COURT FILE NO.: CV-21-668061
DATE: 2022 12 30
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: QIU XIE as the trustee of XIE 2018 FAMILY TRUST, YUN ZUO in her personal capacity and as the trustee of THE XUEZHANG FAMILY TRUST, JIAN MING XU and XING WAN, Plaintiffs
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MARK GROSS, SHELDON GROSS, FAUSTO CARNICELLI, DENNIS DIVALENTINO, ALLEN GREENSPOON, GROSS PROPERTIES INC., GROSS CAPITAL INC., 800 PRINCESS STREET HOLDINGS LIMITED, PORTAGE ROAD HOLDINGS LIMITED, MORRISON STREET HOLDINGS LIMITED, 132 SECOND STREET HOLDINGS INC., 132 SECOND STREET PURCHASER LIMITED, 2478658 ONTARIO LTD., 2009 LONG LAKE HOLDINGS INC., GT SUDBURY HOLDING INC., 2771841 ONTARIO CORP., 2771840 ONTARIO LTD., 2771837 ONTARIO INC., 2771839 ONTARIO LIMITED, 65 LARCH HOLDINGS INC., 2753703 ONTARIO INC., 86 ANGELINE STREET HOLDINGS INC., 100 COLBORNE HOLDINGS INC., GT ORILLIA HOLDING INC., 249 ONTARIO STREET HOLDINGS INC., SOUTHMOUNT HEALTHCARE CENTRE INC., 240 OLD PENETANGUISH HOLDINGS INC., GT PORT HOPE HOLDING INC., VICTORIA AVENUE LP and VICTORIA AVENUE NORTH HOLDINGS INC., Defendants
BEFORE: Associate Justice Todd Robinson
COUNSEL: J. Figliomeni and A. Kwok, counsel for the defendants, 2753703 Ontario Inc., 2771837 Ontario Inc., 2771839 Ontario Limited, 2771840 Ontario Ltd. and 2771841 Ontario Corp. (moving parties)
M. Armstrong and P. Waldmann, counsel for the plaintiffs (responding party)
HEARD: September 28, 2022 (by videoconference)
REASONS FOR DECISION (Motion to discharge certificates of pending litigation)
[1] This action arises out of co-tenancy and loan agreements allegedly made between the plaintiffs and the defendants, Gross Capital Inc. and Gross Properties Inc., pursuant to which the plaintiffs advanced an aggregate of some $1.2 million in 2016. The plaintiffs’ position in this litigation is that, in return for the investments, they were to be given security in certain properties. However, that alleged security interest was never registered against any of the properties. The plaintiffs’ claim that over $1 million of principal under their loans remains outstanding.
[2] In the period between June to September 2020, five of the properties in which the plaintiffs claim a security interest were sold: a property in Lindsay, two properties in Niagara Falls, a property in Kingston, and a property in Cornwall. Title to these properties was transferred to and remains registered in the names of 2753703 Ontario Inc., 2771837 Ontario Inc., 2771839 Ontario Limited, 2771840 Ontario Ltd. and 2771841 Ontario Corp. (together, the “Purchaser Corporations”).
[3] In June 2021, Gross Capital Inc. made an assignment into bankruptcy. Receivership orders were subsequently made over various properties in which Gross Properties Inc., Gross Capital Inc., related entities, and their principals had an interest. These orders did not include the five subject properties, but do capture several other properties in which the plaintiffs claim a security interest.
[4] In September 2021, after commencing this action, the plaintiffs moved ex parte and obtained leave to issue certificates of pending litigation (CPLs) against each of the five properties now owned by the Purchaser Corporations. In bringing that motion, the plaintiffs asserted that the Purchaser Corporations purchased the properties as part of a scheme intended to defeat the plaintiffs’ claims. That allegation is disputed by the Purchaser Corporations, who take the position that they are each bona fide purchasers for value, having paid nearly $40 million to purchase the properties with no prior notice of any claim by the plaintiffs to an interest in them.
[5] The Purchaser Corporations bring this motion to discharge the CPLs. They also seek leave to bring the motion, to the extent required. At the time the motion was brought, three of them had been noted in default and none of the defendants had delivered statements of defence.
[6] In my view, the relevant factors and overall balance of convenience favours the Purchaser Corporations. I am accordingly granting the motion and discharging the CPLs.
Analysis
[7] My authority for discharging a CPL is found in s. 103 of the Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990 c C.43 and rule 42.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194 (the “Rules”). The applicable two-part analysis is not disputed. It is set out in the oft-cited decision of Perruzza v. Spatone, 2010 ONSC 841 at para. 20. I must first determine if there is a triable issue regarding the plaintiffs’ claimed interest in the subject properties. If I am satisfied that the threshold requirement has been met, I must then consider whether the equities favour the continued registration of the CPLs. I may discharge a CPL on any ground that I consider just: 2254069 Ontario Inc. v. Kim, 2017 ONSC 5003 at para. 30.
[8] Whether or not to discharge a CPL is a discretionary decision. My discretion is to be exercised having regard to relevant factors in the circumstances of this particular case. Those relevant considerations include (i) whether the plaintiff is a shell corporation, (ii) whether the land is unique, (iii) the intent of the parties in acquiring the land, (iv) whether there is an alternative claim for damages, (v) the ease or difficulty in calculating damages, (vi) whether damages would be a satisfactory remedy, (vii) the presence or absence of a willing purchaser, and (viii) the harm to each party from the CPL. These factors are non-exhaustive: 2254069 Ontario Inc. v. Kim, supra at para. 31.
Issue 1: Should the moving defendants be denied relief on procedural grounds?
[9] As a preliminary matter, three of the Purchaser Corporations – 2771839 Ontario Limited, 2771840 Ontario Ltd. and 2771841 Ontario Corp. – were noted in default by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs correctly point out that subrule 19.02(1) of the Rules operates such that those defendants are deemed to admit the truth of all allegations of fact made in the statement of claim and are also precluded from taking any other step in the action (other than a motion to set aside the noting in default or any default judgment) without leave of the court or consent of the plaintiff.
[10] Concurrently with releasing these reasons, I have released my decision granting the motion by those three of the Purchaser Corporations to set aside their noting in default. Since that motion was argued prior to this motion, in my view, any deemed admissions under subrule 19.02(1)(a) that would have been in effect when this motion was brought do not apply in deciding it. In any event, I would not have applied them in these circumstances. Since the set aside motion had been brought and was argued prior to this motion being argued, I find it appropriate to grant leave for this motion.
[11] I give no effect to the plaintiffs’ arguments that the Purchaser Defendants should be denied relief because they have failed to defend. I have been provided with no authority supporting that a defendant (who has not been noted in default) is disentitled from moving to discharge a CPL until they have delivered a statement of defence.
Issue 2: Was there failure to make full and frank disclosure on the ex parte motion?
[12] The Purchaser Corporations argue that, in obtaining the ex parte CPLs, the court was not alerted to the fact that both of the plaintiffs who swore affidavits in support of the motion do not understand English fluently and require an interpreter. Their difficulty with English was explored during their cross-examinations. The fact that the plaintiff affiants may not have understood their own evidence is argued to be a matter of material non-disclosure. That they do not speak English is also argued to be relevant to the representations said to have been made by Mark Gross and Sheldon Gross, namely how those representations were made to the plaintiffs and how they were able to understand them.
[13] Subrule 39.01(6) of the Rules provides that, where a motion is made without notice, the moving party is required to make full and fair disclosure of all material facts. Failure to do so is in itself sufficient grounds for setting aside any order obtained on the motion. There are many cases in which material non-disclosure has itself supported discharge of a CPL.
[14] Subrule 4.06(8) of the Rules requires that, where it appears to the person taking an affidavit that the deponent does not understand the language used in the affidavit, the person shall certify in the jurat that the affidavit was interpreted to the deponent in the person’s presence by a named interpreter who took an oath or made an affirmation to interpret the affidavit correctly. That was evidently not done here for Qu Xie. It may not have been necessary for Yun Zo, whose cross-examination evidence was that she is able to read English and that she understood her affidavit.
[15] The Purchaser Corporations point to Asibayan v. Aghdasi, 2020 ONSC 1027, in which Master Sugunasiri (as she then was) held that a plaintiff’s evidence was unreliable in part because there was evidence supporting that he had trouble reading English. That was viewed as casting doubt on the reliability of several affidavits. However, although non-disclosure of the plaintiff’s difficulty reading English was a factor, that was not the key material non-disclosure. Rather, the plaintiff had not disclosed the existence of two handwritten agreements addressing the plaintiff’s rights to the property at issue in that case.
[16] On the facts of this case, I am not convinced that failing to clarify that the plaintiff affiants are not fluent in English amounts to “material” non-disclosure. In my view, technical non-compliance with subrule 4.06(8) is not enough. The Purchaser Corporations have not demonstrated that the plaintiff affiants did not understand the substance or material aspects of their sworn evidence. I was directed to only a few specific examples from cross-examination on the meaning of terms used, but Qu Xie gave evidence that she used translation software to understand certain affidavit statements.
[17] I agree that the inability of the two plaintiff affiants to speak or understand English without interpretation or translation ought to have been disclosed. However, in my view, that is not itself an issue of failure to make full and frank disclosure of a material fact in the absence of better supporting that they may not have understood the substantive evidence given in their affidavits.
Issue 3: Is there a triable claim to an interest in land?
[18] The Purchaser Corporations conceded in argument that the plaintiffs have a triable claim to an interest in the five subject properties. They seek discharge of the CPLs based on the equities of the case. I accordingly need not consider the plaintiffs arguments in support of a triable claim.
Issue 4: Do the equities favour maintaining or discharging the CPLs?
[19] Despite the concession by the Purchaser Corporations that the plaintiffs have a triable claim to an interest in the subject properties, I find that the equities still favour the Purchaser Corporations in the particular circumstances of this case.
(a) Shell corporation
[20] Although the plaintiffs are not corporations, I agree with the Purchaser Corporations that it is still a factor that there is no evidence on any assets held by the plaintiffs. Notably, two of the plaintiffs are named in their capacities as trustees of family trusts and there is no evidence on whether those trusts have any exigible assets.
[21] The Purchaser Corporations also point out that the plaintiffs did not provide an undertaking as to damages. Rule 40.03 of the Rules requires such an undertaking on a motion for an injunction or mandatory order, but there is no equivalent requirement in rule 42.01 of the Rules or in s. 103 of the Courts of Justice Act. I was directed to no authority for such an undertaking being required for a CPL. I accept, though, that it may be considered as a factor and has been in prior cases.
[22] There do appear to be potentially legitimate concerns about the plaintiffs’ ability to pay a damages award if the CPLs are allowed to remain and the plaintiffs are unsuccessful in their claim to an interest in the properties. There is, however, insufficient evidence before me on the matter. I thereby find that the financial status of the plaintiffs is a neutral factor.
(b) Alternative claim for damages / ease of calculating damages
[23] The plaintiffs have an alternative claim for damages. As pleaded, it is actually their primary claim. The claim arises from unpaid amounts owing under a co-tenancy agreement and three loan agreements, for which the subject properties are alleged to have stood as security or in which the plaintiffs allege they were to have had an ownership interest. I agree with the Purchaser Corporations that calculating the outstanding amounts owing under the agreements, including accrued interest, should not be difficult.
(c) Litigation delay
[24] The Purchaser Corporations point to litigation delay by the plaintiffs. In my view, this is a neutral factor. Progress by the plaintiffs since issuing this claim and obtaining leave to issue the CPLs has been fairly slow. Bringing two service-related motions and attempting to note defendants in default is limited progress in a year, even accounting for motion booking delays beyond the control of the parties. However, the Purchaser Corporations have also not moved expeditiously in seeking to discharge the CPLs or advance their defences.
(d) Merits of the claim
[25] Merits is another factor. In this case, merits of the plaintiffs’ claim was a focal point of their submissions, specifically on whether or not the Purchaser Corporations were knowingly involved in a scheme to defeat the plaintiffs and are genuinely bona fide purchasers without notice of the plaintiffs’ investments and claimed interest in the subject properties.
[26] In my view, merits is a neutral factor on this motion. The Purchaser Corporations’ position as asserted on this motion is at least as strong as the plaintiffs’ claims against them.
[27] There is evidence supporting that the full advances made by the Purchaser Corporations were paid into a lawyer’s trust account on closing and disbursed in full to satisfy the loans of first-ranking lenders with registered charges against each of the properties. The plaintiffs’ claimed equitable interests would have ranked behind these charges.
[28] The plaintiffs’ position that the properties were each sold below market value is unsupported by any cogent evidence. The plaintiffs rely on appraisal reports obtained during the course of the purchase transactions and evidence from an examination of Mark Gross that credits to the purchase prices were given to account for existing ownership interests of Fausto Carnicelli and Allen Greenspoon (both of whom were principals for vendor corporations for the subject properties and the Purchaser Corporations). The plaintiffs argue that those credits effectively cut them out from receiving any proceeds from sale of the properties. The plaintiffs have not themselves obtained and tendered any independent evidence on the actual value of the properties at the time of transfer. Accuracy of underlying assumptions in the appraisal reports obtained during the sale process is disputed. There is also a factual dispute around the purpose for which purchase price credits were given. Stephen Foxall’s evidence is that the credits had to do with the state of disrepair and vacancy of the properties at the time of purchase, but inconsistencies in his own evidence were highlighted by the plaintiffs in argument.
[29] In my view, there is insufficient evidence on the market value of the properties. There are also legitimate credibility issues implicated by the conflicts in evidence. These issues are not properly resolved on a motion of this nature.
[30] There is also inconclusive evidence before me on whether either Fausto Carnicelli or Allen Greenspoon knew or reasonably ought to have known about the plaintiffs’ investments or claimed interest in the properties. There is some evidence supporting that Fausto Carnicelli had access to financial statements and lists of co-tenants for the properties, both as a principal of the transferor corporations and as principal of the Purchaser Corporations. Mark Gross also gave evidence that Mr. Carnicelli was told that security interests had been granted in the properties and was kept apprised of the investments obtained and the security interests granted in the properties.
[31] Mark Gross’ evidence is general, though. He states that Mr. Carnicelli was made aware of investors and that security interests were being given in the subject properties and had access to investor portals and financial statements for the properties. I was directed to nothing in Mr. Gross’ evidence where he states that Mr. Carnicelli was made aware of the plaintiffs’ specific investments or interests in the properties.
[32] The evidence before me does not support clear knowledge of Mr. Carnicelli about the plaintiffs, their investments, or their claimed security or ownership interest in the properties. In my view, the fact that Mr. Carnicelli was a director and officer of both the transferors and transferees, may have been involved in prior transactions with certain of the properties, had access to financial statements or other documents listing some of the plaintiffs, and may have had an existing beneficial ownership interest in the properties is not sufficient to support a strong inference that he had knowledge of the plaintiffs’ investments or, more importantly, their alleged interests in the properties.
[33] Mr. Carnicelli was not examined on whether he had, in fact, accessed the financial statements and investor documents or had identified that the plaintiffs were investors or had any interest in the properties. He was asked about his knowledge of the investments. Mr. Carnicelli confirmed that he had no recollection of being told about loans by the plaintiffs or security in the properties. The plaintiffs focus on the fact that Mr. Carnicelli did not deny knowing, but I am not convinced that should be given any weight on this motion. Mr. Carnicelli gave evidence in the same response that he was unaware of the day-to-day financial structures on the properties.
[34] With respect to Allen Greenspoon, there is evidence supporting that he had a pre-existing ownership interest in certain of the properties and a role in vendor corporations, with access to the same financial statements to which Mr. Carnicelli had access. However, that evidence does not support any finding or a reasonable inference on this motion, as argued by the plaintiffs, that Dr. Greenspoon had knowledge of the plaintiffs’ investments and alleged security interest in these properties.
[35] In my view, knowledge of the plaintiffs’ security or ownership interest in the properties is the relevant and material fact.
[36] Neither Mr. Carnicelli nor Dr. Greenspoon gave evidence supporting that they were or may have been aware that the plaintiffs had an enforceable security or ownership interest in any of the subject properties. Similarly, I was directed to nothing in Mark Gross’ examination evidence where he confirmed that Mr. Carnicelli or Dr. Greenspoon were aware or made aware of the plaintiffs’ investments and that the plaintiffs specifically had security or ownership interests in any of the subject properties. Mr. Gross also gave evidence that Mr. Carnicelli had no role in Gross Capital Inc. or Gross Properties Inc. and that the sole shareholder of the vendor corporations was Gross Capital Inc.
[37] Despite the plaintiffs’ incredulity about Mr. Carnicelli and Dr. Greenspoon being unaware of other investors, I am not convinced that knowledge of other investors or co-tenants itself amounts to notice that any of them had an enforceable security interest in the properties. Even if they had knowledge or notice of the plaintiffs’ investments, that is not the same as having knowledge or notice that the plaintiffs’ had a security or other enforceable interest in the subject properties.
[38] In making these observations, I am not saying that the plaintiffs cannot prove their claims at trial. They may well do so. However, on this motion, the plaintiffs have failed to put forward sufficient evidence supporting that there claims are more meritorious than the defence positions put before me. That includes efforts by the plaintiffs to obtain admissions through the cross-examination of Stephen Foxall and through the witness examinations of Fausto Carnicelli and Allen Greenspoon. For these reasons, I view merits as a neutral factor.
(e) Uniqueness and damages as a satisfactory remedy
[39] It is relevant to my decision that the five properties have no intrinsic value to any of the plaintiffs. There is no evidence supporting that any of the properties are unique or that the plaintiffs have any intended use for them. They are admittedly nothing more than a form of security for the plaintiffs’ claim.
[40] The plaintiffs rely on the decision in Royal Bank of Canada v. Azkia, in which Master Sugunasiri (as she was then) held that the question of uniqueness of a property is inherently met in the context of a negotiated transaction like a mortgage: Royal Bank of Canada v. Azkia, 2018 ONSC 1580 at para. 15. However, the factual relationship of the parties in this case distinguishes it from Azkia. This is not a case where the properties are held by the debtors themselves or even entities that are clearly closely related to the debtors.
[41] The Purchaser Corporations submit that, after noting three of them in default, the plaintiffs sought to requisition default judgment for a liquidated sum. They did not bring a motion for default judgment seeking determinations on their claims for constructive trust and fraudulent conveyance. The plaintiffs argue that their decision to seek monetary default judgment was essentially a strategic decision and that they were not precluded from later moving for declaratory judgment on their other claims. However, there is no evidence before me supporting any intention to bring a motion or pursue the declaratory relief claimed in the action against the Purchaser Corporations. In my view, absent that evidence, proceeding to seek default judgment solely for monetary relief does support that damages are a satisfactory remedy.
[42] The plaintiffs’ claim flows from economic transactions. The plaintiffs assert that they were to have been given security or beneficial ownership interests in the properties in return for their investments. I have sympathy for their position. Other than the subject properties, all of the properties in which they claim a security or ownership interest appear to be subject to insolvency proceedings. It does not appear likely that the plaintiffs will recover anything in those proceedings. Nevertheless, CPLs are intended to protect an interest in land in situations where other remedies would be ineffective. They are not intended to be an instrument to secure a claim for damages: 2254069 Ontario Inc. v. Kim, supra at para. 38.
[43] In my view, damages are a satisfactory remedy in this case if the plaintiffs are able to establish the alleged connection between the Purchaser Corporations and Gross Capital Inc. and Gross Properties Inc.
(f) Relative harm
[44] Relative harm to the parties is another factor. I accept that the Purchaser Corporations’ inability to deal with the properties, including refinancing, is prejudicial to their interests. However, I am not convinced that the evidence supports any pending actual prejudice from that inability.
[45] The Purchaser Corporations did put forward evidence of a demand for repayment of a loan secured against the property in Cornwall, but the record does not support an inability to address that demand or that the creditors will actually seek to enforce on the security. The only demand in evidence was made in March 2022, some three months before Stephen Foxall’s affidavit was sworn. There is no evidence of the creditors taking any further steps to enforce on their security. Similarly, assertions by Stephen Foxall that the Purchaser Corporations have insufficient funds to carry the properties without the ability to finance or sell are, in my view, unsubstantiated by any cogent evidence.
[46] Nevertheless, inability to deal with the properties is still relevant when juxtaposed with the plaintiffs’ position. The only harm to the plaintiffs if the CPLs are discharged appears to be the loss of obvious security for their claim. The plaintiffs argue that the Purchaser Corporations have tendered no evidence that they could satisfy a judgment without the subject properties and, since the Purchaser Corporations have demonstrated a willingness to deal with the properties without notice to or consent of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs may be denied their sole source of collecting on their debts.
[47] As already noted, securing a claim for damages is not the purpose of a CPL. Moreover, I am not convinced that the record supports a serious risk of the plaintiffs obtaining an unenforceable judgment. Although there is evidence supporting that the Purchaser Corporations have no other assets than the subject properties, there is no evidence supporting that the Purchaser Corporations intend to or will substantially dissipate the equity in the properties before trial.
[48] The plaintiffs submit that this is an appropriate case for a Mareva injunction, but conceded in oral argument that an injunction was not sought because the test is more stringent and has a higher evidentiary burden. I am not convinced that the plaintiffs would meet the test for a Mareva injunction, at least not on the record before me. I am not satisfied that the plaintiffs have demonstrated a strong prima facie case on the merits, which is why I view merits as a neutral factor on this motion. I have agreed with prior case law and remain of the view that a CPL ought not to be used to achieve pre-judgment execution on what is fundamentally a damages claim if the extraordinary remedy of a Mareva injunction would not be available on the merits: Sachkov v. Ilnitskaya, 2021 ONSC 5495 at para. 29.
[49] Moreover, the plaintiffs have advanced personal claims against several individuals, including Mark Gross, Fausto Carnicelli, and Allen Greenspoon. It is not clear to me that a judgment against any of those defendants cannot be enforced. I reject the plaintiffs’ request that I draw an adverse inference from Mr. Gross, Mr. Carnicelli, and Dr. Greenspoon failing to provide information about their assets and liabilities despite being requested to do so in their notices of examination. I have been provided with no authority supporting that any of them had an obligation to produce financial information or documents in a motion of this nature. The plaintiffs have themselves opted to put forward no evidence supporting that the defendants lack assets.
[50] In my view, weighing the above considerations, the balance of convenience on this motion favours the Purchaser Corporations.
Issue 5: Should funds be posted into court?
[51] In the event the CPLs were ordered discharged, the plaintiffs sought an order that a discharge be on terms that the Purchaser Corporations pay $1.75 million into court as security for the plaintiffs’ claims. No calculation for that amount was provided. Regardless, given my finding that, on the record before me, the plaintiffs’ claim is no more meritorious than the Purchaser Corporations’ defence positions, I do not view such a term to be appropriate.
Disposition
[52] For these reasons, I am discharging the plaintiffs’ certificates of pending litigation against the five subject properties. Order accordingly.
[53] No draft order was included in the motion materials or submitted at the hearing. If a formal order is required, then the parties should follow the process outlined in rules 59.03 and 59.04 of the Rules for preparing, approving, settling (if necessary), and issuing an order through the registrar.
Costs
[54] Costs outlines were exchanged and uploaded prior to the motion hearing. I was unable to hear the parties costs submissions since I was advised that they would involve referring to settlement offers. I encourage the parties to agree on costs. If they cannot, then written submissions on costs shall be made.
[55] The Purchaser Corporations shall serve their submissions by January 20, 2022. The plaintiffs shall serve there responding submissions by February 3, 2022. There shall be no reply submissions absent leave. Costs submissions shall not exceed four (4) pages, excluding any offers to settle or case law. All costs submissions shall be emailed directly to my Assistant Trial Coordinator. Unless costs submissions are served and submitted in accordance with these directions, the parties shall be deemed to have agreed on costs.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE TODD ROBINSON
DATE: December 30, 2022
COURT FILE NO.: CV-21-668061
DATE: 2022 12 30
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
QIU XIE as the trustee of XIE 2018 FAMILY TRUST, YUN ZUO in her personal capacity and as the trustee of THE XUEZHANG FAMILY TRUST, JIAN MING XU and XING WAN, Plaintiffs
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MARK GROSS, SHELDON GROSS, FAUSTO CARNICELLI, DENNIS DIVALENTINO, ALLEN GREENSPOON, GROSS PROPERTIES INC., GROSS CAPITAL INC., 800 PRINCESS STREET HOLDINGS LIMITED, PORTAGE ROAD HOLDINGS LIMITED, MORRISON STREET HOLDINGS LIMITED, 132 SECOND STREET HOLDINGS INC., 132 SECOND STREET PURCHASER LIMITED, 2478658 ONTARIO LTD., 2009 LONG LAKE HOLDINGS INC., GT SUDBURY HOLDING INC., 2771841 ONTARIO CORP., 2771840 ONTARIO LTD., 2771837 ONTARIO INC., 2771839 ONTARIO LIMITED, 65 LARCH HOLDINGS INC., 2753703 ONTARIO INC., 86 ANGELINE STREET HOLDINGS INC., 100 COLBORNE HOLDINGS INC., GT ORILLIA HOLDING INC., 249 ONTARIO STREET HOLDINGS INC., SOUTHMOUNT HEALTHCARE CENTRE INC., 240 OLD PENETANGUISH HOLDINGS INC., GT PORT HOPE HOLDING INC., VICTORIA AVENUE LP and VICTORIA AVENUE NORTH HOLDINGS INC., Defendants
REASONS FOR DECISION
Associate Justice Todd Robinson
Released: December 30, 2022