COURT FILE NO.: 164/21

DATE: 20230203

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

NATHAN BROWN, JOSE CALLEJAS and KARIN CALLEJAS

H. Palin, for the Crown

C. Conron, for the Defendant, Nathan Brown

No one else appearing

HEARD: January 20, 2023

grace j.

RULING ON s. 11(b) CHARTER APPLICATION

A. Introduction

[1] Allegations of the exploitation of migrant workers underlie the spate of criminal charges pending against Nathan Brown, Jose Callejas and Karin Callejas.

[2] On this application, Mr. Brown seeks an order staying the charges he faces on the ground his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time has been breached.[^1]

B. Background

[3] All of the charges relate to the period from July 1, 2015 through December 18, 2019.

[4] Initially, two Informations were sworn on December 18, 2019. Number 19-12511 contained fourteen charges, named Jose Callejas and Karin Callejas as defendants and followed their arrest on December 18, 2019. Mr. Brown was arrested the following day and was the sole defendant named in a three count Information bearing number 19-12524.

[5] Judicial pre-trials were conducted by Harris-Bentley J. in the Ontario Court of Justice (“OCJ”) on May 6, June 10 and July 14, 2020.

[6] On August 10, 2020, a new Information was filed.[^2] It set forth additional counts and combined the parties named and charges set forth in the Informations that had been sworn previously.

[7] A total of five days was set aside in February and April 2021 for the preliminary hearing.

[8] Thereafter, the presiding judge, McHugh J., timetabled the delivery of written submissions. Oral argument was completed on June 9, 2021. Some of the charges were committed to trial on July 7, 2021.

[9] Attendances in this court commenced on July 13, 2021. A July 23, 2021 judicial pre-trial was scheduled but not held. It was conducted on the rescheduled date of August 30, 2021.

[10] A number of potential trial dates were canvassed during the September 14, 2021 assignment court that followed. Ultimately, a four-week judge and jury trial was scheduled to commence on March 6, 2023.

C. The Parties’ Positions

[11] The applicant says that 1,200 days or 39.5 months will have passed from Mr. Brown’s arrest until the estimated end of his trial on March 31, 2023.

[12] Fifty-nine (59) days of defence delay is conceded. Although disputed, the applicant acknowledges the court may be inclined to attribute to him another 28 days on account of the pre-trial that was not held in this court on the initial date scheduled.

[13] The net delay, the defence argues, is at least 1,113 days or 36.6 months, well above the 30-month presumptive ceiling established by this country’s highest court in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 (“Jordan”).

[14] The applicant submits the Crown cannot meet the onus of rebutting the presumption of unreasonableness because there are no exceptional circumstances. He argues the progress of the matter has been unaffected by COVID-19 or other unanticipated occurrences beyond the Crown’s control.

[15] In fact, Mr. Brown maintains the matter could have moved along more quickly. He advances several reasons. Disclosure by the Crown was delayed. The Crown was not prepared to set a date for the preliminary hearing in a timely fashion. Further, its decision, eight months in, to proceed jointly against Mr. Brown and his co-defendants resulted in a protracted preliminary hearing.

[16] The applicant says this case could have been pursued more expeditiously in this court too. The Crown failed to deliver its pre-trial conference brief within the time required by the Criminal Proceedings Rules.[^3] He submitted that caused his brief to be late.

[17] With respect to the trial date, the applicant was available for the week commencing on April 4, 2022, as offered by the trial coordinator. A four-week trial starting then would have been completed well below the presumptive 30-month ceiling.

[18] While the Crown and the police could have accommodated that date too, counsel for the co-defendants could not. Dates in September, October and November 2022 were also offered but availability varied. The current trial date was the earliest one offered that fit the schedules of all of those involved.

[19] Mr. Brown submits the Crown could have taken steps to deal with the problem. It could have accepted the April 4, 2022 trial date and applied to sever him from the co-accused. After all, he noted, as evidenced by the separate Informations that were sworn in December 2019, that was the Crown’s original intention.

[20] Finally, the applicant argues this matter is not one that involves significantly complex evidence or issues.

[21] The Crown takes the position Mr. Brown’s s. 11(b) Charter right has been fully respected.

[22] As a starting point, the Crown calculates the total time from the commencement of this case until its end at 1,198 days or 39.39 months.

[23] From that, the Crown maintains 468 days should be deducted on account of defence delay: 161 in the OCJ and 307 days in this court. If that deduction is made, the net delay is 730 days or 24 months.

[24] Another 169 days are said to be attributable to exceptional circumstances consisting of (i) 45 days in relation to what the Crown describes as the “preliminary hearing overrun”; (ii) the 34 day period that elapsed from the third judicial pre-trial in the OCJ until that court once again began setting dates for out of custody matters; and (iii) an additional 90 day period on account of backlog delays attributable to the impact of COVID-19 on the caseload in both this court and the OCJ. If applied, the number falls to 561 days or 18.44 months.

[25] If unpersuaded by any of those submissions, the Crown also asks the court to recognize it was appropriate to include in one prosecution all of those alleged to have been engaged in a joint enterprise that exploited labourers. Such a case adds legal and procedural complexity. A severance application would not have been appropriate, whether initiated by the Crown or the defence.

[26] The Crown also raised the timing of this application. The possibility of a severance application or one alleging a breach of s. 11(b) of the Charter was not mentioned when the trial date was set on September 14, 2021.

[27] The lawyer for Jose Callejas was in court on January 11, 2022 to provide an update on the status of his retainer for trial. Mr. Brown’s counsel was present too. The issue of delay was not mentioned.

[28] In fact, the s. 11(b) judicial pre-trial required by this court’s Provincial Practice Direction was not requested until the October 4, 2022 assignment court; more than a year after the scheduling of the trial date. By then, the presumptive ceiling had already been exceeded by several months.

[29] In the circumstances, the Crown argues that this application should be dismissed on the basis the applicant failed to act diligently and did not provide a reasonable explanation for his failure to do so.

D. Analysis and Decision

[30] The presumptive ceiling covers the period from the date of the charges until the parties’ involvement in the merits of the trial is complete and the case is turned over to the trier of fact.[^4] While the calculations of the parties are close, they are not exact. The charges were laid on December 18, 2019. This case is scheduled to end on March 31, 2023. I believe the Crown’s number of 1,198 days or 39.39 months is correct. I start there.

[31] All participants in the criminal justice system, including the defence, must take a proactive approach in order to prevent unnecessary delay by targeting its root causes.[^5] Defence counsel are now expected “to actively advance their clients’ right to a trial within a reasonable time, collaborate with Crown counsel when appropriate and use court time efficiently.[^6]

[32] Consequently, any period of defence delay must be deducted.

[33] That classification has two components. The first is delay that is waived by the defence. There is no suggestion of an express waiver in this case. The second is delay caused solely by the conduct of the defendant.[^7] Examples include deliberate and calculated defence tactics employed to delay the trial. Such conduct is not alleged. However, that is not all. As the majority in Jordan explained at paras. 64 – 65:

… the defence will have directly caused the delay if the court and the Crown are ready to proceed, but the defence is not. The period of delay resulting from that unavailability will be attributed to the defence. However, periods of time during which the court and the Crown are unavailable will not constitute defence delay, even if defence counsel is also unavailable … Beyond defence unavailability, it will of course be open to trial judges to find that other defence actions or conduct have caused delay…

To be clear, defence actions legitimately taken to respond to the charges fall outside the ambit of defence delay. For example, the defence must be allowed preparation time, even where the court and the Crown are ready to proceed. In addition, defence applications and requests that are not frivolous will also generally not count against the defence…

[34] Tactics aimed at causing delay and the passage of time solely attributable to the unavailability of an accused’s counsel, are not the only examples of defence delay. As explained in R. v. Cody, 2017 SCC 31, at paras. 31 – 33:

… While trial judges should take care to not second-guess steps taken by defence for the purposes of responding to the charges, they must not be reticent about finding defence action to be illegitimate where it is appropriate to do so.

Defence conduct encompasses both substance and procedure – the decision to take a step, as well as the manner in which it is conducted, may attract scrutiny. To determine whether defence action is legitimately taken to respond to the charges, the circumstances surrounding the action or conduct may therefore be considered. The overall number, strength, importance, proximity to the Jordan ceilings, compliance with any notice or filing requirements and timeliness of defence applications may be relevant considerations. Irrespective of its merit, a defence action may be deemed not legitimate in the context of a s. 11(b) application if it is designed to delay or if it exhibits marked inefficiency or marked indifference toward delay.

As well, inaction may amount to defence conduct that is not legitimate... Illegitimacy may extend to omissions as well as acts… Accused persons must bear in mind that a corollary of the s. 11(b) right “to be tried within a reasonable time” is the responsibility to avoid causing unreasonable delay… [Emphasis in original]

[35] The applicant concedes 59 but recognized the court might allocate a further 28 days on account of defence delay. The latter portion relates to the fact the judicial pre-trial that was to have been held on July 23, 2021 in the Superior Court of Justice did not proceed because Mr. Brown’s Form 17 was filed late.

[36] The applicant’s argument on the point rests on the time requirements set forth in rules 28.04(7) and (8) of the Criminal Proceedings Rules. In my view, that reliance is misplaced. Mr. Brown’s lawyer is a local practitioner. She is well aware of the prevailing practice in London, Ontario. It has been in existence for many years. All Form 17’s must be filed by no later than noon, two business days before the scheduled pre-trial. It is the responsibility of every party to file their Form 17 by the deadline. While it is always helpful for the Crown to serve its Form 17 in sufficient time for the defence to outline their position on that same document, that is not always possible.

[37] The Crown’s Form 17 was filed in a timely fashion. The applicant complains he did not receive it early enough to make notations on it. That is not an excuse. In the circumstances, a separate Form 17 should have been completed and filed in accordance with the local requirements. It should be noted that the Form 17 of co-accused Jose Callejas was filed on time.

[38] So far, there is 87 days of defence delay. The Crown advocates a multiple – 468 days: 161 in the OCJ and the balance in this court.

[39] The Crown asks that 10 days of the period from October 13 to November 3, 2020 be allocated to the applicant. Two days from that timeframe are included in the applicant’s calculation of defence delay. The rest is disputed. After reviewing the transcript of the October 13, 2020 attendance, I agree with the applicant’s allocation. The balance of the period is part of the 30-month period stipulated in Jordan. All else aside, a preliminary hearing could not have been scheduled that day as counsel for the two co-accused were not in attendance.

[40] Further, the November 3, 2020, attendance scheduled then was essentially pre-empted by one on October 23, 2020. At that time, five days were set aside for the preliminary hearing: four days in February and one day in April 2021.[^8] The Crown says 66 days of the period from February 9 until April 23, 2021 constitutes defence delay because the court and prosecution were available to proceed but the defendants, collectively, were not.

[41] Mr. Brown’s counsel was available for some of the earlier dates that were offered. The applicant submits it is therefore inappropriate to allocate any portion of the delay to him. The applicant relies on R. v. Gopie, 2017 ONCA 728, at para. 128. In that case, the Court of Appeal instructed that “an individualized approach must be taken to the attribution of defence caused delay in cases of jointly charged accused”.

[42] That is, of course, an important principle. However, the sentence the applicant has extracted from Gopie cannot be read in isolation. As Roberts J.A. explained in R. v. Albinowski, 2018 ONCA 1084, at paras. 36 – 37:

… This approach avoids “attributing to an accused the delay occasioned by the actions or inactions of a co-accused [which] is inconsistent with the approach and language of Jordan”: Gopie, at para. 136.

In my view, however, the individualized approach in Gopie does not apply in this case because the delay was common to all respondents who proceeded as a collective in this joint trial. Here, the actions or inactions of a co-accused did not cause the delay. Rather, the delay at issue was entirely due to scheduling challenges, which arose directly and inevitably from the respondents’ joint situation.

[43] In Albinowski, it was “common ground that joint proceedings were justified… (especially in light of the coordinated nature of the allegations)” and the parties acknowledged severance “was never an option.”[^9]

[44] That is not conceded by the applicant in this case. In December 2019, the Crown prosecuted Mr. Brown separately from his co-accused. They were not joined together until August 2020.

[45] With respect to cases involving multiple charges or multiple accused, the Supreme Court of Canada in Jordan suggested the Crown may wish to consider whether proceeding in that fashion “will unduly complicate the proceeding” and added:

While the court plays no supervisory role for such decisions, Crown counsel must be alive to the fact that any delay resulting from their prosecutorial discretion must conform to the accused’s s. 11(b) right…[^10]

[46] However, the court must exercise caution. As Watt J.A. noted in R. v. Nguyen, 2013 ONCA 169, at para. 61:

… decisions about how to proceed, against whom, upon what charges, and on what evidence … are contingent upon interdependent circumstances and factors, far removed from the knowledge of presiding judges. Courts should be hesitant to scrutinize the Crown’s decisions absent clear reason to do so…

[47] The applicant appears to be critical of the Crown’s decision to join Mr. Brown with Josee and Karin Callejas in August 2020. Yet, all of the defendants’ counsel participated in the pre-trials that were held in May, June and July 2020 in the OCJ. The joinder of the three individuals involved in this proceeding was not identified as an issue when dates for the preliminary hearing were set in the October 23, 2020 scheduling court.

[48] On several occasions dates were offered that were available for the Crown, the police and counsel for Mr. Brown. Twice the lawyer appearing as agent for Mr. Brown’s counsel confirmed Ms. Conron’s availability but acknowledged other dates had to be canvassed because the lawyers for the co-accused had prior, conflicting commitments.[^11]

[49] As in Albinowski, “the actions or inactions of a co-accused did not cause the delay. Rather, the delay at issue was entirely due to scheduling challenges, which arose directly and inevitably from the [defendants’] joint situation”: at para. 37. Where the defence proceeds through the system as a collective, “the delay caused by scheduling challenges must be analyzed in the same manner – that is, communally”: Albinowski, at para. 38. That language applies to what occurred in the OCJ.

[50] The dates selected for the preliminary hearing were the first ones offered by the court that were convenient to all of the defendants, despite earlier availability of the Crown and police. I accept the respondent’s position that the period of 66 days should be characterized as defence delay. To this point, the total is 153 days.

[51] The Crown also asks that the court characterize the period from May 10 to June 9, 2021, as defence delay. It appears the preliminary hearing did not go according to plan. Five days was insufficient.

[52] On April 20, 2021, it was agreed that oral argument would follow the filing of written submissions. May 10 and 11, 2021 were proposed. The Crown was available on both dates. Counsel for Mr. Brown was the only one who expressed certainty that they could not accommodate either one.[^12] The first date that was open to all of the defendants was June 9, 2021. For the reasons already given, I am of the view that this 30-day period does, indeed, constitute defence delay. The running total is now 183 days.

[53] The balance of the time in issue is 307 days. It is drawn from a total period commencing April 4, 2022 and ending March 6, 2023.

[54] As mentioned previously, this matter was the subject of a judicial pre-trial in the Superior Court of Justice on August 30, 2021. The June 18, 2022 presumptive Jordan date was the one all of the participants had in mind.

[55] The matter was then addressed in the September 14, 2021 assignment court. Counsel for Jose Callejas asked that the matter be adjourned to the October scheduling court so that his retainer could be confirmed. Exchanges with other counsel followed. The applicant’s lawyer informed the court that: (i) she was ready to set a trial date; and (ii) there had been no “extensions to the Jordan date”. The assignment court judge decided the matter would be scheduled for trial.

[56] The first date offered for its commencement was April 4, 2022. The Crown, police and counsel for the applicant were available. Counsel for the co-accused were not. The next date offered was September 12, 2022; 161 days later. The Crown maintains that period constitutes defence delay.

[57] That position is problematic. The police and counsel for Mr. Brown confirmed their availability. However, the discussion concerning a September 12, 2022 commencement date ended when the trial coordinator learned the assigned Crown was not available for four weeks. While the Crown offered “to see if there’s a potential for … reassigning” and asked for a “quick moment”, the September date was quickly forgotten when October 11, 2022 was proposed. Although it does not appear likely that all counsel for the accused would have been available for trial starting September 12, 2022, their position was not put on the record. Nor did the court learn whether the matter could have been reassigned to a different prosecutor.

[58] In those circumstances, the period between April 4 and October 11, 2022 cannot be characterized as defence delay. However, I will return to this period when discussing exceptional circumstances later in these reasons.

[59] The Crown and police were available to start the trial on October 11, 2022. Counsel for Mr. Brown and for Jose Callejas were not available throughout the four-week period. Given the applicant’s unavailability, the 41-day period from that date until the next one offered (November 21, 2022) constitutes defence delay, even if I accepted the argument that an individualized analysis is appropriate. Thus far, a total of 224 days belongs in this category.

[60] All but counsel for Karin Callejas were available for trial commencing November 12, 2022.

[61] Thereafter, the court’s focus turned to scheduling three days of pre-trial applications that did not involve Mr. Brown. The dates of December 12 through 14, 2022 were set aside for them.

[62] Thereafter, March 6, 2023 was offered for trial and accepted by all. The Crown asks that the 105-day period from November 21, 2022 to March 6, 2023 be attributed to the defence.

[63] Is such an allocation appropriate? In order to answer that question, I return to the applicant’s position that this analysis should be individualized. Since Mr. Brown was available for trial commencing April 4, 2022 and told the scheduling justice that there had been no “extensions” of the Jordan date, he argues that none of the time that followed belongs in the category of defence delay.

[64] Unquestionably, the presumptive Jordan date was not waived in this case. However, the analysis does not end there.

[65] Form 17’s contain a series of questions. Some are to be answered by the Crown, others by the defence. Paragraph 6(e) posed this question: Does the Defence intend to bring a stay application for a s. 11(b) Charter breach? The applicant marked the “No” box. Both co-accused had answered “Yes”.

[66] A series of questions are to be answered by the pre-trial judge when completing the Report to Trial Judge too. The same question was posed there. Following the August 30, 2021 pre-trial, the presiding judge marked “No” and added “depends on trial date”.

[67] The trial scheduling attendance occurred two weeks later. Four post June 18, 2022 trial dates were proposed. Beyond a comment made during the initial stages of the hearing that there had been no extension of the Jordan date, nothing was said by anyone about a s. 11(b) Charter application. No one even expressed a single word of dissatisfaction or concern relating to the dates proposed in September, October and November 2022 or even March 2023.

[68] From my reading of the transcript, all of the participants were doing their very best to schedule the trial as expeditiously as possible. However, they recognized just how challenging that was given the fact that multiple schedules had to be reviewed and synchronized.

[69] That explains why the prosecutor did not finish the task of determining whether the case could be reassigned so that the Crown could make a September 12, 2022 trial date work.

[70] On this record, I am of the view the defence proceeded collectively through the system, at least from a scheduling perspective. Consequently, it is appropriate to analyze the scheduling process and the difficulties encountered communally.[^13] Had I concluded otherwise, I would have considered whether the delays in this joint prosecution gave “rise to exceptional circumstances under the Jordan framework” as contemplated by the Court of Appeal in Gopie, supra, at paras. 136 and 142.

[71] I have not forgotten that the applicant maintains the Crown could and should have sought to sever his case from that of the co-accused in order to ensure his trial was completed within the presumptive ceiling. I disagree.

[72] Those completing Form 17’s are supposed to answer whether there will be any pre-trial motions on the indictment, including a motion to sever a defendant. Inappropriately, the applicant left that portion of the form blank. However, the pre-trial judge clearly canvassed the topic. The Report to Trial Judge contains the notation “N/A” or not applicable.

[73] Mr. Brown is named in thirteen of the seventeen counts set forth in the indictment that is currently before this court. In all but one, he is charged jointly with Jose Callejas and Karin Callejas.[^14] All of the alleged offences arise from what is said to be a joint business enterprise that exploited migrant workers. To be clear, the core allegations involve the defendants working together and their treatment of the individuals named in the indictment.

[74] As the Court of Appeal has cautioned in Albinowski, supra, at para. 39, there may be a time when a joint prosecution is no longer in the public interest. An impending breach of a s. 11(b) Charter breach may be the trigger, particularly where the applicant has been held “hostage” by the limited availability of counsel for the co-accused.

[75] That is not the case here. At a minimum, the applicant has acquiesced to the scheduling of his trial in a manner that accommodates the schedules of counsel for the co-defendants.[^15]

[76] Tellingly, no severance application was ever brought or, seemingly, contemplated by Mr. Brown.[^16] The reason is not a mystery. On this record, a joint proceeding continues to appear to be in the interests of justice.[^17]

[77] When the applicant finally expressed an intention to bring a s. 11(b) Charter application, the dye was cast. More than a year had passed. The Crown’s offer to see if the file could be reassigned to another prosecutor so that the trial could be scheduled in September 2022 had been allowed to pass like a whisper in the wind. The presumptive ceiling had already been exceeded. It was far too late for anyone to contemplate adjusting course.

[78] Nonetheless, I do not agree that the entire period of 105-days from November 21, 2022 to March 6, 2023 should be characterized as defence delay. Sometimes the situation justifies apportioning responsibility for delay among the participants rather than attributing all of it to the defence: R. v. Boulanger, 2022 SCC 2 at para. 8.

[79] As mentioned earlier, once it was determined that the trial could not be scheduled to commence on November 21, 2022, the court’s focus turned to the days needed for pre-trial applications.

[80] Dates in January and February 2023 were not canvassed, although some would have been available based on the comments made on behalf of the court during the scheduling attendance. In the circumstances, I would characterize 52 of the 105 days that are in issue during the period from November 21, 2022 to March 6, 2023 as defence delay. The final total of days in this category is 276, resulting in a net delay of 922 days or 30.31 months.

[81] Since the remaining period exceeds the 30-month ceiling, it is presumptively unreasonable. The presence of exceptional circumstances may be used by the Crown to rebut that presumption.[^18]

[82] Exceptional circumstances are ones that lie outside the control of the Crown because they are reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable and the Crown and/or the justice system is unable to reasonably remedy the delay that is occasioned: Jordan, supra, at paras. 69, 70 and 75.

[83] In general, such situations fall into one of two subcategories: discrete events or “particularly complex” matters: Jordan, supra, at para. 71. Medical or family emergencies affecting a necessary participant were mentioned in Jordan as examples of discrete events.

[84] The COVID-19 pandemic fits within that category too.[^19]

[85] I dealt with the local situation at some length in R. v. Nawabi, 2022 ONSC 7258. In that decision I explained why I was of the view the entire period then in issue from June 2, 2020 until September 30, 2021 were captured by the phrase “exceptional circumstances”.[^20]

[86] Not surprisingly, cases accumulated during the pandemic. The backlog was a significant and unavoidable problem when this matter was scheduled for trial on September 14, 2021. Although the court was able to offer an April 4, 2022 commencement date, finding other available dates was challenging. That is why the trial coordinator said:

Your Honour, sorry. Just a moment. It’s a little bit tricky fitting in this.

[87] The next date offered (September 12, 2022) was five months down the road. In fairness, even before COVID this case would not likely have been tried in July or August. However, prior to the pandemic other dates in the spring would have been available. Attributing 60 days of the period from April 4 to September 12, 2022 to the backlog is, in my view, fair and reasonable.[^21] That period fits within the category of exceptional circumstances and should be deducted at this stage since I rejected the Crown’s submission that it be treated as defence delay.

[88] With that deduction, the tally stands at 862 days or 28.33 months. That is below the presumptive ceiling for cases in this court.

[89] I should mention in passing the Crown’s argument concerning complexity. The possibility a proceeding could reasonably take longer than 30 months if particularly complex was contemplated in Jordan.[^22]

[90] However, in this case that is, with respect, an unnecessary detour. As the record demonstrates, the Crown was ready and willing to schedule the trial of this matter on a date that would have resulted in its completion weeks before the June 18, 2022 Jordan date. It was the schedules of other participants that prevented that from occurring, not the nature of the evidence or issues. An adjustment on account of complexity would not have been appropriate.

[91] Nonetheless, the resulting delay of 862 days or 28.33 months is below the presumptive ceiling. The applicant’s material did not contemplate that scenario and therefore, did not attempt to show that delay below 30-months is unreasonable.

E. Conclusion

[92] For the reasons given, the applicant’s s. 11(b) Charter right was not breached. The application for a stay is dismissed.

”Justice A.D. Grace”

Grace J.

Released: February 3, 2023

COURT FILE NO: CR21-164

DATE: 20230203

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

NATHAN BROWN, JOSE CALLEJAS and KARIN CALLEJAS

RULING ON s. 11(b) CHARTER APPLICATION

Justice A.D. Grace

Released: February 3, 2023

[^1]: He also relies on s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“Charter”). [^2]: Number 20-8891 [^3]: See rule 28.04(7) and (8). [^4]: R. v. K.G.K., 2020 SCC 7, at para. 31. See, too, R. v. Zahor, 2022 ONCA 449, at para. 91, where Coroza J.A. emphasized that the time for calculating delay for the purposes of a s. 11(b) analysis commences on the day charges are laid, not the day the defendant was arrested. [^5]: R. v. Cody, 2017 SCC 31, at para. 36; R. v. Boulanger, 2022 SCC 2, at para. 8. [^6]: R. v. Mallozzi, 2017 ONCA 633, at para. 31, citing, among others, R. v. Cody, supra, at para. 33. [^7]: R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, at para. 63. [^8]: The dates set were February 23 through 26 and April 23, 2021. [^9]: At para. 37. [^10]: At para. 79. [^11]: See Caselines, pp. C-1-82 and C-1-85. [^12]: Counsel for Karin Callejas advised the court that his availability on May 11 was subject to a caveat because he had already proposed that date in relation to another matter but did not yet know if it had been accepted. [^13]: R. v. Albinowski, supra, at para. 39. [^14]: The only exception is count 17: a common assault charge under s. 266 of the Criminal Code. [^15]: R. v. Brissett, 2019 ONCA 11, at para. 15; R. v. Ste-Marie, 2022 SCC 3, at para. 10. [^16]: That last comment is based on the contents of the Report to Trial Judge prepared by the justice who conducted the judicial pre-trial in this court on August 30, 2021 and the various endorsements contained in the indictment. [^17]: R. v. Gopie, 2017 ONCA 728. [^18]: Jordan, supra, at para. 68. [^19]: See, for example, R. v. Simmons, 2020 ONSC 7209 (S.C.J.), at para. 63; R. v. Khattra, 2020 ONSC 7894 (S.C.J.), at paras. 61 and 62 and R. v. Buabeng, [2022] O.J. No. 1732 (S.C.J.). [^20]: That conclusion appears at para. 64. [^21]: See, too, R. v. Hyacinthe, [2022] O.J. No. 1327 (S.C.J.), at para. 17. [^22]: See, for example, para. 77.