Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CV-19-3031 Date: 2023-06-02 Superior Court of Justice – Ontario

Re: Karen Dalton, Plaintiff And: Carolyn Woszczyna and RGA Psychological and Counselling Services, Defendants

Before: Justice Spencer Nicholson

Counsel: Plaintiff, self-represented E. O’Dwyer and V. McCorkindale for the Defendants

Heard: March 14, 2023

Reasons on Motion

NICHOLSON J.:

[1] The Defendants bring this motion to dismiss the Plaintiff’s action under rules 57.03(2) and 60.12 of the Rules of Civil Procedure owing to her failure to pay costs awarded against her in two separate court Orders.

[2] In these Reasons, when I use “Defendants” I am referring to the moving parties, or one of them. When I use “defendants” I am referring to the defendants that were previously involved in the litigation but have been released from this action, plus the moving parties.

[3] The first costs Order relates to a motion to set aside the noting in default of the defendants. In his Order dated January 14, 2020, Garson J. ordered the Plaintiff to pay the Defendants $2,500.00 in costs. Costs awards were also made in favour of the other defendants, totalling a further $7,500.00.

[4] The defendants filed a motion to strike the Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim. By Endorsement dated February 4, 2022, (Dalton v. Woszczyna et al, 2022 ONSC 826) Heeney J. dismissed the Plaintiff’s claims against all of the defendants, save and except for a claim of defamation against the Defendants. The Plaintiff was ordered to serve and file a Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim (“FAASC”), confined to the claim of defamation.

[5] Following written submissions with respect to costs, Heeney J. awarded costs to the Defendants in the amount of $10,000. That award was made on May 18, 2022.

[6] The Plaintiff has not paid any amount towards costs to the Defendants. The outstanding awards total $12,500.00 plus interest.

Nature and History of the Proceedings

[7] I set out the nature of the proceedings, as the history will impact my decision on this motion. The following history is taken largely from the Endorsement of Justice Heeney.

[8] The Plaintiff’s action relates to her “employment” with the Defendants, although I use the word employment imprecisely. In her Statement of Claim, she had originally alleged negligence, misrepresentation, breach of contract and defamation. She claimed damages totalling $10,500,000.00 plus interest and costs.

[9] The Defendant, Carolyn Woszczyna, is a registered psychotherapist and is the sole proprietor of the corporate Defendant, RGA Psychological and Counselling Services. The Plaintiff, a professional therapeutic counsellor, rented space from the Defendants and provided counselling services to patients assigned to her by Woszczyna. These services were under the supervision of various clinical psychologists, who were the other defendants now released from the action.

[10] The professional relationship between the Plaintiff and all of the defendants ended in April of 2017. On May 15, 2017, the Plaintiff sued almost all of the defendants in Small Claims Court. That claim was settled with the Defendants in September of 2017, and a Final Release was signed in their favour. The Small Claims Court claim against the remaining defendants was administratively dismissed on October 19, 2019 because it was not advanced by the Plaintiff.

[11] The Plaintiff also made complaints against the defendants with the College of Psychologists of Ontario (“CPO”) alleging professional misconduct in relation to the supervision arrangement. Those complaints were investigated and disposed of by the CPO. The Plaintiff requested a review of the investigative decisions, which were upheld by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board.

[12] The Plaintiff also initiated separate complaints against Woszczyna with the College of Registered Psychotherapists of Ontario (“CRPO”) in January 2018, raising similar allegations to the ones made in the action commenced against the defendants. The CRPO issued a decision addressing those allegations on October 17, 2019.

[13] On April 5, 2018, the Plaintiff initiated a complaint with the Ministry of Labour against the Defendants under s. 50 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act, making allegations that Heeney J. described as being similar to the ones in in the lawsuit against the defendants. These claims were mediated on May 25, 2018. The Plaintiff was paid $9,000 and signed a Full and Final Release in favour of the Defendants.

[14] On July 12, 2018, the Plaintiff initiated a complaint to the Employment Standards Branch of the Ministry of Labour against one of the defendants, Knutt, and her professional corporation. That claim was denied by the Employment Standards Officer. An appeal by the Plaintiff to the Ontario Labour Relations Board was abandoned in June 2019.

[15] In October of 2018, the Plaintiff filed a complaint against two of the defendants with the Stratford Police Services, alleging fraud and other criminal activity related to the supervision arrangement. An investigation was completed with no charges being laid.

[16] The within action was commenced against all the defendants on September 26, 2019. The claim sought damages of $2.5 million against the Defendants, and $5 million as against all the defendants. The FAASC that was considered by Heeney J. was notably 41 pages in length, consisting of 148 paragraphs and 42 exhibits.

[17] Heeney J. described the claim at para. 22 of his Endorsement as follows:

[22] All of the claims relate directly to the professional relationship and the supervision agreement that the plaintiff had with the defendants Woszczyna, RGA, Rider, Knutt and her professional corporation, which ended in April 2017. The sole exception is an allegation, found in paras. 92 and 94 of the FAASC, that Woszczyna defamed the plaintiff in a telephone call to the College of Registered Psychotherapists of Ontario on August 28, 2017, and again in a letter to the College dated September 12, 2017. These communications arose by reason of the plaintiff’s application for admission to the College. The College contacted Woszczyna for a reference and, in response to specific questions posed by the College, she provided details of her history with the plaintiff, as well her opinion as to the plaintiff’s character and competence as a psychotherapist. The College ultimately denied the plaintiff’s application.

[18] Heeney J. was satisfied that the FAASC was an attempt to relitigate the same claims that were made in the Small Claims Court action commenced by the Plaintiff. The only exception was the defamation claim as against the Defendants. He thus dismissed the claims, except the defamation claim, as an abuse of process.

[19] Heeney J. also considered the Full and Final Releases to be a bar to the proceedings, except the defamation claim.

[20] Most importantly, Heeney J. described the proceedings as also being “vexatious, given that the plaintiff has been serially litigating against the same parties, in multiple forums, over essentially the same facts and after settlements had been reached” (at para. 40 of his Endorsement).

[21] Heeney J.’s Endorsement on Costs (Dalton v. Woszczyna et al, 2022 ONSC 3011) is dated May 18, 2022. He considered the rule 57.01 factors. In particular, he referenced the Plaintiff’s personal attacks on the reputations of the defendants. He also noted the arguments of the Plaintiff that she was impecunious, that the defendants knew from the outset that she was impecunious and yet proceeded with their motion to strike in any event such that they should be denied their costs. Justice Heeney wrote of this argument, “[t]his is no answer”.

[22] I note that the Defendants claimed costs in the all-inclusive amount of $15,000, despite having actual costs of $33,675. Heeney J. found that the time expended by counsel for the Defendants to be reasonable given the complexity of the issues. Costs were awarded to the Defendants in the amount of $10,000.

[23] The other defendants were awarded costs totalling $50,000.

[24] The defendants have written many times to the Plaintiff over the course of this litigation. I note the following samples of the correspondence:

• November 19, 2019—advising the Plaintiff that the Defendants believed that her action was an abuse of process and statute barred and providing her an opportunity to withdraw the claim failing which the rule 21 motion would be brought. That letter also specifically requested that the Plaintiff not take any steps to note their client in default. The Plaintiff promptly did just that the very next day, necessitating the motion to set aside the noting in default and resulting in the first costs award.
• September 21, 2020—advising that the deadline by which to pay the first costs award was November 9, 2020.
• December 19, 2020—again inquiring as to when the Plaintiff was going to pay the costs awarded against her. The Plaintiff replied that “she did not have the money to pay the costs.”
• February 16, 2022—inquiring as to when the Plaintiff was going to pay the first costs order. The plaintiff responded that “any costs will force me into bankruptcy. I do not have an income, nor do I have any assets. Zero. You will not be able to collect anything from me which I made very clear in the motion hearing”.
• February 28, 2022—demanding that the Plaintiff address the outstanding costs and warning her of the within motion and rules 57.03 and 60.12. The Plaintiff suggested that the Defendants owed costs of the Heeney J. motion, which had not yet been decided, which would offset any costs she owed to the Defendants. Counsel for the Defendants suggested that the Plaintiff seek legal advice. The Plaintiff responded “I advise you to back off, file your Defence, and wait for the Justice Heeney’s decision about costs instead of sending me aggressive emails. You are out of line.”
• May 18, 2022—inquiring as to when the Plaintiff would be paying both the first and second costs awards and again referring to rules 57.03 and 60.12. The Plaintiff replied that she was waiting to hear back from her Trustee as the “claim is part of my Estate and all the creditors have a right to it”. This eventually led the Defendants’ counsel to inquire as to when the Plaintiff declared bankruptcy. The Plaintiff refused to provide the contact information for her Trustee and refused to advise when she had been declared bankrupt. On June 1, 2022, the Plaintiff threatened to file a report to the Law Society if Defendants’ counsel did not “stop harassing me”.

[25] I should point out that I see nothing contained within counsel for the Defendants’ correspondence that should concern the Law Society. Other than setting out his position on these issues forcefully, he was not unprofessional or impolite. He was not overly aggressive in the circumstances.

Position of the Parties on the Within Motion

[26] As noted, the Defendants rely upon rules 57.03 and 60.12. Those rules provide as follows:

57.03 (1) On the hearing of a contested motion, unless the court is satisfied that a different order would be more just, the court shall,

(a) Fix the costs of the motion and order them to be paid within 30 days; or

(b) In an exceptional case, refer the costs of the motion for assessment under rule 58 and order them to be paid within 30 days after assessment.

(2) Where a party fails to pay the costs of a motion as required under subrule (1), the court may dismiss or stay the party’s proceeding, strike out the party’s defence or make such other order as is just.

60.12 Where a party fails to comply with an interlocutory order, the court may, in addition to any other sanction provided by these rules,

(a) stay the party’s proceeding;

(b) dismiss the party’s proceeding or strike out the party’s defence; or

(c) make such other order as is just.

[27] Correctly anticipating that the Plaintiff would once again raise her impecuniosity in this motion, the Defendants argue that while impecuniosity is a factor, it must be balanced against the other factors, including fairness to the other parties. The Defendants submit that the Plaintiff continues to abuse the process of the court by asking for substantive relief but expecting not to pay costs awards along the way. The Defendants further point out that the Plaintiff, rather than indicating a willingness but inability to pay the costs awards, takes issue with the awards being made against her at all. Thus, it is argued that the Plaintiff is essentially thumbing her nose at the administration of justice.

[28] The Plaintiff argues that she is impecunious and that her impecuniosity should not result in the dismissal of her action.

[29] I have read the Plaintiff’s three affidavits with care, and with allowances recognizing that she is self-represented. Much of the affidavits is dedicated to voicing offence with respect to Defendants’ counsel’s correspondence. As I stated earlier, her offence with respect to the tone of the correspondence is misplaced. The correspondence was not “aggressive” in a manner that gives me any concern.

[30] The Plaintiff also complains about the Defendants unilaterally selecting the return date of this motion to be argued on a day in which she said she was unavailable. In any event, the motion was adjourned to accommodate her from November 2022 to March 2023. Those circumstances offer no valid defence to the motion.

[31] In her affidavit material, the Plaintiff describes that this matter needs to be “seen and handled by” her Trustee. She also describes herself as an undischarged person with a Trustee. Later she describes herself as insolvent.

[32] The Plaintiff describes counsel for the Defendants as “dishonest” and “unscrupulous”. It should be noted that she had made similar allegations of aggressiveness and disrespectfulness on the part of counsel for other defendants in her costs submissions to Heeney J. She described another counsel as acting dishonestly and disrespectfully. I reiterate my comments that there is no correspondence before me that suggests that any of the lawyers involved were unprofessional with the Plaintiff. To the contrary, the lawyers wrote to the Plaintiff in a manner that was clearly intended to inform her of her obligations. It was the Plaintiff’s correspondence that included inappropriate and inflammatory language, as well as her submissions to the court. She made personal attacks upon the integrity of the various lawyers.

[33] In that regard, in his Endorsement on Costs, Heeney J. justified the imposition of significant costs from the many accusations made by the Plaintiff against counsel of unprofessional conduct and dishonesty, up to and including in her written submissions on costs. He described the allegations as being entirely without foundation, scandalous and defamatory, and deserving of the sanction of the court.

[34] With respect to her impecuniosity, the Plaintiff states that as a result of the alleged defamation, she has not been able to obtain employment in her profession since 2017. She has made a Consumer Proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. She also returned to school as the alleged defamation made it impossible for her to obtain employment as a counsellor. She has obtained employment as a house cleaner. She has moved from Ontario to pursue school and alternative employment. She has incurred significant debt to attend school.

[35] The Plaintiff has attached her income tax returns for several years. In 2022, her net income was $6,938. Her husband’s income arises from government benefits, in the amount of $619 per month.

[36] Finally, within her affidavit, the Plaintiff addresses the merits of her claim of defamation against the Defendants. She alleges that the same defamatory letter was published twice and that there is evidence to establish that the defamatory statements are not true.

[37] The Plaintiff makes considerable reference to having raised her own impecuniosity with the court from the outset. She indicates that she informed Justice Garson of her impecuniosity during the motion to set aside the default judgment and that he ordered a case conference “to determine the viability of the claim since I had no legal counsel and no money”.

[38] As an aside, despite being advised of her impecuniosity, Garson J. did order $10,000 in costs as against her on the motion to set aside default judgment.

[39] The Plaintiff deposes that at the case conference held on February 25, 2020, before Leach J., her impecuniosity was discussed. She refers to Leach J.’s endorsement and highlights the following comment attributed to Justice Leach:

“The defendants agree that any request for security costs will not be advised by way of a preliminary issue (e.g. before the hearing dates and motions of other matters) but only as part of the settlement relief sought. Primarily it is the alternative in relation to their motions challenging the Plaintiff’s pleadings”.

[40] The Plaintiff takes the position that the purpose of the case conference was to “determine the viability of proceeding due to my impecuniosity. It was an opportunity for the defendants to stop the claim from proceeding by demonstrating the claim was not viable for all the reasons Justice Garson was concerned about, primarily impecuniosity and complexity of the claim with no legal representation”.

Application of the Relevant Legal Principles

[41] The Ontario Court of Appeal, in Tarion Warranty Corporation v. 1486448 Ontario Inc., 2012 ONCA 288 described that while standing alone, lack of funds cannot justify a failure to pay costs, evidence of impecuniosity is a factor to be taking into consideration by the court. The goal is to strike a balance, keeping in mind the preference to have potentially meritorious claims adjudicated upon, between allowing claims to proceed in the face of a failure to comply and enforcing court orders.

[42] The decisions relied upon by the Defendants require me to consider the possibility that the court’s process is being abused and that by failing to engage rule 57.03, the court may deprive the moving party of justice according to law. Impecunious litigants are not granted “carte blanche to continue to ignore the rules and orders of the court and take unsupportable steps in the action without fear of consequences” (see: Rana v. Unifund Assurance Company, 2016 ONSC 2502 per Dunphy J. at para. 50).

[43] Justice Dunphy in Rana also noted that the court could have regard to a pattern of unnecessary and unreasonable steps taken in the proceeding, including appealing numerous orders without chance of success or knowing the risk thereby imposing costs upon the other party. In that regard, it cannot be overlooked that Heeney J. make the entirely supportable comment that the Plaintiff’s proceedings were “vexatious”.

[44] In summing up the relevant legal principles, Dunphy J. referred to two particularly apt ones. The first is that impecuniosity is not a shield for unreasonable conduct of litigation and a dismissal order may be made even if it resolves the matter on procedural rather than substantive grounds. Secondly, he noted that self-represented litigants, while entitled to some accommodation and assistance to ensure a fair hearing, are not entitled to abuse the system or the party opposed and failure to enforce orders once made against self-represented parties is unfair to the parties opposed and undermines respect for the court and the civil justice system. Dunphy J. referenced Baradaran v. Tarion Corp, 2014 ONSC 6870 and Baradaran v. Tarion Corp., 2015 ONSC 7892 among other cases for those propositions.

[45] It must be kept in mind that in Rana, supra, the plaintiff’s actions were offensive in the extreme. For example, she accused several judges of corruption.

[46] I also note the germane comment by Firestone RSJ, in Apollo Real Estate v. Streambank Funding Inc., 2018 ONSC 392, at para. 47:

[47] To allow impecuniosity to be used as a shield against cost sanctions would mean “that a plaintiff could bring, resist, or appeal motions with no fear of consequences, and would emasculate the powers provided in rules 57.03(2) and 60.12”: Baksh v. Sun Media (Toronto) Corp. (2003), 63 O.R. (3d) 51 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 19 (per Master Dash).

[47] The Plaintiff submitted a number of cases for the court’s review.

[48] In Walsh v. 1124660 Ontario Limited et al, Lane J. noted that costs awards that can bankrupt an ordinary person pose a risk of undermining confidence in the justice system. He described that the loser-pay costs system can act as a serious barrier to justice, deterring both deserving and frivolous cases. Ultimately, Lane J. opined that the court could take impecuniosity into account in determining costs. This is obviously consistent with the decision by the Court of Appeal in Tarion Warranty, supra.

[49] Browne v. Toronto Star Newspaper Limited, 2015 ONSC 2376, is a case in which the defendant sought security for costs in a libel and slander action. It is not particularly relevant to the issues before me as this is not a motion for security for costs, it is a motion to enforce costs awards already obtained. The case does discuss impecuniosity, which is a well-known factor relevant in security for costs motions.

[50] Similarly, the cases of Gamble v. Lakeside Inn, 2012 ONSC 3404, Chachula v. Baillie and Ahimakin v. Dorimain et al, 2019 ONSC 434 are decisions arising from motions for security for costs. Again, impecuniosity is a factor for the court to consider under rule 56. Gamble includes a helpful discussion as to what constitutes being “impecunious”.

[51] Francis v. Leo A. Seydel Limited o/a Canadian Tire Associate Store #126, is an example of a decision from a motion under rule 57.03(2). It is entirely consistent with the other cases referred to in regards the court’s discretion to take into account impecuniosity when determining whether to dismiss an action for failing to pay costs awards.

[52] Imeson v. Maryvale, 2021 ONSC 5289 is readily distinguishable. First of all, Master Jolley had concerns that rules 57.03 (2) and 60.12 were even available, given that the costs award in issue arose from an appeal, as opposed to an interlocutory motion. However, it was also noted that dismissing the action on that basis would be counter to the direction by the Court of Appeal in that case that there be a new trial. She also noted that the costs orders in issue were not in the nature of sanctions for improper behaviour. In the case before me, Justice Heeney was undeniably sanctioning the Plaintiff’s behaviour when he awarded costs of the motion.

[53] Guergis v. Novak, 2013 ONCA 449, and Grant v. Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61 are defamation cases. I am not weighing in on the merits of the Plaintiff’s defamation case on this motion. I cannot consider it either certain of success or doomed to failure.

Discussion

[54] I am satisfied that the Plaintiff is impecunious, although I am unclear as to what role any Trustee may currently have or if she is actually in the process of making a consumer proposal. The Plaintiff clearly cannot afford to be engaged in this litigation unless she is completely shielded from costs consequences.

[55] However, that does not end the analysis. Impecuniosity is only a factor for the court to consider. In this case, I am not satisfied that the Plaintiff’s impecuniosity justifies a reprieve from the costs awards made against her.

[56] I share Justice Heeney’s views that the Plaintiff’s ongoing litigation bears all the hallmarks of vexatious litigation. The court must not only consider the Plaintiff’s perspective, but the Defendants’ perspective. The Defendant moving parties, and the defendants who have previously been released from this action, have incurred significant legal expenses that are apparently going to go unrecovered. None of these defendants are large institutions that can easily bear these legal expenses, although that factor ought not to be determinative. In my view it would be manifestly unfair for the Defendants to have to continue to expend their resources to defend themselves unless the Plaintiff also bears negative consequences from the choices she is making in this litigation.

[57] Unlike the defendants, the Plaintiff is not incurring actual legal expenses, because she is self-represented. Being self-represented and impecunious does not grant a litigant a license to take positions during interlocutory motions without regard to their aftermath.

[58] Respectfully, I do not accept the Plaintiff’s arguments concerning the case conference. It cannot be that Leach J. made some sweeping pronouncement that the Plaintiff would never be required to pay costs of the proceeding or interlocutory matters within the proceeding. That is not the type of order that the court generally makes. I cannot interpret Leach J.’s endorsement as having done so. I also cannot discern from his endorsement that the defendants for some reason waived costs of the proceedings in the event that they were the successful parties. It appears that the defendants simply advised Justice Leach that they would not be pursuing their motion for security for costs at that time and intended to pursue the motion to strike the pleadings instead.

[59] First of all, Leach J’s endorsement is handwritten. The Plaintiff’s interpretation of his handwriting is not correct, in my view, and she has not accurately transcribed it in her motion material. Leach J. stated as follows:

“The defendants agree that any request for 2 and 3 security for costs will not be advanced by way of a preliminary issue, (e.g. before the hearing and determination of other motion), but only as part of the substantive relief sought primarily or in the alternative in relation to the motions challenging the Plaintiff’s pleading.”

[60] This must be read in context of the remainder of his endorsement. “2” and “3” refer to the two prior paragraphs in his endorsement. In paragraph “2” the defendants agreed not to challenge the Plaintiff’s ability to rely upon her FAASC as opposed to the original statement of claim. In fact, Leach J. preserved the defendants’ right to pursue costs thrown away in that paragraph. Paragraph “3” dealt with all of the issues being before the same judge to avoid inconsistent verdicts.

[61] There is nothing in Leach J.’s endorsement that would in any way preclude the defendants from pursuing any costs that were awarded to them or relieve the Plaintiff from any adverse costs consequences of being unsuccessful on these motions. Any understanding to the contrary was erroneous.

[62] I do not understand how the Plaintiff can argue that the motion to strike could have been completely avoided by the defendants. The defendants had concerns with the claims brought against them and successfully moved to strike those claims. The correspondence demonstrates that the Plaintiff was given an opportunity to agree to dismiss the claims. She chose not to. No fault can be made as against the defendants, who were successful on their motion. That motion was successful because the Plaintiff’s position was wrong in law, not because she was impecunious.

[63] Furthermore, the Plaintiff has continued her disparagement of counsel, fitting the pattern in which she pursued the defendants in this case. It was entirely inappropriate to make threats of reporting lawyers to the Law Society. Nothing about their correspondence was offensive or out of the ordinary. It is apparent from the material that she also coupled threats of reporting the defendants to their Colleges with suggestions that they settle with her.

[64] This is not a case in which the Plaintiff has not had her day in court. To the contrary, she has pursued countless administrative tribunal proceedings and court actions in relation to the events that transpired between these parties. I recognize that the alleged defamation was not necessarily the subject matter of any of the previous “litigation”, but this pattern of litigation must either be funded in part by the Plaintiff when she is unsuccessful, or come to an end.

[65] To order otherwise, in my view, would be to allow the Plaintiff to flout the procedural mechanisms of the administration of justice. I agree with counsel for the Defendants—the Plaintiff seeks a remedy from the court but is unwilling to abide by the court’s orders made against her.

[66] Thus, this is a far different case than in Walsh, supra. This matter is not so much about access to justice. The Plaintiff has had access to justice before several tribunals and this Court. In this case, the integrity of the justice system requires that if the Plaintiff continues to want access to the system, she must address these outstanding costs awards.

[67] For those reasons, I order that the Plaintiff’s statement of claim be struck out and her action dismissed unless she pays the outstanding costs amount of $12,500 to the Defendants by no later than 4:00 pm on September 8, 2023. This does not include interest, which is not waived but which is not required to be paid by that deadline in order to preserve the action.

[68] Should the costs of $12,500 remain unpaid past September 8, 2023, the Defendants shall be permitted to file a requisition with a copy of the Order emanating from these Reasons and entitled to an order dismissing the action without further motion to the court. A brief affidavit certifying that the costs remain unpaid should be appended to the requisition.

[69] I dispense with the need for the Plaintiff to approve the form and content of the draft Order arising from these Reasons, but the draft Order should be provided to me through the trial coordinator, copied to the Plaintiff.

Costs

[70] I invited costs submissions at the end of the oral argument. The Defendants have been the successful party on this motion. On a partial indemnity basis, they claim to have incurred a further $12,639 and suggested an award of $7,500 in respect of the motion.

[71] I am mindful of the Plaintiff’s impecuniosity, a factor which I agree can factor in on my discretion in awarding costs. However, once again, I am not prepared to permit the Plaintiff’s impecuniosity to only inflict costs consequences on the Defendants when they are the successful party.

[72] Costs of the motion fixed at $3,500.00, all-inclusive. These are not required to be paid by the deadline to preserve the action, but are payable on or before October 1, 2023 should the action continue.

Justice S. Nicholson Justice Spencer Nicholson Date: June 2, 2023