SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
v.
RAHIEM QUINCY GEDDES
R E A S O N S F O R D E C I S I O N
O N B A I L R E V I E W
DELIVERED REMOTELY BY THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE P. ROGER
on July 11, 2022, for an OTTAWA, Ontario, proceeding
APPEARANCES:
R. Thomson
Counsel for the Crown
F. Poff-Smith
Counsel for Rahiem Quincy Geddes
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S
REASONS FOR DECISION ON BAIL REVIEW
1
Transcript Ordered:
July 11, 2022
Transcript Completed:
July 15, 2022
Approved by Roger J.:
July 19, 2022
Ordering Party Notified:
July 19, 2022
MONDAY, JULY 11, 2022
R E A S O N S F O R D E C I S I O N
O N B A I L R E V I E W
ROGER J. (Orally):
The accused, Mr. Geddes, brings a section 525 review of his detention. Mr. Geddes was arrested on February 11, 2022 for various alleged breaches. He did not request a bail hearing and he has been detained since his arrest in February 2022.
Mr. Geddes faces a number of charges under four different informations. One information contains charges of human trafficking of a 17-year-old complainant. Another information contains a charge involving a handgun bank robbery. The third information contains a charge of possession of a stolen vehicle, and a fourth information, the information for which he was last arrested, contains charges of breaches of court conditions.
The question to be answered at a section 525 hearing is whether the continued detention of the accused is justified within the meaning of section 515(10) of the Criminal Code. Here, for reasons that follow, I find that the continued detention of Mr. Geddes is justified.
The question of the onus at such a hearing is not clearly apparent from section 525 or from the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Myers, 2019 SCC 18.
One line of cases has held that the onus depends on what happened beforehand, that if a bail hearing was not conducted before, as is the case here, the onus would then be as per sections 515(5) and (6). And that if a bail hearing was conducted, that absent an error, accused must demonstrate that their detention is no longer justified because of new evidence, because of a material change in circumstances, or because of other circumstances, including the time spent in detention.
The other line of cases holds that there is no onus on a section 525 review, that the judge conducts an independent review without there being any onus, whether on the accused or on the Crown.
I believe, with respect to my colleagues who believe differently, that the correct approach to a section 525 review is as stated in the decision of R. v. Denesevich, 2019 ONSC 3823, because that approach better reflects principles of statutory interpretation.
The text of section 525 refers to section 515, which incorporates the onus be either on the Crown in most of the cases or on the accused in some cases, depending on the circumstances. As well, the context of section 525 also better supports such an interpretation. Indeed, our justice system incorporates, in most instances, an onus resting on one of the parties. This reflects the adversarial nature of our justice system where the judge is usually not an active inquirer. I would think that Parliament would have been clearer had they intended to effect such a change to our adversarial system, beyond what is stated at s. 525. Finally, I think as well that this is why the Supreme Court of Canada stated what it did in Myers at paras. 42 and 56. At para. 56 it did not make any reference to the onus because it was clear that the onus is not impacted by section 525. Section 525 does not offer any kind of procedural advantage related to the onus that could justify waiting 90 days in jail, which explains the Supreme Court’s decision as it clearly contemplated the different onus at para. 42 of its decision.
However, because the law on the onus is not settled, with cases going one way and cases going another way, I will conduct my analysis using the law that is most favourable to the accused, in this case, with no onus on the accused or on the Crown.
The primary ground is not alleged.
Considering the secondary ground, the facts of this case are not very dissimilar from those in the decision of R. v. G.F., [2020] O.J. No. 2434.
Mr. Geddes was released by Justice Webber on November 13, 2020 under very strict conditions, including house arrest and GPS monitoring. Despite these very strict conditions and despite the clear warning of Justice Webber, Mr. Geddes is now accused of a number of breaches of court conditions, including providing false identification to a police officer in Oshawa despite being on house arrest. These are, of course, allegations but they seem to have merit or to be a strong case for the Crown. Mr. Geddes also has a record for failing to comply with court conditions. Unfortunately, when I consider all circumstances, there is little reason to think that Mr. Geddes will behave differently under this new proposed plan with two older cousins as sureties.
I have no doubt that both of his cousins are extremely well-intentioned and that they mean the best for Mr. Geddes and his family. However, the reality suggests that they do not know Mr. Geddes all that well and that Mr. Geddes is unlikely to listen to them any more than he listened to the previous sureties.
Mr. Geddes was under GPS monitoring when he allegedly breached court conditions, demonstrating, if the allegations are true, that he is not easily deterred by such measures and that he is apparently willing to take risks with regards to his probable detection.
Consequently, I find that the continued detention of Mr. Geddes is justified under the secondary ground of section 515(10) because Mr. Geddes poses a substantial likelihood or probability of re-offending even if under the very strict conditions of his proposed plan of release.
Given my finding on the secondary ground, it is not necessary for me to consider the tertiary ground.
I arrive at this result after considering that the most serious offences will, unfortunately, probably not be tried until March 2023, but note that this can be, at least in part, attributed to Mr. Geddes’ pre-trial applications and to his previous lawyer being conflicted out of this matter.
CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIPT
EVIDENCE ACT, subsection 5(2)
I, Lynn Carrière, Authorized Court Transcriptionist, ACT ID 2366775200, certify that this document is a true and accurate transcription, produced to the best of my skills and ability, of the recording of R. v. Rahiem Quincy Geddes in the Superior Court of Justice held at 161 Elgin Street, Ottawa, Ontario, taken from Recording No. 0411_CR32_20220711_082508__10_ROGERP, which has been certified in Form 1 by Ryan Love.
July 15, 2022
Date Lynn Carrière
- This certification does not apply to the Reasons for Decision on Bail Review which were judicially edited.