SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
491 Steeles Avenue East, Milton ON L9T 1Y7
RE:
Sherry Leanne Shearhart, Applicant
-and-
Paul Robert Shearhart, Respondent
BEFORE:
C. Chang J.
COUNSEL:
S. Berry, for the Applicant
C. Haber, for the Respondent
HEARD:
August 23, 2023 (in-person)
ENDORSEMENT
1The parties bring competing motions for various relief, including respecting relocation, school enrolment and parenting time after September 1, 2023. Pursuant to my endorsement dated August 23, 2023, the issues relating to appointment of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer and the costs of the June 1, 2023 attendance were adjourned to be heard before me on September 15, 2023.
2The applicant seeks the following temporary orders:
a. authorizing her proposed relocation with the children from Oakville to Brampton;
b. that the children reside primarily with her;
c. regular parenting time as follows:
i. if she is authorized to relocate to Brampton, equal parenting time on a week-about basis with exchanges to occur on Wednesdays, or
ii. if she is not authorized to relocate to Brampton, that the respondent have parenting time with the children:
on alternating weekends from Friday (after school) to Monday (drop-off at school), and
on Wednesday evenings (after school to 8:30 p.m.);
d. 2023 holiday parenting time as follows:
i. Thanksgiving:
the applicant from Thursday (after school) to Saturday (8:30 p.m.), and
the respondent from Saturday (8:30 p.m.) to Tuesday (drop-off at school);
ii. Christmas/Winter Break:
the applicant from December 22, 2023 (after school) to December 25, 2023 (2:00 p.m.),
the respondent from December 25, 2023 (2:00 p.m.) to January 1, 2024 (2:00 p.m.), and
the applicant from January 1, 2024 (2:00 p.m.) to January 8, 2024 (drop-off at school);
e. school enrolment for the 2023-2024 academic year as follows:
i. E be enrolled at Williams Parkway Public School in Brampton,
ii. L be enrolled at Massey Street Public School in Brampton, and
iii. A be enrolled at North Park Secondary School in Brampton; and
f. that the parties each:
i. not consume alcohol during their respective parenting times with the children or within twelve hours prior to the start thereof,
ii. not speak negatively about the other in the children’s presence and that they make best efforts to ensure that other persons also do not do so,
iii. not discuss with the children the litigation or other adult issues involving the parties, and
iv. communicate respectfully with the children and refrain from verbal aggression.
3The respondent seeks the following temporary orders:
a. restraining the applicant from moving the children’s residence outside of Oakville;
b. regular parenting time as follows:
i. equal parenting time on a week-about basis with exchanges to occur on Fridays, and
ii. during the children’s parenting time with one of the parties:
the other party is to have parenting time from Wednesday (after school) to Thursday (drop-off at school), and
the children are to have unlimited telephone, email and internet contact with the other party, being respectful of the party with whom the children have parenting time;
c. 2023 holiday parenting time as follows:
i. Thanksgiving: the party with whom the children’s regular parenting time does not include the Thanksgiving long weekend is to have parenting time with them on the Monday of that long weekend from 12:00 p.m. until 4:00 p.m., and
ii. Christmas/Winter Break:
- during odd-numbered years:
(A) the applicant from December 24, 2023 (9:00 a.m.) to December 25, 2023 (12:00 p.m.), and
(B) the respondent from December 25, 2023 (12:00 p.m.) to December 26, 2023 (9:00 a.m.),
during even-numbered years, the above times will be switched between the parties, and
the parties are to otherwise share parenting time during the Christmas/Winter Break equally;
d. school enrolment for the 2023-2024 academic year as follows:
i. E continue to be enrolled at Emily Carr Public School in Oakville,
ii. L continue to be enrolled at Falgarwood Public School in Oakville, and
iii. A attend at her choice of school; and
e. that the parties each encourage M (who is away for post-secondary education) to spend equal time with the other when she returns home from school.
4Given the September 5, 2023 commencement date of the upcoming school year, I am cognizant of the applicable urgency in the release of my decision on these motions.
FACTS
5The facts relevant to these motions are for the most part undisputed and can be summarized as follows:
a. the parties were married in 2001 and separated in 2023;
b. there are four children of the marriage:
i. M, who is 17 years old, will be attending Sheridan College for the 2023-2024 academic year and plans to live in residence during school,
j. A, who is 15 years old and attended at Iroquois Ridge High School in Oakville for the 2022-2023 school year,
k. E, who is 10 years old, has special needs related to dyslexia and attended at Emily Carr Public School in Oakville for the 2022-2023 school year, during which he completed the first year of a two-year specialized program in a segregated class for students with dyslexia, and
l. L, who is 5 years old and attended Falgarwood Public School in Oakville for the last two school years;
c. the applicant commenced this application on April 5, 2023;
d. on April 10, 2023, the applicant called the police to the matrimonial home, during which attendance, the police identified no safety concerns;
e. following that police engagement with the family, the Halton CAS conducted an investigation, the initial reports of which identified no safety concerns;
f. the applicant left the matrimonial home on April 7, 2023 and was staying with friends (her counsel used the words “couch-surfing”) until July 1, 2023;
g. on July 1, 2023, the applicant moved into a townhouse owned by her parents in Brampton and she continues to reside there and pays below-market rent;
h. the said townhouse is where the applicant seeks permission to relocate with the children and is in the same neighbourhood as the home where the parties lived for the first few years after their marriage before moving to elsewhere in Brampton and, ultimately, to Oakville;
i. the applicant has friends, but no family, in Brampton;
j. on June 1, 2023, I made a consent order respecting, among other things, parenting time between June 2, 2023 and September 1, 2023, temporary child support and sale of the matrimonial home;
k. the matrimonial home has been sold and the transaction is scheduled to close on August 29, 2023;
l. the respondent has purchased a home in Oakville, to where he will move following the closing of the sale of the matrimonial home; and
m. the family has lived in Oakville for the last seven years.
6There are allegations of abuse, alcohol abuse and parental alienation, all of which are disputed.
7The applicant admits that her proposed move to Brampton is a relocation within the meaning of s. 16.9 of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.) and not a change in place of residence within the meaning of s. 16.8.
ISSUES
8The issues to be determined on this motion are as follows:
a. Should the applicant be permitted to relocate with the children from Oakville to Brampton?
b. Should the children reside primarily with the applicant?
c. What should the parenting time schedules be for the children?
d. Where should the children, A, E and L, be enrolled in school for the 2023-2024 school year?
e. What, if any, ancillary parenting orders should be made?
ANALYSIS
Issue #1: Should the applicant be permitted to relocate with the children from Oakville to Brampton?
Parties’ Positions
9The applicant submits that her proposed relocation would be in the children’s best interests. While she acknowledges that the family’s residence in Oakville does constitute the status quo, she argues that her proposed move to Brampton is exceptionally beneficial to the children for various reasons. She submits that her current residence in Brampton is within walking distance of all of the schools in the applicable catchment area and all have similar start times for the school day. In contrast, she says, all of A, E and L would have to commute (by bus or car) from the respondent’s home to their schools in Oakville, which all have different start times for the school day, and would have to be driven for more than one and a half hours from her Brampton residence. The applicant also submits that, as the respondent works in the Mississauga/Brampton area, he could effect the applicable drop-offs and pick-ups in Brampton on his way to and from work.
10The respondent submits that the applicant’s proposed relocation would not be in the children’s best interests and would constitute an unjustifiable disruption of the status quo. He argues that there is no evidence to support the applicant’s contention that changing the children’s residence and schools would be in their best interests and that, in fact, the evidence is that maintaining the status quo would be in their best interests. In particular, E was on a waiting list for several years before being accepted into the two-year specialized program to help with his dyslexia, has been doing very well in that program and still has yet to complete the second year of it. L has been at the same school for the last two school years and plans to return there for the 2023-2024 school year. A has expressed a desire to attend school in Oakville.
Law
11Section 2(1) of the Divorce Act defines “relocation” as,
relocation means a change in the place of residence of a child of the marriage or a person who has parenting time or decision-making responsibility — or who has a pending application for a parenting order — that is likely to have a significant impact on the child’s relationship with
(a) a person who has parenting time, decision-making responsibility or an application for a parenting order in respect of that child pending; or
(b) a person who has contact with the child under a contact order.
12Section 16.9(1) of the Divorce Act provides that a person with parenting time or decision-making responsibility respecting a child of the marriage who intends to effect a relocation must provide at least 60 days’ prior notice of that intention, in a prescribed form, to anyone else who has parenting time, decision-making responsibility or contact under a contact order.
13Pursuant to s. 16.91(1), a person who has given notice pursuant to s. 16.9 and intends to relocate a child is permitted to do so if: a) the court authorizes the relocation; or b) a recipient of the s. 16.9 notice does not object in the prescribed manner within 30 days of receipt of that notice and there is no order prohibiting the relocation.
14In determining whether or not a relocation should be authorized, “the crucial question is whether relocation is in the best interests of the child, having regard to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being”, which is a highly fact-specific and discretionary inquiry (see: Barendregt v Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22, at para. 152). The court must consider the best interests of the particular child in the particular circumstances of the case (see: Barendregt, at para. 123).
15In determining the best interests of the child in relocation cases, the court must consider all factors related to the child’s circumstances, including, without limitation:
a. the child’s views and preferences;
b. the history of caregiving;
c. any incidents of family violence;
d. the reasons for the relocation;
e. the impact of the relocation on the child;
f. the amount of parenting time spent with the child and the level of the parties’ involvement in the child’s life;
g. the existence of a court order, arbitral award or agreement that specifies the geographic area in which the child is to reside;
h. the reasonableness of the relocating party’s proposal to vary parenting time, decision-making responsibility, taking into consideration, among other things, the location of the new place of residence and the applicable travel expenses; and
i. whether the parties have complied with their respective obligations under statute, a court order, arbitral award or agreement and the likelihood of future compliance,
(see: Barendregt, at paras. 153-154).
16The court is not to consider how the outcome of the relocation application would affect the parties’ relocation plans – e.g., whether the relocating party would relocate without the child or not relocate at all (see: Barendregt, at paras. 140 and 154).
17A relocation is more likely to be approved “where the clear primary caregiver for a child seeks to relocate” and more likely to be denied if there is a shared parenting arrangement (see: Barendregt, at para. 121).
18The applicable burdens of proof on a relocation application are as follows:
a. where there is substantial compliance with a court order, arbitral award or agreement that provides that the child spend substantially equal time in the care of each party, the party intending to relocate the child has the burden of proving that the relocation would be in the child’s best interests (see: Divorce Act, s. 16.93(1));
b. where there is substantial compliance with a court order, arbitral award or agreement that provides that the child spend the vast majority of their time in the care of the party intending to relocate the child, the party opposing the relocation has the burden of proving that the relocation would not be in the child’s best interests (see: Divorce Act, s. 16.93(2)); and
c. in all other cases, the parties share the burden of proving whether the relocation is in the child’s best interests (see: Divorce Act, s. 16.93(3)).
19Courts are generally reluctant to authorize relocation on interim motions and the burden of proof on such motions is on the party seeking to change the status quo to prove that sufficient compelling circumstances exist to justify the relocation (see: Markowski v. Krochak, 2022 ONSC 2497, at para. 75).
Decision
20I find that the applicant’s request for authorization of her proposed relocation should be denied.
21First and foremost, in my view, the applicant has failed to discharge the applicable burden of proof under s. 16.93(1) of the Divorce Act. The parties negotiated and consented to an order that provides for substantially equal parenting time between June 2, 2023 and September 1, 2023 and the applicant has failed to adduce sufficient evidence that the childcare arrangements were anything other than substantially equal before the parties separated. In addition, both parties have included requests on these motions for orders for equal parenting time on a week-about basis.
22Applying the Barendregt factors relevant to these motions:
a. the children’s views and preferences – the applicant has adduced no evidence that the children’s views and preferences favour relocation;
b. the history of caregiving – as outlined above, the applicant has adduced no evidence that childcare arrangements were historically anything other than equal, the parties previously agreed to an order for substantially equal parenting time and they have each sought equal parenting time on these motions;
c. any incidents of family violence – the applicant has adduced no evidence of family violence and the investigations of both the police and the CAS have identified no applicable concerns;
d. the reasons for the relocation – the applicant’s stated reasons for relocation are that her “friend group” is in Brampton, the family (except L) previously lived in Brampton before moving to Oakville seven years ago and the cost of housing, none of which is supported by any evidence that her proposed relocation is in the children’s best interests;
e. the impact of the relocation on the child – the applicant has adduced no evidence that the impact of her proposed relocation will positively impact the children;
f. the amount of parenting time spent with the child and the level of the parties’ involvement in the child’s life – as outlined above, the applicant has failed to adduce any evidence that the parties’ parenting time and level of involvement in the children’s life has been anything other than substantially equal;
g. the reasonableness of the relocating party’s proposal to vary parenting time, decision-making responsibility, taking into consideration, among other things, the location of the new place of residence and the applicable travel expenses – the applicant’s proposal respecting a variation of parenting time is to leave it as equal and she has made no proposal to vary decision-making responsibility or to contribute to any applicable travel expenses; and
h. whether the parties have complied with their respective obligations under statute, a court order, arbitral award or agreement and the likelihood of future compliance – there is no evidence that there has been any applicable non-compliance with court orders (in fact, the evidence is that the parties have been diligently complying with my June 1, 2023 consent order) or that the court should be concerned with any applicable non-compliance in future.
23In addition, the applicant has also failed to satisfy the burden of demonstrating compelling circumstances that justify the proposed relocation on an interim motion.
24Beyond the above, I am simply not satisfied that the applicant’s proposed relocation is in the children’s best interests. In addition to there being insufficient evidence that relocating the children would be in their best interests, in my view, the evidence indicates that it would not be.
25As outlined above, the status quo for this family includes its residence in Oakville for the last seven years. Furthermore, the applicant’s own evidence is that, while her “friend group” resides in Brampton, she no longer has family there. In addition, the proposed relocation would profoundly (and, in my view, negatively) affect the children’s schooling. E would be prematurely removed from the specialized program for dyslexic students and transferred to a Brampton school that does not have a similar program. A has said that she struggles with the “back and forth between school [in Oakville] and home in Brampton” and expressed a desire to attend school in Oakville for the upcoming school year. L would be transferred away from the school where he has attended for the last two years.
26Furthermore, the applicant’s proposed relocation would result in a much greater geographic distance between her proposed residence in Brampton and the respondent’s residence in Oakville. Given that geographic distance “reduces flexibility, disrupts established patterns, and inevitably impacts the relationship between a parent and a child” (see: Barendregt, at para. 8) and, viewing the children’s present circumstances with an eye to the future, the proposed relocation is not in their best interests.
27Therefore, in my view, the applicant’s request for authorization of her proposed relocation must be denied and her motion should be dismissed accordingly. Given this determination, the respondent’s motion for an order restraining the applicant from moving the children’s residence outside Oakville is moot and should be dismissed accordingly.
Issue #2: Should the children reside primarily with the applicant?
Parties’ Positions
28Although the applicant’s notice of motion seeks an order that the children reside primarily with her, neither party adduced evidence specific to this issue and dedicated no written or oral argument to it. However, it appears quite clearly to me that the issue of primary residence is inextricably tied to the applicant’s proposed relocation and the parties appeared to treat it as such.
Law
29As with all other aspects of parenting, the sole consideration in determining with which parent the children are to be primarily resident is the best interests of those children.
Decision
30Given the apparently inextricable tie between the applicant’s proposed relocation (authorization for which I have denied) and her request for primary residence of the children, I am not prepared to order that the children primarily reside with her.
31In any event, based on the lack of evidence or argument dedicated to this issue, I am not satisfied that the applicant has discharged her burden of demonstrating that the children’s primary residence should be with her.
32Indeed, as outlined above, the parties negotiated and agreed to the June 1, 2023 parenting orders that provide for equal parenting time, but not for primary residence for the children. Furthermore, as also outlined above, both parties seek equal parenting time in their respective current notices of motion. I see no reason to change the obvious “status quo”1 and there are also no factors that would militate in favour of making a primary residence order at this time (see, e.g.: Wiafe v Afoakwa-Yeboah, 2021 ONCJ 201; Seyad v Pathan, 2022 ONCJ 501; Mulik v McFarlane, 2023 ONCJ 148; Tran v Bissessar, 2010 ONCJ 377).
33In addition, the CAS’s report of the caseworker’s June 14, 2023 interviews with the children indicate their lack of aversion to equal time with the parties and, in E’s case, a preference for it.
34Therefore, in my view, the applicant’s request for an order that the children reside primarily with her must be denied.
Issue #3: What should the parenting time schedules be for the children?
Parties’ Positions
35The applicant submits that, if her proposed relocation is authorized, then the regular parenting time schedule should be equal on a week-about basis, with exchanges on Wednesdays after school. If not authorized, then she proposes that it be unequal, with the children’s parenting time with the respondent being on alternating weekends and on Wednesday evenings. For holiday parenting time, the applicant submits that the Thanksgiving long weekend be almost equally split and that the Christmas/Winter break be unequally split into (roughly) seven days with the respondent and ten days with her.
36The respondent submits that both the children’s regular and holiday parenting time schedules should be equally split between the parties. That, he submits, has been the status quo, by virtue of my June 1, 2023 consent order and otherwise, and that is what should be maintained.
Law
37As with all other aspects of parenting, the sole consideration in determining the appropriate parenting time schedules is the best interests of the children.
Decision
38Once again, the applicant has adduced no evidence and dedicated no argument to how her proposed unequal parenting time schedule is more in the children’s best interests than her proposed equal parenting time schedule. Indeed, her differing requested parenting time schedules seem to be a “carrot vs. stick” approach related to the relocation issue. In any event, given the lack of evidence or argument to support the unequal parenting time schedules proposed by the applicant, I am not prepared to order them.
39In addition, as outlined above, the parties negotiated and agreed to the June 1, 2023 parenting orders that provided for equal parenting time and both parties seek equal parenting time in their respective notices of motion. As with the primary residence issue, I see no reason to change the obvious “status quo”2.
40Also, again, the CAS report indicate the children’s lack of aversion to equal time with the parties and, in E’s case, a preference for it.
41Therefore, in my view, the applicant’s requested regular parenting time order must be denied and the respondent’s requested regular parenting time order should be granted, with the exception of the proposed Wednesday overnights. In my view, the additional exchanges associated with the Wednesday overnights would introduce unnecessary complexity and disruption in the children’s routines and, as such, would not be in their best interests.
42Respecting the 2023-2024 holiday (i.e., Thanksgiving long weekend and Christmas/Winter break) parenting time schedule, in my view, neither the Thanksgiving long weekend nor the Christmas/Winter break should alter the week-about regular parenting time schedule set out above. For the latter, the children will spend Christmas Day with one party and New Years Day with the other. The parties are, of course, at liberty to agree on a different 2023-2024 holiday parenting time schedule should they so choose.
43Respecting M’s parenting time, given her age, the June 1, 2023 consent order that the parties encourage her to abide by the applicable parenting time schedule, but that they also respect her views and stated wishes, should continue and extend to the parenting time schedules ordered in this endorsement.
Issue #4: Where should the children, A, E and L, be enrolled and attend at school for the 2023-2024 year?
Parties’ Positions
44The applicant submits that A, E and L should be enrolled and attend at the schools within the catchment area of her current residence in Brampton, as that would be in their best interests. She argues that these schools are all within walking distance from that residence and all of their respective school days start at the same time. The applicant also submits that the children’s schools in Oakville all have different start times for the school day and would result in a one-and-half hour commute from her current residence in Brampton and are also not within walking distance from the respondent’s new residence in Oakville. She also argues that A needs a change of scholastic scenery and her attendance at the applicable Brampton school will ensure that the applicant can be available to receive A when she comes home after school.
45The respondent submits that A, E and L should continue attending school in Oakville, as that would be in their best interests. Similar to his arguments respecting the relocation issue, the respondent argues that the children’s schooling in Oakville is the relevant status quo and that moving them to Brampton schools constitutes an unjustified disruption of it. He submits that there is no evidence that changing the children’s schools would be in their best interests and, in fact, the evidence is that maintaining the status quo would be in their best interests.
Law
46Again, as with all other aspects of parenting, the sole consideration in determining the appropriate parenting time schedules is the best interests of the children. In addition, the choice of school is to be made on its own merits in consideration of the best interests of the child, including the availability of resources offered by the school in relation to the child’s needs (see: Thomas v Osika, 2018 ONSC 2712, at para. 37).
Decision
47As with the issue of primary residence, it appears quite clearly to me that the school enrolment is inextricably tied to the applicant’s proposed relocation and the parties appeared to treat it as such. Indeed, based on the evidence and arguments, the applicant’s proposal to change the children’s schools appeared to only be relevant if she received authorization for the proposed relocation. In other words, if she is not permitted to relocate to Brampton, she doesn’t plan to change the children’s schools. Therefore, in my view, given my decision to deny authorization for the applicant to relocate, I need not consider this aspect of her motion and decline to do so.
48In any event, most of the various reasons outlined above for refusing the relocation authorization apply equally to the applicant’s proposal to change the children’s schooling and explain why that proposed change should be refused. As outlined above, there is no legitimate basis to cut short E’s enrolment in the two-year specialized dyslexia program or to go against L’s and A’s expressed desires to attend school in Oakville.
49Therefore, in my view, the applicant’s requested order to change A’s, E’s and L’s school enrolment must be denied. They are to be enrolled and attend at the applicable schools in Oakville.
Issue #5: What, if any, ancillary Parenting Orders Should be Made?
Parties’ Positions
50Both parties seek various ancillary parenting orders respecting, among other things, proper behaviour with and in front of the children.
Law
51Once again, as with all other aspects of parenting, the sole consideration in determining the appropriate ancillary parenting orders is the best interests of the children.
Decision
52The parties’ respective notices of motion, although worded somewhat differently on this issue, effectively seek the same ancillary parenting orders; orders to ensure that they each remain on their best behaviour. It is noteworthy that neither party dedicated any argument to these ancillary orders and took no issue whatsoever with the other’s proposals.
53Furthermore, the June 1, 2023 consent order includes a number of similar ancillary orders and sets no time limit of any kind on the operation or effectiveness of them. I see no reason why those consent orders should not continue.
54To those June 1, 2023 ancillary orders, I would add the following:
a. the children shall have unlimited telephone, email and internet contact with the parent with whom they do not then have parenting time, which shall be during reasonable times and shall be facilitated by the parent with whom the children then have parenting time;
b. neither party shall discuss with any of the children this litigation, their dispute or any other adult issues involving the parties; and
c. each of the parties shall make best efforts to ensure that no other person speaks negatively about the other party to any of the children or otherwise in any of the children’s presence.
COSTS
55The parties advised that there are relevant offers to settle in respect of these motions. I was therefore not prepared to receive the parties’ costs submissions at the conclusion of oral argument. Those submissions are to be made in writing in accordance with the applicable disposition below.
DISPOSITION
56I therefore make the following orders:
a. the applicant’s motion for an order authorizing her proposed relocation with the children to Brampton is dismissed;
b. the respondent’s motion for an order restraining the applicant from moving the children’s residence outside of Oakville is dismissed;
c. the applicant’s motion for an order that the children reside primarily with her is dismissed;
d. beginning September 2, 2023, the children shall have equal parenting time with the parties as follows:
i. regular parenting time schedule: week-about basis with exchanges to occur on Fridays after school at each child’s school,
ii. 2023-2024 holiday (i.e., Thanksgiving long weekend and Christmas/Winter Break) parenting time schedule: week-about basis with exchanges to occur on Fridays after school at each child’s school or, if the children are not in school, at the home of the party whose week-about is ending, and
iii. the children shall have unlimited telephone, email and internet contact with the parent with whom they do not then have parenting time, which shall be during reasonable times and shall be facilitated by the parent with whom the children then have parenting time;
e. the applicant’s motion for an order changing A’s, E’s and L’s school enrolment to schools in Brampton is dismissed and, for the 2023-2024 school year, E shall continue to be enrolled at Emily Carr Public School in Oakville, L shall continue to be enrolled at Falgarwood Public School in Oakville and A shall attend a school in Oakville that is consistent with (but not determined by) her expressed preference;
f. the June 1, 2023 consent orders respecting M, the non-consumption of alcohol or marijuana and respectful communication with the children and in their presence are hereby continued until further order of the court;
g. neither party shall discuss with any of the children this litigation, their dispute or any other adult issues involving the parties;
h. each of the parties shall make best efforts to ensure that no other person speaks negatively about the other party to any of the children or otherwise in any of the children’s presence; and
i. the parties’ respective costs submissions (limited to two pages each plus bills of costs and offers to settle) shall be exchanged and then delivered to me through the Milton Administration Office as follows:
i. from the respondent by no later than September 6, 2023;
ii. from the applicant by no later than September 13, 2023; and
iii. there shall be no reply.
C. Chang J.
Date: August 29, 2023
Footnotes
- The use of quotation marks here is intentional to indicate that my applicable finding here as to the “status quo” is on a temporary and without prejudice basis.
- Again, the use of quotation marks here is intentional to indicate that my applicable finding here as to the “status quo” is on a temporary and without prejudice basis.