ENDORSEMENT

COURT FILE NO.: Guelph FS-22-73

DATE: 2022-11-29

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: Ryan Keegan Kahro, Applicant

AND:

Ryan Matthew Kahro, Respondent

BEFORE: Kurz J.

COUNSEL: Vanessa Amyot and Daryl Gelgoot, for the Applicant

Michael Ruhl and Ashely Timm, for the Respondent

HEARD: November 22, 2022

ENDORSEMENT

Kurz J.

Introduction

[1] This is a motion by the Applicant wife (the “Wife”) for a variety of relief, including child and spousal support as well as an advance on disbursements. The Respondent husband (the “Husband”) moves for a s. 30 assessment and other relief, including partition and sale of the matrimonial home (the “Home”).

[2] The Husband wishes to have the Wife’s motion adjourned to a long motion date to allow it to be heard together with his cross-motion. The two motions could not be heard together in the 59 minutes allotted to a regular motion. The wife moved first after having leave to do so by Emery J. at the August 29, 2022, case conference.

Refusal to Grant Adjournment

[3] After hearing from counsel, I refused to grant the adjournment and heard the Wife’s motion because:

a) I have before me all of the materials necessary to determine the interim support issues.

b) The Wife claims that the support issues are urgent in light of her expenses and the unilaterally determined quantum of support she is receiving from the Husband.

c) The issues of interim child and spousal support have not yet been determined even though the parties separated over a year and a half ago;

d) The Husband is in the highest tax bracket yet is not receiving any tax relief for his voluntary payments. Those payments include all home expenses. Those tax-neutral payments total over $11,000 per month. The Wife presently has minimal income as she has been a stay-at-home parent since the parties’ first child was born nine years ago. During the marriage, she income-split with the Husband. A support order could therefore assist both parties

e) The Wife indicated in her materials a willingness to agree to the sale of the Home and to pay her share of the Home’s expenses until the sale closes, provided that the interim support issue is determined. That is part of the relief that the Husband seeks in his cross-motion.

f) I did not see sufficient overlap between the issues of support and parenting (which the Husband wishes to pursue in his cross-motion) to require that the support issue be put off until a long motion date can be found to deal with the husband’s parenting issues.

[4] Before I heard arguments, the parties indicated that they have settled some issues regarding sale of the Home, proceeds of that sale, interim disbursements to the Applicant and the Respondent’s request for a s. 30 assessment. On consent, order to go in accord with the draft order that I have signed when the parties were before me, on November 22, 2022.

[5] The key issue in this matter is the income to be attributed to the Husband. The main evidence in that regard comes from two different income reports prepared by the Husband’s CBV[^1] about seven months apart. There is a smaller issue regarding the imputation of a minimum wage income to the Wife, but that will not have a significant influence on the final support figures.

Background

[6] Few central facts other than income are in dispute for the purpose of this motion.

[7] The parties married on October 14, 2011. They separated on April 8, 2021. They have three children, who range in ages between nine and four. At the time of separation, the youngest child had only recently turned three.

[8] The Wife previously worked for the City of Guelph, earning $60,000 annually in its marketing department. However, there is no dispute that she has been a stay-at-home mother since the oldest child was born in 2013. That child just started school this past September.

[9] The Husband, through a corporation, is a part owner of three Tim Hortons franchises in Guelph. He says that he received his shares in the franchises as a gift from his father, through a family trust.

[10] As stated above, the Wife gave up her job with the City of Guelph following the birth of the parties’ first child some nine years ago. Thereafter, she was a homemaker and the primary caregiver of the children. During the marriage, the Husband income-split with the Wife to some extent, having one of his companies pay her $42,400 per annum and offering her a credit card, paid by his company. Access to that card was terminated effective January 2022.

[11] The parties had an affluent lifestyle, which included private school for the children, vacations and an expensive matrimonial home. The Husband went on golfing trips, attended many sports events and held season’s tickets to the Toronto Maple Leafs (through his company). His corporation paid for some renovations to the Home.

[12] The parties resided together in the Home. It is presently worth about $2.9 million, with a $1,264,000 mortgage. They had discussed selling the property since shortly after separation but had not reached an agreement to do so until now.

[13] Following their separation, the parties had originally cohabited separate and apart in the Home. But the Husband moved out to a condo shortly afterwards. He then moved to another condo, owned by his holding company. Recently, he and his new partner have moved into a $1.7 million home that he says was purchased by his father’s holding company. From the evidence, it appears that the house was purchased to allow for the residence of the Husband and his new partner. They pay a rent of $7,400/month to a holding company controlled by the Husband’s father. As set out below, the Husband claims that his partner pays half of that rent. He also says that her income is $51,000 per year.

[14] While the Husband has been paying all of the Home expenses, at least some are actually paid out of a joint line of credit. He has also been paying the Wife $3,000 per month, on an unparticularized tax-free basis, presumably to cover non-Home related expenses. That is a figure he chose. The Wife says that the payments are inadequate within the context of husband’s income (whichever’s view of that income is accepted) and their previous standard of living.

[15] The Wife claims to be sinking further into debt because of the paucity of the Husband’s payments. Her financial statement of October 20, 2022, bears out her claim. It shows her date of separation debts of $707,203.46 increasing by $86,191.54 to $793,395. The Husband’s debts have actually decreased by $8,598.72 between the dates of separation and November 3, 2022, when he swore his financial statement. Those debts declined from $695,168.45 to $686,569.73.

[16] The Wife is also concerned that some Home expenses are being paid from the line of credit, meaning that she is in essence paying for part of her own support even though she is unemployed.

Husband’s Income

[17] The Husband’s latest sworn financial statement sets out his income as $372,714, which he says was his 2021 income, as set out in his tax return. He admits that that is not the appropriate figure for support purposes.

[18] In 2021 the Husband retained CBV, Louise Poole, to prepare an income report. She produced her first income report for the Husband on October 25, 2021. It opined that his 2021 income for support purposes was $641,000. That report was based in part on the Husband’s representations as to his business.

[19] A number of months later, the Husband asked Ms. Poole to prepare a second income report for him. It was a further and revised version of her first income report but based on a different set of his representations. That second report was released on May 30, 2022. As set out below, the second report reduced its estimate of the Husband’s historical income (for 2018 and 2019) by about half, compared from the first report. His more recent and anticipated income were reduced by about a third.

[20] The second report projects the Husband’s current annual income as $409,584. The Husband asks the court to accept that figure for support purposes.

[21] Below is a chart setting out Ms. Poole’s calculations of the Husband’s income in both of her reports:

October 2021 Report May 2022 Report

2018 $687,975 $345,472

2019 $941,715 $434,126

2020 $518,694 $433,471

2021 $641,885 (projected) $409,584

2022 $409,584 (projected)

[22] The midpoint between the two reports’ most recent income figures is $542,234.50 per annum. For the purpose of this motion, the Wife is seeking a determination of the Husband’s income at a slightly lower annual figure, $525,000.

[23] Both reports accepted the Husband’s representations that no expenses were run through the business. In his materials he admits that that is not entirely accurate. Some expenses, including renovations to the Home were run through his business. Further, as set out above, the income split with the Wife during the marriage.

[24] The Husband explains the impetus for requesting the second report as follows. Since the first report was released, he learned that a number of the representations that he communicated to Ms. Poole and upon which she relied, were incorrect. The government’s Covid subsidies to businesses ended. The minimum wage was increased to $15.50 per hour. Tim Hortons’ parent company raised the prices of ingredients without a corresponding increase in the prices of products. He has had to replace his father as the general manager of the company running the three franchises.

[25] I point out that:

a) While the Canadian government’s subsidies to employers did end in May 2022:

https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/wage-rent-subsidies.html;

b) Ontario’s minimum wage was $15.00 per hour at the time of the first report. It did not increase to $15.50 per hour until October 2022: https://news.ontario.ca/en/release/1001954/html. That represents only a 3.3% increase.

c) The Husband’s income as represented in the second report, barely changed from 2019, the year before the pandemic hit, to 2020 its first year. His 2019 income is listed as $434,126 while his 2020 income is set at $433,471, a reduction of $655 a difference of .15%. One would think that that would be the year of greatest loss.

d) A general manager’s income should not significantly affect the income of just one of the shareholders of the company running the three franchises;

e) Both the CBV’s original assumptions and the new set of assumptions came from representations made by the Husband.

f) The timing of the changed report is, as the Wife points out, suspicious, as it follows the commencement of this proceeding.

g) Of equal concern with regard to the veracity of the new figures is the fact that the new circumstances, as represented by the Husband, are alleged to have a retrospective effect. They go back to reduce his income by about half for the two years that precede the pandemic. Bluntly, that claim makes little to no sense. On the materials presently before the court, that retroactive reduction is not credible.

[26] It is certainly open for the Husband to attempt to prove the veracity of his changed representations and revised income figures at trial. But there are sufficient reasons, as set out above, to take the radically changed figures in his second income report with a substantial grain of salt.

[27] For that reason, I find that the Wife’s proposed compromise annual income figure for the Husband, $525,000, represents a reasonable determination of the Husband’s present income and I adopt it.

Jurisdiction and Basic Principles Regarding Interim Support

[28] The jurisdiction to order interim child and spousal support is found at s. 15.1(2) and s. 15.2(2) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, s. 3 (2nd Supp.), as amended. Under those provisions, the court may, on application, make an interim order requiring a spouse to:

a) Pay for the support of any or all children of the marriage pending the determination of the application; and/or

b) Secure and/or pay, such lump sums and/or periodic sums as the court thinks reasonable for the support of the other spouse, pending the determining of the application.

[29] Under s. 15.2(4), the factors that a court must consider in determining interim spousal support are set out as follows:

(4) In making an order under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2), the court shall take into consideration the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including

a) the length of time the spouses cohabited;

b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and

c) any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse.

[30] The four objectives of spousal support are set out in s. 15.2(6) as follows:

(6) An order made under subsection (1) or an interim order under subsection (2) that provides for the support of a spouse should

(a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown;

(b) apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage;

(c) relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and

(d) in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time.

[31] In Driscoll v. Driscoll, 2009 66373 (ON SC), [2009] O.J. No. 5056, 2009 CarswellOnt 7393 (S.C.J.), Lemon J. of this court adopted the following “helpful list of principles governing interim support motions” found in Robles v. Kuhn, 2009 BCSC 1163, [2009] B.C.J. No. 1699:

1. On applications for interim support the applicant's needs and the respondent's ability to pay assume greater significance;

2. An interim support order should be sufficient to allow the applicant to continue living at the same standard of living enjoyed prior to separation if the payor's ability to pay warrants it;

3. On interim support applications the court does not embark on an in-depth analysis of the parties' circumstances which is better left to trial. The court achieves rough justice at best;

4. The courts should not unduly emphasize any one of the statutory considerations above others;

5. On interim applications the need to achieve economic self-sufficiency is often of less significance;

6. Interim support should be ordered within the range suggested by the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines unless exceptional circumstances indicate otherwise;

7. Interim support should only be ordered where it can be said a prima facie case for entitlement has been made out;

8. Where there is a need to resolve contested issues of fact, especially those connected with a threshold issue, such as entitlement, it becomes less advisable to order interim support.

Imputation of income to the Wife

[32] The Husband seeks to impute income to the Wife based on a minimum wage of $15.50/hr. for a 40-hour week. He points to her previous work with the City of Guelph and her university degree. The Wife points out that she has not worked outside of the Home for over nine years. It will take her some time to regain the skills and connections necessary to secure equivalent employment.

[33] Under s. 19(1)(a) of the Child Support Guidelines, a court has the power to impute an income to a party which is greater than their actual income. The provision reads as follows:

Imputing income

19 (1) The court may impute such amount of income to a parent or spouse as it considers appropriate in the circumstances, which circumstances include,

(a) the parent or spouse is intentionally under-employed or unemployed, other than where the under-employment or unemployment is required by the needs of any child or by the reasonable educational or health needs of the parent or spouse;

[34] The leading Ontario case regarding the imputation of income to a support payor is the decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Drygala v. Pauli (2002), 2002 41868 (ON CA), 61 O.R. (3d) 711 (Ont. C.A.). At para. 32 of that decision, the Court described the imputation of income as:

... one method by which the court gives effect to the joint and ongoing obligation of parents to support their children. In order to meet this legal obligation, a parent must earn what he or she is capable of earning.

[35] As Chappel J. of the Superior Court Family Division explained in Szitas v. Szitas, 2012 ONSC 1548, at para. 56, citing Drygala v. Pauli:

The Ontario Court of Appeal has held that in determining whether to impute income on the basis that a party is intentionally underemployed or unemployed pursuant to section 19(1)(a) of the Guidelines, it is not necessary to establish bad faith or an attempt to thwart child support obligations. A parent is intentionally underemployed within the meaning of this section if they earn less than they are capable of earning having regard for all of the circumstances. In determining whether to impute income on this basis, the court must consider what is reasonable in the circumstances.

[36] In reviewing the applicable case law, Chappel J. cites seven principles that apply to the imputation of income to a support payor:

[37] There is a duty on the part of the payor to actively seek out reasonable employment opportunities that will maximize their income potential so as to meet the needs of their children.

[38] Underemployment must be measured against what is reasonable to expect of the payor having regard for their background, education, training and experience.

[39] The court will not excuse a party from their child support obligations or reduce these obligations where the party has persisted in un-remunerative employment, or where they have pursued unrealistic or unproductive career aspirations. A self-induced reduction of income is not a basis upon which to avoid or reduce child support payments.

[40] If a party chooses to pursue self-employment, the court will examine whether this choice was a reasonable one in all of the circumstances and may impute an income if it determines that the decision was not appropriate having regard for the parent's child support obligations.

[41] When a parent experiences a change in their income, they may be given a "grace period" to adjust to the change and seek out employment in their field at a comparable remuneration before income will be imputed to them. However, if they have been unable to secure comparable employment within a reasonable time frame, they will be required to accept other less remunerative opportunities or options outside of the area of their expertise in order to satisfy their obligation to contribute to the support of their children.

[42] Where a party fails to provide full financial disclosure relating to their income, the court is entitled to draw an adverse inference and to impute income to them.

[43] The amount of income that the court imputes to a parent is a matter of discretion. The only limitation on the discretion of the court in this regard is that there must be some basis in the evidence for the amount that the court has chosen to impute. (at para. 57, citations omitted).

[44] Amplifying on Chappel J.'s seven points, while I have broad discretion to impute income to a payor, that discretion is not untrammeled. As the Court of Appeal stated in Drygala:

Section 19 of the Guidelines is not an invitation to the court to arbitrarily select an amount as imputed income. There must be a rational basis underlying the selection of any such figure. The amount selected as an exercise of the court's discretion must be grounded in the evidence. (at para. 44).

[45] The Court in Drygala set out the following three questions which should be answered when considering a request to impute income under s. 19 (1) (a) of the CSG:

(a) Is the party intentionally under-employed or unemployed?

(b) If so, is the intentional under-employment or unemployment required by virtue of his reasonable or health educational needs?

(c) If not, what income is appropriately imputed?

[46] 35. The Drygala test was refined by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Lavie v Lavie, 2018 ONCA 10. There, Rouleau J.A., speaking for the court, set out a very clear black line test for intentional underemployment. It is one in which the subjective reasons for the underemployment (other than health or education needs) are not relevant. He wrote:

26 There is no requirement of bad faith or intention to evade support obligations inherent in intentional underemployment: Drygala v. Pauli, at paras. 24-37. the reasons for underemployment are irrelevant. If a parent is earning less than she or he could be, he or she is intentionally underemployed.

[Emphasis added]

[47] In Singh v Singh, 2013 ONSC 6476, Price J. considered a recipient obligation to be self-sufficient within the context of an interim support motion. He wrote:

While self-sufficiency is an objective that must be considered whenever determining the appropriateness and amount of spousal support under the Divorce Act, Ms. Singh’s failure to achieve self-sufficiency should not be given much emphasis at this interim stage.

[48] That decision did not directly avert to the issue of imputing oncome.

[49] In her written statement of law, the Wife’s counsel writes:

While Ms. Kahro acknowledges that she has an obligation to work toward self-sufficiency, it is not realistic to expect at this early stage that she should be contributing to her own support. The parties’ youngest child is only four years old and started school full-time in September of 2022. Until two months ago, Ms. Kahro’s childcare responsibilities prevented her from pursuing full-time employment. Apart from this, she has been out of the workforce for a considerable period and may need to retrain and/or upgrade her skills before she is able to secure suitable employment.

[50] That argument is compelling but not determinative in the unique circumstances of this case. In light of the authorities cited above, a court should be reluctant to impute income to a stay-at-home wife and mother whose youngest child is four years old, has just started in school and has not worked during the lifetime of her children. However, an unusual fact causes me to find that the usual approach to imputing income at the interim stage does not fully apply here.

[51] In the recent June 2, 2022, provincial election, the Wife ran as a candidate for the Ontario Legislature on behalf of the Green Party.

[52] The Wife says that she ran for the experience and the opportunity to meet people after a near-decade at home. She was not expecting to win. But in running, she signalled to the constituents of her riding that she was available for full time employment as a Member of Provincial Parliament (“MPP”).

[53] Further, on the limited evidence before me, an election victory was not impossible. I note that a Green candidate, also from Guelph, Mike Schreiner, was re-elected to the Ontario legislature in the last election: https://www.ola.org/en/members/current. That being said, Mr. Schreiner is the sole Green Party MPP.

[54] I also note that the parties have been separated for about a year and a half, but the mother has not offered the court an education plan that would place her into the work force.

[55] With all of that in mind, I am willing to impute a minimum wage of $30,000 per year to the Wife on a without prejudice basis. I chose that minimum wage figure (based on the minimum wage and a 37.5 hour per week work week) because the Wife represented to the voters in her riding her willingness to serve in a full-time role. However, it is an occupation that does not require any additional course of training following her time as a full-time homemaker and caregiver.

[56] Nonetheless, following her lengthy absence from the job market, it is likely that the Wife will require further education in order to return to the work force as anything but a minimum wage earner.

[57] Thus, my imputation finding regarding the Wife is without prejudice regarding any further attempts she may make to retrain for the marketplace. In the event that the Wife does arrive at an educational plan that will allow her to train for a return to work, she will be entitled to a review of my imputation, notwithstanding the principles set out in Trang v. Trang 2013 ONSC 1980.

Quantum of Support

[58] The Husband does not question that he should pay table support in an amount set out by the Child Support Guidelines. However, he raises the issue of the $350,000 ceiling or cap under the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, which grants the court greater discretion over its usual range of figures.

[59] The Husband asks the court to adopt an approach somewhat similar to the one adopted by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Halliwell v. Halliwell, 2017 ONCA 349, 138 O.R. (3d) 671. In that case, the court adopted a figure half-way between the $350,000 ceiling and the payor’s actual income. Part of the court’s consideration in Halliwell was the equalization payment that the recipient was receiving in addition to support.

[60] In Plese v Herjavic, 2020 ONCA 810, at paras. 26-27, the Court of Appeal clarified that the approach in Haliwell was not the only one available for the determination of the appropriate quantum of spousal support. Rather what is required is "an individualized fact-specific analysis”. Further, while the SSAGs do not apply automatically after the payor's gross income reaches $350,000 per year, that $350,000 figure is not a 'cap'. “Spousal support can, and often will, increase for income above that ceiling."

[61] Paragraph 11.3 of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (the “SSAG”) allows the court to exercise its discretion to depart from its ranges when the payor's income exceeds the "ceiling" of $350,000 per year. However the SSAG’s authors, Professors Thompson and Rogerson, state at p. 57 of the SSAG Revised User’s Guide (the “RUG”) that when the payor's income is above $350,000, the SSAG ranges will usually be followed up to an income of $700,000 per year. In those cases, support is often fixed at the low range.

[62] Here, the $525,000 figure is already a compromise, even from the mid-range between the two most current figures offered in the Husband’s two income reports. Further, at this point, equalization has not been determined. I note that the Husband claims that there will be a minimal equalization payment if any. That is because his greatest asset, his interest in the corporation holding shares in the three Tim Horton’s franchises, was gifted to him by his father through a family trust. Thus, he will argue that it is excluded property.

[63] I also recognize that, as set out above, interim spousal support orders are not meant be based on a full consideration of all factors and permutations that may be considered at trial. Rather, the court is seeking “rough justice” or a figure that will hold the recipient until trial. Here it also recognizes that the support recipient, the Wife, remains the primary caregiver of three children, all of whom have enjoyed a very comfortable standard of living prior to separation. Even her imputed income is 17.5% of the income that I have attributed the Husband.

[64] I note that the Husband’s standard of living appears to have suffered no diminution since separation. He lives in a $1.7 million dollar home with his new partner, purchased for him by his father’s holding company. He says that his partner pays ½ of the $7,400/month rent based on her income from her own home. But the Husband’s own evidence is that she earns $51,000 per year. That implies that he is subsidizing her in some manner. He has travelled with her to the Caribbean before moving into their new home.

[65] The Husband says that I should set spousal support at the low end of the range and should not automatically advert to the mid range, where the Wife is asking the court to land.

[66] I agree that courts should not automatically default to the mid-range figure. That is not the intention of the SSAG. As its authors write at ch. 7.1 of the RUG:

Determining location in the range is in important issue, given the diverse array of fact situations this formula covers. The mid-range should not be the default. (See SSAG Ch. 9 and “Choosing Location in the Range” below).

[67] But here, there is a strong compensatory aspect to the Wife’s support claim. As the SSAG states at para. 3.3.4:

On the theoretical front, marriages with dependent children raise strong compensatory claims based on the economic disadvantages flowing from assumption of primary responsibility for child care, not only during the marriage, but also after separation. We have identified this aspect of the compensatory principle as it operates in cases involving dependent children as the parental partnership principle, and have drawn on this concept in structuring the with child support formula. For marriages with dependent children, length of marriage is not the most important determinant of support outcomes as compared to post-separation child-care responsibilities.

[68] Thus, post-separation childcare responsibilities can contribute as much to a claim for compensatory support as pre-separation childcare. As the SSAG states at ch. 8.1:

It is not the length of the marriage, or marital interdependency, or merger over time, that drives this theory of spousal support, but the presence of dependent children and the need to provide care and support for those children. Unlike the conventional compensatory approach, parental partnership looks at not just past loss, but also the continuing economic disadvantage that flows from present and future child-care responsibilities.

[69] Recall her that the youngest child is four and the oldest is nine. The Wife will have significant childcare responsibilities for years to come.

[70] Further, compensatory support is usually found when a spouse with children gives up employment for a homemaking role, as the SSAG further states at ch. 8.1:

Where one spouse, in a marriage with children, has become a full-time homemaker or has worked outside the home part time or has worked as a secondary earner, there will be disadvantage and loss at the end of the marriage, usually warranting compensatory support. This compensatory rationale is encompassed by the first of the four objectives of spousal support, in s. 15.2(6)(a) of the Divorce Act.

Conclusion

[71] Based on the income of $525,000 per annum that I have attributed to the Husband, his table child support obligation is $8,173 per month.

[72] Regarding spousal support, at the $525,000 annual income level that I have attributed to the Husband and the $30,000 figure I have imputed to the Wife, with s. 7 expense of $30,000 for private school, the range of SSAG spousal support figures is:

Wife (with Three Children) Husband

Low: 60.7% 39.3%

Mid: 62.7% 37.3%

High: 64.6% 35.4%

[73] Here I find it appropriate to order temporary spousal support at a rate between the low and mid range: $7,500 per month. I make this finding because the Husband’s income is above $350,000 but there is a clear compensatory aspect to the Wife’s support claim, even with an imputed income to her.

[74] The Husband shall also pay his proportionate share of s.7 expenses, which I set at 78.5%. At this time, I am advised that the only s, 7 expense is private school, which costs approximately $30,000 per year.

[75] Regarding other s. 7 expenses, the arguments of the parties are unclear. I have been advised that the only current s. 7 expense is private school. However, the children have other recreational activities, which the Wife says includes hockey, horseback riding, and summer camp. There was little argument on this, and I assume that the parties will be able to agree on appropriate s. 7 expenses, for which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.

[76] Thus, I order that commencing December 1, 2022 and continuing on the first day of each succeeding month, until further order, the Husband shall pay to the Wife on a temporary basis:

(a) Table child support of $8,173 per month;

(b) Spousal support of $7,500 per month;

(c) 78.5% of all s. 7 expenses, including private school.

(d) The Wife shall not incur any further s. 7 expenses without the consent of the Husband, which consent shall not be arbitrarily incurred. It is expected that the children will engage in hockey, horseback riding and summer camp.

(e) Each party shall be responsible for ½ of the mortgage, insurance and property taxes payable for the Home. The Wife will be responsible for all other ordinary upkeep expenses, including utilities. If any expenses are incurred to prepare the matrimonial home for sale, or if any repairs are required, they shall be equally shared.

Costs

[77] The parties should attempt to resolve the issue of costs on their own. If they are unable to do so, the Applicant may submit her costs submissions of up to three pages, double-spaced, one-inch margins, plus a bill of costs/costs outline and offers to settle. The Applicant shall do so within 14 days of release of this endorsement. She need not include the authorities upon which she relies so long as they are found in the commonly referenced reporting services (i.e. , LexisNexis Quicklaw, or WestlawNext) and the relevant paragraph references are included. The Respondent may respond in kind within a further 14 days. No reply submission will be accepted unless I request it. If I have not received any submissions within the time frames set out above, I will assume that the parties have resolved the issue and will make no costs order.

Marvin Kurz J.”

Electronic Signature of Justice Marvin Kurz

Released: November 29, 2022

COURT FILE NO.: FS-22-73

DATE: 20221122

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Ryan Keegan Kahro

Applicant

– and –

Ryan Matthew Kahro

Respondent

Endorsement

Kurz J.

Released: November 22, 2022

[^1]: Chartered Business Valuator