COURT FILE NO.: FC1066/15-1
DATE: February 9, 2022
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY COURT
BETWEEN:
Jacqueline Rose Robinson
Toenie Hersch for the applicant
Applicant
- and -
Rodney Dale Darrah
Robert Haas for the respondent
Respondent
HEARD: January 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 2022 by videoconference
TOBIN J.
Introduction
[1] On March 3, 2017, Mitrow J. granted the applicant ("mother") custody of the parties' child. The order also provided that the respondent ("father") have access with the child at specified times (the Mitrow J. Order).[^1]
[2] After the Mitrow J. Order was made, the father was not able to exercise all of the parenting time that was ordered. He claims that the mother prevented him from exercising the parenting time he was granted. As a result, he brought a Contempt Motion against the mother.
[3] The mother brought a Motion to Change the Mitrow J. Order, as did the father, within his Response to the Motion to Change. The mother subsequently withdrew her Motion to Change. The father did not.
[4] These Reasons concern the father's Contempt Motion and his Motion to Change the Mitrow J. Order.
Facts
[5] The mother and father cohabited for a brief period and together had one child, April Rose Darrah, born April 1, 2015 ("child"). They separated shortly after the child was born. Following the separation, the child remained in the mother's care. Proceedings were brought by her.
[6] Following a five-day trial, the Mitrow J. Order was made. The Order provided that the mother have sole custody[^2] of the child. The father was granted "regular" parenting time to the child, to include:
alternate weekends from Friday at 6 p.m. to Sunday at 6 p.m. (para. 2(d))
"one midweek visit for a period of up to eight hours (but up to four hours if the child is in school) but not past 7 p.m. unless the parties agree otherwise, on a weekday to be chosen by the [father] failing which the day shall be Wednesday ..." (para. 2(e))
Thanksgiving Day from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. in odd-numbered years (para. 3(a))
Father's Day from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. (para. 3(b))
two days during the Easter weekend (para. 3(d))
additional time during the Christmas holidays (para. 4)
summer vacation (para. 5)
make-up parenting time if missed by the father for reasons beyond his control (para. 14)
[7] The father exercised his midweek parenting time on Thursdays.
[8] Shortly after the Mitrow J. Order was made, the mother did not send the child for parenting time as ordered. The father's evidence, which I accept, is that between March 6, 2017 and August 12, 2018, he missed a total of 88 parenting time visits.
[9] He did not have parenting time on: March 26, June 15, June 17, June 18 and June 22, 2017; and every other parenting time he was granted under the Mitrow J. Order from September 12, 2017 to August 12, 2018. On August 14, 2018, the father signed his Notice of Contempt Motion.
[10] The mother acknowledges that she was aware of the Mitrow J. Order and that the father did not have parenting time just as he claims. She provided reasons why she did not allow this parenting time.
[11] On March 6, 2017, the mother left a note on her door explaining why the parenting time would not take place that day. In part, the note states:
We are not home in fear of you coming by yelling and threatening me again in the presence of April.
[12] The note also states that the mother had notified the father through a text the day before that this visit would be cancelled. Parenting time continued after that missed visit.
[13] The missed June 2017 parenting time did not take place because the mother was in Thunder Bay visiting her father. This arrangement had been agreed to by the parties beforehand. The father knew in May 2017 about the trip and agreed that it take place. He drove the mother and child to the airport. While in Thunder Bay, the mother contacted the father to ask if he wanted to have contact with the child on Father's Day. He declined. He did not want the child distracted during the visit.
[14] On August 27, 2019, the child returned home to the mother from the weekend parenting time with the father. Once home, the mother noticed that the child was "walking funny." The child was thirsty, complained and touched her belly. She said she "had to pee and began to cry." The mother examined the child and saw that her vagina and buttocks area looked red and raw. It was more than a rash. The child was not in that condition when she left for parenting time the previous Friday.
[15] As a consequence of this observation, the mother took the child to Children's Hospital emergency where she was examined and subsequently discharged. The hospital record notes that the diagnosis was "UTI / diaper rash." It was subsequently discovered that the child did not have an UTI. After applying a topical medication and diaper cream to the child's affected areas, the redness went away about four days later.
[16] The father had parenting time with the child the next two Thursdays and on the weekend beginning September 8, 2017.
[17] When the child returned home on Sunday, September 10, 2017, the mother observed the child to be upset: she went to the stairs and banged her head on the floor, she was crying and rubbing her stomach. The mother examined the child's bottom. The redness was there again but covered more area and was more severe than it had been two weeks earlier. The child was not in this condition when she left for parenting time the previous Friday.
[18] Again, the mother took the child to the Children's Hospital emergency. The diagnosis given this time was "poor hygiene." The instructions noted in the hospital records included:
Instructed mother to emphasize to father to clean area ... mother to call CAS (illegible) her ... neglect concerns.
[19] In response to counsel's question in-chief, "what did you understand from the doctor?" the mother replied that she ceased access and called the Children's Aid Society to report neglect.
[20] The mother did contact the Children's Aid Society to report her concerns. Child protection worker Nadine Vaillancourt was assigned to investigate. The mother and the worker spoke on September 13, 2017. The mother reported to the worker that she was going to "deny access this Thursday." The note made by the worker stated that "I made no input into this decision."
[21] The child protection worker conducted her investigation over the next few months. This investigation included speaking with the mother and obtaining collateral sources of information. Unfortunately, the father did not participate in this investigation. While he spoke with the worker on September 27, 2017, he would not meet with the child protection worker. His excuse for not meeting with the worker was because the mother would not send the child to him for parenting time, so the worker would not be able to see the two of them together.
[22] In the worker's notes, she wrote "[t]he father's home could not be observed due to his refusal to cooperate." The worker adopted this statement in her evidence.
[23] During the September 27, 2017 conversation with the father, the worker expressed her concern to the father that he "needs to reflect on what he is doing as a parent."
[24] While the investigation was ongoing, the mother did not allow the father parenting time. She wanted to "see the results and then go forward ..." She asked the father to mediate but he would not.
[25] The investigation concluded with the Society verifying neglect on the part of the father. The verification was made on the basis of the hospital report, which provided a diagnosis of "poor hygiene."
[26] The worker met with the mother on December 14, 2017 to review the findings made by the Society. The worker explained to the mother that "verified" meant "like guilty vs. not guilty but for the CFSA." During this meeting, the worker asked the mother "what if this had continued and [the child] was infertile as an adult as a result?" The mother understood this to mean that, if she sent the child to the father and the neglect continued, the child could become "infertile possibly as a result." These comments reinforced the mother's desire to mediate with the father.
[27] The mother did not resume access after the Society investigation concluded and her requests to the father that they get help through mediation, a lawyer or the CAS were rejected by him.
[28] The mother intuited from the worker's conversation with her that she should not send the child for parenting time with the father.
[29] The worker was clear in her evidence that she did not tell the mother to disobey a court order by denying the father access. I accept the worker's evidence that she did not directly give this advice or direction to the mother.
[30] Despite withholding the child from parenting time, the mother did not start court proceedings. She stated in evidence that she did not know she had to and that the father said / texted he would take her to court. She was waiting for him to do this.
[31] One or two Skype calls between the child and the father took place in January 2018.
[32] The mother did not hear from the father again until she was served with the Contempt Motion in August 2018.
[33] On October 2, 2018, Mitrow J. made a temporary order that provided the father have supervised parenting time at Merrymount. This order was made on consent. The father consented because he "simply wanted to see the child."
[34] The Children's Lawyer conducted a s. 112 investigation and report.[^3] The investigator observed that the supervised visits at Merrymount appeared to be going well. As well, the investigator found that there were no "serious or historical concerns noted from collateral sources regarding [the father's] parenting."
[35] The recommendation made by the investigator was for parenting time to resume in accordance with the Mitrow J. Order following a transition period, during which access would be gradually increased.
[36] In mid-September 2019, the parties signed a Consent Endorsement Request that provided that the father would have unsupervised parenting time to the child every other Saturday from 10 a.m. until 3 p.m. The first parenting time visit was to take place on September 21, 2019.
[37] The day before this parenting time was to take place, the father was arrested for and charged with uttering death threats against the mother. He was released on terms that he not communicate with the mother except in defined circumstances, in part which related to parenting time. Three days later, on September 23, 2019, the father was arrested for and charged with a breach of the non-communication provision of his release. Trials of these offences have not yet occurred.
[38] Following these alleged offences, parenting time did not resume as had been agreed. The mother advised the father through counsel that she wanted to continue the father's parenting time at Merrymount.
[39] The father returned the matter of his parenting time to court. On February 19, 2020, Korpan J. ordered that the father have unsupervised parenting time. This parenting time was to transition over 12 weeks starting February 22, 2020 to the access provided for in the Mitrow J. Order.
[40] Then the COVID-19 pandemic began. The mother did not send the child for parenting time because of the pandemic.
[41] Again, the father returned the matter of his parenting time to court. On May 7, 2020, I ordered that the father's parenting time resume in the manner directed by Korpan J.
[42] On May 17, 2020, the father was charged with a further breach for allegedly attending at or near the mother's residence. The trial of this matter has not yet taken place.
[43] Since May 2020, the father has had access without any significant interruptions.
Legal Considerations: Contempt
[44] Motions for Contempt in family law proceedings are governed by Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99 R. 31. Under this rule, a party may move by Notice of Motion and supporting Affidavit to obtain a contempt order: r. 31(1). If found in contempt, r. 35(5) provides for the penalties that may be imposed.
[45] The party alleging contempt by reason of disobedience of a court order must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt: Jackson v. Jackson, 2016 ONSC 3466, at para. 48.
[46] In Carey v. Laiken, 2015 SCC 17 (S.C.C.), at para. 38, the court described the requisite mental element of contempt as follows:
38 It is well settled in Canadian common law that all that is required to establish civil contempt is proof beyond a reasonable doubt of an intentional act or omission that is in fact in breach of a clear order of which the alleged contemnor has notice: Prescott-Russell, at para. 27; College of Optometrists, at para. 71; Sheppard, at p. 8; TG Industries, at paras. 17 and 32; Bhatnager, at pp. 224-25; Sharpe, at ¶6.190. The Court of Appeal followed this approach. As it noted, to require a contemnor to have intended to disobey the order would put the test "too high" and result in "mistakes of law [becoming] a defence to an allegation of civil contempt but not to a murder charge" (2013 ONCA 530 (Ont. C.A.) (para. 59). Instead, contumacy or lack thereof goes to the penalty to be imposed following a finding of contempt: para. 62; see also Sheppard; and Sharpe, at ¶6.200.
[47] A party seeking a finding of contempt must therefore only prove that the alleged contemnor intentionally did not do what was required under the order. The absence of contumacious[^4] intent is a mitigating but not an exculpatory circumstance: Sheppard, Re, 1976 CanLII 710 (ON CA), [1976] 67 D.L.R. (3d) 592 (Ont. C.A.), at 595-596.
[48] In Moncur v. Plante, 2021 ONCA 462, the court concisely set out the general principles that govern the use of the court's power to find a party in contempt for breaching a court order, at para. 10, as follows:
10 The following general principles govern the use of the court's power to find a party in civil contempt of court for breaching a court order:
For a party to be found in contempt of court for breaching a court order, three elements must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the order alleged to have been breached must state clearly and unequivocally what should and should not be done; (2) the party alleged to have breached the order must have had actual knowledge of it; and (3) the party allegedly in breach must have intentionally done the act that the order prohibits or intentionally failed to do the act that the order compels: Carey v. Laiken, 2015 SCC 17, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 79, at paras. 32–35; Greenberg v. Nowack, 2016 ONCA 949, 135 O.R. (3d) 525, at paras. 25–26.
Exercising the contempt power is discretionary. Courts discourage the routine use of this power to obtain compliance with court orders. The power should be exercised cautiously and with great restraint as an enforcement tool of last rather than first resort. A judge may exercise discretion to decline to impose a contempt finding where it would work an injustice. As an alternative to making a contempt finding too readily, a judge should consider other options, such as issuing a declaration that the party breached the order or encouraging professional assistance: Carey, at paras. 36-37; Chong v. Donnelly, 2019 ONCA 799 Ont. C.A., 33 R.F.L. (8th) 19, at paras. 9–12; Valoris pour enfants et adultes de Prescott-Russell c. K.R., 2021 ONCA 366, at para. 41; and Ruffolo v. David, 2019 ONCA 385Ont. C.A. , 25 R.F.L. (8th) 144, at paras. 18–19.
When the issue raised on the contempt motion concerns access to children, the paramount consideration is the best interests of the children: Ruffolo, at para. 19; Chong, at para. 11; and Valoris, at para. 41.
[49] At paras. 19 and 20, the court addressed the importance, especially in family law cases, of considering alternatives to contempt as follows:
19 I do, however, agree with the appellant's argument that the motion judge did not appear to consider whether a declaration of contempt was a remedy of last resort or whether there were alternative enforcement options, such as a declaration that the appellant had breached the order or encouraging professional assistance. Without considering any alternative options, he appears to have proceeded directly from conclusions that the appellant intentionally breached the parenting order to declarations of contempt. Although the motion judge had earlier properly held the contempt ruling in abeyance to allow the parties to arbitrate their parenting conflicts, and offered to help the parties resolve their issues, his reasons do not suggest that he considered other enforcement options in lieu of ultimately making his declarations of contempt. The motion judge had to consider not only when he should issue his decision on the contempt motion, but also whether he should exercise his discretion to resort to a less severe enforcement option than declaring the appellant in contempt of court. In fairness to the motion judge, such other options do not appear to have been raised by the appellant, who was self-represented, or by the respondent. Even so, I conclude that it was an error of law not to have considered such options: Chong, at para. 12.
20 It is especially important for courts to consider such options in high-conflict family disputes such as this one: Chong, at para. 12; Valoris, at para. 41. Otherwise, there is a danger that contempt proceedings may exacerbate the parental conflict to the detriment of the children. In appropriate cases, a staged approach, in which a declaration of breach precedes the opprobrium of a formal contempt order, can give the parties pause to reflect on their conduct and work on cooperative solutions in the best interests of their children. When, however, the court considers that a contempt order is truly a last resort and would not work an injustice, it may still decide in its discretion to make a formal order of contempt.
Discussion: Contempt
[50] The events that give rise to the contempt alleged in this trial occurred between March 6, 2017 and August 12, 2018 when the Contempt Motion was brought: see Dephoure v. Dephoure, 2021 ONSC 1370, at para. 212.
[51] The mother concedes that:
the Mitrow J. Order clearly set out when the father was to have parenting time with the child; and
that she had actual knowledge of it.
[52] The mother submits that she did not intentionally breach the Mitrow J. Order when she prohibited the father from having parenting time with the child. She argues that she had a legitimate reason for doing so. The reason she relies upon is the father's failure to properly care for the child, as evidenced by the medical condition of the child when she returned from weekend parenting time on August 27 and September 10, 2017. She did not stop sending the child for parenting time until after the child returned following a second consecutive weekend parenting time needing medical intervention.
[53] The mother asks the court to consider her belief or understanding following her return from the hospital with the child on September 10, 2017. She saw the state the child was in and understood that it was caused by poor hygiene that occurred while the child was with the father. The mother's evidence is that the doctor told her to cease parenting time and report the matter to the Children's Aid Society.
[54] I do not accept the mother's evidence that a doctor told her not to send the child on access. A review of the hospital records of September 10, 2017[^5] does not support or corroborate the mother's belief that she was to stop parenting time. Specifically, the discharge note states "INSTRUCTION SHEET GIVEN TO PT/FAMILY ... Instructed mother to emphasize to father to clean area ..." This statement is inconsistent with the mother being advised by a doctor to cease access. On the contrary, a specific direction was given by the doctor to direct the father to properly care for the child by cleaning the affected area. This instruction presumes that the father would have the child in his care in the future.
[55] The mother chose not to send the child for parenting time while the Children's Aid Society investigation was ongoing. She was not instructed to do so by the society worker. Once the Children's Aid Society verified the concerns reported by the mother, she continued to choose not to send the child for parenting time. She did so because she believed this is what the Society worker was suggesting to her.
[56] I find that the third element of contempt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.
[57] It is not required that the father prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mother intended to disobey the Mitrow J. Order in the sense that she acted with contumacious intent.
[58] The circumstances relied upon by the mother in explaining why she failed to follow the order are not exculpatory. She made a conscious choice not to send the child for parenting time on March 26, 2017 and between September 12, 2017 and August 12, 2018, as alleged by the father, despite knowing that is what was provided for in the order.
[59] While not exculpatory, these circumstances may be considered when the court exercises its discretion when deciding whether contempt should be found and, if found to be in contempt, as a mitigating factor when imposing sentence.
[60] I find that the mother did not intentionally breach the Mitrow J. Order between June 15 and June 27, 2017. The father agreed that he would forego his parenting time during this period.
[61] Having found that the three elements for civil contempt have been established beyond a reasonable doubt, I must now consider whether to exercise my discretion to decline to make a finding of contempt: see Chong v. Donnelly, 2019 ONCA 799, at para. 8. As well, I must consider the best interests of the child, which is the "paramount consideration" when the issue is raised in a Contempt Motion concerning access: see Ruffolo v. David, 2019 ONCA 385, at para. 19.
[62] The father submits that I should not exercise my discretion and instead find the mother to be in contempt. He suggests a number of factors that militate against exercising discretion in favour of the mother by not finding her in contempt:
The mother had a history of withholding the child. As such, she thinks she can do whatever she wants, notwithstanding the clear terms of the court order. He points to the evidence that, even though there were subsequent agreements for the resumption of the father's parenting time, they were not followed.
The mother has a pattern of interfering with the father's parenting time by making complaints to the police.
The mother was not justified in withholding the child. Neither the doctor, nor the Children's Aid Society worker, told her to do so.
The mother's complaints about the father's care of the child were groundless, including whether they concerned the lack of naps or hygiene.
The breach lasted for an extended period, without the mother bringing the matter before the court on a Motion to Change. The mother's actions were not founded on "exigencies of the moment."
[63] I agree with the father that the mother acted unilaterally in withholding the child from parenting time that was ordered. She should have commenced court proceedings. I accept that she did not realize that was the case. I also accept her apology to the court for acting unilaterally.
[64] I do not agree with the suggestion made by father's counsel that the police involvement called for by the mother was designed to interfere with the father's parenting time. I accept the mother's evidence that she had grounds to contact the police. Charges were laid and therefore the police investigating the matters formed reasonable and probable grounds to believe that the offences occurred. The upcoming criminal trials will address the substance of the mother's allegations.
[65] I agree with father's counsel that many of the complaints made by the mother concerning the father's care of the child were at best minor, however, the question of hygiene was not.
[66] In addition to the factors referred to by the father, there are others to consider.
[67] This is the first request for a contempt order against the mother made by the father. The father did not provide evidence that he took steps to secure compliance with the Mitrow J. Order before bringing the contempt proceedings, such as a Motion relying upon r. 1(8): see, for example, Bouchard v. Sgovio, 2021 ONCA 709, at paras. 51-52.
[68] Having heard the mother's evidence, I am satisfied that she did not act maliciously or with willful disobedience to the court's authority when she withheld parenting time. Her actions were premised on her observations of the child's physical condition following her return from two successive parenting time weekends, together with the hospital finding of poor hygiene. She attributed the child's condition and the hospital finding to the father's lack of proper care.
[69] I also take into account that, from the mother's perspective, the Society worker left her with a serious concern about what would happen if the father persisted with poor hygiene of the child when she was with him.
[70] In Willis v. Crabtree, 2021 ONSC 2155, at para. 137, the court held that "[a] refusal to permit access out of a legitimate concern for the children, rather than a desire to frustrate access or deny contact, does not amount to contempt."[^6]
[71] However, I agree with counsel for the father that these factors do not explain why parenting time was not permitted during the week when there would be parenting time periods of shorter duration.
[72] I also take into account that since my order of May 7, 2020, dealing with parenting time in the time of COVID-19, parenting time has resumed and without any significant interruptions. The mother has now complied with the existing order for almost two years.
[73] The child's best interests have and continue to be addressed and met through adherence with the parenting time schedule provided for in the Mitrow J. Order and the parties' involvement with the investigation and report of the Children's Lawyer. The report released was dated September 22, 2019. The parties are encouraged to pursue the counselling recommendations contained in that report that remain outstanding.
[74] In taking all of these factors into account, I find that in this case a contempt finding is not the only means by which to send a message to the mother that court orders must be followed.
[75] The court expresses its disapproval of the mother's failure to comply with the Mitrow J. Order by declaring that she was in breach on March 26, 2017 and between September 12, 2017 and August 12, 2018.
Motion to Change
[76] The parenting provisions of the Mitrow J. Order were made under the Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12.
[77] Before the court can change an existing parenting order, there must be a finding that there has been a material change in circumstances that affects, or is likely to affect, the best interests of the child who is the subject of the order: CLRA s. 29(1).
[78] In Gordon v. Goertz (1996), 1996 CanLII 191 (SCC), 19 R.F.L. (4th) 177 (S.C.C.), the court set out a two-step process for Motions to Change parenting orders. First, the moving party must establish a material change in circumstances. Second, if the threshold is met, the court must embark on a fresh inquiry into what is in the child's best interests.
[79] Neither party argued what material change in circumstances occurred. I will assume for the purposes of this case that the mother's breach of the Mitrow J. Order, as described in these reasons, and the resulting loss of the father's parenting time, constitutes a material change in circumstances. This was not a likely circumstance contemplated when the order was made.
[80] On the basis that a material change in circumstances has been established, the father asks for a police enforcement order and that he be granted 6,200 hours of make-up parenting time. The father requests this be accomplished by increasing his parenting time from:
alternate weekends from Friday at 6 p.m. to Sunday at 6 p.m. to alternate weekends from Friday at 6 p.m. to Thursday morning drop off at school; and
every Wednesday overnight,
until September 2024. After that date, he asks that his alternate weekend parenting time start on Friday at 6 p.m. and end Monday at school drop off. He also asks for a change in the holiday parenting time schedule.
Make-up Time
[81] The father argues that the change requested is in the child best interests because:
his age and health conditions are such that he may not live to see the child reach adulthood; and
this extra time will allow him to make up for the time he and the child lost because of missed parenting time.
[82] I find that it is in the child's best interests to maintain the existing order.
[83] The child has had parenting time with the father in accordance with the Mitrow J. Order since May 2020. There is no evidence that the current order is not meeting the child's needs or that she is not thriving under the current order. During this trial, little evidence was adduced about the child's current circumstances.
[84] The father's request to expand his parenting time would fundamentally alter the existing schedule to meet his request for make-up time. This is not a child-centered proposal.
Police Enforcement Order
[85] In Gray v. Canonico, 2020 ONSC 5885, at para. 63, the court summarized when and when not to grant a police enforcement order:
- The applicant's notice of motion also requests police enforcement. Numerous cases have confirmed that police enforcement orders should be granted sparingly and should be limited to exceptional circumstances and as a last resort when other judicial enforcement tools have been unsuccessful. Police enforcement should be ordered only when it is shown to be in the best interests of the child, after considering the risk of trauma that police enforcement might cause to the child: Patterson v. Powell, 2014 ONSC 1419 (Ont. S.C.J.), at paras. 13-35; Multani v. Rana, 2020 ONSC 2433 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras. 131-132; Medu v. Medu, 2020 ONSC 2582 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 22; Tessier v. Rick, 2020 ONSC 1886 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 17.
[86] A police enforcement order is not called for in this case. There has been almost two years of compliance with the existing order. There is no evidence that a police enforcement order is needed at this time or going forward to ensure compliance with the existing order.
Continued Court Oversight
[87] The father asked that I remain seized of this matter to deal with any future disputes. As the order to be made on this case is a final one, I will not be seized. The matter is at an end. However, I will direct that any enforcement proceedings brought within the next 12 months in connection with the Mitrow J. Order shall be made returnable before me. I am now quite familiar with this matter and will attempt to assist the parties in ensuring the requirements of r. 2(2) – (5) are addressed. Single judge case management of this case may help the parties and the child should the matter return to court.
Conclusion
[88] For these reasons, an order shall issue as follows:
The mother is declared to have breached the Mitrow J. Order on March 26, 2017 and between September 12, 2017 and August 12, 2018.
The father's Motion for Contempt is dismissed.
The father's Motion to Change is dismissed.
If any enforcement proceedings are brought within 12 months following the release of these reasons in connection with the Mitrow J. Order, it shall be made returnable before me.
Costs
[89] If the parties are unable to resolve the issue of costs, the mother may make written submissions within ten days of the release of these reasons. The father shall have ten days after the receipt of the mother's submissions to respond. The submissions shall be no more than 3 pages, double-spaced and a minimum of 12-point font, together with a Bill of Costs and any Offers to Settle. The party opposing a claim for costs shall include in their submissions documentation showing their own fees and expenses: see Family Law Rules r. 24(12.2). If no submissions are received pursuant to the timelines set out herein, the issue of costs will be deemed to have been settled.
"Justice B. Tobin"
Justice B. Tobin
Released: February 9, 2022
COURT FILE NO.: FC1066/15-1
DATE: February 9, 2022
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY COURT
BETWEEN:
Jacqueline Rose Robinson
Applicant
- and -
Rodney Dale Darrah
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
TOBIN J.
Released: February 9, 2022
[^1]: Effective March 1, 2021, the Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12 was amended to provide that a person who had access to a child in accordance with an order is deemed, as of the transition date, to have parenting time with respect to the child: see CLRA s. 76(3) and (4). Accordingly, in these reasons, the father's access shall be referred to as parenting time. [^2]: Now referred to as decision-making responsibility: see CLRA s. 76(2) and (4). [^3]: This s. 112 investigation and report was undertaken pursuant to the order of George J. dated September 12, 2018. [^4]: Stubbornly or willfully disobedient to authority. [^5]: See Ex. #14, at p. 21. [^6]: The court relied upon Johannesson v. Johannesson, 2003 CanLII 2013 (ON SC), [2003] O.J. No. 2649.