COURT FILE NO.: FS-20-43287

DATE: 2022 11 28

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Hany Melek

Applicant

– and –

Dima Mansour

Respondent

Hany Melek, acting in person

Novalea Jarvis, for the Respondent

HEARD: April 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 2022

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

CHOZIK J.

OVERVIEW:

[1] This trial was about parenting and financial issues arising from the breakdown of the parties’ marriage. The parenting issues were decision-making, primary residence and a parenting schedule for the parties’ seven-year-old child, A.

[2] The Applicant, A’s father Hany, took the position that joint decision-making and an equal ‘week-about’ parenting schedule were in A’s best interests. The Respondent, A’s mother Dima, argued that it was in A’s best interest that she have sole decision-making authority and that his primary residence be with her. Dima also argued that Hany’s parenting time with A should be limited to alternating weekends and a weeknight visit.

[3] Dima’s position was consistent with recommendations made by the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (“OCL”), which conducted an investigation pursuant to s. 112 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43.

[4] The financial issues to be decided included equalization and on-going and retroactive child and spousal support. The determination of these issues turned on the date of separation. The parties married on February 17, 2014. According to Hany, they separated on December 1, 2015 when he was charged by the police with assaulting Dima. According to Dima, they separated on May 23, 2020 when Hany locked her out of the family home.

[5] All of these issues arise in the context of a relationship which Dima claimed was fraught with domestic violence. During their marriage, Dima often reported being abused to various persons, including a midwife, a public health nurse, shelter workers and the police. She left the matrimonial home and lived in a shelter with A three times during the marriage. Some of the incidents were also reported to the Children’s Aid Society (“CAS”). She testified that despite the abuse, she reconciled with Hany because she loved him, did not want to split up the family and held out hope that things would change.

[6] Hany denied assaulting Dima. He claimed that he and A were the victims of Dima’s abuse and that Dima used him to achieve immigration status in Canada. According to Hany, Dima manipulated the “system” to paint herself as an abused woman to stay in Canada, obtain permanent residence status and apply for subsidized housing.

[7] The determination of the issues in this case turned on my assessment of the credibility of witnesses, particularly Hany and Dima. In the end, I did not accept Hany’s evidence on key issues. In particular, I did not accept his evidence that he was not abusive to Dima. There was ample objective evidence, together with admissions he made, which amounted to family violence as defined in the Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), s. 2. I also did not accept Hany’s evidence about the date of separation.

[8] On August 24, 2022 I gave brief oral Reasons regarding the parenting issues. I indicated that I rejected Hany’s claims and found that his parenting proposal was not in the child’s best interests. Rather, I concluded that it is in A’s best interests that Dima have sole decision-making authority, that A be primarily resident with her and that Hany’s parenting time be on alternating weekends, and a weeknight, as recommended by the OCL. A Final Order was to issue in accordance with paragraphs 1 to 36 and 69 of the draft order submitted by Dima (Exhibit 49 at trial).

[9] I indicated that written Reasons on the parenting and financial issues would follow. These are those Reasons.

BACKGROUND:

[10] Hany is 44 years old. He immigrated to Canada from Egypt in 2009. He was an accountant in Egypt. In Canada, he works as a truck or delivery driver. He met Dima in August 2013 when she was visiting Canada. She is from Syria, though she also has citizenship in Antigua. Dima is 41 years old.

[11] The parties were introduced by Hany’s co-worker. Hany was looking to get married and have a family. He and Dima dated for a short time before becoming engaged. To get engaged, Hany obtained the blessing of a priest at his church. After they were engaged, he and Dima had sexual relations. Hany then broke off the engagement.

[12] A few weeks later, Dima learned that she was pregnant. She told Hany. The priest at Hany’s church would not bless their union, so an abortion was arranged. Hany drove Dima to a clinic for the abortion.

[13] Because Dima was in Canada as a visitor, she had to leave Canada by February 18, 2014. On February 17, 2014, Hany phoned her. He said he had obtained the blessing of a different priest and that he wanted to marry Dima. They were married on the same day. Dima’s cousin hosted the wedding. Dima then moved into the house Hany already owned. A was born nine months later, in November 2014.

[14] As a visitor to Canada, Dima had no immigration status in Canada. For her to remain in Canada after they were married, Hany submitted a sponsorship application, which he later revoked. Dima thought he had revoked it twice. Hany testified that at least one time, he told Dima he had revoked it even when he had not. He testified that he revoked it in December 2015 for real, after he was charged with assaulting Dima.

[15] Dima was afraid that she would be deported without A. According to Dima, Hany fueled her fear in this regard. Dima had no ability to work in Canada, no ability to apply for any benefits and for some time she did not have OHIP coverage. Dima eventually obtained permanent residence in Canada in 2019 on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, rather than through sponsorship by Hany.

[16] By both accounts, the parties’ marriage was volatile. Between 2014 and 2015, Dima repeatedly reported instances of physical, sexual, emotional and financial abuse to various agencies and individuals. It is not disputed that she and A left the matrimonial home three times to live in a shelter. This is confirmed by records from the shelter and other agencies. I also heard evidence from Corinne Kossen (a public health nurse), Monica Peprik (a neighbour) and two CAS workers, Catherine Wells and Sharon Persaud, who confirmed the reports Dima made as well as statements A made to the CAS. Monica Peprik testified that one time she saw Hany raise his hand to hit Dima when they were in front of their house, but Dima ducked.

[17] Hany testified that Dima married him for convenience. According to Hany, Dima tried to “use” him to get status in Canada. He admitted that there was a lot of fighting between them, but said it was because Dima was “still asking for her immigration paper.” He claimed that she screamed at him and at A. He claimed that she slapped him, and that on at least three occasions she slapped A. He called evidence from his brother, Kloug Melek, and his sister-in-law, Christeen Sobhy, to confirm that they had witnessed some of Dima’s bizarre behaviour.

[18] Hany claimed that they separated on December 1, 2015, when Dima called the police and reported that he had assaulted her. He was charged by the police with two counts of assault, mischief to property under $5,000 and sexual assault. A term of his release pending a trial was that he have no contact with Dima. Dima went to live in a shelter with A, and stayed there for a year until November 22, 2016. This was the third time that she went to the shelter. Despite the prohibition on contact, it is not disputed that during that year Dima stayed at the home with Hany at times, and on at least one occasion allowed him to have A overnight.

[19] In November 2016, Dima had exhausted the maximum amount of time she was permitted to stay in the shelter. After a year, she had to leave. She had nowhere to go. She had no status in Canada, no ability to work in Canada or receive any financial assistance or housing at that time. She was entirely financially dependent on Hany. Hany agreed to temporarily move out of the matrimonial home in order for Dima and A to live there. Dima paid his first and last month rent in a nearby apartment.

[20] In November 2016, Hany pleaded guilty to one count of assault on Dima. He received a suspended sentence and probation. One of the terms of the probation order prohibited him from having contact with Dima. At his request, and with Dima’s consent, this term was changed in January 2017 to permit him to return to live at the matrimonial home.

[21] Dima and Hany resumed cohabiting in the matrimonial home. At trial, Hany claimed that they lived separate and apart under the same roof. He claimed that they continued to live in his house until May 2020, when Dima ‘abandoned’ A and left for Montreal. He then changed the locks to the house, had his mother move in and refused to allow Dima to see A until a court order was made by Justice Starr of the Ontario Court of Justice on July 29, 2020.

[22] Dima’s version of events is that on May 23, 2020, she intended to go to Montreal for two weeks to visit family. Hany would not allow her to take A. He said he would bring A and join her later. She drove to Montreal in their car. He then refused to bring A and told her he had changed the locks to their home and for her not to return. He refused to allow her to see or speak with A. She started an application in the Ontario Court of Justice dealing with parenting issues, which was then transferred to this court at Hany’s request.

OCL Findings and Recommendations:

[23] The OCL conducted an extensive investigation in this case. The OCL reviewed all of the documentation that is before me, including police, shelter and CAS records, as well as the child’s educational and medical records. The OCL spoke with the parties, with A, and with third parties. The OCL concluded that A had been exposed to adverse childhood experiences, stressful events, unhealthy relationships including long-standing domestic violence.

[24] In its interim report dated December 10, 2020, the OCL recommended that Dima have sole custody of A, but that the parenting time be shared equally. The OCL made several interim recommendations for both parents, and put off making final recommendations for six months in order to see if the parties could take direction, work together and follow the recommendations.

[25] In particular, the OCL recommended that Hany take the Caring Dads program through Thrive Counselling. This is a 12-week program, with weekly 2-hour sessions. The program has a parenting component and a domestic violence component. It is aimed at helping a parent recognize and avoid the use of controlling, intimidating and abusive actions, learn skills to interact in healthy ways, and take responsibility for abusive behaviour. Hany refused to take the program. Instead, he took a one-day condensed program, which was not what was recommended. He told the OCL that he did not need to take the Caring Dads program.

[26] In its interim report, the OCL also recommended that Dima be responsible for routine medical health care. She was to follow doctors’ advice, take A for his 6-year ‘well baby visit’ as soon as possible and follow up with genetic testing at the Clinical Genetics Program at McMaster Children’s Hospital. Hany was to cooperate with this. Dr. Bartens, formerly Dr. Ludlow, was to be the family doctor for A as she has historically been his family doctor and knew him well. The OCL recommended that both parents follow professional recommendations regarding A’s speech and language needs, such as his participation in a language group.

[27] Hany did not abide by these recommendations. He continued to take A to Dr. Ibrahim, his own family doctor, without telling Dima. To explain why he did so, Hany said “why should I lose Dr. Ibrahim.”

[28] Dr. Bartens testified at trial that she was not aware of the child seeing another doctor. Continuity of medical care was important to have records of treatments and assessments, so that care is not duplicated and so that things are not done that had been tried and did not work in the past. For example, A almost received vaccinations twice. Hany had had Dr. Ibrahim vaccinate the child without telling Dima about it. Dima then took A to Dr. Ludlow for his vaccinations. The only reason A did not get double vaccinated was because he was frightened of the needles and lashed out that day. Dr. Bartens testified that receiving double vaccinations in a short time is not ideal, especially for his mental health when he is so afraid.

[29] Hany also told the OCL that he did not think A had any difficulties with speech, contrary to the findings of various professionals. Shortly prior to trial, Hany obtained a speech therapy report from a new provider and submitted it in evidence in support of his position that A had no need for speech therapy. This conclusion is contrary to all of the other evidence in respect of A’s needs in this regard.

[30] During the time Hany had parenting responsibility half of the time, he did not involve A in any extracurricular activities. He works long hours and during the week A is in the primary care of his paternal grandmother. In short, Hany met none of the OCL recommendations.

[31] In its final report, the OCL concluded that Hany had not followed any of its recommendations, whereas Dima had. The OCL found that Hany continued to deny that he had done anything wrong and took no responsibility for his abusive behavior. He continued to make derogatory comments about Dima that were not related to her parenting ability. The OCL concluded that Hany had no ability to co-parent or co-operate with Dima. It recommended that Dima have decision-making authority and that Hany’s parenting time be reduced to every other weekend, and a weekday visit from 6 to 8 pm.

[32] Dima, on the other hand, complied with the OCL interim recommendations: she stabilized her housing situation, and received counselling for her emotional dysregulation (which included crying in front of A during home observation visits). She signed him up for extra-curricular activities, summer camps, after-school care and took a greater interest in ensuring A’s academic needs were met. The OCL concluded that Dima was more actively involved in A’s life and appeared capable of meeting his social, emotional, psychological, medical and special needs.

A’s Statements, Views and Preferences:

[33] A was interviewed many times by various professionals. He made statements, many of which were inconsistent, about his parents. He reported being hit and yelled at by both Hany and Dima. He also denied being yelled at or hit by Hany or by Dima. Despite multiple inconsistencies and difficulties communicating, I find that A consistently reported witnessing his parents argue and Hany hit Dima. He also consistently expressed that he wants to be with Dima, that he dislikes his paternal grandmother and that he was subjected to rough play by Hany and at times did not feel safe with him.

[34] At the time of the interviews, A was young and had trouble communicating. It is apparent from the interviews that he had trouble understanding certain concepts, like whether an action was ‘on purpose.’ He also has difficulties with speech: as recently as February 2022, a CAS worker had trouble understanding his speech. Terri Lynham, a speech language pathologist employed by the Halton Catholic District School Board, gave sworn affidavit evidence that she found A had issues with fluency and articulation. He was referred to Erin Oaks Kids and school-based rehab services. Dr. Bartens confirmed that there were concerns about expressive and receptive delay with speech. A had trouble being understood. He attended speech therapy at Erin Oaks with some benefit.

[35] Hany denies that A has trouble with speech. He obtained a report on the eve of trial, in which the assessor concluded that A needed only two or three therapy sessions. I do not accept this report. The assessment is based on one virtual assessment, conducted on April 12, 2022. During the assessment Hany was present and “provided detailed information” when A could not. Having reviewed the assessment, I am of the view that the information Hany provided in respect of A’s speech was not accurate. The information provided is contradicted by a plethora of other evidence contained in the record before me, including A’s educational records and evidence of Terry Lynham, the school principal, and Dr. Bartens.

[36] Given A’s age, I do not place a lot of weight on his views and preferences. However, there are a few things which I accept on his evidence.

[37] First, I find that Hany hurts A on occasion. A told the OCL and CAS workers that at times Hany “cracks” his back, “broke” his back, “cracking his bones”, would squeeze his waist and throw him on the bed hard. A said that he told Hany to stop but that Hany did not listen to him. While this may happen in play, it is nonetheless serious. Hany does not listen to A. He plays rough with him. He has hurt his son.

[38] I find support for A’s statements that Hany has hurt him in the fact that A had a piece of graphite from a pencil embedded in his finger. Dima learned about this when she took A to see Dr. Ludlow. It turned out that Hany had taken A to an emergency department to deal with the injury some time earlier, but did not tell Dima about it. The graphite was not removed at the hospital. Local aesthetic was necessary to remove the graphite, but A was very nervous about needles. General aesthetic was not warranted. Since the graphite piece was not bothering A and he was able to use his hand normally, it was decided to leave the graphite.

[39] Hany claimed that the piece of graphite became embedded in A’s finger when the two were doing math homework: according to Hany, a pencil had flown into the air, landed on the child’s finger and somehow a piece of it was embedded under his skin. I do not accept this explanation. It defies common sense. Lead was deeply embedded under the child’s skin on his finger. A’s explanation for how this happened was more convincing. A reported that Hany became frustrated with him while doing math homework and hit him with a flip-flop, causing the lead to become embedded in his finger. It seems likely that A was holding the pencil when Hany hit him with the flip flop, driving the pencil lead into his finger.

[40] Second, I find that A consistently reported that he does not like his paternal grandmother. He told the OCL that he did not like her cooking, that she makes him angry and that she is “not nice”. He reported that Hany yells and hits A’s grandmother and that he does not feel safe when this adult conflict happens.

[41] At trial, Hany did not call his mother to testify to deny the abuse. I draw a strong adverse inference from this, especially because the paternal grandmother is the primary caregiver to A when he is in Hany’s care.

[42] Third, A was consistent that he loved Dima, felt safe with her, and that he wanted to spend time with her (he was not similarly consistent about loving or wanting to spend time with Hany). The only time he said anything negative about Dima was when he had not seen her for 47 days, after Hany locked her out of the home and refused to let her see A. At that point, when he had no contact with Dima and was only with Hany and the paternal grandmother, A said that Dima yelled at him and hit him. Since his relationship with Dima resumed following that separation, A has denied that Dima yelled at him or hit him. He has been consistent in stating that he wants to spend more time with Dima. He has not asked to spend more time with Hany.

ISSUES:

Issue 1: Decision-Making, Primary Residence and Parenting Time:

[43] Since August 9, 2020, the parties have had equal parenting time with A on a week about basis. Hany seeks an Order for joint decision-making and submits that the week-about shared parenting time continue. Dima takes the position that joint decision-making is impossible, and that she should have sole decision-making authority. She argues that A’s primary residence should be with her in Oakville, and that Hany’s parenting time should be reduced to alternating weekends, with a weekly weeknight visit for a few hours.

[44] The test to determine decision-making, primary residence, and parenting time is the best interests of the child: Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), s. 16(1); Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12, s. 24 (“CLRA”). The best interests test is the only test to be applied. Parental rights, interests, and preferences play no role in this determination: Young v. Young, 1993 CanLII 34 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3, at pp. 35-36, 44, 57, 117.

[45] The newly enacted s. 16(2) of the Divorce Act explicitly requires that a court’s assessment of the best interests of the child give primary consideration to a child’s “physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being.” The factors to be considered to determine a child’s best interest under s. 16(3) of the Divorce Act mirror those that are set out in s. 24(3) of the CLRA. Those factors in s. 16(3) include:

a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability;

b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each spouse, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life;

c) each parent’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other spouse;

d) the history of care of the child;

e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;

f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;

g) any plans for the child’s care;

h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;

i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and co-operate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;

j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things,

i. the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and

ii. the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to co-operate on issues affecting the child; and

k) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition, or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.

[46] This list is not exhaustive. All of the factors relevant to the specific case must be considered; including the child’s emotional, psychological, intellectual and moral well-being: Bazinet v. Bazinet, 2020 ONSC 3187, at para. 19; Elliott v. Elliott (2008), 2008 CanLII 27033 (ON SC), 53 R.F.L. (6th) 423 (Ont. S.C.) at para. 49, aff'd 2009 ONCA 240. Ultimately, the best interests of the child are paramount to the determination of decision-making responsibility, principal residence, and parenting time.

[47] Family violence is a factor that the court must consider in determining the best interests of the child. Family violence is defined in s. 2(1) of the Divorce Act:

family violence means any conduct, whether or not the conduct constitutes a criminal offence, by a family member towards another family member, that is violent or threatening or that constitutes a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour or that causes that other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person — and in the case of a child, the direct or indirect exposure to such conduct — and includes

(a) physical abuse, including forced confinement but excluding the use of reasonable force to protect themselves or another person;

(b) sexual abuse;

(c) threats to kill or cause bodily harm to any person;

(d) harassment, including stalking;

(e) the failure to provide the necessaries of life;

(f) psychological abuse;

(g) financial abuse;

(h) threats to kill or harm an animal or damage property; and

(i) the killing or harming of an animal or the damaging of property; (violence familiale)

[48] Section 16(4) of the Divorce Act and s. 24(4) of the CLRA require the court to take the following into account:

(a) the nature, seriousness and frequency of the family violence and when it occurred;

(b) whether there is a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour in relation to a family member;

(c) whether the family violence is directed toward the child or whether the child is directly or indirectly exposed to the family violence;

(d) the physical, emotional and psychological harm of risk of harm to the child;

(e) any compromise to the safety of the child or other family member;

(f) whether the family violence causes the child or other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person;

(g) any steps taken by the person engaging in the family violence to prevent further family violence from occurring and improve their ability to care for and meet the needs of the child; and

(h) any other relevant factor.

[49] Section 16(5) of the Divorce Act and s. 24(5) of the CLRA provide that a person’s conduct will not be taken into consideration unless the conduct is relevant to the exercise of their parenting time, decision-making responsibility or contact with the child under a contact order.

[50] In this case, having reviewed the extensive evidence including the findings and recommendations contained in the reports of the OCL, I have concluded that it is in A’s best interests that Dima have sole decision-making authority, that he reside primarily with her, and that Hany’s parenting time be alternating weekends and one weeknight as recommended by the OCL in its final report.

[51] Joint decision-making demands the cooperation of parties in respect of major decisions involving a child. It requires good communication and a commitment by each party to support the child’s relationship with the other parent: McBennett v Davis, 2021 ONSC 3610, at para. 97; Kaplanis v. Kaplanis, 2005 CanLII 1625, 249 DLR (4th) 620, at para. 2.

[52] I find that joint decision-making is not possible or appropriate in this case for the following reasons:

a. Hany has engaged in a pattern of abusive, controlling and coercive behaviour towards Dima. His conduct amounts to family violence within the meaning of the Divorce Act. His abusive, controlling and coercive behaviour has been frequent, extensive and pervasive. His conduct makes joint decision-making impossible and manifestly inappropriate.

b. Since the separation, Hany has continued to attempt to exert control over Dima by making unilateral parenting decisions in respect of A.

c. Hany has not, and would not, support A’ relationship with Dima. He has repeatedly tried to cut her out of A’ life.

d. Hany shows no insight into his behaviour, its significance or how it bears on his ability to jointly parent A.

I expand on these reasons below.

Family Violence:

[53] I find that Hany has engaged in a pattern of abusive, controlling, and coercive behaviour towards Dima throughout their marriage that meets the definition of family violence under the Divorce Act. The difference in power and control dynamics that result from that makes joint decision-making impossible and inappropriate. Hany’s behaviour has caused and continues to cause Dima to fear for her safety. Continued communication between the parties risks harm to the child, who has already suffered physical, emotional and psychological harm or been put at risk of suffering such harm from exposure to family violence and other negative events. I also find that Hany has taken no steps, shows no insight, and has no intention of addressing any of his problematic behaviours.

[54] There are three areas of testimony that convince me beyond any doubt that Hany engaged in the behaviours described by Dima since September 2014. These areas pertained to three incidents, which Hany did not deny.

[55] First, Hany did not deny that he would threaten Dima with cancelling her sponsorship application. Indeed, he seems to feel justified in doing so. As I have already set out, he admitted that he told her that he cancelled it even when he had not. At trial, he tried to portray her request for him to sponsor her as evidence of her “using” him. But this makes no sense. Hany testified that he married Dima with the intention of forming a family, knowing that she had no status and was about to leave the country. How else did he think she would be able to stay in Canada to form a family with him? He must have been aware that she needed immigration sponsorship when he married her. He then tried to use her lack of status to threaten and control her. Once A was born, he deliberately exploited her fear that she could be deported without her child.

[56] Second, Hany did not deny the events around A’s birth. Dima did not have OHIP coverage at the time. According to Dima, Hany did not want to pay for the delivery to take place in a hospital. He insisted on a home birth with a midwife, despite Dima’s concerns. When the birth did not go as planned at home, and Dima had to be taken to a hospital, he did not want to pay $700 for Dima to have an epidural. The doctor delivered A’s using forceps, which was extremely painful. Shortly after the birth, Hany did not want to pay for Dima to stay in the hospital despite the midwife’s and doctor’s recommendations. He told Dima to get her clothes, and told her she could come if she wanted to, but she was too exhausted following the birth. He told her he was not going to come back to get her. He then took the newly-born baby and tried to leave the hospital with him, and without Dima. He was stopped at the hospital exit by security. A short time later, Dima gathered herself and followed him home.

[57] Third, Hany did not deny the incident at the abortion clinic when Dima had a second abortion in September 2015. According to Dima and other records showed up at the clinic and made a scene outside. His conduct indicates that he felt that he had the right to control Dima’s reproductive health. He yelled at the staff that they could not carry out the procedure without his consent. Police were called. Dima and A were taken to a shelter for their safety.

[58] Additionally, Hany admitted that he maintained control over the family finances. He was the sole income earner for most of the marriage. He testified that he refused to have a joint bank account with Dima. He appeared to claim total possession over the matrimonial home. He testified that he felt justified in insisting that Corrine Kossen, who was supporting Dima and A through the Halton Healthy Babies Healthy Children Program not enter “his” house, even though Dima enjoyed the support she offered.

[59] These facts confirm that Hany behaved in a coercive, controlling and abusive fashion on those occasions. I infer that it is more than likely that he behaved in similarly coercive, controlling and abusive ways on the other occasions as Dima described long before separation.

[60] Hany called evidence from his brother and sister-in-law, who testified that Dima was the instigator of the family violence and that she slapped A and acted erratically. I do not accept their evidence. Hany’s brother was interviewed by the OCL. At that time, he told the OCL that there were no concerns about Dima’s conduct. He did not tell the OCL about any physical violence on A perpetrated by Dima. Similarly, Hany’s mother was interviewed by the OCL and reported no concerns about Dima.

[61] Based on all of the evidence, I find that Hany’s conduct meets the definition of family violence. As a result, the dynamics of power and control render the parties unable to communicate or make joint decisions in the best interests of the child. It would also be manifestly inappropriate to make an order that would require Dima to cooperate with Hany on issues affecting A.

Unilateral Decision-Making:

[62] Additionally, since separation, Hany has made important decisions about A unilaterally, without any regard for A’s best interests or for the need to consult with or even inform Dima. When A suffered a rash, he chose not to follow the recommendations of A’s doctor regarding cream, resulting in the rash taking longer to clear up. During the separation, he took A to see Dr. Ibrahim without consulting or telling Dima, and contrary to the OCL interim recommendation that Dr. Bartens be A’s primary doctor. Shortly prior to trial, he took A for a speech assessment without telling Dima about it. He sought to use this speech assessment to contradict other speech therapists regarding A’s special needs.

[63] It was clear during the trial that Hany had no appreciation whatsoever for the significance of making these decisions unilaterally.

[64] Even prior to separation, Hany tried to cut Dima out of decision making about A. The most glaring example of this occurred in November 2019 when A was hit by a car and hospitalized, but Hany did not tell her. As discussed below, she learned of the accident from the news.

[65] Hany also denied that A had any special needs at school. The OCL concluded that Hany’s belief that A is doing fine at school and has no special speech and language needs is inaccurate. I accept the OCL findings in this regard. I accept the evidence that A requires support with his communication skills.

Inability to Support A’s Relationship with Dima:

[66] I find that Hany does not recognize the importance of supporting A’s relationship with Dima. If he could, he would cut Dima out of the child’s life. He has, from the day of A’s birth, regarded Dima as irrelevant to the child. He took the newborn from his mother at birth and attempted to leave the hospital with him. He tried to cut Dima out of the child’s life again in May 2020 when he told Dima not to return to the matrimonial home, changed the locks on the house and refused to allow her to see or speak to A until he was ordered to by the court.

[67] In October 2019, Dima went to Antigua to renew her passport. Hany would not allow Dima to take A. While Dima was away, A was hit by a car while in the care of his paternal grandmother. This was a very serious accident: the paternal grandmother remained in the hospital for a long time. Hany did not tell Dima anything about it. Instead, Dima heard about a serious accident on the news, and recognized A’s shoes in some of the footage she saw. She called Hany repeatedly, but he would not answer the phone. Eventually, she learned that A was in the hospital with serious injuries. She returned home the next day.

[68] I observed Hany express extreme disrespect and disregard for Dima during the trial. During cross-examination, Hany had to be reminded many, many times to let Dima answer the questions he put to her. He kept interrupting. It was as if he could not help himself. He was compulsive. Despite multiple explanations from me to the contrary, Hany viewed his questions as more important than Dima’s answers. He was visibly uncomfortable with allowing her to speak. This was him being on his best behaviour in the courtroom. His conduct at this trial demonstrated to me that he would not (could not) have regard for Dima’s input into any parenting decisions in respect of A. He cannot stand to listen to what she has to say. He regards her with contempt.

[69] For these reasons, I conclude that Hany has absolutely no intention or ability to support A’s relationship with Dima.

[70] The evidence before me overwhelmingly indicates that Hany has no insight into his own behaviour. He does not appreciate how his disregard of Dima impacts his ability to co-parent with her. He does not realize the devastating negative impact his conduct has on A. He does not even pretend to recognize the importance of supporting A’s relationship with Dima.

[71] I also find that it is in A’s best interests that his primary residence be with Dima and that Hany’s parenting time be reduced. I make this determination having regard to the factors contained in section 16(2) of the Divorce Act, and with respect to the following findings:

a. A is a young child, with special needs. Hany denies that A has any special needs.

b. A is closely bonded to both parents. There is no doubt that he loves both his father and his mother.

c. Dima is willing to support the development of A’s relationship with Hany;

d. Historically, Dima has been A’s primary caregiver;

e. A wants to live with Dima;

f. When A is in Hany’s care, he is cared for by his paternal grandmother. I did not hear evidence from the paternal grandmother. Hany did not call her to testify. I heard evidence that she does not speak English and that she has serious mobility issues: she takes an Uber to and from A’s school instead of walking the very short distance (5 min) there. A was in his grandmother’s care when they were hit by a car. I accept that A does not like his paternal grandmother very much. I have serious concerns about the paternal grandmother’s ability to meet the developmental needs of this young boy. The OCL has identified that A needs to be enrolled in extracurricular activities and have opportunities for socializing. I heard no evidence from which I can infer that the paternal grandmother can meet those needs. To the contrary, I find that she cannot.

g. As I have already set out, the parties are unable to communicate or cooperate with one another on matters affecting the child. Given the history of family violence in this case it would not be appropriate to make an order that would require Dima to cooperate with Hany or vice versa on issues affecting A.

h. I also have concerns about Hany’s ability to care for or meet the needs of A. He has not met any of the recommendations made by the OCL in its interim report. He has not taken the recommended counselling. He has hurt A when he has had him in his care.

[72] I do not accept Hany’s claims that Dima “used” him. Dima obtained permanent resident status in 2019. Despite this, she and A continued to live with Hany in the matrimonial home. Dima was offered subsidized housing as early as 2016, but she refused. In April 2019, Hany broke his wrist. He was off work for six to seven months. He needed help with everything, including bathing, dressing, and driving; Dima took care of him. Had Dima’s intention been to use him as he claims, there was no reason for her to stay in the marriage or in the home to bear that burden.

[73] In summary, joint decision-making is not possible because I find that Hany has engaged in conduct that constitutes a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour, that he causes Dima to fear for her safety as well as A’s safety while in his care. A has been directly and indirectly exposed to family violence, which I find has included physical assaults, psychological abuse and financial control. Hany demonstrated his lack of respect and controlling behaviour in court throughout the trial. He appears to have no insight into his conduct, no ability to control himself, and little interest in changing his behaviour. He engaged in a pattern of unilateral decision-making since separation. He has no intention, willingness or ability to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relations with Dima, who has been the primary caregiver for A since his birth. Hany has no ability or willingness to communicate or cooperate with Dima on matters affecting the child. I have no hesitation in concluding that he is entirely unable to co-parent or making joint decisions with Dima in respect of A.

[74] For these reasons, I find that it is in A’s best interests that Dima have sole decision-making authority, primary residence and the majority of the parenting time as recommended by the OCL.

Issue 2: Date of Separation and Equalization

[75] The parties’ primary asset is the matrimonial home. Hany owned the home prior to their marriage. Equalization turns on whether the date of separation is December 1, 2015, as claimed by Hany, or May 23, 2020, as claimed by Dima.

[76] For the following reasons, I find that the date of separation is May 23, 2020 and not December 1, 2015:

a. On their income tax returns for 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019, both Hany and Dima claimed that they were married. Each indicated that they were separated for the first time on their 2020 income tax returns;

b. Between February 2017 and May 2020, Dima was taking birth control in the form of Depo-Provera injections every three months. Dr. Bartens testified, and a receipt from Costco Pharmacy confirms, that Dima’s last injection was on May 19, 2020. I infer that she was taking this birth control because she and Hany were not separated but continued to have sexual relations during those years. After May 19, 2020, Dima stopped taking the birth control.

c. Catherine Wells, a child protection worker, testified that in December 2016 or January 2017 he told her that he wanted to move back in with Dima to resume their relationship and try to make their marriage work.

d. Hany, Dima and A went on vacation together to the Dominican Republic in November 2019. Hany claims that he had to let Dima come along for the trip because otherwise she would not allow him to take A. I do not accept his evidence in this regard. They stayed together in one room with two beds. I am cautious that one cannot necessarily judge the internal state of a marriage from its external trappings. However, the photos of Hany, Dima and A in evidence before me strongly suggest that they were together as a family.

e. Their neighbour, Monika Peprik, testified that she observed Hany, Dima and A from a distance up until May of 2020. To her, they appeared to spend time together as a family, going to the park together, walking together, helping A learn to ride his bike together. She and Dima regularly got together between 2019 and 2020 for their children to have playdates. After May 2020, she no longer saw Dima at the house and learned later than she and Hany had separated.

f. Hany did not pay any child or spousal support to Dima between December 1, 2015 and May 23, 2020.

[77] In light of the above, I reject Hany’s claim that he and Dima separated in December 2015. I accept Dima’s evidence that, despite his abuse, she reconciled with Hany many times and that they continued to live together as husband and wife until May 23, 2020 when she left for Montreal and Hany locked her out of the matrimonial home.

[78] It is agreed by the parties that the value of the home on May 23, 2020 was $610,000.

Deductions Claimed:

[79] Hany claims a deduction for notional disposition costs of the matrimonial home of $25,000. I am of the view that he is not entitled to this deduction. He testified that he has no intention of selling the home or moving out. He is therefore not entitled to claim a deduction which is dependant on him selling the home.

[80] Hany claims a date of marriage deduction of $10,000 for the value of household contents that he owned on the date of marriage. No evidence was led by him to support this claim. While receipts for household contents are not necessarily required, there has to be some evidentiary foundation for the deduction. Hany adduced no evidence in respect of this $10,000 deduction except to say that it is for things that were in the house. While I accept that he must have had some household items, I have no evidence as to what those were or what their value was on the date of marriage. I therefore do not give effect to his claim for a $10,000 deduction.

[81] Dima claims a deduction for a loan from her brother of $4,000. I accept her claim in this regard. The separation was unexpected. She left on a trip to Montreal, expecting Hany and A to join her, when Hany locked her out of her home and told her not to return. She did not even take her belongings. She was completely financially dependent on Hany at the time. She had no means on which to live and he offered her no financial support.

[82] I accept that, in the circumstances, she would have had to borrow money to survive. I accept her evidence that she borrowed money from her brother. She also had to bring an urgent motion to gain some parenting time with A; such a motion generates legal fees. She needed financial support from someone. Hany provided none. I accept that this was a legitimate loan from her brother. Dima is therefore allowed to claim this $4,000 deduction.

[83] Given these deductions, and the value of the matrimonial home agreed to by the parties, I am satisfied that Hany owes Dima an equalization payment of $157,502.

[84] I note that the financial consequence of my finding that the date of separation is May 23, 2020 is minimal. Had the date of separation been December 1, 2015, then Hany would owe substantial retroactive child and spousal support. Dima’s calculation of the support arrears, retroactive to December 1, 2015 is in excess of $110,000. The equalization owing had the separation date been December 1, 2015 would have been $66,515. He would have owed Dima a total of approximately $176,515. Based on a separation date of May 23, 2020 what he owes Dima for equalization and retroactive support is similar.

Issue 3: Child Support and Imputation of Income for Support Purposes:

[85] The only issue with respect to child support is imputation of income to Hany. Though she initially took a different position, having heard Hany’s evidence regarding various transactions reflected in his bank records, Dima takes the position that Hany’s income for support purposes is his line 150 income, plus his rental income grossed up.

[86] Hany asserts that his income is his line 150 income. He testified that he received rental income of approximately $700 per month but that it was not “steady.” The bank records in evidence before me confirm this. He also received WSIB income in 2020.

[87] As outlined in s. 19(1) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175, the court may impute such amount of income to a spouse as it considers appropriate in the circumstances, which circumstances include the following:

(a) the spouse is intentionally under-employed or unemployed, other than where the under-employment or unemployment is required by the needs of a child of the marriage or any child under the age of majority or by the reasonable educational or health needs of the spouse;

(b) the spouse is exempt from paying federal or provincial income tax;

(c) the spouse lives in a country that has effective rates of income tax that are significantly lower than those in Canada;

(d) it appears that income has been diverted which would affect the level of child support to be determined under these Guidelines;

(e) the spouse’s property is not reasonably utilized to generate income;

(f) the spouse has failed to provide income information when under a legal obligation to do so;

(g) the spouse unreasonably deducts expenses from income;

(h) the spouse derives a significant portion of income from dividends, capital gains or other sources that are taxed at a lower rate than employment or business income or that are exempt from tax; and

(i) the spouse is a beneficiary under a trust and is or will be in receipt of income or other benefits from the trust.

Application:

[88] Hany admitted that he receives approximately $700 in cash per month from his tenant for rent, albeit not on a regular payment schedule. I am satisfied that in addition to his line 150 income, Hany receives additional income of approximately $700 per month. This amounts to approximately $8,400 per year, to be grossed up.

[89] Based on his line 150 income as reflected in his Notices of Assessment, plus the $8,400 per year grossed up, I find that Hany’s income for support purposes is as follows:

Year	Line 150 Income	Additional Income	Total Income	Grossed Up Income per DivorceMate
2020	$78,274	$8,700	$86,974	$90,945
2021	$54,061	$8,400	$62,461	$68,833
2022 (January 1 to April 30)	$78,000	$8,400	$86,400	$90,096

[90] Hany ought to have paid child support as follows:

Year	Child lives with	Grossed up income of the Applicant	Income of the Respondent	Child support Payable	Child Support Paid	Child Support Arrears
2020 (June/July) 2 mos	Dad	$90,351	$5,615	$0 x 2 months = $0.00	$0.00	$0.00
2020 Aug to Dec 31, 5 mos	Shared	$90,491	$5,615	$837 x 5 months = $4,185	$0.00	$4,185
2021-12 Months	Shared	$68,833	$9,789	$642 x 12 months = $7704	$7,608	$96
2022- 4 months (shared)	Shared	$90,096	$33,000 (estimated)	$553 x 4 months = $2212	$2,536	<$324>
2022 May 1 Onwards (Mom)	Mom	$90,096	$33,000 (estimated)	$835 per month onwards	N/A	N/A
TOTAL				$14,101	$10,144	$3,957

[91] For the period of June 1, 2020 until April 30, 2022, Hany owes Dima $3,957 for retroactive child support.

[92] Based on his income, commencing May 1, 2022, Hany shall pay $835 monthly as ongoing child support.

Section 7 Expenses:

[93] Dima seeks an order that Hany pay his proportionate share of section 7 expenses. Hany takes no position on this issue.

[94] In a child support order, a court may, on either spouse’s request, provide for an amount to cover all or any portion of the following expenses, which expenses may be estimated, taking into account the necessity of the expense in relation to the child’s best interests and the reasonableness of the expense in relation to the means of the spouses and those of the child and to the family’s spending pattern prior to the separation:

(a) child care expenses incurred as a result of the employment, illness, disability or education or training for employment of the spouse who has the majority of parenting time;

(b) that portion of the medical and dental insurance premiums attributable to the child;

(c) health-related expenses that exceed insurance reimbursement by at least $100 annually, including orthodontic treatment, professional counselling provided by a psychologist, social worker, psychiatrist or any other person, physiotherapy, occupational therapy, speech therapy and prescription drugs, hearing aids, glasses and contact lenses;

(d) extraordinary expenses for primary or secondary school education or for any other educational programs that meet the child’s particular needs;

(e) expenses for post-secondary education; and

(f) extraordinary expenses for extracurricular activities.

[95] For ongoing s. 7 expenses, Dima seeks an order that Hany pay 68% of the expenses. This figure is based on his estimated income in 2022 of $90,096 and her estimated income of $33,000. I am satisfied that this is a fair and proportionate sharing of these expenses.

[96] These expenses include summer camp, day care, marital arts and dental care. I am satisfied that these expenses are reasonable and, having regard to the best interests of this child, necessary. The OCL recommended that A participate in extracurricular activities and sports and that he needs socialization and structure provided by a day care setting. Most children benefit from involvement in such activities, but these are especially crucial for A given his special needs.

[97] I accept Dima’s calculation of the arrears of s. 7 expenses as set out in Exhibit 57: Hany owes Dima $3,394.75.

Issue 4: Ongoing and Retroactive Spousal Support:

[98] Dima argues that she is entitled to ongoing spousal support of between $506 to $926 per month or $44,066 as a lump sum payment, and retroactive spousal support of $20,520. Hany took no position on spousal support, neither entitlement nor quantum. Hany did not make any submissions about spousal support.

[99] Duration and quantum of support are separate and interrelated tools available to courts to best achieve the purposes of an order for spousal support, which, according to s. 15.2(6) of the Divorce Act are to:

a. Recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouse arising from the marriage or its breakdown;

b. Apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child over and above any obligation for the support of any child;

c. Relieve economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and

d. Promote economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time.

This is consistent with the concept of marriage as a partnership. There is a presumption that spouses owe one another a mutual duty of support: Bracklow v. Bracklow, 1999 CanLII 715 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R 420, at para. 20.

[100] It is critical for the court to determine all grounds for entitlement because the basis for entitlement may significantly impact quantum and duration of spousal support: A.E. v. A.E., 2021 ONSC 8189, at para. 463. A strong compensatory claim will be a factor for a higher SSAG range: s. 9.1 of the SSAG: Schulstad v. Schulstad, 2017 ONCA 95, 91 R.F.L. (7th) 84, at para. 54.

[101] Compensatory support is premised on a marriage being a joint endeavor. It seeks to alleviate economic disadvantage by taking into account all the circumstances of the parties, including the advantages conferred on either spouse during the marriage. It is concerned with an equitable sharing of the benefits of the marriage: Poirier v. Poirier, 2010 ONSC 920, 81 R.F.L. (6th) 161, at para. 47.

[102] A support obligation may also arise when a spouse is unable to become self-sufficient. Entitlement can be based on need, where a spouse experiences economic hardship resulting from the breakdown of the marriage, but not necessarily the roles assumed during the marriage. Needs-based support could, therefore, consider the recipient’s inability to become self-sufficient for reasons such as health.

Application:

[103] Having regard to all the circumstances of these parties, I am of the view that Dima has a compensatory claim for spousal support. Although Hany supported Dima during their six-year marriage, it was a ‘conventional’ marriage in every way. Hany worked, Dima stayed home and looked after their child and home. During those years, her education, career development, and earning potential were impeded as a result of the marriage.

[104] In my view, Dima had a significant needs-based claim for support at the time of the separation. She was not in a position to be self-sufficient. However, since then, Dima has made impressive strides and is well on her way to becoming self-sufficient. She has obtained rental accommodations and a job that earns her $33,000 a year.

[105] Given all of the circumstances, including Dima’s extreme dependence on Hany during the marriage, compensatory and needs based claims, I accept her claim for ongoing mid-range support of $506 per month commencing May 1, 2022. She argues in favour of a lump sum support payment of $44,066. I find that this amount is reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances.

[106] I also accept Dima’s claim for retroactive support calculated as following:

Year	Grossed up income of the Applicant	Income of the Respondent	Spousal Support Payable	Spousal Support Paid	Spousal Support Arrears
2020 (June/July) 2 mos	$90,351	$5,615	$614 x 2 months = $1,228	$0.00	$1,228
2020 to Aug – December 31, 2020 – 5 mos	$90,491	$5,615	$1,926 x 5 months = $9,630	$0.00	$9,630
2021-12 months	$68,833	$9,789	$1,095 x 12 months = $13,140	$5,592	$7,548
2022 (Jan 1 to April 30) – 4 months (shared)	$90,096	$33,000 (estimated)	$878 x 4 months = $3,512	$1,398	$2,114
May 1 onwards (Mom)	$90,096	$33,000 (estimated)	$506 per month onwards	N/A	N/A
TOTAL			$27,510	$6,990	$20,520

[107] In all the circumstances, mid-range ongoing support of $506 monthly is fair, based on Hany’s grossed up income of $90,096 for 2022 and Dima’s estimated income of $33,000.

Issue 5: Restraining Order:

[108] Dima sought a restraining order against Hany or, alternatively, a “no contact order.”

[109] On application, the court may make a restraining order against any person if the applicant has reasonable grounds to fear for his or her own safety or for the safety of any child in her or her lawful custody: Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 46(1); CLRA, s. 35(1). Because of the serious potential criminal consequences of breaching a restraining order, the court must be satisfied that there are imminent and reasonable grounds for the person to fear for their safety, or the safety of their child, before granting a restraining order: see D.C. v. A.B., 2022 ONSC 198, at paras. 80-81; Jiang v. Zeng, 2019 ONSC 1457, at paras. 28-29.

[110] In this case, I am not satisfied that there is any imminent threat to Dima’s or A’s safety. I therefore decline to grant a restraining order.

[111] However, a non-communication order is appropriate. There is a history of family violence. Hany has obvious animosity and disrespect towards Dima. At times during the trial, he struggled to maintaining decorum towards her. I saw more than once that he has difficulty listening or interacting with her without becoming extremely agitated, animated and bordering on belligerent even in the solemnity of a courtroom. I find that Dima has legitimate concerns for her physical safety at exchanges and for her emotional safety as a result of any communications from Hany by phone, email or otherwise. It is also in A’s best interests that a non-communication order be imposed, so as to avoid any risk of exposure to adult conflict and family violence.

[112] I am satisfied that it is appropriate to impose conditions as proposed in para. 69 of the draft order which was Exhibit 49 at trial, in order to ensure any exchanges are through third parties, and that Hany’s contact with Dima is minimized. These terms are also necessary and reasonable in order to minimize A’s exposure to any potential conflict. No contact between the parties is also recommended by the OCL. I accept these recommendations.

Issue 6: Admissibility of Surreptitious Recordings:

[113] During the trial, Hany sought to adduce a recording of his conversation with Dima that he recorded without her knowledge. He sought to adduce a translation of the conversation as well. It pertained to the sexual assault allegations she made against him. He also sought to have admitted a recording of A. I refused to admit the evidence, with Reasons to follow.

[114] These are those Reasons.

[115] As a general principle, the use of secretly recorded conversations is not to be encouraged in family proceedings. When determining whether to admit a surreptitious recording, I must consider the importance of discouraging the use of secretly recorded conversations in family proceedings, while assessing the probative value of the recording in relation to the issues before the court: Sordi v. Sordi, 2011 ONCA 665, 283 O.A.C. 287, at para. 12.

[116] In order for a surreptitious recording to be admitted, the probative value must outweigh the significant, presumptive prejudice caused by the surreptitious recording. As explained by Kurz J., the “presumption cannot be rebutted short of evidence disclosing serious misconduct by a parent, significant risk to a child's safety or security, or a threat to another interest central to the need to do justice between the parties and the children”: Van Ruyven v. Van Reyven, 2021 ONSC 5963, 62 R.F.L (8th) 451, at para. 41.

[117] In this case, the probative value of the recordings was minimal. The recording of Dima’s conversation with Hany was irrelevant. This trial was not about whether or not Hany sexually assaulted Dima. It was about the best interests of their child, A, and financial issues.

[118] Similarly, I was not prepared to entertain admission of the recording of the child. Recording children for the purpose of using those recordings in family proceedings must be strongly discouraged. Hany failed to establish any probative value of the recording.

[119] In all of the circumstances, I concluded that the presumptive prejudice caused by the surreptitious recordings far outweighed any potential probative value.

CONCLUSION:

[120] In conclusion, I find that it is in A’s best interests that Dima have sole decision-making authority and primary residence. I am also satisfied that Hany’s parenting time with A be on alternating weekends from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 8:00 p.m. (extending to Monday if Monday is a holiday), and for two hours on Wednesdays from 6:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.

[121] I am also satisfied that the other terms in respect of parenting contained in paragraphs 1 to 36 of the Draft Order (Exhibit 49) are in the best interests of A.

[122] In respect of equalization, I find that Hany owes Dima $157,502. He owes $3,957 as retroactive child support, $20,520 as retroactive spousal support. He shall pay $3,394.75 ($2,116.95 for 2022 and $1,277.80 for 2021) for his proportionate share of s. 7 expenses retroactive to the date of separation.

[123] Commencing May 1, 2022, Hany shall pay monthly child support of $835 based on an income in 2022 of $90,096.

[124] Commencing May 1, 2022, Hany shall pay monthly on-going spousal support of $506 based on his income in 2022 of $90,096 and Dima’s estimated income of $33,000. He may pay this as $44,066 as a lump sum spousal support payment.

[125] Based on his 2022 income $90,096 and Dima’s estimated 2022 income of $33,000, Hany shall pay 68% as his proportionate share of section 7 guideline expenses. These expenses include before and after school care, daycare, summer camps, medical dental and health care expenses and extracurricular activities such as swimming and martial arts. Monthly, Hany shall pay $732.69 monthly towards s.7 expenses commencing May 1, 2022.

[126] The OCL recommended that A participate in extracurricular and social activities suitable to his age and preferences. Hany’s consent or approval of these activities is not required.

[127] This Order is to be enforced by the Family Responsibility Office.

[128] Either party may move for divorce at his or her own expense.

[129] The terms of the draft order set out in Exhibit 49 in respect of life insurance (paragraphs 53 to 60) and medical and dental benefits (paragraphs 61 to 66) shall be incorporated into the Final Order.

[130] Prejudgment and post judgment interest shall be payable in accordance with sections 128 and 129 of the Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C. 43.

COSTS:

[131] The parties are encouraged to agree upon appropriate costs for this trial. If the parties are not able to agree on costs, each may make brief written submissions to me (maximum two pages double-spaced, plus a bill of costs) by 4:30 pm on December 9, 2022.

[132] If no submissions are received within this timeframe, the parties will be deemed to have settled the issue of costs as between themselves.

[133] If I have not received submissions by 4:30 pm on December 9, 2022 from either party, I will infer that the party who did not submit does not wish to make submissions and I will decide on the basis of the material that I have.

Chozik J.

Released: November 28, 2022