COURT FILE NO.: FC 445/21

DATE: July 14, 2023

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

FAMILY COURT

RE: Rebecca Gielen, Applicant

AND:

Christopher Gielen, Respondent

BEFORE: HASSAN J.

COUNSEL: Kate Bennett, for the Applicant

Iain Sneddon, for the Respondent

HEARD: April 26, 2023

ENDORSEMENT

MOTIONS AND POSITION OF PARTIES

[1] This is the Respondent's Motion for the release to him of his half of the share of proceeds of sale of the parties' former Matrimonial Home, presently held in trust. The Applicant's Motion asks that the proceeds continue to be held in trust.

[2] The home was sold in August 2020, shortly after the parties separated. The net proceeds of sale total $598,448.

[3] The Respondent first commenced this Motion in July 2022. The Motion was adjourned, eventually to April 2023.

[4] In July 2022 the Respondent consented to the Applicant receiving her half of the share of the proceeds, and his share was retained in trust.

[5] Both parties agree that the Respondent will owe an Equalization payment to the Applicant. They differ in the amount of the payment, with the Respondent claiming that the payment will be approximately $127,000 or less and the Applicant claiming it will be a minimum of $260,000.

[6] It was the Respondent's position that he is presumptively entitled to his share of the proceeds of sale, as a joint owner of the property, and that a preservation order was not required as there are other sources of funds to satisfy the Applicant's Equalization entitlement, particularly his OMERS Pension.

[7] The Applicant conceded that the Respondent is prima facie entitled to his share of the proceeds of sale but that this right is subject to her entitlement to a "security order" to protect her Equalization entitlement. She argued that she is presumptively entitled to immediate payment of any Equalization payment and that if the proceeds of sale are released to the Respondent, she would be forced to accept a transfer from the Respondent's pension, which she is not in agreement with. The Applicant claims that she needs the Equalization payment to further reduce her debts.

[8] The Applicant also has other claims which she argued would need to be paid from the proceeds of sale, including outstanding cost awards as against the Respondent and retro-active child and spousal support from the date of separation in August 2020 to the date the Respondent was ordered to pay support, being September 2022.

[9] I conclude that the most fair and equitable outcome is that the Respondent receive half of his equity in the Matrimonial Home, that Applicant be paid the arrears and outstanding costs owed to her, and that the remaining proceeds be held pending trial or agreement of the parties.

RELEVANT FACTS

[10] The Applicant and Respondent were married for 13 years, from October 13, 2007 to their separation three years ago on August 3, 2020. They have two children, Jacob Gielen, born January 14, 2009 and Owen Gielen, born October 21, 2015. The parties have shared the care of their children since separation.

[11] Following separation, the parties continued to reside together briefly in the matrimonial home, located at 29 Landsdowne Park Crescent in Komoka, until it was sold on August 31, 2020. The net proceeds of sale of $598,448, were placed in trust with Cassino Coulston & Gallagher. As indicated above, half of the proceeds were released to the Applicant in July 2022.

[12] Following the sale of the home the Applicant rented the two-bedroom basement of her sister's home, for herself and the children, while she awaited completion of a home that she had built for herself and the children located at 185 Martin Road, Delaware. The Applicant and the children moved into the home in November 2021.

[13] The Applicant deposes that she elected to build a home because there were no suitable homes available in the children's catchment area at the time of the separation. She deposes that the purchase of the lot and payment for the build were financed through loans from her parents, Henk and Carol Goertz.

[14] The Applicant's current Financial Statement, sworn July 2022, indicates a value of $1.3 million for the home, with corresponding loans to her parents and a joint Line of Credit with her parents, totaling over $1.2 million.

[15] Following separation, the Respondent moved to his present residence, located at 23 Caverhill Crescent, Komoka. The home is owned by his parents. The Respondent deposes that he wishes to purchase the home from his parents. He attached an Agreement of Purchase and Sale to his Affidavit, signed by himself and his father, John Gielen, to purchase the home for $1.1 million. It provided for a down-payment of $300,000, payable on acceptance, which was then July 7, 2022.

[16] The Respondent deposed in his initial Affidavit, that he required the proceeds of sale of the home as a down payment to purchase his current residence. In a subsequent Affidavit he deposed that he required the funds to continue to pay rent to his parents, pay his legal fees and pay outstanding costs owing to the Applicant.

[17] For the purposes of this Motion, I will assume that any proceeds of sale released to the Respondent will be used for purposes other than acquiring equity in his present residence.

[18] The Respondent was employed throughout the marriage as a firefighter. He is presently employed with the City of St. Thomas Fire Department. The Respondent's income, as shown in his Financial Statement of April 2023, is approximately $115,000 per annum.

[19] In August 2022, the Respondent was ordered to pay "set off" child support of $949 per month and spousal support of $825 per month. The Respondent had not paid either child support or spousal support since the date of separation in August 2020. The Applicant is claiming retro-active child and spousal support.

[20] The Respondent also owes outstanding costs to the Applicant, in this proceeding, totaling over $20,000. The Applicant provided a Statement of Money Owed as of April 2023, which totaled $28,059. This included only arrears under the present support Order and outstanding costs.

[21] Aside from his interest in the Matrimonial Home, the Respondent's only significant asset is his OMERS Pension, which has a Family Law Value of $561,187, with a maximum transferable value of approximately $280,593.

[22] The Applicant is presently employed with BECO Developments, on a part-time basis. BECO is a corporation owned by the Applicant's sister, Michelle Doornbosch. The Applicant also operates a home business as an Independent Consultant for Arbonne, a multi-level marketing company selling skin care and cosmetic products. The Applicant estimates her income, in her most current Financial Statement, to be approximately $41,000 per annum.

[23] Draft Net Family Property (“NFP”) Statements were uploaded to Caselines by the Respondent at the time of the Motion; one which had been previously provided by the Applicant and one by the Respondent. I acknowledge that the Equalization determination is in process at this time and that further information and documentation will be requested and likely even provided by this time. However, the statements are of some assistance in determining the possible range of the Applicant's entitlement and the assets involved in the calculations.

[24] The Applicant's draft NFP Statement indicated an Equalization owing by the Respondent, in the amount of approximately $262,000. I note this did not include the tax debt relating to the Respondent's OMERS Pension, of approximately $123,000.

[25] The Respondent's draft NFP Statement indicated an Equalization owing by the Respondent in the amount of approximately $127,000. This included a "date of marriage" value for the Respondent's OMERS Pension, which presumably would already be factored into the "Family Law Value" of the Pension, although I did not review the Pension Valuation.

[26] It is clear from both NFP Statements that the main assets of both parties, at the time of separation, was the Matrimonial Home ($1 million) and the Respondent's OMERS Pension ($561,187).

[27] According to the Applicant's most current Financial Statement dated July 2022, her main asset is her present home, owned solely by her and valued at $1.3 million. She has minimal savings and no pension. The majority of her debt ($1.2 of $1.3) is owing to her parents as loans or jointly with her parents. These debts relate to the financial assistance provided by the Applicant's parents when the Applicant built her present home. This would be prior to the Applicant receiving approximately $300,000 from the proceeds of sale of the Matrimonial Home pursuant to my Order of August 2022.

[28] According to the Respondent's current Financial Statement dated April 2023, he has no other significant assets aside from his OMERS Pension. The majority of his $104,000 in debt relates to an auto loan ($35,000) and loans to his father and the family corporation ($48,000).

[29] The matter is presently set to a Trial Sitting in February 2024.

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

[30] The parties agree and caselaw is settled, that a joint owner of property is prima facie entitled to their equity. In the family law context, this entitlement can be subject to restrictions to protect the other party’s entitlement under Parts I or II of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3.

[31] Under Part I of the Act, s. 12 provides:

Orders for preservation

12. In an application under section 7 or 10, if the court considers it necessary for the protection of the other spouse’s interests under this Part, the court may make an interim or final order,

(a) restraining the depletion of a spouse’s property; and

(b) for the possession, delivering up, safekeeping and preservation of the property.

[32] Under Part II of the Act, s. 40 provides:

Restraining orders

40. The court may, on application, make an interim or final order restraining the depletion of a spouse’s property that would impair or defeat a claim under this Part.

[33] Caselaw has also recognized that given the "debtor-creditor" nature of the Equalization regime in the Act, a party is prima facie entitled to payment of their Equalization in cash as opposed to an interest in property, such as a pension:

(see: Taus v. Harry, 2016 ONSC 219)

[34] Although the Applicant does not have a Motion before the Court for an Order under either s. 12 or s. 40 of the Act, she included in her Motion a request for an Order that the proceeds of sale continue to be held in trust. I treat that as a request for a preservation order and restraining order under ss. 12 and 40.

[35] Some helpful considerations were summarized by Leach J. in Fraser v. Fraser, 2017 ONSC 3774, relating to factors in determining whether a "preservation order" is appropriate. Starting as paragraph 58, Leach J. indicated:

[58] In my view, the real question for determination is whether it would be appropriate, in the circumstances, to make orders effectively providing the Applicant with security for her claims by charging or restraining disposition of the Respondent’s assets.

[59] General principles and considerations applicable to the exercise of the legislative provisions permitting such orders, set forth above, include the following:

• The onus lies on the party requesting such a charging or preservation order to demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that such an order is necessary to protect his or her interests under Part I of the Family Law Act, supra, and/or to prevent impairment or defeat of his or her claims for support under Part III of that legislation.[1]

• While a party with a court-determined claim is in a stronger position to request such relief, such orders are commonly and frequently made in family law matters to protect such claims in advance of trial.[2]

• Our courts generally agree that the standard for granting such relief, essentially injunctive in nature, is not the high threshold required for the granting of a Mareva injunction; i.e., a threshold that includes a need for demonstration of a strong prima facie case on the merits.[3]

• Beyond that, different court decisions have applied different standards. Some consider whether there is a “real risk that assets could be dissipated” before a claim is determined on the merits.[4] Others suggest that an order should be made “out of an abundance of caution”.[5] Others indicate that the appropriate approach is similar to that generally applicable to the granting of interlocutory injunctive relief set forth in R.J.R. Macdonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1994 117 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, which requires the court to focus on:

o Whether the party seeking injunctive relief has shown that there is a serious issue to be tried;

o Whether the party seeking such relief has demonstrated that he or she will suffer irreparable harm if the requested relief is not granted; and

o Which party will suffer the greater harm from granting or refusing the requested relief, pending a decision on the merits, (often called “the balance of convenience”).[6]

• More generally, however, it has been emphasized that the remedies available pursuant to such legislative provisions are discretionary, making it “difficult, dangerous and, perhaps, undesirable” to lay down explicit formulations or guidelines, as each decision properly will depend on the particular circumstances before the court. The exercise fundamentally is one of balancing risks.[7]

[36] In Bronfman v. Bronfman, 2000 22710 (ONSC), at para. 28, Sachs J. considered the factors relating to injunctions in the civil context, which include:

(a) The relative strength of the plaintiff's case;

(b) The balance of convenience (or inconvenience); and

(c) Irreparable harm.

[37] Justice Sachs concluded that factors (a) and (b) were most applicable to an application for preservation of proceeds under s. 12, at paras. 29 and 31:

[29] The first two factors are relevant to the determination of an application for a non-dissipation or restraining order under s. 12. Clearly, a court will want to consider how likely it is that the plaintiff or petitioner will receive an equalization payment. It will also want to consider the effect that granting, or not granting, such an order will have on the parties. Under s. 12, the agenda is to protect the spouse's interests under the Family Law Act, so that if a spouse is successful in obtaining relief under that Act, there are assets available to satisfy that relief. Relevant to this exercise is an assessment of the risk of dissipation of the assets in existence prior to trial.

[31] This comment is helpful when considering an application under s. 12 of the Family Law Act. There are certain cases where the factual record, and the applicable legal principles, make it very clear that a spouse will be entitled to an equalization payment in a particular amount. In such cases, considerable weight will be given by the court to this factor when deciding an interim application under s. 12, and perhaps less weight to the other factors. There are others where the facts and the law are disputed and complicated. In addition, the record may not be fully developed, as both sides may not yet have been in a position to obtain their experts' reports on some of the more difficult valuation issues. Further, even if the reports have been obtained, if they differ substantially, it may be impossible for a court, on an interim motion, to assess with any degree of certainty which expert's report will prevail at trial. In such cases, the court will want to go on and give serious consideration t o the other factors, being the balance of convenience and the risk of dissipation prior to trial.

[38] In this present case there is no dispute as to the Applicant's entitlement to an Equalization payment. The issue is really the form of the payment, depending in part on the outcome of this Motion.

[39] Of relevance in that regard are the provisions of ss. 9 and 10.1 of the Family Law Act. Section 9(1) provides for the potential orders following an Equalization of Net Family Property, and includes:

Powers of court

9 (1) In an application under section 7, the court may order,

(a) that one spouse pay to the other spouse the amount to which the court finds that spouse to be entitled under this Part;

(b) that security, including a charge on property, be given for the performance of an obligation imposed by the order;

(c) that, if necessary to avoid hardship, an amount referred to in clause (a) be paid in instalments during a period not exceeding ten years or that payment of all or part of the amount be delayed for a period not exceeding ten years; and

(d) that, if appropriate to satisfy an obligation imposed by the order,

(i) property be transferred to or in trust for or vested in a spouse, whether absolutely, for life or for a term of years, or

(ii) any property be partitioned or sold.

[40] Sub-section 10.1(3) provides for an additional method to satisfy an Equalization entitlement, through the transfer of a lump sum from a pension plan. It provides:

Order for immediate transfer of a lump sum

10.1 (3) An order made under section 9 or 10 may provide for the immediate transfer of a lump sum out of a pension plan but, except as permitted under subsection (5), not for any other division of a spouse’s interest in the plan

[41] Sub-section 10.1(4) sets out the considerations for the Court in relation to a lump sum transfer:

Same

10.1 (4) In determining whether to order the immediate transfer of a lump sum out of a pension plan and in determining the amount to be transferred, the court may consider the following matters and such other matters as the court considers appropriate:

1. The nature of the assets available to each spouse at the time of the hearing.

2. The proportion of a spouse’s net family property that consists of the imputed value, for family law purposes, of his or her interest in the pension plan.

3. The liquidity of the lump sum in the hands of the spouse to whom it would be transferred.

4. Any contingent tax liabilities in respect of the lump sum that would be transferred.

5. The resources available to each spouse to meet his or her needs in retirement and the desirability of maintaining those resources.

[42] The Applicant argues, and it was not disputed, that if the Respondent's proceeds of sale from the Matrimonial Home are released to him, then the most likely method to satisfy the Applicant's Equalization entitlement would be through a lump sum transfer from the Respondent's pension.

[43] In this sense it is helpful to look at the considerations applied by the Court in determining whether a lump sum transfer ought to be ordered as payment of an Equalization entitlement. While I am clearly not making a determination today, of either the Equalization entitlement or form of payment, I agree with the Applicant that if I order the release of the Respondent's proceeds, I am removing the most likely source of cash payment of the Applicant's entitlement. It is instructive, then, in my view, to consider the approach courts have taken to requests for payment of an Equalization via a transfer from a pension fund.

[44] The Court in Baribeau v. Baribeau 2020 ONSC 861, contained a helpful discussion of the considerations relevant to determining the form of Equalization payment when, like here, the main assets are a jointly owned Matrimonial Home and a pension. Starting at Paragraph 73:

[73] The big question for these parties is how to effect payment of the equalization obligation owing by the respondent. A division of assets between spouses is to be fair to both of them. This is confirmed in Best v. Best, 1999 700 (SCC), [1999] 2 SCR 868.

[74] For these parties their two most significant assets are the home and the respondent’s pension. It is agreed between the parties that each has approximately $71,000 in equity available to them. They each wish to retain their own equity. The applicant wishes to remain in the home thereby holding her equity within the home itself. The respondent wants his equity out of the home to be bought out or to receive it on sale.

[76] While section 10.1 of the Family Law Act provides a tool for satisfying an equalization obligation through pension division, the VanderWal v. VanderWal, 2015 ONSC 384 case confirms that there is no presumption that payment will be made in this way.

[77] Justice Shelston provides a tidy summary of the jurisprudence on this topic in the case of Fortier v. Lauzon, 2017 ONSC 7503. He reviews a number of cases that are helpful to this court. For ease of reference I adopt his summary contained in paragraph 40 of his decision as follows:

[40] Courts have considered various factors when considering whether the equalization payment is to be satisfied by way of a pension transfer:

i. where the employment pension was the most significant asset owned by the parties and it was the only method by which the applicant would realize the equalization payment owed to her, the court ordered a transfer by pension rollover (O’Kane v. O’Kane, 2013 ONSC 1617);

ii. where neither party had much in the way of liquids assets; over half of the wife’s net family property was related to her future pension; the pension was to be locked in for many years and not liquid in either party’s hands; the husband had no pension or provision for retirement savings; and if the pension was not divided at source, the wife would have to deplete almost all her liquid assets to satisfy the equalization payment, the court ordered equalization by way of a pension transfer (Spurgeon v. Spurgeon, 2016 ONSC 14);

iii. where the applicant’s pension constituted a great portion of her net family property, both parties were in their early 40s, and the court was satisfied that each of the parties would be able to meet their needs in retirement; and the equalization payment of $35,660 represented only one quarter of the net proceeds of sale which the wife was to receive upon this matrimonial home being sold, leaving her with over $100,000 to invest in a new home, the court refused to order the equalization satisfied by way of a pension transfer (VanderWal);

iv. where there was a young child residing with the pension holder; the pension transfer would require the non-pension holder to pay an equalization of $55,000 which could significantly impact the type of residence that she could afford; and a cash payment would require the pension holder to provide a small amount to satisfy the equalization and both parties would come out of the relationship at roughly the same amount of cash, placing them in equal liquidity, the court ordered a cash equalization (Jackson v. Mayerle, 2016 ONSC 72); and

v. the pension holder cannot force the other spouse to accept a deferred payment of a share of his pension to ease his own liquidity position in the face of the clear words of section 9(1) of the Family Law Act (Tupholme v. Tupholme, 2013 ONSC 4268).

[45] On review of caselaw on this issue, one of the main considerations is whether the pension holder has access to any other liquid assets. This can impact the determination both ways, in that there will likely not be other assets available to satisfy the Equalization obligation, but the Payor can then be left with no liquid assets and the recipient with all.

DISCUSSION

[46] As indicated above, the parties agree that the Respondent is prima facie entitled to receive his proceeds of sale, as a joint owner of the Matrimonial Home.

[47] The parties are also in agreement that the Respondent will owe the Applicant an Equalization payment. I will assume, for the purposes of this Motion, that the Equalization obligation will be at minimum, $260,000.

[48] It is not disputed that the only secure sources of payment of the Equalization entitlement are the proceeds of sale of the Matrimonial Home or the Respondent's OMERS Pension.

[49] The issue is whether the Applicant is entitled to a preservation order/restraining order, pursuant to Sections 12 and 40 of the Family Law Act, to protect her Equalization entitlement pending trial.

[50] Following from Fraser v. Fraser and Bronfman v. Bronfman, I consider the following factors:

(a) Strength of claim;

(b) Possibility of irreparable harm; and

(c) Balance of convenience

Strength of Claim

[51] This factor considers the relative strength of the claim made by the party seeking the order, and whether they have shown that there is a serious issue to be tried.

[52] This factor is not in dispute and both parties agree that the Applicant will be entitled to an Equalization payment; the issue to be tried is the quantum. As indicated above, while the quantum of the Equalization is an issue, the approximate range is known. I am assuming a minimum of $260,000.

[53] I note that the reason the quantum is not particularly contentious is that the two main assets are easily valued; the Matrimonial Home by the sale price close to separation and the Respondent's pension through the Family Law Valuation.

Possibility of Irreparable Harm

[54] This factor looks at whether the party seeking the injunctive relief has demonstrated that they will suffer irreparable harm if the requested relief is not granted.

[55] In this case the Applicant's Equalization is not in jeopardy. She will receive her entitlement whether I grant the Respondent's relief or not. The question is whether the payment will be wholly in cash, from the proceeds of sale of the Matrimonial Home, or partially or wholly by way of a transfer from the Respondent's pension. These possibilities are not disputed.

[56] I do not find that Applicant has shown that she will suffer irreparable harm to her claim, should the proceeds of sale be released to the Respondent.

[57] While s. 9 of the Act provides for an immediate entitlement to the Applicant and an immediate liability to the Respondent, the section does not prescribe how the payment is to be made. There is authority to provide security for the entitlement or the transfer of property to satisfy the entitlement, or to provide for payment over a period of up to 10 years.

[58] Generally, absent the specific provisions allowing for security for the entitlement or the transfer of property, it is either up to the parties to agree to the form of payment or up to the recipient to enforce the order.

[59] Irreparable harm, in my view, would involve proof that without the preservation order sought, the Applicant would be at risk of not receiving her entitlement. In this case, there is almost near certainty that without the order sought by the Applicant, she would still receive her full Equalization entitlement. This would occur either by way of a lump sum transfer from the Respondent's pension, or by way of some other payment arrangement determined by the Court or the parties, following trial.

[60] I do not find the potential delay to the Applicant, in receiving her entitlement, to represent irreparable harm. She has received her half of the share of the proceeds of sale already, and will receive further funds, as provided by the terms of this Order. The potential of receiving part of her entitlement upon her retirement, I find, does not represent a risk to her entitlement. The Act specifically envisions, through s. 10.1, that in appropriate circumstances receipt of an Equalization entitlement can be delayed.

[61] I am not, of course, making a finding at this stage, of the form of Equalization order that would be made at trial. I am finding, however, that the potential for a lump sum transfer from the Respondent's pension does not constitute irreparable harm in these particular circumstances, in my consideration under s. 12.

[62] I do find, however, that my order today should include protection of the Applicant's claim to outstanding costs and arrears and proposed claim for retro-active support. These claims cannot be satisfied through a transfer from the Respondent's pension. There is a good chance that the Respondent will not have any other source from which to satisfy these liabilities, if all of his proceeds are released to him.

Balance of Convenience

[63] This factor invites a consideration of the impact of my decision on each party. It asks, "which party will suffer the greater harm from granting or refusing the requested relief, pending a decision on the merits."

[64] This is the factor I find most relevant in the present case. As with many cases, the Respondent's accumulated pension entitlement makes up the majority of his "net family property", aside from his interest in the jointly owned home. While he has a significant entitlement to a future income steam in retirement, he has no access to that fund as a liquid asset.

[65] Aside from his interest in the Matrimonial Home the Respondent has no other "liquid assets", from which to meet his increased needs resulting from the separation of the family. Like the Applicant, he has a wish to acquire ownership in a home, and to pay some of his debts, particularly to his family. The Applicant sought, and was granted, access to her equity in the home, to allow her to satisfy at least some of the debt incurred as a result of the separation. In my view, fairness, or the balancing of interests, would suggest that the Respondent have that opportunity as well, but only to the extent that the Applicant's interests are protected.

[66] As indicated above, while I am not making a determination of Equalization at this interim stage, it is helpful to consider the factors set out in both the caselaw and in s.10.1(4) of the Act, as to when courts may find a pension division appropriate.

[67] On my review of these sources, one of the main factors is the proportion of the Respondent's Net Family Property, consisting of the imputed value of his interest in his pension plan. When, like here, the Equalization payment results almost entirely from the Respondent's pension, fairness may require a more equitable sharing of the nature of assets and not just the value of the assets. I find this sharing could be achieved with the Respondent receiving some his share in the matrimonial home, at the present time, and the Applicant sharing in the deferred receipt of the benefit of the second main asset, the pension. The parties are of similar age (41 and 42 respectively) and will presumably wait a relatively similar period of time to access their pension asset.

[68] I find that a fair balancing of interests under these factors, would see the Respondent sharing in some of the liquid assets accumulated by the family, in the form of his equity in the Matrimonial Home.

[69] While this sharing could also be sought, and potentially granted at trial, the proceeds have been held for almost three years and there is no guarantee that the matter will be reached in February, given the volume of cases awaiting trial. The Respondent has a need now; including payment of legal costs to advance his case in this proceeding, and to pay costs owing by him.

[70] Based on the above considerations I grant the Respondent's request, in part, and I grant the Applicant's request, in part, in the terms of my order below.

[71] I view success to be divided on these Motions. However, there may be Offers to Settle or other factors which could impact the issue of costs. As such if the parties are not able to resolve the issue of costs, I will consider written submissions as set out below.

ORDER

[72] For the above reasons an order will issue:

1. That the Applicant shall immediately be paid from the proceeds of sale of the Matrimonial Home, the amount of $28,059.70, or such other amount presently owing by the Respondent to the Applicant, for arrears in child and/or spousal support under the August 24, 2022 Order, and outstanding costs.

2. That the Respondent shall immediately be paid from the proceeds of sale of the Matrimonial Home, the amount of $150,000.

3. That the remaining proceeds of sale shall continue to be held in trust, pending further court order or the written agreement of the parties.

4. In the event that the parties are not able to resolve the issue of costs of the Motions, written submissions may be forwarded as follows:

a. The Respondent shall serve and file submissions within 15 days;

b. The Applicant shall serve and file submissions within 15 days thereafter;

c. The Respondent shall serve and file any reply submissions within five days;

d. Submissions shall be restricted to two pages, double spaced and 12-point font, not including Bills of Costs and any relevant Offers to Settle. Reply submissions shall be restricted to one page.

“Justice Sharon E. Hassan”

Justice Sharon E. Hassan

Date: July 14, 2023