COURT FILE NO.: FS-22-0095-00 DATE: 2023 10 17 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Z.A – and – M.A.
Self-Represented Self-Represented M. Leonard, Counsel for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer
HEARD: October 6, 10, 11 and 12, 2023
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT Conlan J.
I. The Parties, the Undisputed Background Facts, and the Trial
[1] The Applicant mother, Z.A. (“mother”), and the Respondent father, M.A. (“father”), are the parents of a young girl who is eleven years old (“child”).
[2] Both the mother and the father are now in new relationships, though they are not married to their current partners. The parties were not married either, and they separated in March 2015.
[3] Since the date of separation, the child has lived primarily with and spent the majority of her time in the care of the mother.
[4] There has never been a final order made with regarding to parenting issues. The mother’s application began in the Fall of 2022, when she took the position that the father had failed to return the child to her care as agreed to between the parties. On September 19, 2022, Justice Chozik made a temporary, without prejudice order, which order remains in effect today, that, among other things, stipulates that the child shall reside primarily with the mother, and the father shall have parenting time every other weekend. No order was made with regard to decision-making responsibility for the child.
[5] Over four days in October 2023, a trial was held to determine, primarily, whether the mother and the child could relocate from Ontario to Portugal. Each party was self-represented. Ms. Leonard was counsel for the child.
[6] The mother called three witnesses at trial – herself, her current partner, H.A., and her friend, B.S. The father also called three witnesses at trial – himself, his current partner, D.K., and his sister, M.R. Ms. Leonard called one witness at trial, Jacqueline Iafrate (“Iafrate”), Ms. Leonard’s clinical assist in this case. Much of Iafrate’s evidence-in-chief was tendered by way of her affidavit dated October 2, 2023.
II. Should the Mother and the Child be Permitted to Relocate to Portugal?
[7] In this Court’s opinion, it is not in the best interests of the child to permit the proposed relocation of the mother and the child to Portugal. What follows are the reasons for that conclusion.
The Law
[8] Subsections 39.3(1) through (3) and 39.4(3) through (8) of the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12, as amended (“CLRA”), provide as follows:
39.3 (1) A person who has decision-making responsibility or parenting time with respect to a child and who intends a relocation shall, at least 60 days before the expected date of the proposed relocation, notify any other person who has decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact under a contact order with respect to the child of the intention. 2020, c. 25 , Sched. 1, s. 15.
Notice requirements
(2) The notice shall be in the form prescribed by the regulations or, if no form is prescribed, shall be in writing and shall set out,
(a) the expected date of the proposed relocation;
(b) the address of the new residence and contact information of the person or child, as the case may be;
(c) a proposal as to how decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact, as the case may be, could be exercised; and
(d) any other information that may be prescribed by the regulations. 2020, c. 25 , Sched. 1, s. 15.
Exception
(3) On application, the court may in any circumstance provide that subsections (1) and (2) or anything prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of subsection (2) do not apply, or apply with any changes the court specifies, if the court is of the opinion that it is appropriate to do so, including if there is a risk of family violence. 2020, c. 25 , Sched. 1, s. 15.
Best interests of the child
(3) In determining whether to authorize the relocation of a child, the court shall take into account the best interests of the child in accordance with section 24, as well as,
(a) the reasons for the relocation;
(b) the impact of the relocation on the child;
(c) the amount of time spent with the child by each person who has parenting time or is an applicant for a parenting order with respect to the child, and the level of involvement in the child’s life of each of those persons;
(d) whether the person who intends to relocate the child has complied with any applicable notice requirement under section 39.3 and any applicable Act, regulation, order, family arbitration award and agreement;
(e) the existence of an order, family arbitration award or agreement that specifies the geographic area in which the child is to reside;
(f) the reasonableness of the proposal of the person who intends to relocate the child to vary the exercise of decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact, taking into consideration, among other things, the location of the new residence and the travel expenses; and
(g) whether each person who has decision-making responsibility or parenting time or is an applicant for a parenting order with respect to the child has complied with their obligations under any applicable Act, regulation, order, family arbitration award or agreement, and the likelihood of future compliance. 2020, c. 25 , Sched. 1, s. 15.
Factor not to be considered
(4) In determining whether to authorize a relocation of the child, the court shall not consider whether, if the child’s relocation were to be prohibited, the person who intends to relocate the child would relocate without the child or not relocate. 2020, c. 25 , Sched. 1, s. 15.
Burden of proof
(5) If the parties to the proceeding substantially comply with an order, family arbitration award or agreement that provides that a child spend substantially equal time in the care of each party, the party who intends to relocate the child has the burden of proving that the relocation would be in the best interests of the child. 2020, c. 25 , Sched. 1, s. 15.
Same
(6) If the parties to the proceeding substantially comply with an order, family arbitration award or agreement that provides that a child spend the vast majority of time in the care of the party who intends to relocate the child, the party opposing the relocation has the burden of proving that the relocation would not be in the best interests of the child. 2020, c. 25 , Sched. 1, s. 15.
Same
(7) In any other case, the parties to the proceeding have the burden of proving whether the relocation is in the best interests of the child. 2020, c. 25 , Sched. 1, s. 15.
Burden of proof, exception
(8) If an order referred to in subsection (5) or (6) is an interim order, the court may determine that the subsection does not apply. 2020, c. 25 , Sched. 1, s. 15.
[9] In determining whether a proposed relocation is in the best interests of the child, a court may consider (i) how well-defined the plan is for the future and (ii) whether there is a meaningful proposal on the table to ensure that the child has appropriate parenting time with the parent that is left behind in Canada. Al Kowatli v. Berrwin, 2021 ONSC 4999, at paragraph 5.
[10] Neither consideration has been satisfied here, in my opinion.
The Law as Applied in our Case
[11] In terms of subsection 39.3 of the CLRA, it should be noted that there is no evidence that was tendered at trial that the mother has provided to the father any written notice of the proposed relocation [39.3(2)], never mind the address of the new residence in Portugal, which is unknown [39.3(2)(b)], and a parenting time proposal [39.3(2)(c)].
[12] Further, there is no evidence that was tendered at trial, whether from the mother herself or otherwise, that would enable this Court to conclude, pursuant to subsection 39.3(3), that subsections 39.3(1) and (2) ought not to apply in this case because of a risk of family violence. Although the mother testified about having been sexually assaulted by, assaulted by, and harassed by the father in the past, she did not rely upon any or all of those allegations to argue that a current risk of family violence meant that compliance with the said subsections should be dispensed with. To the contrary, she testified that she would happily invite the father to visit the new residence in Portugal.
[13] The wholesale failure of the mother to comply with the notice provisions of the legislation is one reason for not permitting the proposed relocation to occur.
[14] More important, this Court finds that the parties do not substantially comply with an order, family arbitration agreement (not applicable in our case), or agreement that provides that the child spend the vast majority of time in the care of the mother, and thus, the father does not have the burden of proving that the proposed relocation to Portugal would not be in the best interests of the child, within the meaning of subsection 39.4(6) of the CLRA.
[15] In fact, that has been proven on a balance of probabilities, but getting the burden of proof correct is still important.
[16] There is no evidence that was tendered at trial about any “agreement” between the parties, written or not, pre-September 19, 2022 (the date of Justice Chozik’s Order), in terms of parenting time.
[17] The Order of Justice Chozik does provide that the child spend the vast majority of time in the care of the mother, but that was clearly an interim, without prejudice order, and thus, in accordance with subsection 39.4(8), I have determined that subsection 39.4(6) ought not to apply.
[18] Rather, subsection 39.4(7) applies to our fact situation – “the parties to the proceeding have the burden of proving whether the relocation is in the best interests of the child”.
[19] I have concluded that (i) the mother has not established that the proposed relocation to Portugal is in the best interests of the child, while (ii) the father has proven that the said proposed relocation is not in the child’s best interests.
[20] Looking at the factors relevant to the best interests of the child, in accordance with section 24 of the CLRA, and more specifically those factors outlined in subsection 39.4(3) of that legislation, the following is important to note.
[21] There is no bona fide reason for the proposed relocation. Not family. Not friends. Not employment. Not medical care. Nothing, except for the bald statement that the child will get a better education in Portugal than in Ontario. There is no independent evidence adduced at trial to substantiate that assertion. In fact, I know very little about the school that the mother has in mind for the child. No curriculum was filed. No information of any kind about or from the school was filed.
[22] The most significant impact on the child of the proposed relocation will be, without question, significantly less frequent and substantially less regular time spent with the father and the father’s family, and I cannot see how that is in the best interests of the child.
[23] Paragraph (c) of subsection 39.4(3) favours the proposed relocation, as the child has historically spent much more time in the care of the mother than the father, and the mother has been much more involved in the child’s life as compared to the father.
[24] I pause here to observe the following, however. I am very concerned about the mother’s lack of proper respect for the father’s role in the life of the child. Two concrete examples will suffice to illustrate that serious concern. First, the mother herself testified that, for more than one and one-half years, between March 2020 and October 2021, she demanded that the father and the child have zero hugs or kisses or any physical contact between them or be anywhere inside for any length of time. This was apparently due to the COVID-19 health pandemic. I find that absurd. As serious as the said health pandemic was, and still is, it could not and cannot be used as a crutch to turn a parent and child into virtual strangers. Second, the mother herself testified that she travelled Europe with the child and H.A. for close to a year, with the father left behind in Ontario, when the original plan consented to by the father was for a much, much shorter trip abroad. That the mother testified that she thought that the father had consented, verbally, or by acquiescence, to a much longer trip misses the point. If she had more properly respected the father’s role in the life of the child, she would have never asked for that consent.
[25] As already mentioned above in these reasons, the mother has not complied with the notice provisions of the legislation.
[26] The current court order in place does not permit the child to reside, or even travel, outside of Ontario without the father’s permission or pursuant to a further court order. Obviously, Justice Chozik was concerned enough to issue that restriction.
[27] Perhaps most important, I find the mother’s proposed relocation plan to be completely unreasonable. There is no new residence that can be identified. There is no assurance that the child can attend the school envisioned, at least none from the school itself. There is no documentary evidence, or independent evidence of any kind, that the mother and/or H.A. can afford to fund the proposed relocation. The mother makes no money at all, and H.A. filed one piece of paper (Exhibit 8) that shows that he has a bank account where the money going in is approximately equal to the money going out. The mother and H.A. are not married or engaged to be married and have never lived together except for temporarily while travelling, and H.A. is a crucial part of the proposed relocation, yet there are six outstanding criminal charges against H.A. for crimes of dishonesty (fraud over $5000.00 and possession of property obtained by crime over $5000.00) and an active arrest warrant for him, as confirmed by the document from the Toronto Police Service dated October 2, 2023 (Exhibit 7), effectively prohibiting H.A. from coming to Canada. The criminal charges are part of an international investigation, through Interpol. I have no confidence that the said charges are going to go away, as per the testimony of H.A. I have no confidence that the child will even be entitled to become a resident of any permanence in Portugal, under the sponsorship of H.A., which is the current plan. I have no confidence that the child will return to Canada at certain times of the year, as testified to by the mother and H.A.
[28] Of the seven witnesses who testified at trial, the one whose evidence causes me the most concern is H.A. He spent much of his testimony speaking about things that, though while interesting, are irrelevant to the issues to be decided by this Court, such as, in his opinion, the failures of modern capitalism and over-consumption. He offered very little information about his own background, for example, whether he has his own children or has ever been married in the past. He offered very little information about his criminal charges and the arrest warrant until he was cross-examined by Ms. Leonard, even though he and the mother would have known that the subject of the criminal charges was an important issue because he had been asked directly about that subject in pre-trial discussions with Ms. Leonard and Iafrate. When asked by Ms. Leonard why it was not best for the child to have a life in Ontario, he could only suggest that Europe has more history to offer the child, more affordable privileges to offer the child, better weather, better education, less pollution, and less crime. It was akin to expert opinion evidence, and without any proper foundation for any of those opinions. His evidence was internally inconsistent on the issue of his citizenships; he first told Ms. Leonard that he has citizenships in four countries – Canada, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, and Iran, but he then stated that the United Arab Emirates only permits a total of three citizenships. Initially, he refused altogether to answer Ms. Leonard’s question about his citizenships. He also refused to answer Ms. Leonard’s question about the identity of his lawyer dealing with the criminal charges in Canada, and he never did reveal that lawyer’s name. He stated that he has attempted to make a “private settlement” with the complainant involved in the criminal charges, in order to have them withdrawn, which seems odd to me. He acknowledged that he has nothing to provide to the Court about the status of his criminal charges, whether from a court, or from the Crown, or from the police, or from his lawyer. He stated that he had been advised by his lawyer to not speak about his work because the only thing that matters is whether he can financially support the mother and the child, which I think is an oversimplification of the matter. In cross-examination by the father, H.A. acknowledged that he has other bank accounts besides the one noted in Exhibit 8 but chose not to provide any documentation about those other accounts. In answering questions by the father, H.A. spoke at length in explaining to the father the concept of healthy relationships and how the father could be a better parent to the child, which evidence was not what one would reasonably expect to hear from a fact witness.
[29] I agree with Ms. Leonard that H.A. is an integral part of the relocation plan, indispensably so. His evidence at trial causes me much trepidation.
[30] To summarize, this is, frankly, nothing more than a desire for the mother and the child to reunite with H.A. at the place where they all had such a great time while on vacation. It is not a proposed relocation plan of any substance or a plan with any reasonable degree of anticipated success.
[31] Finally, paragraph (g) of subsection 39.4(3) is a relatively neutral factor in this case. The father has shown a callous disregard for court orders in the past, including when he withheld the child from the mother earlier this Fall, contrary to the express Order made by Justice Chozik. The mother has a much better track-record of following court orders, but compliance with any order for parenting time between the father and the child after a relocation to Portugal is, in my view, very difficult to predict because of (i) the criminal charges and the arrest warrant against H.A., who apparently has the financing but cannot even accompany the child and the mother to Canada in order to facilitate the parenting time between the child and the father, and (ii) the mother’s proven history of getting sidetracked, to put it charitably, while abroad for any substantial length of time.
[32] On balance, the Court cannot reasonably permit the proposed relocation to Portugal to occur, despite the child’s consistent and strong desire to go, which desire I accept and give due weight to.
[33] As Ms. Leonard’s closing submissions at trial confirm, there are serious concerns about H.A.’s current circumstances. The child has been clear about her desire to maintain an ongoing and meaningful relationship with her father. The evidence of the father, D.K., and Iafrate all support a very loving and close relationship between the father and the child.
[34] I find, on balance, that the proposed relocation to Portugal is not in the best interests of the child. This Court orders that the child shall not be relocated to Portugal.
[35] I cannot leave this section of these reasons without commenting on the very serious allegations of family violence made by the mother against the father. Those allegations are definitely relevant to a determination of what is in the best interests of the child.
[36] On the basis of the evidence of the mother and her friend, B.S., I find that the father has indeed shown in the past tendencies to be violent to and harassing of the mother (not the child, however). I accept that he, for example, has punched walls near to and while angry at the mother. I accept, as well, that he, shortly after separation, sent unsolicited and inappropriate sexually explicit electronic communications to the mother.
[37] These behaviours are very concerning to this Court. They cannot be condoned or even explained. They must be strongly condemned, no matter how long ago they occurred, and regardless of the fact that they were not directed at the child. Violence against the mother is violence against the family unit as a whole, and indirectly it amounts to violence against the child.
[38] I am unable to find as a fact that the mother was sexually assaulted by the father. I am not suggesting that the mother is a liar; I am saying simply that the civil standard of proof has not been met. I found the mother’s evidence about the sexual allegations to be more vague than what she outlined for the Court about the threatened physical assaults, and I am concerned that the mother did not first mention anything about sexual assault until she testified from the witness box at trial.
[39] Despite the father’s history of family violence that I do accept, I remain unwilling to approve of the proposed relocation of the mother and the child to Portugal, as I am still of the firm opinion that it does not coincide with the child’s best interests. The presentation of the case and the submissions of Ms. Leonard give me some comfort in that conclusion.
III. Decision-Making Responsibility, Primary Residency for the Child, and Parenting Time
[40] In this Court’s opinion, it is in the best interests of the child for the mother to have sole decision-making responsibility for the child, and for the child to reside primarily with the mother, and for the father to have parenting with the child that is essentially a continuation of the status quo. I agree with Ms. Leonard in all of those respects. What follows are the reasons for those conclusions.
[41] Whatever I might think about the mother’s lack of a proper appreciation for the role of the father in the child’s life, it is clear to me that she has been the rock in this child’s upbringing. The evidence establishes that she has always been the child’s primary caregiver, and she has always been the main decision-maker for the child, and, for the most part, nothing negative could be said about the decisions that she has made. The child is described by everyone as a healthy, happy, intelligent, curious, and mature pre-teenager. The mother is largely responsible for that.
[42] Joint decision-making responsibility is not a viable option in this case, as submitted by Ms. Leonard. Co-parenting has proven to be an abysmal failure; I agree with Ms. Leonard on that submission.
This Court orders that the mother shall have sole decision-making responsibility for the child.
[43] The father resides in a leased home with seven other individuals – his fiancée, his teenage step-son, his step-daughter, his other step-daughter, his daughter that he shares with his fiancée, his mother, and his brother. It would seem impractical to me to add a ninth person, the child, to that home.
[44] I was impressed with the evidence of the father’s fiancée, D.K. She is a very busy mother and home daycare provider, however, and the father often works out of town. It is not in the best interests of the child to be removed from the primary care of the mother and to be placed in this very busy household that she has never spent any considerable time in.
This Court orders that the child’s primary residence shall be with the mother.
[45] I disagree with the mother, though, that all parenting time between the father and the child should be in her absolute discretion. That is not consistent with the evidence of Iafrate (Exhibit 9) in terms of the positive nature of the relationship between the child and the father and the child’s strong desire to maintain that close relationship.
[46] I agree with Ms. Leonard that it is in the best interests of the child to have regular contact with the father, essentially mirroring the current Order in place.
[47] This Court orders that the father shall have in-person parenting time with the child every other weekend from Friday at 5:30 p.m. until Sunday at 7:30 p.m., commencing on Friday, October 27, 2023. If the Friday is a PA day, the father’s parenting time for that weekend shall commence at 5:30 p.m. on the Thursday. If the Monday is a PA day, the father’s parenting time for that weekend shall extend to Monday at 7:30 p.m. If both the Friday and the Monday are PA days, the father’s parenting time for that weekend shall be from Thursday at 5:30 p.m. until Monday at 7:30 p.m.
[48] This Court orders that the child’s birthday shall follow the regular parenting schedule outlined immediately above.
[49] In addition, this Court orders that the father shall have in-person parenting time with the child (i) every Father’s Day, (ii) every second Easter weekend commencing in 2024, (iii) every second Thanksgiving weekend commencing in 2024, (iv) two extra weeks (14 days, whether all consecutive or 7 days consecutive and a later period of 7 days consecutive) every summer commencing in 2024, and (v) a minimum of three days, consecutive, every Christmas season, between December 23-January 1, commencing in 2023.
[50] Also, this Court orders that the father shall have parenting time with the child, not in-person, at such other times as he wishes, subject to the father showing proper respect for the child’s preferences and for the child’s schedule of other activities, including school. This may include texting with the child, emailing with the child, other electronic communications with the child, telephone calls with the child, and video calls with the child.
[51] Finally, this Court orders that the father shall have in-person parenting time with the child on such other times as agreed to by the parties in advance.
[52] I was encouraged by everyone, including Ms. Leonard, to make a detailed order about contact between the father and the child, and I have attempted to do so above.
IV. Child Support, Arrears and Ongoing, including Section 7 Expenses
[53] The father is in arrears of child support payments, including contributions towards section 7 expenses, and the father shall be required to pay ongoing child support and his fair share of section 7 expenses for the child. The following are the reasons for those conclusions; they are brief because the evidence was sparse on one side (the mother) and virtually non-existent on the other side (the father).
[54] Exhibit F contains the mother’s calculations of child support arrears - $10,535.86 (her document says $10,535.87, but the proper arithmetic is one cent less than that). Her calculations are for the years 2019, 2020, 2021, and 2022, which I find to be proper as the date of separation was in 2015, but the arrears being sought commence no earlier than three years before the originating process was issued (in 2022).
[55] The father was confronted with Exhibit F in cross-examination by the mother. He neither denied nor admitted the alleged arrears of base child support. He commented no further about the document. He offered no calculations of his own. He did not dispute any of the key inputs used in the mother’s calculations – (i) the father’s annual gross income for each year according to Canada Revenue Agency documentation, (ii) what the father actually paid in child support each year according to the mother’s records, and (iii) what the father should have paid in child support each year according to the Federal Child Support Guidelines.
[56] The mother could not calculate the arrears of child support for the year 2023, to date, because she has no disclosure of the father’s annual gross income for this year. The father did not dispute that fact of non-disclosure. The father offered no evidence about his annual gross income for this year.
[57] In the circumstances, the best that I can do is to fix the father’s annual gross income for the year 2023 at the average of what it was in the four years preceding ($43,784.00 in 2019, $53,593.00 in 2020, $36,114.00 in 2021, and $44,372.00 in 2022). That average figure is $44,465.75 ($177,863.00 divided by 4).
[58] The parties shall calculate the arrears of child support owing for the year 2023, to date, based on (i) a ten-month period (January 1 to the end of October 2023), (ii) the father having paid $2590.00 thus far in 2023 (Exhibit F), (iii) the father’s gross annual income fixed at $44,465.75, and (iv) the table amount in the Federal Child Support Guidelines.
[59] That calculated amount shall then be added to the $10,535.86. That total figure I will refer to hereunder as “X”.
[60] This Court orders that the father shall pay to the mother child support arrears of X, which sum shall be paid in full by October 31, 2024 (approximately twelve months from now).
[61] This Court orders, further, that the father shall, commencing on November 1, 2023 and on the first day of each and every consecutive month thereafter, pay child support in accordance with the Federal Child Support Guidelines based on an annual gross income of $44,465.75. The within Order shall be enforced by the Family Responsibility Office. A Support Deduction Order shall issue.
[62] No order is made on account of any arrears of section 7 expenses. No receipts or invoices or bills or other documentation were filed.
[63] This Court orders that the parties shall contribute to all future section 7 expenses for the child in proportion to their respective incomes. The father’s income is fixed at $44,465.75. The mother’s income is unknown, per Exhibit F. Between today and when the mother receives her Notice of Assessment from the Canada Revenue Agency, for the tax year 2023, the mother’s income shall be fixed at zero.
[64] This Court orders that, in advance of each section 7 expense being incurred, except for emergency matters, the mother shall advise the father and obtain his approval for the expense, and the father shall not unreasonably withhold such approval. Further, as soon as possible after each section 7 expense is incurred, the mother shall provide the father with proof of the expense.
V. Other Relief Sought by the Parties
[65] In trial Exhibits A through E, the parties outlined their proposed orders on the basis of two different scenarios – (i) in the event that the mother and the child were permitted to relocate to Portugal, and (ii) in the event that everyone remained in Ontario.
[66] Except where expressly stated otherwise below, all of the other relief claimed by both sides (that is, relief not captured by sections I through IV of these reasons) is dismissed.
[67] These orders are made by this Court:
(i) all exchanges of the child shall take place at the home of the receiving party or, alternatively, at another location agreed to in advance by the parties;
(ii) all exchanges of the child shall be done by the parties themselves or, in the alternative, by another person(s) agreed to in advance by the parties;
(iii) until the child is the age of majority (18 years old), neither party shall move out of Ontario without the other party’s written consent obtained in advance or a court order, and both parties shall make their very best efforts to remain no further apart than they are currently (in terms of the distance between their residences);
(iv) neither party shall travel with the child outside of Canada without the prior written consent of the other party obtained in advance, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, or a court order; and
(v) the within Final Order shall be strictly enforced by the police and border officials.
[68] In my view, all of the above orders are necessary and in the best interests of the child, particularly in light of the palpable mistrust between the parties and the prior ten-month trip abroad by the mother and the child, which trip morphed from one of a few months in duration, with the father’s consent, to a much longer period of time and in circumstances of considerable uncertainty as to whether the father really consented or not.
[69] The only other order not mentioned above in this section of these reasons which was expressly dealt with by either side in his/her opening or closing statement at trial is the mother’s request for a restraining order against the father. That request is denied.
[70] I reject the mother’s position that she has, currently, any reasonable basis to fear for her safety or the safety of the child, and the strong evidence of that is in the mother’s own willingness to have the child in the care of the father, totally unsupervised, and for very lengthy periods of time, while she visits Canada from Portugal, in the event that the proposed relocation had been permitted.
VI. Costs
[71] At the conclusion of the trial, everyone agreed that the Office of the Children’s Lawyer would not be entitled to or liable for costs against/in favour of either the mother or the father.
[72] As between the mother and the father, for various reasons, this Court is not inclined to make any order as to costs. It would appear to be fair, just, and reasonable for each parent to bear her/his own costs. If either side wishes to persuade the Court to the contrary of that inclination, then she/he may contact the Superior Court of Justice trial office in Milton to schedule a thirty-minute attendance, by Zoom, before me to make submissions on the issue. Of course, both sides would be required to attend.
VII. Final Order
[73] A Final Order shall issue in accordance with these reasons. For the benefit of the parties, the positive orders made herein are in bold print.
Conlan J.
Released: October 17, 2023