COURT FILE NO.: FS-18-00005351-0002 DATE: 20240530

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

MILENA KUMERDJIEVA Applicant – and – GIUSEPPE (JOSEPH) CERASUOLO Respondent

Counsel: Karen Ballantyne, for the Applicant Areesha Zubair, for the Respondent

Heard: April 16, 17, 18, 19 and 23, 2024

Justice Sharma

Reasons for Judgment

[1] This Judgment concludes a four-day trial arising from a Motion to Change initiated by the Applicant mother, Milena Kumurdjieva (the “Mother”). The Mother seeks to vary a Final Order, made on consent, and signed by Shore J. on October, 29, 2021 (the “Final Order”).

[2] Parties have one child, M, born October 15, 2013.

[3] In summary, the Orders sought by the Mother would give her final decision-making responsibility. They would also reduce M’s parenting time with her father, the Respondent, Joseph Cerasuolo (the “Father”) on weekdays such that the Father would have dinner with M on weeknights rather than overnights on weeknights. In addition, she seeks an Order for child support based on an imputed income to the Father of $120,000. There was no child support payable under the Final Order.

[4] At the conclusion of the Father’s evidence, I invited submissions on whether I should conduct a judicial interview of M. The Mother was in favour. The Father took no position.

[5] I determined it was necessary to conduct a judicial interview of M, which was held on April 22, 2024. I reached this decision because there was no Voice of the Child Report or recent assessment done with respect to the child’s views. The parties had competing evidence of what the child wanted.

[6] On April 23, 2024, I reported to the parties on M’s views as expressed to me. I provided to them a written summary of my interview with M. I invited parties to consider settlement. No settlement was achieved.

[7] Written closing submissions were received on April 26 and 29, 2024.

Conclusion

[8] For the reasons below, I am satisfied there has been a material change of circumstances. I make orders granting the Mother sole decision-making responsibility with a positive onus on her to consult with the Father and consider his views prior to making major decisions for M. I also adjust the parenting schedule to reduce the Father’s overnight parenting time on weeknights, but extend his parenting time on one weekend per month. I further order the Father to pay monthly child support of $766 per month, commencing September 1, 2024, based on an annual income of $82,159 and make other orders regarding s. 7 expenses, and annual financial disclosure.

Overview

[9] Parties were married in 2013 and separated in 2018. M was born in October 2013.

[10] The Mother has worked during the marriage and post-separation at Canadian Tire. She currently holds the position of Associate Vice-President at Canadian Tire and earned approximately $335,000 in 2022. She was born in Bulgaria and holds dual citizenship in Canada. She lives in North York.

[11] The Father has his own electrical contracting company, which he operated during the marriage and post-separation. His 2023 income was roughly $97,000. Post-separation, he used to live in a building adjacent to the Mother in North York, but he moved to Woodbridge, Ontario in 2020. He continues to live there, proximate to his mother and other family members. The Father has two daughters from a previous relationship, who are both in their 20s and for whom he pays child support.

[12] In the original Application, parties retained Howard Hurwitz to conduct a s. 30 assessment, which assessment was completed in 2019. Mr. Hurwitz’s recommendations were updated on July 7, 2021, although a full report was not complete.

[13] The parties consented to the Final Order on October 29, 2021 based largely on Mr. Hurwitz’ 2021 recommendations. At the time, M was 8 years old. She is now 10.5 years old. In summary, the relevant provisions of the Final Order are:

a. Parties will have joint decision-making responsibility for M.

b. Parties will retain Ms. Carolyn Cahen as their Parenting Coordinator (“PC”). Any disputes regarding decision-making or the parenting schedule shall be referred to her.

c. During the school year, M was to have her primary residence with the Mother, and she would reside with the Father in accordance with the following schedule:

i. Week One: Tuesday after school until Thursday before school (2 overnights); and

ii. Week Two: Monday after school until Tuesday before school and Friday after school until Sunday at 7 pm (3 overnights).

d. M will spend all PA days with the Father during the school year, except certain PA days, resulting in M spending approximately six PA days with the Father.

e. During the summer, March break, Winter break and statutory holidays, the parties would have equal parenting time.

f. Neither party will pay the other child support. [1]

g. The Father was required to pay 40% of Ms. Cahen’s fees as PC, and 27% of the cost of M’s other s. 7 expenses.

[14] Parties agreed to use Ms. Cahen as PC in August 2021, but they did not start to work with her until January 2022 because the Father was delayed in paying a retainer.

[15] Parties continued to have disputes following the Final Order, which centred around scheduling issues, travel and obtaining a travel consent letter, and selection of camps. The Mother argued that the Final Order was confusing which resulted in some of the conflict.

[16] In September 2023, Ms. Cahen terminated her services with the family, although the Father had previously terminated her services.

Parties’ Positions

[17] The Mother’s position is that since the Final Order, material changes in circumstance have occurred which support the varied Orders she seeks. She says the following are the material changes:

(a) Joint decision-making, with the assistance of the PC, is not working for the parties. There is no longer a PC working with the family after Ms. Cahen terminated her services.

(b) The Father has not complied with his parenting obligations under the Final Order; and

(c) The child has not adjusted to the parenting schedule in the Final Order, and the child now seeks a different schedule.

[18] The Father’s position is that the Mother has failed to meet the threshold of a material change in circumstances.

Issues

[19] The issues to be decided are:

a. Has there been a material change in circumstances to support a variation of the Final Order?

b. If so,

i. What parenting orders ought to be made in the best interests of the child?

ii. Is child support payable by the Father as a result of a new parenting schedule, and if so, what is the Father’s income for child support purposes?

Analysis

Witnesses, Credibility and Co-Parenting Capacity

[20] For the Mother, she testified along with the parties’ PC, Ms. Cahen. I comment briefly on the hearsay evidence of the child given by Ms. Cahen in my reasons.

[21] For the Father, he testified as did Mr. Howard Hurwitz, the Father’s other children and his mother (the paternal grandmother). The child’s therapist, Dr. Li, also provided brief evidence.

[22] Later in my analysis, I refer to the parties’ testimony and provide a limited assessment of their credibility where it is relevant. However, I find that not much turns on the credibility of the parties in this case in relation to how the child was faring in the parties’ care because (a) the parties rarely witness parenting that occurs in the other party’s home, (b) there is the possibility that a 10-year-old child may say one thing in one household and something different in the other, (c) I was able to hear the child’s views directly; and (d) there is documentary evidence of the parties’ communication which speaks to some of the allegations made.

[23] The parties’ testimony, however, did provide insight into how each approached co-parenting following the Final Order. This is relevant and I comment on it in my reasons.

Issue 1: Has there been a material change in circumstances?

[24] Subsection 17(5) of the Divorce Act states:

Before the court makes a variation order in respect of a parenting order or contact order, the court shall satisfy itself that there has been a change in the circumstances of the child since the making of the order or the last variation order made in respect of the order, or of an order made under subsection 16.5(9).

[25] Before the Court can assess whether a change in parenting orders should be made, it must be satisfied that there has been a material change in the circumstances of the child since the last order was made. If the moving party is unable to show the existence of a material change, the inquiry can go no further: Gordon v. Goertz, [1996] 2 SCR 27, at para. 10).

[26] To conclude there has been a material change, the Court must be satisfied that: (a) there has been a change in the condition, means, needs or circumstances of the child and/or the ability of the parents to meet those needs; (b) the change must materially affect the child; and (c) the change was either not foreseen or could not have been reasonably contemplated by the judge who made the initial order. The change must be substantial, continuing and “if known at the time, would likely have resulted in a different order.” Gordon v. Goertz, at paras. 12-13; L.M.L.P. v. L.S. [2011] SCC 64.

[27] The onus is on the moving party to show that there has been a material change in the circumstances of the child. If there is no material change in circumstances, the inquiry ends. The Court would be without jurisdiction to vary the order. Litman v. Sherman, 2008 ONCA 485.

[28] The threshold test of whether a material change in circumstances occurred “can also be satisfied by evidence that circumstances which the parties anticipated would occur did not in fact materialize, or where there were expectations at the time of the order respecting the parties’ future conduct and those expectations did not materialize”: M.A.B. v. M.G.C., 2022 ONSC 7207 at para 163 (9).

[29] Similarly, “a party’s non-compliance with an existing court order can amount to a material change in circumstances for the purposes of the variation analysis if the breaches have affected or are likely to affect the child’s best interests”: M.A.B., at para 163 (10) and cases cited therein.

[30] I am satisfied there has been a material change in circumstances that affect the child from the circumstances that were in place at the time the Final Order was reached.

[31] Mr. Hurwitz testified as to the circumstances that were in place when he made his initial report in 2019, with updated recommendations in 2021. He stated that in forming his recommendations, he was of the view that both parents were reticent to co-parent, but that they had the capacity to do so. He was of the view that joint decision-making was feasible, but that they needed support through a parenting coordinator to make sure it happened in a child-focused manner. He recommended there be a timely response to communication, within 24 hours, and that parties’ communication should be cordial and brief.

[32] On cross-examination, Mr. Hurwitz testified a significant change between his 2019 and 2021 recommendations was the use of PC. He said this recommendation was made because there needed to be some accountability by the parents to someone and to avoid court involvement. This is why he recommended that the PC have arbitral authority. He further testified that with a PC, he expected the parties to communicate better, conflict would be reduced and parties would be able to make decisions together. If they did not, he would have recommended a different decision-making model.

[33] I am satisfied that as a result of the cumulative effect of the Father breaching communication Orders, his inability to respond to the Mother in a timely way and to refrain from disparaging her, and his inability to work effectively in a PC process, the parties are no longer able to communicate and make joint decisions in M’s best interests.

Father’s Repeated Late Responses

[34] The Father has breached communication orders and deadlines for certain communications which has impacted the Mother’s ability to schedule events for the child, such as camp and travel, and has frustrated the parties’ ability to communicate in an effective co-parenting relationship.

[35] Paragraph 3b of the Final Order requires the parties to respond within 24 hours to requests for information or a request for a temporary change. There were several examples of the Mother sending the Father emails with multiple follow-ups before getting a response.

[36] On October 30, 2022, the Father sent an email to the Mother advising that he planned on taking M on a family vacation in December 2022. He advised that he would confirm by October 31, 2022 whether he was going. The Mother agreed to this travel, but she asked for information on the location, dates and flights in an email on October 31, 2022, the date when the Father advised he would provide this information. She then sent follow-up emails on November 3, 5 and 8, 2022 for this information because, as she advised the Father, she was also planning a trip with M in January 2023 and she needed to finalize those arrangements. While a response was ultimately received, it created unnecessary anxiety.

[37] In an email on March 22, 2023, the Mother asked the Father what camps he had registered the child in on certain weeks in the summer of 2023. She sent follow-up emails on March 28 and April 23, 2023 to again request this information. The Mother then engaged Ms. Cahen, who sent an email to the parties on April 24, 2023. The Father’s assistant responded saying the Father would provide a response by May 3, 2023. By May 4, 2023, no response was received and Ms. Cahen followed up with the Father, and a response was finally provided that day.

[38] There was also evidence of the Father not responding to requests for a travel consent letter in a timely manner, which caused the Mother much anxiety and uncertainty about her travel plans with M.

[39] On March 23, 2022, the Mother sent the Father an email requesting a travel consent letter for a trip to Cuba from April 9 – 17, 2022. She asked for this letter by April 2, 2022, consistent with para. 23 of the Final Order which required travel letters to be delivered one week in advance of a trip. In response, on March 24, 2022, the Father said he would advise once he got the travel consent letter notarized. The Father did not indicate when he would provide the letter, despite follow-ups by the Mother on March 30, 2022 and April 1, 2022. As the Mother testified, this situation created unnecessary stress.

[40] The problem persisted even when an Arbitral Award fixed a time for delivery of another travel consent letter. On June 9, 2022, the Mother obtained an Arbitral Award from Ms. Cahen allowing her to travel to Bulgaria with M for three weeks, and which required the Father to deliver a travel consent letter by July 17, 2022. The Mother sent requests for the travel consent letter on July 4, 2022, July 17, 2022, and July 18, 2022, without receiving a response. Because the Father did not respond, the Mother had to engage her lawyer to get a response from the Father. On July 20, 2022, the Mother’s lawyer engaged the Father’s lawyer to request this letter, and still it was not provided immediately. Instead, his lawyer advised that the letter would be delivered at the end of the week.

[41] The problem persisted in 2023. On June 10 and 22, 2023, the Mother sent two messages asking for a travel consent letter for a trip planned to Europe on June 30, 2022. She did not get a response until she copied Ms. Cahen. Then again in December, 2023, after the Mother sent several emails to the Father for a travel consent letter for a trip she was taking over the Christmas holidays, the Mother engaged her lawyer on December 20, 2023 to ask the Father’s lawyer to arrange for the letter to be sent. The Father’s lawyer responded the same day advising it would be delivered on December 22, 2023.

[42] The Mother testified that these were only a sample of the instances in which the Father would not respond.

Father’s Abusive Communication

[43] The Father also engaged in abusive communication with the Mother after the Final Order. Para. 3e of the Final Order required that all communication be cordial, brief and to the point about M, and that parties shall refrain from denigrating or communicating negative feelings, frustrations and opinions about the other party. They were also required to communicate by email and not text.

[44] Notwithstanding these Orders, on January 17, 2022, the Father sent a text to the Mother, stating among other things “Your (sic) the selfish one who tried to take my daughter from me and hurt our daughter in process”.

[45] On December 1, 2022, he wrote among other things in a text, “Only problem is your (sic) dragging our daughter threw (sic) this for nothing. Bring it on, you want to spend money and harm our daughter, go for it. How can I left (sic) my daughter spend more time with a crazy mother, Stop being Soo selfish and grow up”.

[46] On September 1, 2023, after M had returned from camp and was allegedly refusing to go to the Father’s home, the Father was texting the Mother and blaming her for the child’s refusal. He said, among other things, “Stop playing these games. Your (sic) just putting pressure on [M] indirectly with this childish obsessions….Stop manipulating our daughter. Let her be herself and not worry about meeting mommy’s needs.”

[47] In an email on September 6, 2023, he wrote, “…I love driving her to her activities – this is your Bitterness coming out – does not matter what I say your bitterness blinds you – this is why I suggest you get some help for real”.

[48] This type of language used by the Father, after the Final Order was made, negatively impacts the parties’ capacity to effectively co-parent. As stated by the Mother during her testimony, respect is a minimum requirement for a successful co-parenting arrangement and the Father has not demonstrated that.

Father’s Actions Frustrated the PC Process

[49] I am also persuaded that the Father frustrated the PC process leading to Ms. Cahen resigning, which process Mr. Hurwitz testified was intended to support the parties’ ability to exercise decision-making in a child-focussed manner.

[50] Through a letter from his counsel dated December 1, 2022, the Father advised Ms. Cahen that he would not be renewing the PC Agreement in February 2023. He understood he was entitled to do so because para. 2.5 of the PC Agreement states that the PC is appointed for a term of 18 months from the date the second parent signed the agreement (i.e. August 28, 2021) and para. 2.6 required 60 days’ notice to the PC if the parties sought to renew the agreement. Ms. Cahen responded advising that she would remain working for the family as required, until parties have a new agreement or order regarding decision-making. As it turned out, both parties continued to rely on Ms. Cahen until she terminated her services in September 2023.

[51] As the Father was contractually entitled not to renew the PC Agreement, I do not take his refusal to renew the PC Agreement as evidence of him frustrating the PC process.

[52] However, the Father’s actions or lack thereof leading up to and after December 1, 2022 demonstrate that the Father was non-responsive to Ms. Cahen, that he refused to follow her guidance and direction, and that he created barriers that prevented Ms. Cahen from functioning in a manner consistent with their PC Agreement.

[53] Ms. Cahen testified that very often, the Mother would contact her after first trying to raise issues with the Father and his failure to respond. Because of the Father’s unresponsiveness, this would make it difficult for the Mother to schedule appointments and book activities and travel with M. Ms. Cahen testified that he was also quite rude to her, and that he did not respond to calls or emails she sent to the Father. Ms. Cahen testified that the Father’s unresponsiveness made it problematic for the parties to jointly decide upon minor and major issues, and that this affected M because children pick up when one parent is less interested in scheduling activities and supporting their interests.

[54] I accept Ms. Cahen’s evidence on these points as truthful. It was consistent with the documentary evidence received at trial, and consistent with how the Father communicated with the Mother. I also accept that it impacted M. M advised me during the judicial interview that there is a lack of activities when she spends time with her Father. I reject a suggestion that Ms. Cahen was biased. The evidence supported the conclusions she gave at trial, with the modest exception that M reported to me less strong views than what Ms. Cahen suggested in her evidence.

[55] The Father refused to permit Ms. Cahen to meet with M at her school. Ms. Cahen testified that she sought to do so that she could meet the child at a neutral location, and that she had discussed this with the parties. As a result, most of her meetings with M occurred while M was in the Mother’s care.

[56] A further example is the Father continuing to have the child sleep at her paternal grandmother’s home when M was in his care. As part of Ms. Cahen’s Arbitral Award issued on June 9, 2022, she directed the parties to strictly follow the right of first refusal clause in para. 15 of the Final Order which states:

“If either party is unavailable to provide care for [M] for a period of more than eight hours during which [M] is normally in the party’s care, is awake, and not in school, or if either party is away overnight, the other party shall the right of first refusal to provide care for [M] during that period .”

[57] It is clear from having interviewed M and from the evidence of the Father and the paternal grandmother that M used to sleep regularly at her grandmother’s home on weeknights, but this stopped about 1.5 years ago. When M was staying overnight at her paternal grandmother’s home, I am also satisfied that the Father would typically remain at the paternal grandmother’s home until after M fell asleep, and return in the morning after M had breakfast and was ready for school. This was because the Father had early morning work meetings, which he has now changed to virtual work meetings.

[58] However, I am equally satisfied that after the June 9, 2022 Arbitral Award, M continued to sleep at the paternal grandmother’s home until at least October 2022, contrary to para. 15 of the Final Order and the Arbitral Award. Ms. Cahen commented on the Father’s admission of these facts in her November 30, 2022 letter to the parties.

[59] Neither the Mother nor Ms. Cahen were suggesting that M should not have quality time with her paternal grandmother. However, the fact that regular sleepovers at the grandmother’s home continued, in defiance of the Final Order and Arbitral Award, speaks to his lack of respect for the Final Order and the PC process. The fact that the Father continued with weekday overnights also speaks to his refusal or inability to be the primary caregiver during his parenting time until October or November of 2022. It also speaks to the Father’s unwillingness to address concerns M reported to Ms. Cahen about her staying overnight at the paternal grandmother’s home.

[60] The spirit and intent of the Final Order and the Arbitral Award was that M would primarily be in the Father’s care on his parenting time. Even if the Father remained at the paternal grandmother’s home late into the evening such that M was not left for more than 8 hours in the paternal grandmother’s care, the Father was “away overnight” and the right of first refusal kicked in.

[61] Finally, both the Mother and Ms. Cahen testified that even after the Mother engaged Ms. Cahen to address an issue, the Father would not respond. The evidence supports this factual finding. I have already commented on some of the documentary evidence to support it. I appreciate that the Father may have viewed Ms. Cahen as biased, at least for some portions of her engagement with the family. However, the fact remains that he was bound by the PC process and obligated to participate in it. It was the expectation, as described by Mr. Hurwitz, when he made his recommendations for a PC process. The parties required an arbitrator to deal with their disputes, as recommended by Mr. Hurwitz, and it was not open to the Father to ignore the PC if he disagreed with her direction or Arbitral Awards.

[62] In all, these events are significant material changes in circumstances that impact the child and could not have been foreseen when the Final Order was taken out. While the parties had high conflict in the past and difficulty communicating, there was an expectation after the Final Order was issued that the parties would communicate consistent with the Final Order, abide by its terms, and participate in the PC process. The evidence at trial established that the Father did not meet these expectations.

Issue 2: What new parenting orders should be made?

[63] If a material change in circumstances has been established, the Court then embarks on a fresh inquiry into the best interests of the child. In this fresh inquiry, both parties bear the evidentiary burden of demonstrating where the best interests of the child lie. There is no legal presumption in favour of the custodial parent, or in favour of maintaining the existing timesharing arrangements. Bubis v. Jones; Persaud v. Garcia-Persaud, 2009 ONCA 782; Deslauriers v. Russell, 2016 ONSC 5285; Roloson v. Clyde, 2017 ONSC 3642.

[64] I make the following new parenting orders for the reasons set out below:

a. The Applicant shall have final decision-making authority with respect to the parties’ daughter, M, born October 15, 2013.

b. The parties shall apply the following principles when making major decisions relating to M:

i. Both parties shall solicit input and opinions of the other party in relation to any and all major decisions impacting M, including those relating to her physical and psychological health, education, cultural and religious training and experiences, any extracurricular activities that may affect the time spent by her with the other party, and any other major decision affecting her general welfare.

ii. Communication shall take place through email correspondence only, to document the process and to minimize the possibility of M’s exposure to parental tension and conflict.

iii. Parties shall respond to email correspondence about major decisions within 48 hours. Consultation as contemplated in para (i) shall be deemed to have occurred if a party does not respond within 48 hours.

iv. Before a decision is made, both parties shall seek input from appropriate professional so that if there is a dispute around an educational issue, the school is contacted. If there is a disagreement around a healthcare issue, then the doctor is contacted.

c. The Applicant shall hold M’s Canadian and Bulgarian passports. She will be responsible for ensuring they are current and she shall initiate the process for any renewals. She shall provide the Respondent with M’s passports should he need them for travel with M or should he require photo identification for M.

Regular Parenting Schedule

d. Commencing September 1, 2024, M shall have her primary residence with the Applicant. She shall reside with the Respondent in accordance with the following regular alternating week schedule:

i. Week One: M shall reside with the Respondent on Wednesday from after school until 8:00 p.m., when the Respondent shall drop M off at the Applicant’s home.

ii. Week Two: M shall reside with the Respondent on Tuesdays after school until Wednesday at 8:00 p.m., when the Respondent shall drop M off at the Applicant’s home. M shall also reside with the Respondent from Friday after school until Sunday at 6:00 p.m. when the Applicant will pick M up from the Respondent’s home.

iii. Week Three: The Week One schedule applies.

iv. Week Four: The Week Two schedule applies, however, rather than the Respondent’s parenting time ending on Sunday at 6:00 p.m., it will continue to Monday morning at school drop-off.

v. If M has a PA day on a Friday immediately prior to the Respondent’s scheduled weekend, he shall pick her up on Friday at 10:00 a.m. from the Applicant’s home. Otherwise, M shall spend the PA days in accordance with the regular schedule.

vi. Such further and additional regular parenting time as requested by M. In the event of a dispute as to whether M has requested additional regular parenting time with the Respondent, the parties shall consult with Dr. Li or such other therapist engaged by the Applicant for M, and the Applicant shall determine such additional parenting time with the Respondent after considering the views of M and of the therapist.

Holiday & Summer Vacation Schedule

e. Commencing September 1, 2024, M shall spend holiday and summer vacation time with the parties as follows. This schedule overrides the regular parenting schedule set out above:

Summer Vacation

i. The summer period is defined as the last day of school and the first day of resumption of the new school year as determined by the Toronto District School Board.

ii. Each party may request up to three consecutive or non-consecutive weeks each summer to vacation with M. A party may use such vacation weeks in the GTA or outside, and M may attend camps during one or more of those vacation weeks, as selected by that party. In odd years, the Applicant shall have first choice of vacation weeks, and she shall choose her weeks by March 1. The Respondent may then choose his vacation weeks by April 1. In even years, the Respondent shall have first choice of vacation weeks, and he shall choose his weeks by March 1. The Applicant shall choose her vacation weeks by April 1.

iii. If a party scheduled to have first choice in a given year does not choose their vacation weeks by March 1, then the other party shall have first choice of weeks and shall select them by April 1. In this case, the party who was originally scheduled to have first choice of weeks may still request vacation weeks (other than those weeks chosen by the second party) and they shall fall within the remaining summer vacation weeks.

iv. In the event of a disagreement with respect to the summer schedule, the Applicant shall make the final decision, and in doing so, she shall consider M’s entitlement to spend up to three vacation weeks with the Respondent each summer and M’s views and preferences in relation to other activities in which M wishes to engage over the summer months.

December Vacation

v. December school break vacation commences from the last day of school in December until the commencement of school in January. M shall reside in alternate years in the care of one party from after school on the day that the Christmas school vacation period begins (normally a Friday) until December 25th at 2:00 p.m.; then with the other party from December 25 at 2:00 p.m. until January 2 at 2:00 p.m; then with the other party until the return of school in January. Then the regular schedule resumes. The Respondent shall have M in even numbered years for the first portion of the holiday and the Applicant shall have M for the first portion in odd numbered years.

vi. With respect to statutory holiday weekends, except as otherwise provided herein, the regular schedule shall apply.

Winter (March Break)

vii. For the Winter School Break (March Break) commencing at the end of school on Friday and returning to the other home the following Saturday evening at 6:00 p.m., M shall reside with the Respondent in even numbered years, and with the Applicant in odd numbered years. This will allow each party to have one week of winter vacation (either between December 25 to January 2, or during March break) to travel with M.

Easter and Greek Orthodox Easter

viii. If Easter falls on the Respondent’s scheduled weekend, the Applicant shall pick up M early from the Respondent’s home on Sunday at 10:00 a.m. and M shall remain with her for the rest of the Easter weekend until return to school on Tuesday morning. If Easter falls on the Applicant’s scheduled weekend, the Respondent shall pick up M early from the Applicant’s home on Sunday at 10:00 a.m. and M shall remain with her for the rest of the Easter weekend until return to school on Tuesday morning.

ix. If Greek Orthodox Easter falls on the Respondent’s scheduled weekend, the Applicant shall pick M up early from the Respondent’s home on Sunday at 10:00 a.m. and M shall remain with her for the rest of the Greek Orthodox weekend.

Father’s Day

x. If Father’s Day falls on the Applicant’s scheduled weekend, the Respondent shall have M on Father’s Day Sunday from 10:00 a.m. until Monday morning drop-off at school, with the Respondent picking up and dropping off M at school.

Mother’s Day

xi. If Mother’s Day falls on the Respondent’s scheduled weekend, the Applicant shall have M on Mother’s Day Sunday from 10:00 a.m., with pick up at the Respondent’s home.

Birthdays

xii. M’s birthday shall be spent in accordance with the regular schedule.

xiii. If M elects to have a birthday party, the Applicant shall arrange/organize M’s birthday party in even numbered years and the Respondent shall arrange/organize M’s birthday party in odd numbered years.

xiv. M shall spend each party’s birthday in accordance with the regular schedule.

Additional Holiday Time

xv. M shall reside for such additional periods of time in the care of each party as the parties may agree from time to time. If either party requests to take M on a holiday of up to one 7-day period in the spring/fall period, that opportunity will not be unreasonably denied. Both parties shall have the same opportunity to holiday with M at least one week per year outside of the regular holiday period, if they so wish.

f. Unless otherwise provided herein, all pick ups and drop offs that occur on days when M has school or is attending camp shall occur at school or camp by the party who has M in her care. If a parenting exchange occurs on a day when M does not have school or daycamp (such as a holiday, PA day, sick day), the party whose time with M is starting will pick her up from the other party’s home. Pick-ups shall occur at the times indicated for transitions, or as otherwise agreed upon by the parties. Parties may, if necessary, arrange for an occasional 3rd party to assist with pick ups and drop offs.

g. By no later than September 1 of each year, the Applicant shall send to the Respondent an annual calendar that identifies the dates/times when M shall be in the Respondent’s care pursuant to the regular schedule and holiday/vacation schedule, to the extent dates are known by September 1.

Travel

h. M may travel outside of Canada to a country that is a signatory to the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction with either party for the purposes of vacation, special occasions and contact with extended family members.

i. M may travel to Bulgaria with the Applicant for three consecutive or non-consecutive weeks each calendar year, during her scheduled vacation and/or holiday weeks, and the Respondent’s consent will not be required, nor will it be necessary for him to provide a notarized travel letter.

j. With respect to countries other than Bulgaria, both parties may travel outside Canada to other locations during their scheduled vacation and/or holiday weeks and other additional holiday time, with the consent of the other party and such consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. In these instances, the other party shall provide a notarized “Travel Letter” authorizing M to travel outside the country with the accompanying parent.

k. Each party shall request the notarized “Travel Letter” with a minimum three weeks’ notice in any instance in which that party wishes to travel with M. The party providing the notarized “Travel Letter” shall provide it a minimum seven days in advance of the scheduled trip.

l. Parties shall strictly comply with the requirement to provide a notarized “Travel Letter” on time. Where a party fails to provide the notarized “Travel Letter” a minimum of seven days in advance of a scheduled trip, the other party may seek, by way of urgent 14B motion, to vary this Order to permit the other party to permanently travel without the consent or a notarized “Travel Letter” of the delinquent party.

[65] I make these parenting orders for the following reasons.

Best Interests of the Child Analysis

[66] The Court shall take into consideration only the best interests of a child when making parenting orders, giving primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being: Divorce Act, ss. 16(1), 16(2).

[67] The child is 10.5 years old. Her views should be afforded some weight. There is evidence, which I found persuasive, including from the child, that the child has not adjusted to the current schedule with her father.

[68] Ms. Cahen gave evidence of what the child had reported to her. The Father objected to this hearsay evidence. While it was hearsay, I admitted it because it was relevant and, in accordance with the principled exception to the hearsay rule of necessity and reliability, it met threshold reliability: R. v. Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787 at para 47; R. v. Bradshaw, 2017 SCC 35, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 865, at para 23.

[69] I was satisfied that it was necessary because (a) there was no Voice of the Child report; (b) there was no updated s. 30 assessment; and (c) there is a reluctance to have children testify in family proceedings. Ms. Cahen’s evidence met threshold reliability because she is a social worker holding a MSW, has experience working with high conflict families, and has worked for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer providing s. 112 assessments and Voice of the Child Reports. While she was not an expert witness in this proceeding, her experience established threshold reliability with respect to her conversations with M, subject to my later determination of ultimate reliability once all the trial evidence could be considered. I later met with the child. Much of what the child said to me was consistent with Ms. Cahen’s hearsay evidence of what the child had reported to her. However, when the child met with me, I did not perceive the child’s views to be as hardened as Ms. Cahen suggested in her evidence.

[70] Even if I were to entirely discount the hearsay evidence of what the child shared with Ms. Cahen, the child reported to me that she is not satisfied with the current schedule. Dr. Li, the child’s therapist who the Father called as his witness, also gave evidence that the child wrote a note stating that she did not want to spend overnights on weekdays with her father.

[71] It would appear, in large part, that the child’s views have to do with the quality of time she spends with her father, the fact that she misses her mother, and that she has not settled in her father’s home. The Father’s work hours require early morning work which impacts the quality of time he spends with her in the morning. Parenting time with him requires commuting between North York and Woodbridge, which is not quality parenting time. The child also does not participate in the same activities with her father as she does with her mother and would rather be engaged in activities while in her father’s care. She reported that she felt like she was “wasting time” with her father, and that the Father’s home is “basic”. While she loves both of her parents and is bonded to both of them, I am persuaded that the child’s current emotional and psychological state would benefit from greater consistency of care that she receives from the Mother.

[72] For these reasons, I have reduced the Father’s weeknight parenting time to only one overnight every two weeks, but have retained dinnertime parenting time on other weeknights. This parenting time can provide opportunities for the parent-child relationship to be maintained and to develop further. I have also increased the Father’s weekend parenting time once a month so that it ends on a Monday morning rather than Sunday evening. This was a parenting schedule to which M expressed she was open. It will ensure the Father has at least one full weekend with M each month ending on Monday at 9:00 a.m., and his other weekend each month will end on Sunday at 6:00 p.m. On the Sunday evenings when M is in his care, it is expected that the Father will participate in homework and other activities with M, which M said she does not regularly do when with her father.

[73] There was evidence from the Father, his other two daughters, and the paternal grandmother about the Father’s parenting time with M. I am persuaded that M does enjoy time with her Father and his extended family, and that they share a special and close bond with M. There were also photos and video evidence of their time together. These relationships should be nourished, and for this reason, the Father will continue to have one overnight on weekdays every two weeks, plus expanded time on weekends once per month, in addition to other holiday and vacation time. The schedule I have ordered is intended to maintain a strong bond between M, her father and extended family members, with the prospect of it expanding further.

[74] I have ordered that the new regular parenting schedule and summer/holiday schedule shall commence on September 1, 2024. I make this Order because it is child-focused to introduce changes to the child’s regular schedule at a juncture when the child is anticipating other changes to her regular schedule (e.g., the start of a new school year). There is approximately one month remaining in the current school year, and while M seeks a change in the schedule, there is no urgency to make this change in her final month of the school year. Furthermore, the parties have already settled their summer 2024 vacation schedule.

[75] I have ordered that the child’s schedule with the Father may change in the future, if M seeks further regular parenting time with the Father. I made this Order because, as I advised the parties, M’s views were not hardened with respect to a parenting schedule. She is only 10.5 years old, and her views of her parenting time with her father may change if some of the things that are lacking were to change.

[76] For example, she expressed that she is not engaged in activities at her father’s home (e.g., practicing her instruments, or learning something), that her father’s home is “basic” with very little in the fridge, she expressed not liking being treated like a baby by her extended family, and she indicated that she did not like the commute from Woodbridge. If some of these variables were to change in the future, I can contemplate M expressing a desire to spend more time with her father, and the parties should seek to accommodate M’s wishes as she grows older.

[77] If M does express a desire for expanded regular parenting time with the Father, I have left it to the Mother to determine what that schedule would be and in doing so, I have imposed a positive obligation on the parties to consider M’s views and the views of M’s therapist. I made this Order for the following reasons:

a. The parties have been in expensive, protracted litigation since 2018. A streamlined process is required, consistent with the primary objective of the Family Law Rules and in the child’s best interests.

b. Circumstances may change such that M wishes to spend more time with the Father. As I reported to the parties, I am not persuaded that M has a hardened view about permanently spending less time with her father.

c. I am persuaded that if the Mother, in the past, lacked capacity to effectively co-parent with the Father, or that her actions were informed by hostilities and anger (e.g., allegedly making a false complaint of assault in the past), she has now changed her approach. She is now child-focused and capable of co-parenting effectively with the child’s best interests in mind. This is evident in all her email communications with the Father adduced into evidence since the Final Order was made. Her communication was consistently polite, timely, respectful and co-operative when dealing with the Father. When necessary, she obtained the advice and opinions of third parties (e.g., Ms. Cahen, the child’s physician or therapist), shared them with the Father, and she proposed child-focused solutions. These are hallmarks of a co-parent seeking to co-parent effectively and in the best interests of a child.

d. My impression of the Mother’s co-parenting capacity was consistent with Mr. Hurwitz’ testimony. He testified that he saw a shift in the Mother between 2019 and 2021. His view was that the Mother had listened and integrated what he had discussed with her, such that she was more flexible, more willing to involve the Father, and less critical of the Father. According to him, she had softened, let go of some of hardened views from 2019. Mr. Hurwitz perceived her position in 2021 as being genuine. I drew a similar impression based on my assessment of her testimony. I found her testimony highly credible.

e. The Mother’s testimony commented on the importance she placed on M’s relationship with her Father, and that she welcomes calls and FaceTime calls between M and the Father at anytime when M is in her care. I am persuaded that if M wishes to spend more time with her Father, the Mother will act reasonably and in a child-focussed manner to make that happen, after consulting with the Father and the child’s therapist.

f. In contrast, some of the Father’s email communication to the Mother was abusive, riddled with blame and accusations and not child-focused. At the start of his own testimony, he ranted about the Mother being “unflexible”, a “complete dictator”, and that the Mother was “trying to take M away from her dad.” While I appreciate the Father’s frustration, his evidence and the documentary evidence adduced at trial strongly suggests that he lacks capacity to co-parent and communicate with the Mother in the child’s best interest.

g. The Father has thwarted the PC process. The Court has concerns the Father will not reasonably participate in a future PC process, if a new PC were ordered. As such, rather than a PC determining a future adjustment to parenting time, I find it is necessary and appropriate for the Mother to decide, after consulting others, whether the Father’s regular parenting schedule should expand in the future and in the child’s best interests.

[78] For these same reasons, I have given the Mother sole decision-making responsibility with respect to M. As already indicated, there is ample evidence of the Father not responding to reasonable requests made by the Mother in a timely manner, and of him not reasonably participating in the PC process. The PC process was intended to overcome disputes in decision-making and given the Father’s reluctance to meaningfully participate in it, it is in the child’s best interests that the Mother exercise sole decision-making. There was no evidence of her making decisions that were not in the child’s best interests.

[79] I do acknowledge the Father’s flexibility in accommodating scheduling changes requested by the Mother. He sought to tender evidence showing the frequency with which he agreed to various scheduling changes sought by the Mother. He is to be commended in this regard for his willingness to cooperate directly with the Mother on certain issues, and for doing that more regularly in recent months (e.g., they were able to settle the summer 2024 vacation schedule). However, the evidence of repeated past challenges outweighs the more recent efforts of the Father to be responsive and cooperative.

Parental Alienation

[80] I have considered whether the child was subjected to parental alienation, but I decline to make such a finding. If I made such a finding, I would not have placed any weight on the child’s views as reported to me or to Ms. Cahen.

[81] The child has not expressed a rejection of her father. On the contrary, she appeared to want to spend time with her father, but external factors unrelated to the Mother informed her view of wanting to spend less time with him - the quality of time spent with him as compared to the Mother, the commute to and from Woodbridge, and the fact that the Father’s home is “basic”. These factors have nothing to do with the Mother.

[82] I am not persuaded that the Mother has taken steps to cause the child to want to spend less time with her father. I accept as truthful the Mother’s testimony that she speaks positively of the Father when M is in her care, and that she would adjust her plans (as did the Father) to accommodate the Father’s plans with M. She testified that it would be very hurtful for M to hear her say bad things about the Father. I also accepted as truthful her testimony that when the child was reluctant to spend time with the Father, the Mother would encourage M to do so. This included times when the child was too tired (e.g., after returning from camp). The documentary evidence of the Mother’s communication with the Father also does not suggest hostility towards him. She remained co-operative and respectful throughout.

[83] Finally, Ms. Cahen, a social worker who has training in parental alienation and who has worked with this family for nearly two years testified that she had not seen any indication of parental alienation.

[84] For these reasons, I am not satisfied that parental alienation is a factor in this case.

Vacation Time

[85] With respect to vacation time, I have granted a slightly different vacation schedule requested by the Applicant around the December holiday break and Winter (March) Break. There was evidence of both parties vacationing with the child and with their extended family. It is important that M be provided with equal opportunities for travel in both of her homes. The schedule I have ordered will ensure that one party will have at least seven full days during the winter months to travel, either from December 25 to January 2, with the other party having March break. Generally, given the TDSB does not have school scheduled for two weeks, it should result in an equal sharing of the TDSB winter break, but with one household having seven consecutive days to travel.

[86] I have granted reciprocal sharing of the Easter weekend, and afforded the Mother extra time for Greek Orthodox Easter to respect her cultural upbringing and so that it may be shared with M.

[87] Because of the repeated delays by the Father in responding to requests for notarized “Travel Letters”, and the Mother’s evidence of how this created anxiety and difficulties in planning travel, I have dispensed with the Father’s requirement to provide consent or a travel letter when the Mother travels to Bulgaria. This appears to be an annual event, and the Mother’s travel planning ought not be arrested by the Father’s unresponsiveness. Bulgaria is a signatory to the Hague Convention on child abductions. For all other travel by either party, a notarized “Travel Letter” will be required. If either party fails to provide one within seven days prior to scheduled travel, the order I made may be varied on a 14B motion to dispense with the non-compliant party’s consent for any travel. Enough is enough.

[88] Finally, the Court hopes that the Father will find ways to incorporate into his parenting the things that M would like changed when she is in his care. While his counsel argued that the Father will do so now that those concerns were raised at the judicial interview, the Court has no explanation why steps were not taken sooner by the Father. It would not be in the child’s best interests nor fair to the child to wait for an uncertain outcome, when the evidence presented at trial suggested a change in parenting is required now.

Issue 3: Is child support payable by the Father as a result of a new parenting schedule, and if so, what is the Father’s income for child support purposes?

[89] As the Father’s previous parenting time was 39.7% of the time, and he now has fewer overnights, his parenting time is less than the 40%. For certainty, I have prepared a Parenting Time Calculator (attached) and have erred on the side of inputting all the time that the Father may have under the new schedule. It results in the Father having 33.3% of M’s time each year. Because the 40% threshold has not been met, s. 9 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175 (“Guidelines”) does not apply. The new regular and holiday schedule shall commence on September 1, 2024, and I find that his child support obligation shall commence as of that date.

Father’s Income

[90] The Father’s Financial Statement, sworn February 1, 2024, shows that he earned an income in 2023 of $97,257.44, which reflects the income the Father receives from his own company, Tron Electrical Automation Inc. It is taxed at source, according to his paystub. The Father testified that his business provides electrical services to residential and commercial clients, and employs seven to eight other employees, based on the volume of business. He testified that there may be some modest retained earnings in the business, but it was not significant to pay him dividend income. It was the Father’s position that if child support is ordered, it should be based on his income of $97,000.

[91] The Father has not disclosed his corporate or personal income tax returns – he has only provided his personal Notice of Assessment. He has produced paystubs. They show that his income taxes are deducted at source.

[92] On cross-examination, the Father acknowledged the following facts:

a. According to his Notices of Assessment for the years 2020, 2021 and 2022, his income was roughly $90,000, $53,000, and $81,000, respectively. This represents a three- year average of roughly $75,000 per year.

b. His annual expenses are about $77,000, and his Financial Statement did not include what he pays in child support for his other two children, which is $1,000 monthly, or a further $12,000 annually. The Father acknowledged this was an error.

c. The Father drives a Mercedes Minivan for personal use. This vehicle is owned by his company, and he does not have a vehicle expense. If he were to lease it for personal use, the cost would be roughly $800/month. The company also pays the car insurance which is roughly $800/year. These personal benefits were not listed in his Financial Statement.

d. The Father’s cell phone is paid for by his business, which is about $50 per month.

e. He was declared bankrupt two years ago, and as such, does not have any debt.

f. After his expenses are paid, he has very little in savings. Some of the spending not reflected on the Financial Statement (e.g. for trips, food) was paid for by others (e.g., his sister, meals prepared by his mother).

g. His Financial Statement did not reflect legal fees he is spending on this case.

[93] The Father has the obligation to prove his income for support purposes. He was required to provide his corporate income tax statements, and he had a legal obligation to do so as a self-employed individual: s. 21(1) (d), Guidelines. In such a circumstance, it is possible to draw a negative inference and impute and income to him: s. 19(1) (f), Guidelines.

[94] However, I found the Father’s testimony with respect to his income and expenses to be truthful. I accept that after his expenses are paid, he has little remaining income for other purposes. His discretionary spending was not exorbitant. He acknowledged that it was an error not to include in his Financial Statement the $12,000 he pays in child support annually for his other children. He also acknowledged that he acquires a personal benefit for certain expenses paid for by his company. He provided reasonable explanations for how certain expenses were paid for by others. His company is also relatively new, and I accept that it is unlikely that there are significant retained earnings. While he gave evidence of his corporate income being roughly $20,000, this is not a significant amount of retained earnings for a new business and it may be legitimately invested in the business for business purposes. As he recently declared bankruptcy, it is unlikely he has a pool of assets that were not disclosed.

[95] I begin with determining his base annual income for support purposes. The Father’s income fluctuates from year to year. This fact was not disputed by the Mother. As such, I have determined that it is fair and reasonable under s. 17(1) of the Guidelines to average his income over the past three years for support purposes. If I consider his income for 2021, 2022, and 2023, it results in an average income of $77,000.

[96] I then consider whether further income should be imputed to him. I find that it is appropriate to impute income under s. 19(1) of the Guidelines based on the expenses paid for by the Father’s business for which he receives a personal benefit. When a spouse personally benefits from expenses paid for through a spouse’s business corporation, it is appropriate to impute these amounts as income and to gross them up: Riel v. Holland, [2003] D.L.R. (4th) 264 at para. 36. There must be an evidentiary basis, however, to impute an income to a support payor.

[97] I find that 33% of the expenses paid for by the Father’s business relating to his car and cell phone should be imputed to him, and grossed up. I come to the 33% figure because this is roughly the amount of parenting time the Father will have with M. The Father’s evidence was that he is typically working, including on weekends, except when M is in his care. Therefore, to apportion 33% of this cost to the Father appears to coincide with his personal time.

[98] I find that the reasonable annual lease and insurance costs of the car is $10,400, and the annual cost of the cell phone is $600, for a total of $11,000. 33% of this cost is $3,630, which amount I impute to the Father as a personal benefit, subject to gross-up.

[99] I do not impute a further $12,000 to reflect possible hidden income to pay for his child support for his other two children. Based on his current annual income of $97,000, it is possible that he is able to pay child support based on his disclosed income and expenses.

[100] I decline to impute income to him to reflect what he would have needed to earn to pay his legal fees. The evidence at trial was not sufficient to allow the Court to determine this cost, and it is possible that others have paid his legal fees. The Father acknowledged that his sister has paid for other things for him (i.e., a trip).

[101] I am also mindful that the Mother earns significantly more than the Father. Her most recent Financial Statement disclosed her last year’s income was $335,220. There is no concern that with the amount of child support I have determined to be owing by the Father that the child’s needs will not be reasonably met.

Child Support Obligation

[102] Attached is a DivorceMate calculation, using the Father’s income of $82,159, which results in a child support obligation for one child of $766 per month, pursuant to the Guidelines. I order that this amount be enforced by the Family Responsibility Office, and a support deduction order shall issue.

S. 7 Expenses – Ongoing & Retroactive

[103] For retroactive expenses, and pursuant to para 29 of the Final Order, the Father had agreed to pay for 27% of M’s special and extraordinary expenses to which the parties have given prior written consent such consent not to be unreasonably withheld, including medical expenses not covered under insurance (including counselling), childcare, extracurricular activities and post-secondary expenses.

[104] Since the Final Order, the Mother testified that she spent $13,803 on special expenses for M, which receipts were marked as an exhibit at trial. They are expenses for orthodontic care, ski lessons at a ski resort, lunch and afterschool programs, summer camps at the ROM, music at the Royal Conservatory of Music, and Spanish classes. The Father gave evidence that he only paid $1,000 a year (or $2,000) in total for these expenses because it was all that he could afford, although 27% of this cost would result in him paying $3,726.

[105] I am not persuaded that the Father, at trial, demonstrated it was beyond his means to pay his full 27% share of these expenses, or that there was another reasonable basis for him not to pay his full share. Accordingly, I order that the Father pay a retroactive amount of s. 7 expenses to the Mother in the amount of $1,726. If there are other s. 7 expenses incurred since trial and through to August 31, 2024, the Father shall continue to pay 27% of those costs and his consent for such expenses shall not be unreasonably withheld.

[106] In terms of prospective s. 7 expenses, I order that commencing September 1, 2024, the Father shall pay 19% of s. 7 expenses and the Mother shall pay 81% of s. 7 expenses. Those expenses shall include any necessary uninsured medical or dental expense (including uninsured costs of counselling/therapy), and reasonable music, educational and camp expenses.

[107] Given the disparity of the parties’ income, I can appreciate that the Father may have difficulty contributing even his proportionate share of expenses and the Mother may have greater means to pay. M is involved in many extra-curricular activities. A review of her s. 7 expenses incurred to date show that they are not at an insignificant cost. I find that it would be beyond the reasonable means of the Father to pay his proportion of s. 7 expenses that exceed $2,000 annually. As such I order that the Father shall not be obligated to contribute more than $2,000 annually towards M’s s. 7 expenses. This amount shall be subject to review annually, and shall increase or decrease in proportion to changes in the Father’s income.

Child Support and s. 7 expense Orders

[108] For the reasons given above, I make the following child support orders:

a. The Father shall pay monthly child support to the Mother, commencing September 1, 2024, in the amount of $766 per month for one child based on the Father’s income of $82,159, pursuant to the Guidelines.

b. Within 30 days, the Father shall pay $1,726 to the Mother representing his contribution towards retroactive s. 7 expenses incurred by the Mother for the period up to trial, and pursuant to the Final Order of Shore J., dated October 29, 2021.

c. Effective September 1, 2024, the Father’s contribution towards s. 7 expenses shall be 19% and the Mother’s shall be 81%. Those expenses shall include any necessary uninsured medical or dental expense (including uninsured costs of counselling/therapy), and reasonable music, educational and camp expenses. However, the Father shall not be obliged to contribute more than $2,000 annually towards s. 7 expenses.

d. On or before June 1 of each year, the parties shall exchange financial disclosure pursuant to the Federal Child Support Guidelines, commencing June 1, 2024. Parties shall recalculate the Father’s new child support obligation, and provided he remains self-employed, his income from the preceding three years shall be averaged for the purposes of determining his income, and 33% of expenses paid for by his business for which he acquires a personal benefit shall be imputed as income to him and grossed-up. The Father’s new child support obligation shall be effective on September 1 of each. The parties’ contribution towards s. 7 expenses will also be determined based on their proportionate income and will be effective as of September 1. The cap of $2,000 for the Father’s s. 7 expense contribution shall increase or decrease in proportion to changes in his income.

e. Unless the support order is withdrawn from the Family Responsibility Office, it shall be enforced by the Director and amounts owing under the order shall be paid by the Directors, who shall pay them to the person to whom they are owed. A Support Deduction Order shall issue.

Other Orders

[109] The Mother sought an Order that paragraphs 2-5, 7, 14-20, 22, 24-25 of Justice Shore’s Final Order of October 29, 2021 shall remain in full force and effect. I have reviewed these Orders and they are common sense orders in a case such as this. The Father did not oppose these remaining in force, since he argued that the Final Order should remain as is. As such, I order that paragraphs 2-5, 7, 14-20, 22, 24-25 of Justice Shore’s Final Order of October 29, 2021 shall remain in full force and effect.

Costs

[110] Parties are strongly urged to settle costs. If there is no settlement, parties shall deliver cost submissions not exceeding 5 pages double-spaced, attaching any Offers to Settle or other documents relevant to costs. The Mother shall deliver written cost submissions within three weeks; the Father shall deliver responding submissions three weeks thereafter, and if necessary, the Mother may deliver 2-page reply submissions two weeks thereafter.

Justice M. Sharma

Attached: Parenting Time Calculations DivorceMate Calculations

Released: May 30, 2024

[1] The Mother explained no child support was payable because the Father had the child close to 40% of the time (i.e. 39.7%). The Final Order notes the Father’s 2020 income was $90,534 and the Mother’s income was $240,260.