A. Introduction

[1] There are before me: (a) a garnishment motion brought by the judgment creditor (Joseph Hiess); (b) a motion for an adjournment of the garnishment motion so that a refusals motion can be decided by an associate judge; (c) a refusals motion; and (d) a garnishment cross-motion brought by the garnishee (Lynda Reeves), who resists the refusals motion.

[2] This dog’s breakfast of motions may be summarized as follows. After Joseph Hiess obtained a judgment from a Québec court against Michel Zelnik, who is married to Lynda Reeves, Mr. Hiess obtained a Notice of Garnishment in Ontario against the garnishee, Lynda Reeves. Mr. Hiess brought a motion to enforce the garnishment, but now he seeks to adjourn the motion to have an associate judge decide whether Ms. Reeves should answer questions that she refused to answer on a cross-examination in the garnishment proceedings. Ms. Reeves brings a cross-motion, and she seeks an Order setting aside the Notice of Garnishment on two grounds, one procedural and one substantive; namely: (a) procedurally, the Notice of Garnishment should be set aside because Mr. Hiess did not make full disclosure in obtaining the Notice; and (b) substantively, the Notice should be set aside because Ms. Reeves is not indebted to Mr. Zelnik.

[3] At the hearing of the motions, I refused the adjournment request, and I heard the refusals motion, and I made the following endorsement:

ENDORSEMENT

[1] In effect, there are four motions before me: (a) a garnishment motion brought by the judgment creditor; (b) a motion for an adjournment of the garnishment motion so that a refusals motion can be decided by an associate judge; (c) a refusals motion; and (d) a garnishment cross-motion brought by the garnishee.

[2] In the immediate case, an associate judge would have the jurisdiction to decide the refusals motion, but the associate judge would not have the jurisdiction to decide the garnishment motion and the cross-motion because under rule 60.08 (16) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.S.O. 1990, Reg. 194, if “the [garnishment] motion is made to an associate judge and raises a genuine issue of fact or of law, it shall be adjourned to be heard by a judge.”

[3] Although refusals motions are typically heard by an associate judge, a judge has the jurisdiction to decide a refusals motion and in the immediate case, I see no good reason to decline to exercise the jurisdiction I have to decide all the motions that are before the court and which I undoubtedly have the jurisdiction to hear.

[4] Having heard argument on the refusals motion, I dismiss Mr. Hiess’s motion.

[5] I dismiss Mr. Hiess’s refusals motion for the reasons set out in Ms. Reeves’s Refusals Chart and with respect to the questions taken under advisement, for the reasons set out below.

[6] I dismiss Mr. Hiess’s refusals motion because none of the sixteen questions and the two questions taken under advisement that Ms. Reeves refused to answer were proper questions in the context of the garnishment matter that is before the court.

[7] The fundamental core of a garnishment proceeding is whether the garnishee is currently indebted or will in the future become indebted to the judgment debtor. The notion of garnishment is that the judgment creditor intercepts this indebtedness for the benefit of all the judgment creditors.

[8] In the immediate case, fifteen of the sixteen questions that Ms. Reeves refused to answer were irrelevant to the core issue and the two questions taken under advisement were essentially a fishing expedition about Ms. Reeves’s business affairs. She was justified in refusing to answer these questions.

[9] How Ms. Reeves treated for tax purposes the loan that she made to Mr. Zelnik is irrelevant to the predicate issue of whether Mr. Zelnik is indebted to Ms. Reeves.

[10] How Ms. Reeves treated for her income tax returns, the payments she made to Mr. Zelnik, which payments she contends are gifts and which Mr. Hiess contends were payments for Mr. Zelnik’s employment by the Nicaraguan corporation known as Coconut Corp., is irrelevant as to whether Mr. Zelnik owes money to Ms. Reeves. The tax treatment of these matters is irrelevant to the core issue of this garnishment proceeding.

[11] In the immediate case, the only refused questions that had a scintilla of relevance were the matters taken under advisement with respect to Coconut Corp. and refused question #12, Q. 247, which was:

To advise if Ms. Reeves has ever entered into any written agreements with Mr. Zelnik other than the possible written agreement between her and Mr. Zelnik in relation to Coconuts Corp. and the four loan agreements attached to her Garnishee’s Statement and to produce them if they exist.

[12] Apart from the fact that this question is objectionable on a variety of grounds (including vagueness, disproportionality, and objectively fishing), its materiality and relevance could only be with respect to an alleged employment agreement that would support a current or prospective indebtedness of Ms. Reeves to Mr. Zelnik. The employment agreement would be with respect to the work he is alleged to have done for the Nicaraguan corporation known as Coconut Corp.

[13] In the cross-examination of Ms. Reeves and in Mr. Zelnik’s examinations and in his answers to undertakings, all the evidence and documents that are available about Coconut Corp. have already been provided.

[14] When and what Mr. Zelnik did for Coconut Corp. has been provided. The operational and financial history of Coconut Corp. has been provided. The corporation never became operational. The capital was expended on expenses. There was no revenue. The tax treatment of monies advanced for Coconut Corp. for payments to Mr. Zelnik with respect to Coconut Corp. are irrelevant. Thus, if the question was a proper question, it has been answered and no more information is available.

[15] A further examination is a waste of time. Both parties, however, are at liberty to make submissions about what has been proven or disproven and about what adverse inferences may be drawn about the existence of an outstanding or prospective indebtedness between Mr. Zelnik and Ms. Reeves.

[16] Therefore, the refusals motion is dismissed, and I shall proceed with the motion and the cross-motion.

[4] I then heard argument on the garnishment motion and the cross-motion. I reserved judgment.

[5] For the reasons that follow, I strike the Notice of Garnishment. I do so substantively not procedurally. Substantively, the Notice should be set aside because Ms. Reeves is not indebted to Mr. Zelnik and so there is no debt to garnish.

B. The Garnishment Rule

[6] For the motions before the court, the relevant rule is rule 60.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,[^1] which states:

Garnishment

Where Available

60.08 (1) A creditor under an order for the payment or recovery of money may enforce it by garnishment of debts payable to the debtor by other persons.

Obtaining Notice of Garnishment

(4) A creditor under an order for the payment or recovery of money who seeks to enforce it by garnishment shall file with the registrar where the proceeding was commenced a requisition for garnishment (Form 60G) together with a copy of the order as entered, any other evidence necessary to establish the amount awarded and the creditor’s entitlement, and an affidavit stating,

(a) the date and amount of any payment received since the order was made;

(b) the amount owing, including postjudgment interest;

(c.1) the address of the debtor;

(d) the name and address of each person to whom a notice of garnishment is to be directed;

(e) that the creditor believes that those persons are or will become indebted to the debtor and the grounds for the belief;

(f) such particulars of the debts as are known to the creditor;

(g) where a person to whom a notice of garnishment is to be directed is not in Ontario, that the debtor is entitled to sue that person in Ontario to recover the debt, and the basis of entitlement to sue in Ontario; and

(h) where a person to whom a notice of garnishment is to be directed is not then indebted but will become indebted to the debtor, such particulars of the date on and the circumstances under which the debt will arise as are known to the creditor.

(5) The affidavit required by subrule (4) may contain statements of the deponent’s information and belief, if the source of the information and the fact of the belief are specified in the affidavit.

(6) On the filing of the requisition and affidavit required by subrule (4), the registrar shall issue notices of garnishment (Form 60H) naming as garnishees the persons named in the affidavit and shall send a copy of each notice of garnishment to the sheriff of the county in which the debtor resides or, if the debtor resides outside Ontario, to the sheriff of the county in which the proceeding was commenced.

Garnishee Liable from Time of Service

(11) The garnishee is liable to pay to the sheriff any debt of the garnishee to the debtor, up to the amount shown in the notice of garnishment or supplementary notice of garnishment, less $10 for the cost of making each payment, within ten days after service on the garnishee or ten days after the debt becomes payable, whichever is later.

(12) For the purposes of subrule (11), a debt of the garnishee to the debtor includes,

(a) a debt payable at the time the notice of garnishment is served; and

(b) a debt payable (whether absolutely or on the fulfilment of a condition) after the notice is served and within six years after it is issued.

(13) For the purposes of subrule (11), a debt of the garnishee to the debtor does not include,

(a) if the garnishee is a financial institution, money in an account opened after the notice of garnishment is served;

(b) if the garnishee is an employer, a debt arising out of employment that commences after the notice is served; or

(c) if the garnishee is an insurer, a debt payable under an insurance policy that is entered into after the notice is served.

Payment by Garnishee to Sheriff

(14) A garnishee who admits owing a debt to the debtor shall pay it to the sheriff in the manner prescribed by the notice of garnishment, subject to section 7 of the Wages Act.

When Garnishee Must Serve Statement

(15) A garnishee who wishes for any reason to dispute the garnishment or who pays to the sheriff less than the amount set out in the notice of garnishment because the debt is owed to the debtor and to one or more co-owners or for any other reason shall, within 10 days after service of the notice of garnishment, serve on the creditor and the debtor and file with the court a garnishee’s statement (Form 60I) setting out the particulars.

Garnishment Hearing

(16) On motion by a creditor, debtor, garnishee, co-owner of the debt or any other interested person, the court may,

(a) where it is alleged that the debt of the garnishee to the debtor has been assigned or encumbered, order the assignee or encumbrancer to appear and state the nature and particulars of the claim;

(b) determine the rights and liabilities of the garnishee, the debtor, any co-owner of the debt and any assignee or encumbrancer;

(d) determine any other matter in relation to a notice of garnishment,

and the court may proceed in a summary manner, but where the motion is made to an associate judge and raises a genuine issue of fact or of law, it shall be adjourned to be heard by a judge.

[7] The applicant for a Notice of Garnishment should make full and fair disclosure of relevant evidence, and the failure to do so may constitute sufficient grounds to set aside the Notice of Garnishment.[^2]

[8] A person served with a garnishment notice is liable only to pay to the sheriff the amount of the garnishment if he or she is indebted to the debtor.[^3] A debt is a sum payable in respect of a liquidated money demand, recoverable by action.[^4]

[9] Garnishment is an equitable and discretionary remedy, and the court may make any order it deems just in the particular circumstances of any given case.[^5] Since garnishment is an equitable remedy, the court may refuse it where the attachment of the debt would work inequitably or unfairly, or cause prejudice or injustice to some person or persons.[^6]

C. Factual Background

[10] Ms. Reeves and Mr. Zelnik met in July 2004, and they began a romantic relationship. At the time of their meeting, they both were very successful entrepreneurs. Their financial futures were, however, markedly different.

[11] Ms. Reeves is (I emphasize the “is”) a wealthy businessperson and entrepreneur. Among other things, she is an interior designer and a magazine publisher of House and Home Magazine, she was the host and executive producer of national TV and radio talk shows. She is a media and social media celebrity.

[12] Mr. Zelnik had been (I emphasize the “had been”) a wealthy businessperson and entrepreneur, most particularly in the clothing business. I was told that he had an interest in Kleinfeld, the wedding gown store in New York City and in Moores another well-known enterprise in retail clothing. In her judgment in Hiess v. Zelnik,[^7] Justice Lamarche described Mr. Zelnik as follows:

It is important to recall that Mr. Zelnik is a seasoned businessman. For example, he was the president of a company in the garment industry which employed over 7,000 individuals in the 90s. He also owned one of the biggest chain of retail stores in the United States as well as the chain store Moores in Canada. As previously mentioned, he was the CEO of Agmont [a clothing enterprise].

[13] Mr. Zelnik has three children from previous marriages and one grandchild. Mr. Zelnik is now 77 years old. He is retired and suffers from health problems. He has no income from current or past employment. It is unlikely he will ever work again.

[14] Beginning in 2004, Mr. Zelnik’s business ventures began to fail. Ms. Reeves and one of her companies made a series of loans to Mr. Zelnik in 2004, 2005, and 2008. These loans were evidenced by promissory notes and two unregistered mortgages on a property that Mr. Hiess owned in New York State, where he lived. These loans, which total approximately $2.1 million, were never repaid. Ms. Reeves made a series of short-term smaller loans that also were never repaid.

[15] In 2010, Mr. Zelnik incorporated Coconut Corp. a proposed coconut plantation in Nicaragua. Ms. Reeves provided the capital for the venture. She became an 89% owner of the corporation. Mr. Zelnik did not own any shares in the corporation. Mr. Zelnik was the president, and his evidence and Ms. Reeves’s evidence was that he received no remuneration for his start-up work as president.

[16] Coconut Corp. never became operational. Mr. Zelnik was never able to consummate a deal to acquire the leases of land for the coconut plantation in Nicarauga. The political strife in Nicaragua makes it a precarious place to carry on business much less launch a new one.

[17] Meanwhile around 2010, Mr. Zelnik’s financial situation became dire. The bank foreclosed on and took possession of his home, a large farm he owned in New York State. Ms. Reeves purchased the farm through a court-supervised auction. (She paid $1.2 million USD). Mr. Zelnik lived on the farm for a time, until Ms. Reeves sold the farm and he moved to live with her.

[18] Mr. Zelnik’s evidence was that he retired from all his business endeavors in 2014, although he continued to make trips to Nicaragua until 2019.

[19] In the early years of their romantic affair, Ms. Reeves and Mr. Zelnik had maintained separate residences on either side of the Canadian-U.S. border. Mr. Zelnik came to be financially dependent on Ms. Reeves.

[20] Beginning around 2009, Mr. Zelnik and his children became totally dependent on Ms. Reeves for support. She began paying for his living expenses, including their travel together. When they were in New York City, she paid for hotel stays in Manhattan for $800 to $1,000 per night. She paid for his children’s education, health care, and living expenses. She paid his son’s law school tuition in the United States.

[21] Between January 2009 and September 2019, Ms. Reeves advanced at least $2.6 million to Mr. Hiess for him and his family.

[22] From 2014 until September 3, 2019, Ms. Reeves made an average monthly deposit of approximately $18,000 into Mr. Zelnik’s bank account. These payments do not take into account other moneys paid to Mr. Zelnik and his family. Ms. Reeves’s evidence was that she gave this money gratuitously, without any obligation to do so and without any expectation of being repaid, because they are her family, and she cares about them. Mr. Zelnik’s evidence was to the same effect.

[23] One of Mr. Zelnik’s creditors was Joseph Hiess. On December 16, 2016, Mr. Hiess demanded repayment of a $1.5 million promissory note. Mr. Zelnik failed to repay the debt, and Mr. Hiess sued him in Québec. On January 24, 2019, the Superior Court of Québec ordered Mr. Zelnik to pay Mr. Hiess $1,325,000. Ms. Reeves was not a party to the action.

[24] On March 6, 2019, Mr. Zelnik married Ms. Reeves.

[25] On July 4, 2019, the Québec judgment was recognized in Ontario by court Order.

[26] On September 4, 2019, Mr. Zelnik was served with a summons for a judgment debtor examination. A few days later, Ms. Reeves stopped making payments to Mr. Zelnik.

[27] I find as a fact that Ms. Reeves purposefully did not want her money being used to pay Mr. Zelnik’s indebtedness to Mr. Hiess.

D. Procedural Background

[28] On September 26, 2019, Mr. Zelnik underwent his first judgment debtor examination. The examination revealed that he is personally impecunious and bereft of assets, but he and his family lives and have lived very well due to the generosity of Ms. Reeves.

[29] On January 23, 2020, Mr. Hiess brought a motion to have Ms. Reeves examined in aid of the enforcement of the Québec/Ontario judgment. The motion was made returnable on April 7, 2020. In February 2020, Mr. Zelnik swore an affidavit in response to Mr. Hiess’s motion to examine Ms. Reeves. In March 2020, Mr. Zelnik answered his undertakings given at his judgment debtor examination, following which Mr. Hiess abandoned his motion to have an examination of Ms. Reeves in aid of the judgment enforcement proceedings against Mr. Zelnik. Thus, in April, with the intervention of the Covid-19 pandemic, the motion to examine Ms. Reeves did not proceed.

[30] Mr. Hiess’s efforts to enforce the Québec judgment, however, did not stop. On August 12, 2020, Mr. Hiess obtained a Notice of Garnishment against Ms. Reeves in the amount of approximately $1.5 million. To obtain the Notice of Garnishment, Mr. Hiess relied on an affidavit from Jenny Ferreira, a law clerk with Affleck Greene McMurtry LLP, Mr. Hiess’s Ontario lawyers, dated August 5, 2020. In her affidavit, Ms. Ferreira stated:

[…] I verily believe that the garnishee, Lynda Reeves a.k.a. Lynda Colville-Reeves is, or will become indebted to the debtor, Michel Zelnik, for the reason that Mr. Zelnik was examined on September 26th, 2019 in aid of execution and he advised on page 112, question 637 of his transcript that, ‘Ms. Reeves has given Mr. Zelnik, on average, $15,000 every month over the last two years’…”

[31] An after-the-fact analysis based on Ms. Ferreira’s subsequent cross-examination reveals that Ms. Ferreira was told by Mr. Hiess’s lawyers what to say in her affidavit. The analysis reveals that she could have been told a great deal more about Mr. Zelnik’s evidence from his examinations and about his answers to undertakings.

[32] It is based on the paucity of Ms. Ferreira’s affidavit evidence that Ms. Reeves now argues that the Notice of Garnishment should be struck on procedural grounds. I shall return to that matter later in these Reasons for Decision.

[33] On September 9, 2020, Mr. Hiess served the Notice of Garnishment on Ms. Reeves.

[34] On September 14, 2020, Ms. Reeves filed a Garnishee Statement disputing that she was indebted to Mr. Zelnik. In her statement, she said that she had made monetary gifts to Mr. Zelnik for him and his family and was under no legal obligation to make these payments. She stated that she had no obligation to make payments to Mr. Zelnik in the future. She stated that he was indebted to her for four loan agreements totaling $2.1 million.

[35] Mr. Hiess brought a motion to strike Ms. Reeves’s Garnishee Statement and to enforce the garnishment.

[36] On November 5, 2020, Mr. Zelnik was examined at his second judgment debtor examination.

[37] In the garnishment proceedings, an affidavit dated December 21, 2020 from Ms. Ferreira was delivered.

[38] On December 22, 2020, Mr. Zelnik answered his undertakings from the November 2020 cross-examination.

[39] Mr. Zelnik was summoned as witness pursuant to rule 39.03, and he was examined on January 21, 2021.

[40] On January 25, 2021, Ms. Reeves swore an affidavit in the garnishment proceedings. She deposed that she did not owe any money to Mr. Zelnik and that the payments she had made to him were gifts. She deposed that she was under no obligation to pay Mr. Zelnik previously or in the future.

[41] On March 5, 2021, Ms. Reeves and Ms. Ferreira were cross-examined.

[42] Mr. Hiess delivered a Notice of Motion seeking answers to questions refused at the cross-examination of Ms. Reeves. Ms. Reeves responded by a bringing cross-motion to have the garnishment proceedings dismissed.

[43] The parties attended a case conference to determine whether the refusals motion should proceed before Ms. Reeves’s cross motion, and whether the refusals motion should be heard by a judge or an associate judge. Justice Sharma ordered that both motions would be returnable before a judge.

[44] All the motions were heard on January 10, 2022.

E. Analysis and Discussion

[45] As noted at the outset of these Reasons for Decision, Ms. Reeves brings a cross-motion in the garnishment proceedings, and she seeks an Order setting aside the Notice of Garnishment on two grounds, one procedural and one substantive; namely: (a) procedurally, the Notice of Garnishment should be set aside because Mr. Hiess did not make full disclosure in obtaining the Notice; and (b) substantively, the Notice should be set aside because Ms. Reeves is not indebted to Mr. Zelnik.

[46] For the reasons that follow, I shall decide Ms. Reeves’s cross-motion substantively. I conclude that she is not indebted to Mr. Zelnik and, therefore, there is nothing to garnish.

[47] With a substantive decision, it is, therefore, not necessary for me to decide the procedural point and I decline to do so. What I will say is that the full disclosure principle is a matter that will depend on the facts of the particular case and there is no easy measure of determining how much a party moving ex parte for a court order needs to disclose of the opponent’s case or the opponent’s position.

[48] In the immediate case, Ms. Ferreira was evidentiary-tightrope-walking the facts of the lives of the rich and famous and I will leave it there without deciding whether there is a procedural basis for striking the Notice of Garnishment.

[49] Substantively, the immediate case is not difficult. I find as a fact that Ms. Reeves is not indebted to Mr. Zelnik. It follows that Mr. Hiess’s garnishment proceeding should be dismissed.

[50] This conclusion is more than a conclusion that Mr. Hiess failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that there was an indebtedness. It is an affirmative conclusion that there is no indebtedness. I find as a fact that Ms. Reeves is not indebted to Mr. Zelnik.

[51] The essence of Mr. Hiess’s garnishment claim is that the millions of dollars paid by Ms. Reeves can only be explained as payment for Mr. Zelnik’s services as an advisor or employee of Ms. Reeves and therefore Ms. Reeves must be indebted to Mr. Zelnik. This legal essence, however, like a morning mist, evaporates in the light of the evidentiary day. I believe Ms. Reeves’s and Mr. Zelnik’s evidence that he became totally dependent on Ms. Reeves and that she was not paying him as a servant, but she was supporting him and his family out of love and affection. Mr. Zelnik is a lucky man, but good luck is not an enforceable legal obligation.

[52] Moreover, even if there was a basis for concluding that Ms. Reeves’s payments for such things as her adult step-children’s education and health care were remuneration for goods and services provided by Mr. Zelnik, there is no evidence that there is an unpaid indebtedness to Mr. Zelnik.

[53] Indeed, the evidence is that Mr. Zelnik may be indebted to Ms. Reeves for millions of dollars, although she may have forgiven this indebtedness also out of love and affection. The point is that if the payments made by Ms. Reeves to Mr. Zelnik may be characterized as payment of an indebtedness (as opposed to a gift by way of payment or forgiveness of the loans), there is no present or future debt to garnish. If there was a legal obligation to pay (and I find that there was not), she has paid everything she owes.

[54] Mr. Hiess made much of the fact that Mr. Zelnik continued into 2019 to visit Nicaragua for the purposes of launching Coconut Corp., which was owned by Ms. Reeves. There is evidence that Ms. Reeves paid Mr. Zelnik expenses for doing so. The fact remains, however, that whether Mr. Zelnik made these trips because he was an employee or as favour for Ms. Reeves, the evidence is that there is no outstanding present or future indebtedness of Ms. Reeves and that Coconut Corp. is a stillborn business. There is nothing to garnish.

F. Conclusion

[55] For the above reasons, I strike the Notice of Garnishment.

[56] If the parties cannot agree about the matter of costs, they may make submissions in writing beginning with Ms. Reeves’s submissions within twenty days of the release of these Reasons for Decision followed by Mr. Hiess’s submissions within a further twenty days.

Perell, J.

Released: January 21, 2022

COURT FILE NO.: CV-19-00617279-0000

DATE: 20220121

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

JOSEPH HIESS

Plaintiff

and -

MICHEL ZELNIK

Defendant

REASONS FOR DECISION

PERELL J.

Released: January 21, 2022

[^1]: R.S.O. 1990, Reg. 194

[^2]: First Internet Financial Services Ltd. v. Lewis, 2014 ONSC 3487, Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corp. No. 1250 v. Mastercraft Group Inc., 2011 ONSC 2548; Noble China Inc. v. Lei, [1999] O.J. No. 5030 (S.C.J.).

[^3]: First v. Fillion, 2020 ONCA 451; Superior Hardwood Flooring v. Iron Horse Construction Corp. [2019] O.J. No. 5119 (Sm. Cl. Ct.); Richter LLP v. Big Truck TV Productions Inc., 2015 ONCA 567, rev’g 2014 ONSC 6379; Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Cooper, Sandler, West & Skurka, (1998), 1998 18860 (ON SC), 37 O.R. (3d) 729 (Div. Ct.), leave to appeal dismissed May 21, 1998.

[^4]: Diewold v. Diewold, 1940 52 (SCC), [1941] S.C.R. 35

[^5]: Raso v. Bayne, 2020 ONSC 6654 (Master); Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Co. v. Nicol, 2014 ONSC 4748; Parker v. Parker, 2014 ONSC 3398 (Div. Ct.); Mullin v. R - M & E Pharmacy (2005), 2005 1073 (ON SC), 74 O.R. (3d) 378 (S.C.J.); International Union of Painters and Allied Trades, Local 200 v. S & S Glass & Aluminum (1993) Ltd., 2004 12611 (ON CA), [2004] O.J. No. 1284 (C.A.); 20 Toronto Street Holdings Ltd. v. Coffee, Tea or Me Bakeries Inc. (2001), 2001 28048 (ON SC), 53 O.R. (3d) 360 at para. 5 (S.C.J.)

[^6]: Raso v. Bayne, 2020 ONSC 6654 (Master); Mullin v. R-M & E Pharmacy (2005), 2005 1073 (ON SC), 74 O.R. (3d) 378 (S.C.J.); 20 Toronto Street Holdings Ltd. v. Coffee, Tea or Me Bakeries Inc. (2001), 2001 28048 (ON SC), 53 O.R. (3d) 360 (S.C.J.); Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) v. O’Brien (1995), 1995 7053 (ON SC), 23 O.R. (3d) 543 (Gen. Div.); Wayfarer Holidays Ltd. v. Hoteles Barcelo (1993), 1993 8571 (ON SC), 12 O.R. (3d) 208 (Gen. Div.).

[^7]: Québec Superior Court No: 500-17-097 435-179; January 24, 2019.

Hiess v. Zelnik, 2022 ONSC 484

Case Summary

A. Introduction

B. The Garnishment Rule

C. Factual Background

D. Procedural Background

E. Analysis and Discussion

F. Conclusion

Judge

Counsel

Parties

Areas of Law

Fact Patterns

Issues

Statutory Provisions 1

Legal Tests 1

Legislation 1