Court File No. CV-21-00087946-0000
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
FRANCIS JOSEPH SCHILLER
Plaintiff
- and -
GREGORY A. STE. MARIE and MANN LAWYERS
Defendants
R E A S O N S F O R J U D G M E N T
REMOTELY BEFORE THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE P. ROGER,
on NOVEMBER 23, 2023, for an Ottawa, Ontario proceeding
APPEARANCES:
Francis Joseph Schiller In-person
S. McLean Counsel for Gregory A. Ste. Marie and Mann Lawyers
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 2023
R E A S O N S F O R J U D G M E N T
ROGER, J. (Orally):
Mr. Schiller brings a motion opposing the confirmation of the certificate of assessment delivered by the assessment officer in this matter.
Mr. Schiller argues that the assessment officer made unreasonable errors in principle in the determination of a fair and reasonable fee for him to pay to the lawyer, in as much as she:
- erroneously found that Mr. Schiller had terminated the lawyer/client relationship when he argues that it was the lawyer who did
- not clarifying the lawyer's hourly rates
- under weighing the factors applicable including the lawyer's skills and competence in handling this matter
- and using discriminatory and stigmatizing language, vis a vis, the client.
Mr. Schiller also alleges that the assessment officers afforded the lawyer some courtesies that she did not afford him and that she was unfair in that regard.
Mr. Schiller seeks that the assessment be set aside, that a reduced amount be ordered, and that the lawyer be referred to the Law Society.
Assessment officers are owed deference because they are one who hear and consider all the evidence presented to them during an assessment. In this case, the assessment occurred over three days and substantial documentation was presented to the assessor. It is apparent from her reasons that there was significant questioning, significant arguments, and that points were argued, raised, and addressed.
The law provides that the decision of an assessment officer should not be reviewed unless it is clear that the officer applied the wrong principle or came to a wrong conclusion. The standard of review is well established by the cases, and absent an error of law, a misapprehension of the evidence, a palpable and overriding error on a factual matter, or an assessment that is unreasonable, their assessments are entitled to deference.
The materials presented by Mr. Schiller and his arguments before me do not establish a legal error, a misapprehension of the evidence, a palpable factual error, or an unreasonable assessment.
It is apparent from her reasons that the officer knew what the applicable law was, that she knew what the factors to be applied were, and that she applied the law to the evidence in order to arrive at what she considered to be a fair and just result in this matter.
Assessment officers have a lot of discretion in that regard, and my job is not to decide whether I or another judge would have arrived at the same or a different result, but whether the assessment officer made an error as described above. Here, she did not.
We see from the reasons of the assessment officer, particularly at pages 5 and 7, that she was well aware of the facts relating to the termination of the retainer, and that she found, based on those facts, that the client had caused the breakdown in the lawyer/client relationship. That finding was therefore hers to make from the evidence and is not unreasonable.
Describing Mr. Schiller as a determined individual that is involved in his legal matters, and otherwise, as she did, is not discriminating against him, and is not using discriminatory or inappropriate language. I found no evidence of that. The assessment officer was well aware of the hourly rates applicable. She considered all of the applicable factors, made reference to some of them, and her assessment of the factors, based on the evidence, is not unreasonable. As well, there is no evidence that she did not treat the parties fairly, that she preferred one over the other, or that she preferred the lawyer. In fact, her assessment of the credibility of the parties indicates otherwise.
Considering the argument raised by Mr. Schiller, there is no evidence that would warrant in any way a report by this Court to the Law Society.
Consequently, the motion opposing confirmation of the assessment report is dismissed.