COURT FILE NO.: CV-21-00003595-0000

DATE: 2022 12 09

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HEALTHPLEX PHARMACY INC.

Applicant

– and –

PREMANANDA PANDA and 2460783 ONTARIO INC. c.o.b. as MARITIME PHARMACY and GURLEEN KHEHRA and RINKAL PATEL and TEJAL PATEL

Respondents

Shaun Laubman and Joseph Stonehouse, for the Applicant

James S.G. Macdonald and Rida Anmol, for the Respondents Premananda Panda and 2460783 Ontario Inc. c.o.b. Maritime Pharmacy

HEARD: September 13, 2022

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

DALEY J.

INTRODUCTION:

[1] The applicant Healthplex Pharmacy Inc. (“Healthplex”) carries on business as a pharmacy in the city of Brampton and Rajeev Gupta (“Gupta”) is the president and principal operator of the business also in addition to being a licensed pharmacist.

[2] The respondent Corporation 2460783 Ontario Inc. c.o.b. Maritime Pharmacy (“Maritime”) is a corporation which operates as a pharmacy in the city of Brampton. The respondent Premanada Panda (“Panda”) is the owner and director of Maritime and is also a licensed pharmacist.

[3] The respondents other than Panda and Maritime are former employees of Healthplex and reported to Gupta while working at his pharmacy. Panda had been associated with the applicant as an independent contractor working in its pharmacy location.

[4] Healthplex commenced this application seeking a variety of relief against the respondents, including an accounting of profits allegedly made by them, general and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief.

[5] In its application, Healthplex has alleged that all the respondents had stolen cash, inventory, medication and confidential information, and had improperly solicited clients and competed with the applicant.

[6] The respondents Panda and Maritime brought the present motion pursuant to rule 21.01(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 under Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 seeking an order staying or dismissing the application on several grounds, including that it was an abuse of the court’s process and that the applicant’s conduct in several respects, during the litigation, both individually and cumulatively warranted that the court exercise its discretion to either stay or dismiss the application.

[7] The grounds for the respondents’ motion included:

(1) that the applicant had improperly utilized the application process as opposed to commencing an action by way of a statement of claim contrary to the requirements of rule 14;

(2) that the applicant failed to immediately disclose the terms of a settlement entered into by it with the respondent Tejal Patel (“Patel”);

(3) that the applicant failed to disclose to the moving respondents surveillance evidence;

(4) that the applicant is seeking a form of relief in respect of which the court has no jurisdiction relating to the moving respondents’ professional conduct and standing with the Ontario College of Pharmacists (“OCP”).

[8] For the reasons that follow, I have concluded that the respondents’ motion must be dismissed. However, the application shall be converted to an action.

LITIGATION CHRONOLOGY & EVIDENTIARY RECORD:

[9] While the moving respondents base their motion on several grounds as noted, in order to provide a proper context to my decision in this matter, particularly as it relates to proper disclosure of a partial settlement purportedly entered into between Healthplex and Patel, it is necessary to outline in detail the sequence of events leading up to the present motion where a stay of proceedings is sought.

[10] The following is the chronology of the significant events in this litigation. This chronology does not include details of behind-the-scenes communications and negotiations between counsel, which may have resulted in the purported partial settlement and which are separately outlined below in these reasons:

(a) This proceeding was commenced as an application on October 6, 2021.

(b) Following a request by the applicant’s counsel for an urgent case conference with the court, the matter came before Tzimas J. on November 30, 2021. At that time, counsel for the applicant requested a speedy timetable due to alleged public safety concerns relating to the operation of a pharmacy by the respondents Panda and Maritime.

(c) The application, as ordered, returned to court before me on February 14, 2022, at which time the hearing of the application proper was scheduled to proceed over two days. However, counsel for the applicant advised that they were seeking an interlocutory injunction on the return date; however, no motion for such relief had been delivered as required by rule 40.01. Over the objection of all respondents, the matter was adjourned, and a timetable was set for the return of an interlocutory injunction motion, with the application proper being adjourned.

(d) In a reply factum, dated February 11, 2022, filed by the applicant on the application proper for the hearing date of February 14, 2022, it was stated that the evidentiary record in respect of the application included “a voluntary handwritten confession by Tejal Patel which implicates Premananda and Maritime, corroborates the Applicant’s evidence, and stands uncontested.” (para. 2). Further, it was stated in the factum: “Tejal Patel has been released from the application and her affidavit evidence, sworn January 10, 2022, has been withdrawn. Thus, Tejal’s voluntary confession, which has been confirmed by Rajeev, stands uncontracted (sic)” (para. 6).

(e) On April 4, 2022, the applicant’s interlocutory injunction returned to court before me for a hearing, however counsel for Panda and Maritime advised the court that a form of settlement had been reached between the applicant and the respondent Patel and that her affidavit of January 10, 2022, which supported the positions advanced by the respondents Panda and Maritime, had been “withdrawn.” As counsel for Panda and Maritime submitted that the particulars of the purported settlement had not been disclosed other than the fact that some form of settlement had been reached and that the affidavit was to be withdrawn, I ordered that the parties provide affidavit evidence as to the nature of the settlement. The injunction motion returnable on that date was, therefore, adjourned pending receipt of further evidence.

(f) On April 28, 2022, counsel for the respondent Patel, served and filed an affidavit in his name, providing details as to the events leading up to the purported settlement.

(g) On April 29, 2022, Gupta, on behalf of the applicant, served and filed an affidavit sworn April 28, 2022, detailing the chronology of settlement discussions and the purported settlement resulting in the withdrawal of the respondent Patel’s affidavit of January 10, 2022.

(h) Following delivery of the evidence in respect of the purported settlement, counsel for Panda and Maritime advised that his clients wished to bring a motion seeking an order staying or dismissing the application.

[11] Prior to instituting this application, the respondent Patel had provided a handwritten statement dated September 24, 2021, to Gupta wherein she makes a variety of statements as to the conduct of Panda which supported and accorded with the allegations being made against him by the applicant, including allegations of misconduct and breaches by him in the course of his association with Healthplex.

[12] The respondent Patel provided a further handwritten statement dated November 12, 2021, to the respondent Panda wherein she stated that Gupta had forced her to make the statement dated September 24, 2021, which in fact was backdated from September 27, 2021. Further, in this statement, she contradicts her earlier statement in several respects and, as well, offers evidence against the positions being advanced by the applicant.

[13] On January 10, 2022, Patel, through her counsel, delivered an affidavit in her name where she provided evidence similar to the details set out in her statement of November 12, 2021, along with further evidence contrary to the positions advanced by Gupta and Healthplex and supportive of Panda and Maritime.

[14] As to the settlement between the applicant and Patel, the evidence discloses the following sequence of events:

(a) Cross-examinations of the parties on their affidavit evidence were scheduled in January 2022 in anticipation of the application’s return date on February 14, 2022, including the cross-examination of the respondent Patel, which was set for January 17, 2022.

(b) On January 14, 2022, counsel for Patel emailed counsel for the applicant and advised that she had suffered a miscarriage. It was requested that her cross-examination be adjourned.

(c) On January 16, 2022, counsel for the applicant presented, by email, a settlement offer to counsel for Patel as follows:

We are prepared to make the following without prejudice offer to Ms. Tejal Patel, on compassionate grounds:

(i) We will not proceed with Ms. T Patel’s cross-examination tomorrow;

(ii) Ms. T Patel’s affidavit shall be withdrawn;

(iii) We will not proceed against Ms. T Patel, and agree to settle the Application as against Ms. T Patel;

(iv) There are no costs of the Application as against Ms. T Patel; and

(v) The terms of this offer are not severable.

(d) On February 9, 2022, counsel for Patel advised counsel for the applicant that his client accepted the offer of January 16, 2022.

(e) On February 10, 2022, counsel for the applicant emailed counsel for the respondent Patel stating as follows: “Can you please send an email to all counsel informing them that Ms. Tejal Patel and the Applicant have reached a settlement, a term of which includes that her affidavit has been withdrawn from the proceeding, forthwith.”

(f) On the same day, namely February 10, 2022, counsel for Patel sent an email to all counsel stating as follows: “Please note that Tejal Patel and Healthplex have agreed to settle this matter on a final basis. Hence, Tejal Patel’s affidavit will be withdrawn from the record, and shall not be relied on in future proceedings.”

[15] As to the other grounds for the respondents’ motion, apart from the alleged non-disclosure of the settlement with Patel, it is submitted that using the originating proceeding of an application, as opposed to by an action, constituted an abuse of process. Further, the respondents assert that the applicant’s failure to disclose details of surveillance evidence also constitutes an abuse of process. Additionally, the applicant’s attempts at using this litigation to interfere with the moving respondents’ profession as pharmacists is beyond the jurisdiction of the court and, as such, is an abuse of process.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK:

[16] The respondents’ motion is brought pursuant to rule 21.01(3), where it is provided that the court may stay or dismiss, as an abuse of process, a proceeding where the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the proceeding.

[17] The court has an inherent and broad jurisdiction to prevent the misuse of its process that would be unfair to other parties in the litigation or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

[18] The principal ground among the several asserted on behalf of the respondents on their motion is that the applicant and the respondent Patel entered into a settlement of the proceedings as against that respondent, which changed the landscape of the litigation, without proper and immediate disclosure of the settlement to the non-settling parties and the court.

[19] The category of cases where the court has inherent jurisdiction to prevent an abuse of process is wide. The court has the ability and jurisdiction to respond to many forms of abuse of its process: Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, [2003] 3 SCR 77 (SCC).

[20] The moving respondents submit that the applicant’s conduct and breaches, as asserted, both individually and cumulatively constitute an abuse of the court’s process. The respondents argue that the applicant’s conduct must be sanctioned by a stay or dismissal of the application.

[21] Turning to the respondents’ ground for their motion that the application must be stayed as a result of the applicant’s failure to disclose a settlement agreement reached with the respondent Patel, the duty to disclose settlements to other parties in the litigation and to the court was first articulated by the court in Pettey v. Avis Car Inc., 1993 CanLII 8669 (ON SC), 13 O.R. (3d) 725, where the court stated that Pierringer and Mary Carter-type partial settlement agreements must be disclosed to the court and to the other parties to the lawsuit as soon as the agreement is made.

[22] In Pettey, the settling parties had satisfied their twofold disclosure obligation, namely to the non-settling parties and to the court, so it was not necessary for the court to consider what consequences should flow from non-compliance with the disclosure obligation.

[23] The disclosure obligation considered in Pettey applies not only to settlement agreements reached at mid-trial but to any settlement agreement where the non-settling parties remain in the action or proceeding. Furthermore, the settlement agreements are not limited to Mary Carter or to Pierringer agreements: Handley Estate v. DTE Industries Limited, 2018 ONCA 324.

[24] In considering the factors as to the disclosure obligation, as set out by the Court of Appeal in its decision in Aecon Buildings, a Division of Aecon Construction Group Inc. v. Brampton (City), 2010 ONCA 898, Brown J.A. in Handley identified the consequences that should flow from a party’s failure to disclose immediately an agreement that changes the litigation where he stated at para. 45:

By contrast, Aecon squarely addressed the consequences that should flow from a specific kind of abuse of process – a party’s failure to disclose immediately an agreement that alters the adversarial posture of the litigation. Several clear messages emanate from Aecon:

(i) The obligation of immediate disclosure of agreements that “change entirely the landscape of the litigation” is “clear and unequivocal” – they must be produced immediately upon their completion: at paras. 13 and 16;

(ii) The absence of prejudice does not excuse the late disclosure of such an agreement: at para. 16;

(iii) “Any failure of compliance amounts to abuse of process and must result in consequences of the most serious nature for the defaulting party”: at para. 16; and

(iv) The only remedy to redress the wrong of the abuse of process is to stay the claim asserted by the defaulting, non-disclosing party. Why? Because sound policy reasons support such an approach;

Only by imposing consequences of the most serious nature on the defaulting party is the court able to enforce and control its own process and ensure that justice is done between and among the parties. To permit the litigation to proceed without disclosure of agreements such as the one in issue renders the process a sham and amounts to a failure of justice: at para. 16.

[25] The principles established in both Aecon and Handley have been further considered and refined in subsequent Court of Appeal decisions.

[26] In Poirier v. Logan, 2022 ONCA 350, the court, in upholding a stay of the action for failure to make timely and full disclosure of a settlement to non-settling parties and the court, considered the earlier jurisprudence and as well any limits on the court’s discretion on a motion seeking a stay in circumstances involving non-disclosure of a settlement. At para. 41, Paciocco J.A. stated as follows:

It follows that the usual principles that apply in granting a stay, an otherwise discretionary remedy that is to be used only in the clearest of cases, do not apply. Essentially, any breach of the obligation to disclose falls among the clearest of cases that require a stay. There is a one-part test, not a two-part test. Put simply, if it is found that immediate disclosure of a settlement was required but not made, it follows automatically that an abuse of process has occurred and that the action must be stayed.

See also Hamilton-Wentworth District School Board v. Zizek, 2022 ONCA 638.

[27] In a further recent decision from the Court of Appeal in Crestwood Preparatory College Inc. v. Smith, 2022 ONCA 743, the court synthesized many of the principles emanating from recent case law regarding the disclosure of settlement agreements at para. 43, where Feldman J.A. stated as follows:

The principles that arise from the case law were most recently summarized by this court in Tree of Knowledge, at para. 55. For the purposes of this appeal, the following are the relevant principles:

(a) The “clear and unequivocal” obligation of immediate disclosure is triggered where partial settlement agreements “change entirely the landscape of the litigation”: Handley Estate, at para. 45, citing Aecon at paras. 13, 16;

(b) The disclosure obligation applies to Mary Carter, Pierringer and any other settlement agreement that has the effect of changing the pleaded or expected adversarial position of the parties into a co-operative one: Handley Estate, at paras. 39, 41; see also Tallman, at para. 23; Waxman, at paras. 24, 37; Poirier, at para. 47;

(c) Identifying a change in the parties’ pleaded positions is not an essential part of the disclosure test: Poirier, at para. 47.

(d) Parties may bring a motion for directions where the extent of the duty to disclose may be unclear: Handley Estate, at para. 47; see also Hamilton-Wentworth, at para. 8;

(e) The absence of prejudice does not justify late disclosure of such an agreement: Handley Estate, at para. 45, citing Aecon, at para. 16; and

(f) The failure to provide immediate disclosure in these circumstances amounts to an abuse of process where the sole remedy is an automatic stay of proceedings: Handley Estate, at para. 45; Tallman, at para. 28; Waxman, at paras. 24, 45-47; Poirier, at paras. 38-40.

ANALYSIS:

[28] I will now consider the separate breaches or alleged misconduct on the part of the applicant either individually or cumulatively giving rise to an abuse of process.

Failure to Disclose Surveillance:

[29] It is asserted on behalf of the respondents that the applicant, through one of its former legal counsel, carried on a campaign of surveillance with respect to the respondents’ activities at the Maritime pharmacy location which commenced business after the respondent Panda ended his association with the applicant. The evidence adduced shows that on March 25, 2022, an individual, allegedly a lawyer associated with the applicant’s previous law firm, entered the respondents’ pharmacy location wearing a mask and baseball cap for the purpose of carrying out surveillance of the respondents’ business activities. This surveillance evidence was only disclosed to the respondents following the cross-examination of witnesses on this motion.

[30] It is also alleged that there had been previous surveillance activity by or on behalf of the applicant as to the respondents’ activities in 2001.

[31] As this proceeding was not instituted as an action, and the ordinary discovery rights attendant with an action pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply, the applicant refused to provide to the respondents particulars of surveillance that they had obtained. However, evidence with respect to the applicant’s surveillance is that the respondents were offered an opportunity to view such surveillance. It is further alleged that the moving respondents obtained surveillance as well in respect of the applicant which, apparently, has not been fully disclosed.

[32] On the whole of the evidence both sides have presented, I cannot conclude that there was any unlawful withholding of surveillance evidence, particularly given that the proceeding was by way of an application and not subject to the ordinary discovery rules, and further, given the position taken by the respondents in not fully disclosing surveillance evidence in their hands.

[33] Thus, the applicant’s handling of the surveillance evidence, in my view, does not, standing on its own or cumulatively with other considerations, constitute an abuse of process.

The Court’s Alleged Lack of Jurisdiction Re-OCP:

[34] It is asserted on behalf of the respondents that the claims made by the applicant in its application as to the alleged professional misconduct on the part of the respondents in the operation of the Maritime pharmacy constitutes an abuse of process in that matters regarding alleged professional misconduct are within the jurisdiction the OCP, where such allegations relate to a pharmacist’s right to carry on his or her profession.

[35] Relying on the Court of Appeal decision in Ontario College of Pharmacists v. Katzman, 2002 CanLII 16887 (ON CA), the respondents submit that this court has no jurisdiction to regulate or police the respondents’ pharmacy practice.

[36] The decision in Katzman does not directly apply to the issues at stake on this motion. Rather, this decision dealt with the question of the jurisdiction of the Complaints Committee of the OCP and whether it had the jurisdiction to refer allegations of misconduct to the College’s Discipline Committee.

[37] Without having to determine the position advanced on behalf of the respondents regarding the court’s alleged lack of jurisdiction, standing on its own or cumulatively with other alleged abuses, this ground would not support the granting of a stay of this action on the basis that it is an abuse of process.

Failure to Disclose Settlement Agreement with Respondent Patel:

[38] As set out in the jurisprudence reviewed above, the court has established a clear line separating those cases where a stay is being requested for some form of abuse of process other than with respect to the non-disclosure of a settlement agreement from those involving non-disclosure of a settlement. In cases generally where an abuse of process is alleged, it is only in the clearest of cases that a stay will be granted. However, where there is any breach of an obligation to disclose a settlement agreement, a stay must be granted.

[39] In Hamilton-Wentworth at para. 10, the court considered the exercise of discretion and what was required in respect of contextual or factual analysis. The court stated as follows:

The principle established by Aecon has been confirmed in a number of subsequent decisions of this court [citation omitted]. The principle itself is clear. The requirement that a settlement agreement must be disclosed immediately means exactly what it says. This is not a matter of discretion, nor is it a matter of “context”, nor of factual analysis. More than three months passed before the existence of the settlement agreement was disclosed to the appellant. There was, thus, a clear failure to notify the appellant immediately. The motion judge failed to understand and apply that central principle and, thus, erred in her conclusion not to grant a stay.

[40] The obligation to immediately disclose a settlement whereby non-settling parties will remain in the proceedings or action is twofold in that not only must the settlement be disclosed immediately to the non-settling parties but also to the court: Pettey at para. 32.

[41] The obligation to make immediate disclosure of a settlement where there are non-settling parties is premised on the fact that the entire litigation landscape and the interrelationship between the parties will have changed because of the settlement, and, as such, both the non-settling parties and the court must be advised. The court must have a full and complete understanding as to the litigation landscape to ensure fairness in the conduct of the litigation and to avoid any possibility of the administration of justice falling into disrepute.

[42] In this matter, counsel for the applicant delivered an offer to settle to counsel for the respondent Patel by email on January 16, 2022, setting out the terms of the proposed resolution, as outlined above.

[43] By an email of February 9, 2022, counsel for the respondent Patel advised counsel for the applicant that she had accepted the offer of January 16, 2022. The following day, on February 10, counsel for the applicant emailed counsel for the respondent Patel requesting that he advise all counsel informing them that “Ms. Tejal Patel and the applicant have reached a settlement, a term of which includes that her affidavit has been withdrawn from the proceeding forthwith.”

[44] On the same day, namely February 10, counsel for Patel sent an email to all counsel, including counsel for the moving respondents, where he stated: “Please note that Tejal Patel and Healthplex have agreed to settle this matter on a final basis. Hence, Tejal Patel’s affidavit will be withdrawn from the record, and shall not be relied on in future proceedings.”

[45] Thus, a settlement of Patel’s involvement in the application was concluded on February 9. Whether that settlement is or may be enforceable is matter which has not been determined on this motion.

[46] The disclosure of the settlement to the non-settling parties occurred on February 10, however counsel for the moving respondents submits that the email sent by counsel for Patel, at the request of the applicant’s counsel, did not fully disclose the nature of the settlement in that it did not clearly state that it was a term of the settlement that Patel’s affidavit must be withdrawn in consideration for the proceeding being discontinued or dismissed as against her.

[47] In my view, it would have been readily apparent to counsel for the non-settling respondents that there was a significant change in the litigation landscape by the information contained in the email Patel’s counsel sent in that the application was to be dismissed as against her, and her affidavit, which clearly supported the position advanced by the respondents, would be withdrawn. Although it is not stated expressly that withdrawing the affidavit was a term or condition of the dismissal of the application against her, a reasonable reading of the email would lead experienced counsel to conclude that it was a term of the settlement; otherwise, there would be no need to mention this.

[48] Furthermore, it would have been readily apparent to a reasonably experienced counsel that the alliances in the litigation had shifted, whereby Patel would no longer be providing evidence favourable to the respondents as had been set out in her affidavit.

[49] It was further urged, on behalf of the moving respondents, that clear and unequivocal disclosure of the settlement with Patel was not immediately made.

[50] As noted above, the application proper returned to court before me on February 14, 2022. As discussed already, counsel for the applicant wished to proceed with an interlocutory injunction motion and so the scheduling of that event was set out in my endorsement on that date. The purported settlement of the application between the applicant and the respondent Patel was neither addressed nor referred to in my endorsement from that date.

[51] However, notably, the return date for the application proper on February 14, 2022 was a matter of three days after the settlement was completed and communicated to all counsel by Patel’s counsel on February 10, 2022. Furthermore, there was disclosure to the court in the applicant’s counsel’s factum of February 11. That factum stated that the handwritten statement Patel provided, implicating the respondents, “stands uncontested.” The factum further stated that the respondent was being released from the application and that her affidavit of January 10, 2022 had been withdrawn. Thus, disclosure had been made to all counsel and the court of the circumstances of this settlement and the resulting change in the litigation landscape as of February 11, 2022.

[52] While the court at first instance on a motion such as this has been directed not to use unwarranted discretion or to do a contextual or factual analysis when considering evidence that would otherwise support a stay, in the circumstances here, I am satisfied that immediate and particularized disclosure was made to both the non-settling respondents and to the court, such that it was apparent to all that the litigation landscape had changed significantly.

[53] Thus, I have concluded that immediate and proper disclosure was made of the settlement with the respondent Patel. As such, no stay of this proceeding is warranted on this ground.

[54] Whether the purported settlement was concluded lawfully and whether it is enforceable has not been determined on this motion. When and in what circumstances an affidavit filed in an action or application may be withdrawn from the court record was carefully considered by Kimmel J. in the matter of Solomon v. Unger, 2022 ONSC 924.

Wrong Form of Proceeding Instituted:

[55] In response to this motion, new counsel representing the applicant has fairly conceded that in the event a stay is denied, the applicant agrees with an order being granted providing that the application be converted into an action.

[56] It was evident from the outset that the proceeding was improper and ill- advised given that the factual and evidentiary framework of the application did not qualify under any of the enumerated subparagraphs in rule 14.05(3), other than possibly subsection (h), which provided that an application may be brought where the relief claimed is “(h) in respect of any matter where it is unlikely that there will be any material facts in dispute requiring a trial.” The evidentiary record adduced by both parties has demonstrated that this case was nowhere near the requirements provided for in rule 14.05(3)(h).

CONCLUSION:

[57] For the reasons set out above, the respondents’ motion to stay the application is dismissed. However, the application shall be converted to an action and counsel shall schedule a time before me to establish a litigation timetable for the delivery of pleadings, documentary disclosure and the conduct of examinations for discovery as well as any other interlocutory motions required. Counsel shall contact my administrative assistant to schedule a time for a virtual case conference to address these issues.

[58] With regard to the costs of this motion, counsel for the applicant shall deliver costs submissions of no longer than three pages plus a costs outline within 15 days from the release of these reasons, followed by similar submissions from counsel for the moving respondents within 15 days thereafter. No reply submissions shall be filed without leave.

Daley J.

Released: December 9, 2022

COURT FILE NO.: CV-21-00003595-0000

DATE: 2022 12 09

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

HEALTHPLEX PHARMACY INC.

Applicant

• – and –

PREMANANDA PANDA and 2460783 ONTARIO INC. c.o.b. as MARITIME PHARMACY and GURLEEN KHEHRA and RINKAL PATEL and TEJAL PATEL

Respondents

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Daley J.

Released: December 9, 2022