COURT FILE NO.: CR-19-90000417

DATE: 20220830

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

– and –

CRAIG LAWRENCE

Defendant/Applicant

F. Alibhai and S. Tsai, for the Crown (Responding Party)

H. Tse, for the Defendant/Applicant

HEARD: June 22, 2022

MOLLOY J.:

REASONS FOR DECISION

(Application for Stay: Issue Estoppel)

A. INTRODUCTION

[1] Craig Lawrence is charged with criminal negligence causing bodily harm. He applies for a stay of proceedings, based on the principle of issue estoppel. Mr. Lawrence submits that the criminal negligence charge in this jurisdiction is based on the same facts as prior charges against him in Bermuda for drug importation. He was tried on that charge in Bermuda and acquitted by a jury.

[2] The Canadian charge against Mr. Lawrence is based on the Crown allegation that on December 14, 2016, he (and three other co-accused) coerced Jaqueline Robinson to swallow 45 pellets containing fentanyl as part of a plan to smuggle the drug into Bermuda. The following day, Mr. Lawrence and Ms. Robinson flew to Bermuda and checked into a hotel room there. Over the next several days, Ms. Robinson excreted only 44 of the pellets. On December 20, 2016 she was rushed to the hospital, having been found unconscious in the hotel room she was sharing with Mr. Lawrence. She was diagnosed as suffering from an overdose of fentanyl. While in the hospital, she vomited one capsule, which was found to have leached into her system, causing severe damage including kidney failure. Mr. Lawrence was admitted to the hospital the next day, also suffering from fentanyl overdose, but his condition was not as severe as Ms. Robinson’s.

[3] Both Ms. Robinson and Mr. Lawrence were arrested and charged with importing fentanyl into Bermuda. Both were held in custody pending trial. Ms. Robinson pleaded guilty to importing a controlled substance and testified as a Crown witness at trial. She was sentenced to seven years in prison. Mr. Lawrence pleaded not guilty to importing fentanyl, proceeded to a trial with a jury, and was acquitted.

[4] Upon his return to Canada, Mr. Lawrence was charged with criminal negligence causing harm to Ms. Robinson, along with his three other co-accused. Two of his co-accused are also charged with conspiracy to export fentanyl to Bermuda; Mr. Lawrence is not. The Crown’s principal witness will be Ms. Robinson.

[5] Mr. Lawrence argues that his acquittal by the Bermudan jury was based on the same underlying facts and evidence and that the charge against him in this jurisdiction should therefore be stayed, even though it has the appearance of being in respect of a different crime. He submits that the jury necessarily found in his favour on issues that, if accepted, would make it impossible for him to be convicted of criminal negligence.

B. BACKGROUND FACTS

Evidence of Jaqueline Robinson

[6] Jacqueline Robinson will be the primary Crown witness in the upcoming criminal negligence trial against Mr. Lawrence. She was also the primary Crown witness in the drug importation conspiracy trial against Mr. Lawrence in Bermuda. It is anticipated that Ms. Robinson’s testimony in the trial here will be substantially the same as the evidence she gave in Bermuda, and the various statements she has given to police.

[7] Ms. Robinson testified that she had known Mr. Lawrence for about a month before their trip to Bermuda. After exchanging back and forth text messages, Mr. Lawrence asked her if she would like to go on an all-expense vacation. She said that, based on what Mr. Lawrence told her, she believed that they would be carrying cash from Bermuda to Toronto after their vacation.

[8] Ms. Robinson said that the night before their departure for Bermuda, she and Mr. Lawrence were in a hotel room near Pearson airport and that the other three co-accused were also there. She testified that, the next morning, the alleged co-conspirator Stephanie Legge took her into the hotel room bathroom and showed her some pellets, which she described as thick, wrapped in white plastic, and about two inches long. She testified that Mr. Lawrence and Ms. Legge told her to swallow them. She asked what it was, and they told her it was marijuana. She said that when she told them she did not want to swallow them, Mr. Lawrence told her that she would do as she was told if she wanted to go home again. She therefore swallowed the 45 pellets.

[9] Ms. Robinson and Mr. Lawrence then boarded a plane and arrived in Bermuda that same day, December 15, 2016. Ms. Robinson testified that, over the next few days, she vomited or passed many of the pellets. As she did so, she would give the pellets to Mr. Lawrence, who stored them in the hotel room safe. The last day that she excreted a pellet was on December 19, 2016. On December 20, she was found unconscious in her hotel room and rushed to the hospital. She vomited another pellet there, which was tested and proved to be fentanyl. She was diagnosed with acute kidney failure caused by fentanyl poisoning.

Cooperation Between Canadian and Bermudan Law Enforcement

[10] On December 22, 2016, the Bermuda Police Service (BPS) contacted an RCMP liaison officer and advised that Mr. Lawrence and Ms. Robinson had been hospitalized and arrested. The RCMP then shared criminal record information for these two individuals with the BPS.

[11] On January 8, 2017, BPS provided information to the RCMP from their interview with Ms. Robinson and the RCMP requested further information about specific points. By February 2, 2017, there was already an ongoing Canadian investigation into the import/export scheme, which was being conducted in coordination with the BPS. On February 8, 2017, the RCMP opened “Project O’Bermuda,” directed at determining the source of the fentanyl exported to Bermuda.

[12] In April 2017, RCMP officers working with Project O’Bermuda travelled to Bermuda. Prior to their departure, they met with and received legal advice from Crown counsel here in Canada. The RCMP met with the BPS, who shared information from the Bermudan criminal investigation with them. While in Bermuda, and with the assistance of the BPS, the RCMP officers conducted a formal interview of Ms. Robinson on April 4, 2017, and of Mr. Lawrence on April 6, 2017. In an earlier ruling, I found Mr. Lawrence’s statement to be voluntary and admissible at trial.[^1]

[13] Some of the fruits of the Canadian investigation were shared with the BPS, e.g., the transcript of statements given by Ms. Robinson and Mr. Lawrence to the RCMP. During the course of Mr. Lawrence’s trial in Bermuda, two requests were made by the Bermudan Crown counsel conducting that trial for assistance and information from the Canadian investigation. That information was provided by the RCMP after consultation with Crown counsel in Canada.

[14] Likewise, the Crown in the case now before this court will be relying on substantial evidence obtained by the BPS during its investigation (e.g., things like medical records, drug analysis reports, and airport records).

C. APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

[15] It is a fundamental principle of our legal system that things should be decided only once, and not relitigated over and over. Finality is important, not only for the efficient administration of justice, but also in the interests of fairness to the parties. Individuals charged with an offence should not be put to their defence a second time if the matter has already been conclusively determined in their favour.

[16] In its purest form, these principles have been embodied in the common law as cause of action estoppel, or res judicata, which has been part of our common law for centuries. In criminal law, this is often referred to as double jeopardy and is protected under s. 11(h) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which states:

11. Any person charged with an offence has the right

(h) if finally acquitted of the offence, not to be tried for it again and, if finally found guilty and punished for the offence, not to be tried or punished for it again.

[17] These principles are also specifically adopted in the Criminal Code by the special pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict.[^2]

[18] However, all of these concepts apply only where the subsequent charge is for the same offence as the previous charge, or at least substantially the same as the previous one. This narrow form of res judicata rarely arises and does not arise here. Mr. Lawrence was previously charged with conspiracy to import the controlled drug fentanyl into Bermuda. He is now charged with criminal negligence causing bodily harm for actions he is alleged to have undertaken while in Canada. The defence before me does not rely upon autrefois acquit, but rather on the principle of issue estoppel, sometimes referred to as a branch of res judicata.

[19] Issue estoppel was first recognized in civil cases. It has its roots in the same general principles as res judicata but does not require the same cause of action. Rather, it relates to whether the same issue has previously been definitively decided. In civil law cases, there were three requirements for issue estoppel to apply: (1) that the same issue has been decided; (2) that the judicial decision which is said to create the estoppel was final; and (3) that the parties to the prior judicial proceedings or their privies were the same as the parties to the proceedings in which the estoppel is raised or their privies.[^3]

[20] In R. v. Grdic,[^4] the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that the principle of issue estoppel also applies in a criminal context, with the same three elements required in civil law. The Court in Grdic recognized that it is not always easy to determine precisely what issues have been conclusively determined in a criminal trial, particularly in a jury trial where no reasons are provided. This was also a central concern 23 years later in Mahalingan, when the Supreme Court of Canada revisited whether issue estoppel should continue to be available in criminal cases. Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for the majority in Mahalingan, accepted that cases post-Grdic had shown some “perplexing difficulties” in how issue estoppel should be applied in criminal cases and that reform was required. However, the majority held that issue estoppel should not be excised entirely from the criminal law, but rather “retained in a narrower, less problematic form.”[^5] The Chief Justice wrote:

I conclude that issue estoppel serves important goals in the criminal process — goals that are not fully achieved by other doctrines and rules of evidence. Issue estoppel remains a useful and, indeed, necessary part of our criminal law system. A simple, clear rule is required to prevent issues established in one criminal proceeding from being relitigated in a subsequent proceeding. All would agree that an accused should not be required to defend himself against the same allegations twice; that inconsistent findings on matters of fact are abhorrent to the criminal law; and that finality and economy are important institutional values in the administration of justice. Adequate protection of these goals requires, at a minimum, a rule that issues determined in one criminal trial cannot be relitigated in a subsequent criminal trial.[^6]

[21] Applying these principles, as clarified in Mahalingan, it is clear that the Crown is not estopped from leading evidence on any issue raised in a previous trial that resulted in an acquittal. The only issues giving rise to estoppel are those which were expressly resolved in the accused’s favour, or which must have been resolved in the accused’s favour to have resulted in an acquittal.[^7] It is not necessary that the resolution of the issue in favour of the accused be based on a positive factual finding; it is sufficient that there was a reasonable doubt on the point, resulting in an acquittal.[^8]

[22] The burden is on the person seeking to rely on issue estoppel, in this case the accused Mr. Lawrence, to establish that the preconditions are met.[^9]

[23] The Court in Mahalingan also held that the three traditional requirements would continue to apply: (1) same issue; (2) finality (the previous decision must be final); and (3) mutuality (the same parties or their privies in both proceedings).

[24] The determination on the first requirement will typically be based on the nature of the charge in the first proceeding, the evidence at trial, and the arguments advanced by the parties. In a one-issue trial, it will be relatively easy to determine the specific issue on which the acquittal was based. However, this will be less clear in a multi-issue trial. Likewise, and as noted in Mahalingan, identifying a specific finding on a particular issue will be easier in a criminal trial before a judge who has provided reasons for decision, as opposed to a jury trial, at the conclusion of which no reasons are given. Indeed, in a jury trial, the individual jurors are not required to reach their verdict by the same route; they are only required to be unanimous as to the verdict itself. Some may acquit based on their findings on a particular issue, whereas others might not agree on that issue, but base their acquittal on a different issue. In that situation, it may be impossible to determine what the finding was on any given issue and issue estoppel would therefore not apply.

[25] To meet the onus on this first requirement, an accused must establish that the issue decided in the first trial either explicitly disposed of an issue that would mandate an acquittal on the charges now before this court, or show that such is a “necessary inference” from the first acquittal, or is an issue that “must necessarily” have been decided in the accused’s favour.[^10] As stated in R. v. Gushue:

The possibility or even the probability that the jury found in the accused’s favour on a particular issue is not enough. A finding on the relevant issue must be the only rational explanation of the verdict of the jury.[^11]

[26] There can be complexities in determining whether a decision on an issue was final. Those do not arise here. The acquittal in Bermuda was clearly a final decision.

[27] The mutuality requirement typically does not give rise to any difficulties when an accused person raises issue estoppel against the Crown in a criminal trial based on finding on an issue in a prior criminal trial. Both proceedings will have involved the same parties — the Crown versus the accused. Complications can arise when one of the proceedings is not criminal in nature, with difficult issues as to whether the parties are privies to each other. Again, that does not arise here. The complex issue that does arise in this case is the situation in which the first trial was criminal in nature but took place in a jurisdiction outside Canada.

[28] In R. v. Libman,[^12] the Supreme Court of Canada reviewed many circumstances in which crimes could be committed across various international borders, resulting in the possibility of perpetrators being charged with criminal offences in more than one jurisdiction. The Court adopted a broad interpretation to the territorial jurisdiction of Canada to proceed with offences that were only partially committed here. In doing so, the Court held that any risk to the accused of being charged more than once for the same offence would be cured by resort to the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict, which would apply notwithstanding that the earlier trial was conducted in a foreign country. LaForest J., writing the unanimous decision of the Court, held:

I am also aware that the view I have taken leaves open the possibility that a person could be prosecuted for the same offence in more than one country, but any injustice that might result from this eventuality could be avoided by resort to the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict, which have been applied to persons tried in other countries; see Burrows v. Jemino (1726), 2 Strange 733, 93 E.R. 815; R. v. Roche (1775), 1 Leach 134, 168 E.R. 169; R. v. Azzopardi (1843), 2 Mood. 288, 169 E.R. 115; R. v. Aughet (1918), 13 Cr. App. R. 101; see also Treacy v. Director of Public Prosecutions, supra.[^13]

[29] It must immediately be noted that LaForest J. was referring to prosecutions for the same offence and not to principles of issue estoppel. However, arguably, the same principles should apply.

[30] The issue estoppel mutuality requirement arose in the Supreme Court of Canada’s 1990 decision in R. v. Van Rassel,[^14] but the Court declined to deal with it. Van Rassel was an R.C.M.P. officer stationed in Quebec, who was a member of an international drug enforcement team. The R.C.M.P were assisting the United Stated Department of Justice in a drug investigation in southern Florida. Van Rassel had access to confidential information and reports about that investigation. He was arrested in Miami and charged in the United States with various offences, the essence of which were that he travelled from Montreal to Miami where he solicited and received bribes in exchange for this information. He was tried before a jury and acquitted. Subsequently, he was charged in Canada with breach of trust in relation to his duties as an R.C.M.P. officer by converting confidential information from the U.S. drug investigation to his own use for the purpose of deriving a profit. The trial judge stayed the Canadian charges on various grounds, including autrefois acquit, res judicata, and the Charter. The Quebec Court of Appeal reversed that decision, ruling that autrefois acquit did not apply because the charges were different, but did not rule on any of the other issues. The accused appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

[31] The Supreme Court in Van Rassel agreed with the Quebec Court of Appeal that the charges in the two jurisdictions were sufficiently different that autrefois acquit could not apply. However, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the Quebec Court of Appeal should also have dealt with issue estoppel as, based on Gushue, those principles applied to criminal law. The Crown argued that issue estoppel could not apply with respect to a foreign criminal judgment since the parties involved were not the same. However, the Supreme Court did not resolve the issue, stating:

The respondent suggests that issue estoppel could not apply with respect to a foreign criminal judgment since the parties involved are not the same. It will not be necessary to decide this point since it is well established that the principle applies only in circumstances where it is clear from the facts that the question has already been decided. Laskin C.J. wrote in Gushue, at p. 807:

I am of opinion that the question of issue estoppel in respect of the robbery conviction is put to rest by the following statement, which I adopt, in Friedland, Double Jeopardy (1969), at p. 134:

. . . The possibility or even the probability that the jury found in the accused's favour on a particular issue is not enough. A finding on the relevant issue must be the only rational explanation of the verdict of the jury.

See also Wright v. The Queen, 1963 CanLII 14 (SCC), [1963] S.C.R. 539; Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1964] A.C. 1254.

In the present case there is nothing to indicate that the American jury found in the accused's favour on the particular issues raised in the Canadian charges. The jury might have acquitted the accused for reasons entirely distinct from those underlying the Canadian jury's decision. This becomes apparent when we consider the differences between the American and Canadian charges. The result might perhaps have been different if the appellant had adduced in evidence the opinion of an expert in American law establishing that an issue in the Canadian proceedings had been decided in his favour in the United States, but he did nothing in this regard. This defence thus does not assist the accused's case.[^15]

[Emphasis added]

D. ANALYSIS

[32] Mr. Lawrence is charged in Canada with criminal negligence causing bodily harm. He was acquitted in Bermuda of conspiracy to import a controlled drug, which was specified in the charge to be fentanyl. It is common ground between the parties that these are different offences and that one is not an included offence of the other. It is clear that autrefois acquit and res judicata do not apply. Therefore, the defence relies upon issue estoppel as the basis upon which the acquittal in Bermuda should result in a stay of the Canadian charge.

[33] I turn then to a consideration of whether the three requirements for issue estoppel are established in this case: finality, mutuality, and the same issue. As I have already indicated, it is conceded by the parties, and I agree, that the finality requirement is established. Mr. Lawrence’s acquittal by the jury in Bermuda is a final decision.

[34] Counsel for Mr. Lawrence has advanced a compelling argument that the mutuality requirement is also met. As a starting point, it is recognized that autrefois acquit applies in situations involving a prior acquittal in a different country. The policy reasons underlying the plea of autrefois acquit have equal application in a case of issue estoppel, as is apparent from the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Mahalingan. Therefore, it seems to me to be consistent with that policy to extend the principle of issue estoppel to findings made in favour of an accused in a foreign criminal court. It follows that the mutuality requirement would have to be applied differently, and perhaps with more flexibility, in such a situation as clearly the two prosecutors could not be the same. There will certainly be circumstances where the mutuality requirement cannot be met, particularly where the legal systems are significantly different. The applicant in the case before me argues that, if mutuality cannot be established in this case, it is difficult to see how it could ever be met. Both Canada and Bermuda have similar legal systems rooted in the British common law and both are British Commonwealth countries. The Bermudan system allows for a jury trial, with a presumption of innocence. There was substantial cooperation between the police in Canada and the police and prosecution team in Bermuda, including both police agencies sharing the fruits of their respective investigations. However, while recognizing the force of these arguments, I stop short of finding that the mutuality requirement has been met. The law in this area is unsettled and there is no case in which the issue has been definitively determined one way or the other. The Supreme Court of Canada in Van Rassel deliberately chose not to decide the issue because it was not essential to do so, given that the identity of legal issue requirement had not been met. I find myself in the same situation. For the reasons set out below, I am not satisfied that the issues decided in Bermuda in Mr. Lawrence’s favour would necessarily result in his acquittal on the criminal negligence charge here in Canada. Any ruling I might make on the mutuality requirement would be obiter dicta. I therefore decline to make a ruling.

[35] I find that the applicant has failed to meet his onus of establishing that the issue or issues decided in his favour in Bermuda, and resulting in his acquittal there, are the same as the central issues to be decided in the charge here. It is useful to first examine the central issues to be determined in each jurisdiction.

[36] In Canada, Mr. Lawrence is charged with criminal negligence causing bodily harm. That offence is set out in the Criminal Code as follows:

219 (1) Every one is criminally negligent who

(a) in doing anything, or

(b) in omitting to do anything that it is his duty to do,

shows wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons.

[37] The Supreme Court of Canada described the conduct necessary to constitute this offence as being a “marked and substantial departure from the conduct of a reasonably prudent person in circumstances in which the accused either recognized and ran an obvious and serious risk or, alternatively, gave no thought to the risk.”[^16]

[38] In Bermuda, Mr. Lawrence was charged with conspiracy to import a controlled drug, specified to be fentanyl. There is no expert evidence before me as to the constituent elements required under Bermudan law to constitute the offence of conspiracy to import a controlled drug, specifically fentanyl. For purposes of this argument, I am prepared to accept that the law in Bermuda would be largely the same as here in Canada with respect to conspiracy and importing. It is important to note that the charge is conspiracy, which requires an agreement with others in advance to import fentanyl into Bermuda. That is neither the same substantive charge as actually importing fentanyl, nor aiding or abetting its importation. The conspiracy charge would require the Crown to prove: the existence of an agreement; that Mr. Lawrence was a party to the agreement; and that the object of the agreement was to bring a controlled substance (fentanyl) into Bermuda. It is unclear whether the law in Bermuda might require that the agreement be with more than one person or that there must be an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. However, given the facts, nothing would turn on that for purposes of this case. Importing would require proof that: there was an intention to bring a substance into Bermuda; the substance was brought into Bermuda; the substance was the controlled drug fentanyl; and the accused knew the nature of the drug.

[39] It is clear that the issues of negligence and causing bodily harm were not factual issues that needed to be determined in the Bermuda trial. The question is whether there was an issue decided in Mr. Lawrence’s trial in Bermuda that would also be a required element of the charge in Canada and which, if accepted as resolved in his favour here, would preclude a conviction on the criminal negligence charge.

[40] The applicant has satisfied me that the evidence before the court in Bermuda was substantially the same as the anticipated evidence here, but that is not sufficient to establish issue estoppel. Before issue estoppel can apply here, I must be satisfied that the jury must necessarily have decided issues in Mr. Lawrence’s favour that would be inconsistent with a conviction on the charge here. The immediate difficulty, as is often the case with a jury verdict, is that there are no specific factual findings, and it is therefore impossible to determine precisely why the jury decided as it did.

[41] I am further hampered by the absence of evidence as to the specific issues that were left to the jury to decide in Bermuda. In particular, I do not have the benefit of:

• any submissions by counsel to the presiding judge as to the content of her instructions to the jury;

• counsel’s closing addresses to the jury;

• the judge’s instructions to the jury;

• any questions asked by the jury during its deliberations; or,

• any evidence as to the applicable law in Bermuda, and whether itis the same as in Canada.

[42] Even if I were to assume that the constituent elements of the offence in Bermuda are the same as they would be here in Canada, a lot depends on how those issues were put to the jury.

[43] I note that, in Bermuda, Ms. Robinson pleaded guilty to importing a controlled drug. Mr. Lawrence, however, was charged with conspiracy to import a controlled drug, which, unlike in Ms. Robinson’s charge, was specified to be fentanyl. Ms. Robinson testified at Mr. Lawrence’s trial that she did not know what was in the pellets she was told to swallow, and that Mr. Lawrence told her it was marijuana. The conspiracy charge would require the jury to be satisfied that Mr. Lawrence had agreed to participate in a scheme directed towards importing fentanyl into Bermuda. I do not know whether Mr. Lawrence’s knowledge of the nature of the drug would be a required element of that offence under Bermudan law. Perhaps some members of the jury could have believed that Mr. Lawrence did not know the drug was fentanyl, or had a reasonable doubt about that, and thought that this required his acquittal. Even if I were to assume that principles of wilful blindness could be applied to impute that knowledge to Mr. Lawrence, I do not know if this was an instruction given to the jury or if they reached that conclusion. Perhaps members of the jury did not believe Mr. Lawrence was a member of the conspiracy and instead believed that he was a dupe of some sort, along with Ms. Robinson. Perhaps members of the jury thought that Ms. Robinson made up the whole story about the conspiracy and brought the drugs in without any prior knowledge by Mr. Lawrence. It is simply impossible for me to know the route by which the jury necessarily came to its verdict.

[44] As was clearly established in Mahalingan and Van Rassel, the burden is on the applicant to establish that the issues decided in Mr. Lawrence’s favour by the jury in Bermuda are such that he could not possibly be convicted of the criminal negligence charge in Canada. The legal elements of the criminal negligence charge are completely distinct from the conspiracy to import charge in Bermuda, and different legal issues will obviously arise here.

[45] I accept that there could be some routes upon which the jury in Bermuda found in Mr. Lawrence’s favour that would of necessity mean he could not be convicted of criminal negligence causing harm to Ms. Robinson. For example, the jury in Bermuda might not have believed Ms. Robinson’s evidence and might therefore have concluded that Mr. Lawrence had no involvement in her ingesting the 45 pellets later discovered to contain fentanyl, or they might have at least had a reasonable doubt as to his involvement. Such a finding would have resulted in his acquittal in Bermuda and would also mean he could not be found guilty of criminal negligence causing bodily harm in Canada. However, I have no means of determining if that was the basis for the jury’s verdict. As the Supreme Court of Canada noted in Gushue, quoting from Friedland, “the possibility or even the probability that the jury found in the accused’s favour on a particular issue is not enough. A finding on the relevant issue must be the only rational explanation of the verdict of the jury.”[^17]

[46] I cannot say that the jury in this case necessarily found that Mr. Lawrence had no involvement in causing Ms. Robinson to ingest the pellets containing fentanyl. While this is a possible explanation of the verdict, it is not the only rational explanation. The basis for the verdict could have been narrower in focus, such as a lack of belief in Mr. Lawrence’s specific knowledge of the nature of the drug, or a reasonable doubt about his being a party to an overall criminal scheme to import that drug into Bermuda. Those findings would not preclude prosecution for an offence involving the specific act of causing Ms. Robinson to ingest a substance in Canada, knowing that it was dangerous and could cause bodily harm to her and nevertheless taking that risk.

[47] Accordingly, I find that the applicant has failed to establish the requirement of identity of issues and that issue estoppel does not apply. The application is therefore dismissed.

Molloy J.

Released: August 30, 2022

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

– and –

CRAIG LAWRENCE

Defendant/Applicant

REASONS FOR DECISION

Molloy J.

Released: August 30, 2022

[^1]: R. v. Lawrence, 2021 ONSC 3167, 2021 CarswellOnt 6242. [^2]: Criminal Code, ss. 607-609. [^3]: R. v. Mahalingan, 2008 SCC 63, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 316, at para. 4, citing Angle v. Minister of National Revenue, 1974 CanLII 168 (SCC), [1975] 2 S.C.R. 248, at p. 254 and Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd., [1967] 1 A.C. 853 (H.L.), at p. 935. [^4]: R. v. Grdic, 1985 CanLII 34 (SCC), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 810. [^5]: Mahalingan, at para. 1. [^6]: Ibid, at para. 47. [^7]: Ibid, at paras. 22-23, and 33. [^8]: Ibid at paras. 23, 26, and 31. [^9]: Ibid, at paras. 23 and 52. [^10]: Ibid, at para. 52. [^11]: R. v. Gushue, 1979 CanLII 56 (SCC), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 798, at p. 807, quoting Martin L. Friedland, Double Jeopardy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), at p. 134. [^12]: R. v. Libman, 1985 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178. [^13]: Libman, at para. 73. [^14]: R. v. Van Rassel, 1990 CanLII 124 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 225. [^15]: Ibid, at pp. 238-239. [^16]: R. v. A.D.H., 2013 SCC 28, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 269, at para. 61. [^17]: Gushue at p. 807, quoting Friedland, Double Jeopardy.