Court File and Parties
COURT FILE NO.: 21-129 DATE: 20230223 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN: HIS MAJESTY THE KING – and – ABAD ABDI SHIRE Defendant
Counsel: Hanieh Azimi for the Crown Alexandra Mamo for Mr. Shire
HEARD: February 23, 2023
Reasons for Sentence
C. Boswell J. (Orally)
[1] Mr. Shire was convicted by a jury on January 26, 2023 of the second degree murder of Ryan Babineau.
[2] I am obliged to impose a sentence of life imprisonment pursuant to the provisions of s. 235(1) of the Criminal Code. I have no discretion in that regard. I do have a discretion under s. 745(c) of the Code to fix the period of parole ineligibility at anywhere between 10 and 25 years.
[3] Counsel made submissions this morning on the appropriate period of parole ineligibility.
[4] The Crown urges the court to impose a period of ineligibility of 18-20 years. Mr. Shire’s counsel urges the court to impose an period of ineligibility in the range of 12-14 years.
The Fundamental Principles of Sentencing
[5] In crafting a just and fit sentence, even where the sole issue is the period of parole ineligibility, the court must have regard to the fundamental principles and purposes of sentencing. Long known to the common law, these principles are, for the most part, codified now in the Criminal Code.
[6] Section 718 of the Criminal Code provides that the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives: the denunciation of unlawful conduct, deterrence - both general and specific, the separation of the offender from society where necessary, rehabilitation, reparation for harm done to the victims and the community, and the promotion of a sense of responsibility in offenders and an acknowledgment of the harm done.
[7] No one sentencing objective trumps the others. In each case, the weight to be put on the individual objectives varies depending on the facts and circumstances of the offence and of the offender. In this instance, there is no dispute that deterrence, denunciation and the separation of the offender from the community are of particular importance.
[8] Section 718.1 expresses the fundamental principle of sentencing: a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.
[9] Proportionality engages two concepts: censure and restraint. As Lebel J. explained in R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, at para. 37:
Proportionality is the sine qua non of a just sanction. First, the principle ensures that a sentence reflects the gravity of the offence. This is closely tied to the objective of denunciation. It promotes justice for victims and ensures public confidence in the justice system…Second, the principle of proportionality ensures that a sentence does not exceed what is appropriate, given the moral blameworthiness of the offender. In this sense, the principle serves a limiting or restraining function and ensures justice for the offender. In the Canadian criminal justice system, a just sanction is one that reflects both perspectives on proportionality and does not elevate one at the expense of the other.
[10] The concept of proportionality compels courts to treat like cases alike and to recognize where there are material differences between different offenders and different offences. Section 718(2)(b) of the Code specifically provides that “a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances”.
[11] Having said that, proportionality, as a guiding sentencing principle, must be considered through an individualized lens. As former Chief Justice McLachlin described it in R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15, at para. 43,
…[I]mposing a proportionate sentence is a highly individualized exercise, tailored to the gravity of the offence, the blameworthiness of the offender, and the harm caused by the crime…
[12] Distinguishing one case from another involves a careful consideration of the circumstances of the offender as well as the presence of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See s. 718.2(a) of the Code.
Discussion
[13] The sole issue to be determined with respect to Mr. Shire’s sentence is the period of parole ineligibility.
[14] Section 745.4 of the Criminal Code enumerates some of the factors the court should consider in exercising its discretion to fix the period of parole ineligibility. They include the character of the offender, the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission, and the recommendations, if any, made by the jurors. I will consider each of these factors in turn, as well as the impact of the offence. I begin with the circumstances of the offence.
The Circumstances of the Offence
[15] Jurors do not provide reasons for their decisions. We do not, in the result, know exactly what facts the jury relied upon to come to their finding of guilt. Clearly, they concluded that Mr. Shire participated in the killing of Mr. Babineau either as a principal or as an aider and that he had the requisite state of mind to make him culpable for murder.
[16] Sentencing judges must, of necessity, come to certain conclusions about the facts of the case. The Supreme Court’s ruling in R. v. Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6 provides comprehensive guidance on a sentencing judge’s role in fact-finding. In particular, it is not necessary that I arrive at a complete theory of the facts. I need only determine those facts that are necessary for sentencing. In doing so, I am bound by the express or implied factual implications of the jury’s verdict. But I am otherwise entitled to come to my own independent conclusions about the facts relevant to sentencing. Where I rely on a fact that is of an aggravating nature, I must be satisfied of the existence of that fact to the reasonable doubt standard. Other facts are to be determined on a balance of probabilities standard.
[17] I begin with a simple conclusion: the facts and circumstances of this case are egregious.
[18] Mr. Shire, together with two other males – Cory Greavette and Tyler Wren – attended at the residence of a common associate – Glenn Germaney – early in the morning of November 16, 2019. Mr. Germaney lived roughly ten minutes by car from a residence on Dunlop Street, Barrie where Ryan Babineau was staying. Mr. Shire was in a state of heightened agitation and mumbling something about “respect” and “nobody touches family”. He and his companions did not stay long. One of them took the keys to Mr. Germaney’s car, which in fact was a rental vehicle. On the way out the door, Mr. Shire instructed Mr. Germaney to tell the police the car was stolen while he was asleep.
[19] Mr. Shire and his two companions made their way to an apartment building at 16 Dunlop Street East. They paused for a minute or so in the parking lot, then entered the building. They proceeded to apartment one where they knocked on the door. It was roughly 7:00 a.m.
[20] It is common ground that apartment one was a drug house. The tenant was a man named Alfie Benson. Mr. Benson died before the trial proceeded. A number of individuals were present in the apartment when Mr. Shire and his companions arrived. They had been doing drugs all night, including opioids. They included, in addition to Mr. Benson, Mr. Babineau, Deb Whiltshire, Jamie Bradley and Melanie Rothon.
[21] Things moved quickly when Mr. Shire and the others entered the apartment. Mr. Shire proceeded into the living room of the unit, where Mr. Babineau was standing, and began to stab him repeatedly. Mr. Babineau quickly fell to the floor, but that did not stop or deter the attack. Mr. Shire was joined in the stabbing by Mr. Greavette. In total, almost 70 stab wounds were inflicted on Mr. Babineau. Mr. Wren remained near the exit door during the attack.
[22] A pathologist testified, and I accept, that Mr. Babineau suffered 11 deep sharp force injuries and 57 superficial sharp force injuries. He quickly bled to death from his wounds.
[23] It is impossible to know which of the two attackers inflicted which blows. The sole eyewitness to testify – apart from Mr. Shire – was Melanie Rothon. She said the two attackers inflicted an equal number of blows. I find differently. I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Shire inflicted far more of the blows to Mr. Babineau than did Mr. Greavette. I make this finding on the basis of the following facts:
(a) Mr. Shire appeared to be angry at Mr. Babineau for reasons unknown. He – and not Mr. Greavette – appeared to hold an obvious animus against Mr. Babineau. Mr. Shire testified that it was Mr. Greavette who held an animus towards Mr. Babineau and that the stabbing was committed by Mr. Greavette – and Mr. Greavette alone – as revenge for Mr. Babineau having some form of sexual involvement with Mr. Greavette’s girlfriend. It is obvious that the jury rejected much of the core of Mr. Shire’s testimony, which was generally exculpatory in nature. Whether they rejected his testimony regarding Mr. Greaveatte’s motive to attack Mr. Babineau is something we cannot know. In my view, however, it was Mr. Shire and not Mr. Greavette who held an animus towards Mr. Babineau; (b) Ms. Rothon identified Mr. Shire as the one who initiated the stabbing; (c) Mr. Shire was covered in blood; so much so that he thought it necessary to change his clothes following the assault; (d) Mr. Shire suffered a significant cut to one of his hands, which I find to have been incurred during his frenzied attack on Mr. Babineau; and, (e) Mr. Greavette had little blood on him and no injuries. Given the amount of blood on the scene, the intimate nature of the attack, and the amount of blood on Mr. Shire, I find that Mr. Greavette must have played a far more limited role in the stabbing than did Mr. Shire.
[24] Following the offence, Mr. Shire and his two companions left the apartment, with Mr. Babineau dead or near dead. Mr. Shire uttered on the way out the door that if anyone said anything they would “kill their families”.
[25] The three intruders returned to Mr. Germaney’s residence where Mr. Shire obtained a change of clothing. They then left town and headed to Huntsville. They took Mr. Germaney’s rental vehicle and never returned it.
The Character of the Offender
[26] Mr. Shire is a 28-year old male. He was 25 at the time of the offence.
[27] He is one of five siblings. He and his family lived in Toronto in the Jane and Finch area until he was about 7 years old. His parents separated at that time and his mother moved with the children to Egypt. They remained in Egypt until Mr. Shire was about 14 years old. At that time they returned to Canada and settled in Ottawa, moving in with Mr. Shire’s aunt.
[28] Mr. Shire had a difficult time adjusting to school in Canada. His first language was Arabic. His family had very little money and he was teased about his clothing.
[29] His mother worked two jobs and was rarely at home. He experienced poverty and food insecurity. He dropped out of school at age 14 due to bullying and his difficulty in following the lessons.
[30] Mr. Shire and his older brother began to hang out in their neighbourhood – associating with individuals who sold drugs. The allure of the easy money associated with drug dealing took hold of Mr. Shire. He began selling drugs at age 14. He continued to do so until taken into custody for the murder of Mr. Babineau.
[31] Mr. Shire has one child, a young son, whose mother has care and control of him.
[32] At the time of the offence, Mr. Shire was living with his brother in a home on Kozlov Street in Barrie. He was continuing to make his living selling drugs – cocaine and crack cocaine in particular.
[33] Mr. Shire has a lengthy criminal record. It begins with Youth Court convictions in Ottawa in December 2011 and it continues, essentially unabated, until December 2022. There are 36 convictions in total, not including his conviction for murdering Mr. Babineau.
[34] His criminal antecedents include: four convictions for breach of probation; twelve convictions for breach of recognizance; single convictions for failing to attend court, forcible confinement, forcible entry, being unlawfully in a dwelling house, possession of a Schedule I substance for the purpose of trafficking, possession of a Schedule II substance for the purpose of trafficking, conspiracy to commit an indictable offence, and theft under $5,000; four convictions for obstructing a police officer; two robbery convictions; one conviction for assault; two convictions for assault with a weapon; and three convictions for assault causing bodily harm.
[35] I do not know what the underlying facts are with respect to any of the prior convictions. Mr. Shire’s counsel correctly pointed out, however, that he has not previously been subjected to a penitentiary sentence.
[36] Mr. Shire does not accept the jury’s verdict. He maintains the position that he did not participate in Mr. Babineau’s killing. In the result, he has taken no responsibility for the offence. When offered an opportunity to make submissions at sentencing, he declined, as is his right.
[37] I observe that Mr. Shire is a young, Black male. I note that the research literature shows that the highest rates of food insecurity in Canada are experienced by Black families. There is no longer any serious debate that systemic racism in many social institutions has tended to marginalize Black people in communities marked by poverty diminished economic and employment opportunities and a strong and aggressive police presence. See R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680.
[38] I am alive to the fact that Mr. Shire grew up in communities marked by poverty in both Toronto and Ottawa. And I am alive to the fact that his experience growing up in poverty, essentially a Black immigrant at the time he commenced high school, undoubtedly contributed to the path that his life ultimately took.
[39] Having said that, he has siblings who have not followed the same path. Whatever experiences he may have had with anti-Black or systemic racism do not impact on the gravity of the offence he committed in this instance. While those experiences can serve to mitigate moral responsibility, there must be some connection made between overt or systemic racism in the community and the events said to mitigate the criminal conduct in issue. Otherwise, mitigation becomes a discount based on the offender’s colour. There was no attempt, in this instance, to connect Mr. Shire’s conduct to any of his experiences with anti-Black racism.
The Impact of the Offence
[40] The offence had a profound impact on Mr. Babineau and those close to him.
[41] Mr. Babineau obviously lost his life.
[42] He was the father to a young girl who is now seven. Her grandmother prepared a victim impact statement on her behalf. I also received victim impact statements from Mr. Babineau’s mother, his spouse, and his siblings.
[43] The victim impact statements share common themes of anguish, heartache and loss.
[44] Chloe Babineau has lost a father. She is too young to understand why she does not have a daddy while other children do. Instead, she has a picture book to remember him by.
[45] Ines Cavaliere lost a spouse. She experienced the trauma of being told by the police that her partner had been killed. And the further trauma of being denied an opportunity to see him because his body had been mutilated. She has lost her partner in life, her best friend, the father to her young daughter. She has to live with the anguish of the manner in which he died. Her mental health has suffered and she continues to live with grief and heartache.
[46] Chantal Brunino lost a brother. She acted as the voice for Mr. Babineau’s seven siblings. She spoke of the closeness of the family and analogized her brother’s death to the loss of a limb. She has lost her sense of safety and security in her community. She has elected to move her family away from the area.
[47] Kathy Cameron lost a son. She struggled to find the words to express the excruciating anguish of losing a child to violent crime. She too has had to move from the area in an effort to escape the memories associated with her son and his death. She continues to suffer emotionally, cannot sleep and struggles with anger every day. She prays that she will find peace someday.
[48] Peter Soucies lost a stepson. He, like all other family members, commented on how impactful a loss this has been for Mr. Babineau’s daughter, Chloe. He described Ryan as a genuine, caring soul, fun-loving and generous. His loss is huge and he is deeply missed.
The Recommendations of the Jurors
[49] When asked for their recommendations with respect to the issue of parole ineligibility, four jurors made no recommendation. The balance recommended an ineligibility period of 25 years.
[50] While I am not bound by the recommendations of the jurors, I take them seriously. In this instance, they reflect the fact that two-thirds of the members of the community tasked with finding the facts of this case consider the circumstances here to be so egregious as to warrant the imposition of a period of ineligibility at the highest end of the spectrum.
Analysis
[51] Crown and defence counsel provided me with a number of cases in support of their disparate positions. I will comment on those cases briefly in a moment.
[52] The jurisprudence makes it clear that the decision regarding parole ineligibility is a very fact-specific exercise. The court’s discretion must be exercised having regard to the fundamental purpose of sentencing and the sentencing objectives that I referred to earlier.
[53] The standard to be applied when exercising the court’s discretion was described by Iacobucci, J. in R. v. Shropshire (1995), 102 C.C.C. (3d) 193 at para. 27, where he said the following:
… [A]s a general rule, the period of parole ineligibility shall be for 10 years, but this can be ousted by a determination of the trial judge that, according to the criteria enumerated in s. 744, the offender should wait a longer period before having his suitability to be released into the general public assessed. To this end, an extension of the period of parole ineligibility would not be "unusual", although it may well be that, in the median number of cases, a period of 10 years might still be awarded.
[54] Justice Iacobucci also noted that the only difference in punishment between first and second degree murder is the duration of parole ineligibility.
[55] First degree murder is one of the most serious offences found in the Criminal Code. It is an offence associated with an elevated level of moral blameworthiness. A conviction for first degree murder mandates a life sentence with a period of parole ineligibility fixed at 25 years. A conviction for second degree murder similarly mandates a life sentence. But the sliding scale of parole ineligibility – between 10 and 25 years – reflects the fact that there can be varying levels of moral culpability associated with second degree murder.
[56] Determining where on that sliding scale any particular offence and offender fall requires a careful assessment of the circumstances of the offence and of the moral culpability of the offender.
[57] In my view, there are significant aggravating circumstances present here, which combine to substantially elevate Mr. Shire’s level of moral blameworthiness. They include:
(a) This was a sudden attack of extraordinary violence; (b) The infliction of harm on Mr. Babineau can only be described as a frenzied attack – an example of gross overkill; (c) Mr. Babineau was entirely defenseless against the attack. Apart from being unarmed and unprepared for the violence inflicted upon him, he was also significantly impaired by drug consumption; (d) Mr. Babineau pleaded for his life as he squirmed on the floor in an effort to avoid further blows. At the same time others present at the scene, included Mr. Wren, implored Mr. Shire to halt his attack. Yet he continued, despite the vulnerable and helpless position Mr. Babineau was in; (e) The attack was committed in front of a number of shocked and, no doubt, terrified occupants of the apartment; (f) The occupants of the apartment were threatened with harm to their families if anyone said anything; (g) The killing has had a devastating impact on the family of Mr. Babineau; and, (h) Mr. Shire has a long criminal record including a significant number of prior convictions for offences of violence.
[58] Mr. Shire was not charged with first degree murder. The jury was not called upon to classify the murder as either first or second degree. Having said that, there are circumstances here that demonstrate, in my view, that a certain amount of planning went into the killing of Mr. Babineau.
[59] Amongst other things, Mr. Shire and his companions attended at Mr. Germaney’s apartment for the purpose of obtaining his vehicle. The suggestion that Mr. Germaney should tell the police the car was stolen while he slept tends to support the inference that the vehicle was going to be used for a nefarious purpose. Mr. Shire and his companions paused for some time in the parking lot outside of 16 Dunlop Street East, which also supports the inference that there was some level of planning going on about what was to happen inside apartment one.
[60] I appreciate that evidence of planning is not the equivalent of evidence of planning a killing. But the events that transpired inside apartment one, once Mr. Shire and the others entered, happened with such rapidity that one can readily infer – and I do so infer – that the intent of Mr. Shire, as he entered apartment one – was to attack and kill Mr. Babineau. The manner of the killing reflects significant rage. There is no evidence that anything that happened inside apartment one triggered Mr. Shire’s rage. To the contrary, there is evidence that his rage was triggered prior to his arrival at Mr. Germaney’s residence.
[61] I am satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was some level of planning involved in the attack on Mr. Babineau. This is a significant aggravating factor.
[62] There are, in my view, very limited mitigating circumstances here. Only two come to mind.
[63] First, Mr. Shire’s difficult childhood, one marked by poverty, bullying, and a lack of education and opportunity.
[64] Second, the fact that Mr. Shire has spent some 1092 days in pre-sentence custody under conditions that, due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, have been particularly harsh. Appellate authority makes it clear that in certain instances, accused persons who have been detained prior to trial are entitled to some additional mitigation against sentence if the circumstances of their detention have been particularly punitive. See R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754 and R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 344.
[65] The mitigation applied as a “Duncan credit” as it is conventionally referred to, cannot be such that it reduces the sentence imposed to a level below that which is a fit and just sentence in the circumstances.
[66] In this case, no evidence was tendered to establish the particular conditions Mr. Shire has been subject to, nor their specific impact on him. I do take judicial notice, however, of the fact that the pandemic has had a significant impact on prisoners in remand facilities. They have been subjected to chronic lockdowns, reduced access to showers, the yard, phones and to visits from family and friends. The harshness of Mr. Shire’s time at the Central North Correctional Centre is something that modestly mitigates the sentence to be imposed. It cannot, of course, reduce the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, but it can impact on the length of the period of parole ineligibility imposed.
[67] While the principal sentencing objectives in play in cases of culpable homicide are denunciation, deterrence and the separation of the offender from the community, rehabilitation may at times remain an important objective. I do not consider Mr. Shire to be beyond rehabilitation. I understand that he continues to have the support of his mother and his siblings, all of whom wish to see him turn his life around. But he has committed himself to a career of serious criminality since the age 14. Given the nature and extent of his criminal record and the particular circumstances of this offence, I put very little weight on the objective of rehabilitation. It takes a distant back seat to the other objectives I have mentioned.
[68] Crown and defence counsel each provided me with a number of cases to support their respective positions. They pointed out similarities and differences in the aggravating and mitigating circumstances present in these other cases in an effort to justify their positions.
[69] I make an obvious observation. No two cases are identical. The aggravating and mitigating circumstances of each case are unique. Considering prior cases does, of course, aid in focusing in on an appropriate range of sentence and helps to ensure that like cases are treated alike.
[70] The Crown cited three cases: R. v. LaPierre, 2018 ONCA 801; R. v. Dahr, 2012 ONCA 433; and R. v. Hindessa, 2011 ONCA 477.
[71] In LaPierre, the offender stabbed a random, 74-year old male who had been out in his neighbourhood delivering Christmas cards. The offender had mental health issues. He had been walking about the neighbourhood for some time looking for someone to kill and building up the courage to do so. The attack was random, senseless and brutal. The offender inflicted some 40 stab wounds. The Court of Appeal upheld a sentence that imposed a period of parole ineligibility of 17 years.
[72] In Dahr, the offender killed his father. The offender’s sister was sick with cancer. The father came from out-of-province to assist with her care. He was staying at the sister’s residence. The offender came by to speak to his father and they argued. The offender stabbed his father some 50 times. He stole money from his father’s pocket and left his dead body on his sister’s bed. The Court of Appeal upheld a 15 year period of parole ineligibility imposed by the trial judge.
[73] The Hindessa decision is somewhat less helpful, given the very limited facts set out in the appellate ruling. The Court of Appeal upheld an 18 year period of parole ineligibility, noting that the attack – which was domestic in nature – was particularly brutal and savage and characterized by gratuitous violence.
[74] Defence counsel also cited three cases: R. v. Brown, 2017 ONSC 1441; R. v. Boukhalfa, 2013 ONSC 1255; and R. v. Walent, 2005 CarswellOnt 10255, affirmed 2007 ONCA 871.
[75] In Brown, the offender and the victim were high school acquaintances. The offender travelled to Peterborough to stay with the victim for a week. They got into an argument when the offender criticized the state of the victim’s home. The victim appears to have had a knife at some point during the confrontation. Nevertheless, the offender stabbed the victim some 30 times, including 20 in the back. The offender had a lengthy criminal record, though largely lacking convictions for offences of violence. He had not, in the words of the trial judge, had an easy life. There were a number of letters of support filed with the court on his behalf. The jury had recommended a period of parole ineligibility of 10 years. The trial judge imposed a period of 13 years.
[76] In Boukhalfa, the offender killed his mother by stabbing her 30 times and hitting her with a baseball bat. He then attempted to clean up the scene and he stole money from the deceased. The trial judge found that the deceased was smaller and older than the offender. She was vulnerable and he stood in a position of trust with respect to her. The offender had a criminal record but it included only one conviction for an offence of violence. The offender had psychiatric problems and family members advised the court that he had been quite close with his mother prior to this incident. The trial judge imposed a period of 15 years ineligibility for parole.
[77] In Walent, the offender went to the victim’s residence to purchase drugs. While there, the victim apparently attempted to touch the offender’s crotch. That move triggered a violent attack. The offender stabbed the victim some 50 times. He took the victim’s wallet, then went to a friend’s house to shower and change. The offender was 43 years old with a significant criminal record including crimes of violence. He was physically and sexually abused as a youth and left home at 17. He had worked throughout his adult life until he became disabled due to an accident. He had substance abuse issues which he was focused on resolving. He was remorseful and apologetic. He offered a plea to manslaughter. The trial judge imposed a period of 14 years ineligibility for parole, which was subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeal.
[78] The cases cited by counsel tend to establish, in my view, that an appropriate range to apply to parole ineligibility in this case is roughly between 14 and 18 years. Where in that range the sentence falls squarely reflects the aggravating and mitigating circumstances present.
[79] There is no doubt in my mind that the aggravating circumstances here strongly outweigh the mitigating circumstances.
[80] R. v. Bettencourt, 2008 ONCA 337, leave to appeal to the Supreme Court dismissed June 3, 2010, reported at [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 489, is a case not referred to by counsel, but it is one that is on point in my view. There, the accused attacked a man in his car, stabbing him. The man escaped and Mr. Bettencourt pursued him, ultimately shooting him twelve times. In upholding a twenty-year period of parole ineligibility, the Court of Appeal described the murder as one of “extraordinary violence, cruelty and inhumanity”. Moreover, there was no evidence of good character and no mitigating factors in Mr. Bettencourt’s background.
[81] The circumstances present here may be described in a similar fashion. The murder here was also one of extraordinary violence, cruelty and inhumanity. While there are some factors that tend to mitigate the sentence, they do so only modestly.
[82] The extreme nature of the violence; the public execution of Mr. Babineau who was entirely defenceless; the evidence of planning; and Mr. Shire’s criminal antecedents, including multiple convictions for offences of violence, raise his level of moral blameworthiness to a high level.
[83] His counsel argued that I should consider the fact that he had consumed alcohol as a mitigating factor. I consider that to be a non-factor. He testified that he was not overly intoxicated. The jury obviously concluded that he was able to form the intent required for murder despite whatever intoxicants he had ingested.
[84] Considering all of the foregoing, my view is that a fit and just period of parole ineligibility in the circumstances of this case is 17 years.
[85] In the result, Mr. Shire is sentenced to life imprisonment with no chance of parole for a period of 17 years.
[86] I also impose the following ancillary orders which are not in dispute:
(a) A DNA order; (b) A s. 109 weapons prohibition for life; and (c) An order under s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code that, during such time as he is incarcerated, Mr. Shire is not have no direct or indirect communications with Kathy Cameron, Pierre Soucie, Claude Babineau, Michel Babineau, Douglas Babineau, Chantal Brunino, Krista Fildey, Brawn Soucie, Chloe Cavaliere-Babineau, Ines Cavaliere and Harold Cameron.
C. Boswell J. Released: February 23, 2023

