261:

Once it is shown by the client that there existed a previous relationship which is sufficiently related to the retainer from which it is sought to remove the solicitor, the court should infer that confidential information was imparted unless the solicitor satisfies the court that no information was imparted which could be relevant. This will be a difficult burden to discharge. Not only must the court’s degree of satisfaction be such that it would withstand the scrutiny of the reasonably informed member of the public that no such information passed, but the burden must be discharged without revealing the specifics of the privileged communication. Nonetheless, I am of the opinion that the door should not be shut completely on a solicitor who wishes to discharge this heavy burden.

a. Has Mr. Lewis established that the Lundy and Cavan retainers are sufficiently similar?

[15] The onus of showing the two retainers are sufficiently similar rests on the client asserting the conflict of interest: Chapters Inc. at para 29.

[16] It is well recognized that it is challenging for a client to explain that confidential information was shared without disclosing its specifics and thereby compromising its confidentiality: MacDonald Estate at p. 1260. Nonetheless, it is not enough for a client alleging conflict to baldly assert that the retainers are sufficiently related. There must be clear and cogent evidence from which the court can reach that conclusion: Chapters Inc. at para 29. No. 151 Cathedral Ventures Ltd. v Gartrell, 2000 BCSC 1020 at para 47; Milverto Capital Corp. v Thermo Tech Technologies Inc., 2002 BCSC 773 at para 78. This may be done, for example, through a description of the two retainers or an outline of the nature of the confidential information passed to the lawyer pursuant to the first retainer: Chapters Inc. at para 30.

[17] In order to find that the Lundy and Cavan retainers are sufficiently related, I must conclude that in all the circumstances it is reasonably possible that Mr. MacLaren acquired confidential information pursuant to the Lewis retainer that could be relevant to the Cavan action: Chapters Inc. at para 31. I do not find such is the case here.

[18] It is not disputed that Mr. Lewis retained PRHM for the Lundy action and that Mr. Lewis did not consent to the disclosure of confidential information related to the Lundy retainer. However, I am not satisfied that any confidential information that did pass to Mr. MacLaren was relevant to the Cavan action.

[19] Mr. Lewis was employed with Lundy between August 29, 2018 and October 5, 2020 at which time he received a termination letter from Lundy containing a severance offer. Mr. Lewis contacted Mr. McKellar of Cavan who he knew through their previous work together. Mr. McKellar referred Mr. Lewis him to his own lawyer Mr. MacLaren at PRHM.

[20] Mr. Lewis reached out to Mr. MacLaren. Their contact consisted of two telephone calls and three emails following which Mr. MacLaren referred Mr. Lewis to his co-counsel Karen Pagé who practices employment law. Thereafter, Mr. MacLaren did not deal with Mr. Lewis. Mr. Lewis entered into a retainer with Ms. Pagé who negotiated a confidential settlement with Lundy on behalf of Mr. Lewis and which was finalized by December 14, 2020.

[21] Mr. Lewis attests that he shared with Mr. MacLaren several sections of his termination/severance letter and that Mr. MacLaren advised him of his rights with respect to the Lundy severance offer. However, Mr. Lewis concedes that Lundy’s severance package did not contain the reasons for his termination.

[22] Mr. Lewis filed two emails dated October 15, 2020, with the subject line “Severance Papers MP Lundy/Marc Lewis.” Mr. MacLaren filed two additional emails dated October 20 and 27, 2020, with the subject line “Severance Papers.” All three emails are almost entirely redacted. These emails establish that Mr. Lewis and Mr. MacLaren corresponded but provide no insight into the nature of the discussions or advice.

[23] Furthermore, Mr. Lewis does not attest that the redacted portion of the emails contained information regarding the circumstances of his employment, his reasons for termination, or any other information that is otherwise relevant to the Cavan action.

[24] The evidence presented indicates that the Lundy retainer was intended to assist Mr. Lewis in obtaining a fair settlement package for a without cause termination. It was open to Mr. Lewis to give evidence that the retainer went beyond that and included discussions or advice on topics which are relevant to the Cavan action. He did not do so. At no time does Mr. Lewis attest that during the negotiation of his settlement with Lundy, he disclosed either to Mr. MacLaren or Ms. Pagé the reasons for his termination or the circumstances leading to his termination.

[25] Furthermore, within a week of being retained for the Cavan action in July 2021, Mr. MacLaren reached out to Mr. Lewis as well as his father Robert Lewis who he believed might also be implicated in the matter. Robert Lewis responded with a telephone call on July 28, 2021 indicating that Mr. Maclaren was in a conflict of interest because he had previously represented his son Mr Lewis in the Lundy matter. One can reasonably infer that this information would have been given to Robert Lewis by his son Marc Lewis. Mr. Lewis and his counsel also met with Mr. MacLaren for a without prejudice meeting as early as October 2021. However, Mr. Lewis did not take any steps to act on concerns he may have had regarding a conflict of interest until two years later in August 2023 and after Cavan has invested considerable time and expense in advancing this litigation. Delay in bringing motions to remove counsel is a relevant factor in the exercise of the court’s discretion on the disqualification of counsel although not a determinative factor: Milicevic at para 71 citing Forsyth v. Blue Rock Wealth Management Inc., 2015 ONSC 6666.

[26] Turning now to the questioning of the defendants for the summary judgment motion. Mr. Lewis presumes from the nature of the questions asked that Mr. MacLaren obtained and relied on confidential information from the Lundy retainer. However, Mr. MacLaren has provided evidence that he obtained information about Mr. Lewis’ conduct with other employers from speaking to his own client and through his own investigation.

[27] Mr. MacLaren cross-examined Ms. Fahey and Mr. Lewis on August 15 and 16, 2023. Ms. Fahey was living with Mr. Lewis at the time he was terminated from Lundy in the fall of 2020 and would have known about his termination and severance package. There was nothing improper in Mr. MacLaren asking her questions about her knowledge of those events. Similarly, Mr. MacLaren takes the position that Mr. Lewis’ conduct with other employers both before and after he worked for Cavan is similar act evidence that could be relevant to the Cavan action. Therefore, Mr. McLaren asked both Ms. Fahey and Ms. Lewis specific questions related to potential misconduct by Mr. Lewis. The particular questions of concern are as follows:

a. Mr. MacLaren asked Ms. Fahey whether or not Mr Lewis told her that Lundy had made allegations against him for taking money from the company to which she replied no.

b. Mr. MacLaren asked Mr. Lewis if he was terminated because of “financial malfeasance” and Mr. Lewis replied he was not.

c. Mr. MacLaren asked Mr. Lewis if he was terminated because of “allegations of malfeasance” and again Mr. Lewis replied no.

d. Mr. McLaren asked Mr. Lewis whether he would explain why he was terminated from Lundy, at which time his counsel indicated she was refusing the question on the basis of relevance.

[28] The mere fact that Mr. MacLaren put to the defendants questions suggesting that Mr. Lewis may have engaged in misconduct while employed with Lundy does not necessarily mean the source of information for this questioning came from the Lundy retainer. As already noted, Mr. Lundy does not attest that he shared any such information with PRHM counsel. Furthermore, both Mr. MacLaren and his client Mr. McKellar attest that the information which formed the basis of the questioning came from third party sources.

[29] Mr. McKellar states in his affidavit dated October 10, 2023, that in 2021 when Mr. Lewis was still employed with Cavan, he met with Sean Lundy on an unrelated manner. During their conversation, Mr. Lundy inquired about Mr. McKellar’s relationship with Mr. Lewis and whether Cavan had renovated Mr. Lewis’ home or paid for contracts involving Mr. Lewis’ associates. During this meeting, Mr. Lundy also provided an explanation for Mr. Lewis’ termination. Mr. McKellar subsequently informed Mr. MacLaren what he learned.

[30] On August 14, 2023, Mr. McKellar met with Mr. MacLaren to prepare for his cross-examination. During that time, Mr. McKellar discussed with Mr. MacLaren his previous meeting with Sean Lundy. In addition, Mr. MacLaren contacted a representative of Brigil Construction who employed Mr. Lewis following his termination from Cavan. The Brigil representative described instances of Mr. Lewis altering cheques for his own personal gain.

[31] Mr. MacLaren corroborates this account. Mr. MacLaren attests that during the preparatory meeting with Mr. McKellar on August 14, 2023, Mr. McKellar referred to his meeting with Mr. Lundy. He also confirms that during the preparatory meeting, he called a representative of Brigil Construction who described instances of Mr. Lewis altering Brigil cheques to his benefit. It was these conversations that formed the basis of his questioning.

[32] Given the evidence of Mr. McKellar and Mr. MacLaren’s that the source of information for the questioning came from third parties and given that Mr. Lewis does not attest that he ever shared information about the reasons for his termination from Lundy or allegations of misconduct by Lundy with PRHM counsel, I find that Mr. Lewis has not provided clear and cogent evidence that Mr. MacLaren obtained relevant confidential information during the Lundy retainer and relied on it in questioning.

[33] This is not to say that just because information is available from a third party, it cannot also have been obtained from a previous retainer. There may be circumstances where there is overlap. The determination is fact specific. For example, in No. 151 Cathedral Ventures v Gartrell et al, the court noted that while much of the information was available to the defendants in any event from other sources, one could not assume that the defendant would ferret out all of the information in the usual discovery process in the same frank format in which was relayed to counsel in the original retainer: 2000 BCSC 1020 at para 49.

[34] The distinction, however, is that in No. 151 Cathedral Ventures, the court found that business and financial information had been shared with counsel. I do not find such is the case here. Mr. Lewis has not attested that he shared any information about his reasons for termination with counsel, and on the contrary, Mr. MacLaren and Mr. McKellar provide corroborative evidence that the information came from third party sources.

[35] In addition, the mere fact that both retainers concern employment matters does not, without more, make them sufficiently similar. The Lundy retainer was for the negotiation of a settlement package on a without cause termination whereas the Cavan retainer concerns a malfeasance action. It is possible that Mr. Lewis engaged in misconduct both at Lundy and Cavan. Mr. MacLaren is entitled to question Mr. Lewis about his conduct with the employers he worked with both before and after working for Cavan to support his claim.

b. Has Mr. MacLaren established that he did not obtain any relevant confidential information?

[36] Even if I am incorrect, and the two retainers are sufficiently similar, I find that Mr. MacLaren has discharged the heavy burden of showing that he did not obtain any confidential information from the Lundy retainer that is relevant to the Cavan action.

[37] Mr. MacLaren is clear both in his affidavit and his cross-examination of October 20, 2023, that Mr. Lewis did not disclose to him the reasons for his termination of employment by Lundy or provide him with any information that could be relevant to the Cavan action.

[38] According to Mr. MacLaren, Mr. Lewis told him he was terminated without cause and would be entitled to some additional compensation. More specifically, Mr. Lewis asked him for advice about a letter which he wished to send to Lundy asking for additional compensation for termination and Mr. MacLaren refused.

[39] Mr. MacLaren acknowledges the email communications with Mr. Lundy. Mr. MacLaren states that in the October 15th email, he provided limited advice after warning Mr. Lewis that he did not do employment work. In the October 20th and 27th emails, Mr. Lewis sought further advice which Mr. MacLaren was unable to give and referred Mr. Lewis to Ms. Pagé.

[40] While Mr. Lewis attests that he shared with Mr. MacLaren parts of his severance package, it is unclear from Mr. MacLaren’s cross-examination if he did, in fact, view the severance package offered by Lundy. The redacted email communications filed were of no assistance in this regard. Nonetheless, even if the emails and discussions between Mr. Lewis and Mr. MacLaren referred to terms of the severance package offered by Lundy, Mr. Lewis concedes that the Lundy severance package did not include information about the reasons for termination. This would be consistent with a without cause termination.

[41] Finally, Mr. MacLaren is clear in his affidavit and cross-examination that he informed Mr. Lewis at the outset that he would not represent him in the matter and referred him almost immediately to Ms. Pagé. After asking Ms. Pagé to contact Mr. Lewis, he did not speak further to Mr. Lewis about his termination from Lundy.

[42] Mr. MacLaren’s account is not contradicted by Mr. Lewis.

Issue 2: Given that Mr. Lewis previously retained PRHM, is there a risk that relevant confidential information will be used to his prejudice in the Cavan action?

[43] The second question in McDonald Estate concerns whether the confidential information will be misused. A lawyer who has relevant confidential information cannot act against his client or former client. In such cases, the disqualification is automatic and cannot be remedied by assurances or undertakings: MacDonald Estate at p. 1261; Chapters Inc. at para 42.

[44] In this case, I have found that Mr. MacLaren did not obtain relevant confidential information from the Lundy retainer that could prejudice him in the Cavan action.

[45] Mr. Lewis argues that even if there is no risk to the use of confidential information, Mr. MacLaren has a duty not to act against him given he is a former client. Rule 3.4-10 states:

Acting Against Former Clients

3.4-10 Unless the former client consents, a lawyer shall not act against a former client in

(a) the same matter,

(b) any related matter, or

(c) save as provided by rule 3.4-11, any other matter if the lawyer has relevant confidential information arising from the representation of the former client that may prejudice that client.

[46] In this regard, counsel relies on decision in Brookville Carriers Flatbed Inc. v Blackjack Transport Ltd., 2008 NSCA 22 where the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal states that a lawyer has a duty not to act against a former client in a related matter. Similarly, in Re Regina and Speid, the Ontario Court of Appeal stated that a client has every right to be confident that the solicitor retained will not subsequently take an adversarial position against him/her with respect to the same subject-matter on which he was retained: (1983), 1983 1704 (ON CA), 8 C.C.C. (3d) 18 at para 22; see also Consulate Ventures Inc. v Amico Contracting and Engineering 2010 ONCA 788 at para 30; In Chiefs of Ontario v. Ontario (2003), 2003 32351 (ON SC), 63 O.R. (3d) 335 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) at para 112.

[47] The governing factor in determining the application of the duty of loyalty rests on the relationship between the two retainers. A matter is “related” if the new retainer involves the lawyer taking an adversarial position against a former client with respect to legal work the lawyer performed for the former client or a matter central to the retainer: Brookville at para 17.

[48] In Brookville, the judge found that while the causes of action pled in each employment lawsuit were different, the matters were related because the law firm was attacking the honesty of the defendant during his employment with a company during an overlapping where they had earlier vouched for his honesty in the course of the same employment.

[49] Brookville, however, is factually distinct from the case at hand. Here, the Lundy retainer was completed before the Cavan action commenced. There is no overlap in the retainers or employers. Mr. MacLaren was also unaware at the time of his dealings with Mr. Lewis in October 2020 that Mr. Lewis intended to or would go on to work for Cavan in December 2020.

[50] Furthermore, while Mr. MacLaren may have given advice on the strength of the Lundy settlement offer in those two telephone calls and three emails, there is no evidence to suggest that the advice was based on Mr. Lewis having imparted to him knowledge about the circumstances of his employment. It is possible that if Mr. MacLaren and Mr. Lewis had engaged in a more protracted solicitor client relationship, Mr. MacLaren might have inquired about the reasons for termination or Mr. Lewis might have discussed it with him for the purpose of assessing the fairness of Lundy’s settlement offer. However, Mr. Lewis does not attest this occurred, and Mr. MacLaren is clear that he was never made aware of the reasons for Mr. Lewis’ termination. Consequently, there is no evidence that Mr. MacLaren previously knew, yet alone defended, Mr. Lewis’ honesty such that he should now be disqualified for taking an adversarial position in challenging Mr. Lewis’ honesty while employed at Cavan.

[51] Finally, I must consider whether Mr. Lewis’ retainer with Ms. Pagé and PRHM gives rise to a risk of the use of relevant confidential information. Lawyers, like most people, talk. Hence there is a strong inference that lawyers who work together share confidences: MacDonald Estate at p. 1262. When addressing the second question in relation to other members of the law firm, judges should draw the inference that confidential information was shared between lawyers in a firm unless satisfied on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that all reasonable measures have been taken to ensure that no confidential information will be disclosed between the tainted lawyer and other members of the firm. MacDonald Estate at p. 1262.

[52] Courts have typically held that compliance with guidelines set out by the relevant governing bodies, in this case the Law Society of Ontario, can provide sufficient protection to minimize conflicts of interest. Adoption of only some guidelines may be adequate in some cases while others cases may require more: Bester-Zilevitch v Nexen Inc., 1017 FC 874) at paras 43-44. The reasonableness of the measures will vary depending on the circumstances of the case and the retainers in question. Nonetheless, the inquiry remains, at all times, whether the reasonably informed person would be satisfied that no use of confidential information would occur. In this case, I am satisfied that reasonable measure were taken by PRHM to ensure that confidential information would not pass between Ms. Pagé and Mr. MacLaren that could prejudice Mr. Lewis in the Cavan action.

[53] First, Mr. MacLaren attests that he did not discuss the Lewis matter with Ms. Pagé after he referred the matter to her. Second, on July 21, 2021 just after Mr. McKellar contacted him, Mr. MacLaren requested a conflict search for Marc Lewis which confirmed that PRHM’s involvement in his litigation was complete. Third, on July 26, 2021 Mr. MacLaren instructed his office to install an ethical wall to limit his access to the Lewis action and to limit Ms. Pagé’s access to the Cavan action. Mr. MacLaren finalized his retainer with Mr. McKellar only after these steps were completed. I disagree with Mr. Lewis that there would have been a reason to implement an ethical wall earlier because Mr. MacLaren could not have anticipated that Mr. Lewis would go work for Mr. Cavan giving rise to a future claim for malfeasance. I find that upon consideration of the facts of this case, a reasonably informed person would be satisfied that sufficient measures were taken by PRHM to ensure no use of confidential information would occur to prejudice Mr. Lewis

[54] In conclusion, I find that Mr. Lewis has not demonstrated that Mr. MacLaren has breached his duty of confidentiality or loyalty such that either he or PRHM should be disqualified as counsel of record for the Plaintiffs. The motion is dismissed.

Costs

[55] The Plaintiffs are the successful party on this motion. The parties are encouraged to resolve the issue of costs. If they cannot, they may file brief written submissions not exceeding two pages exclusive of Bills of Costs. The Plaintiffs shall file their submissions by June 14th, 2024, and the Defendants shall file their submissions by June 28th. Costs submissions are to be sent to scj.assistants@ontario.ca and to my attention.

Somji J.

Released: May 31, 2024

COURT FILE NO.: CV-24-87145

DATE: 2024/05/31

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Cavan Construction LTD and Am-Tech Electrical Inc.

Plaintiffs (Responding Parties)

– and –

Marc Lewis, Jessica Fahey, Christopher Keith Everett Stacey, Brodie Spratt, 12278430 Canada Inc., 12048515 Canada Inc., Supreme Yard Mjl Inc., Grand Mortgage Corporation, And Oz Funding

Corporation

Defendants (Moving Parties)

MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL AND LAW FIRM FOR CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Somji J.

Released: May 31, 2024