COURT FILE NO.: CV-19-0005231-000

DATE: 2022-08-09

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: Karnail Gill v. Amarjit Gill, by the Estate Trustee Kuldeep Gill and Kuldeep Gill (CV-19-0005231-000)

AND RE: Kuldeep Gill and Amarjit Gill, by the Estate Trustee Kuldeep Gill v. Karnail Gill (CV-20-0000829-000)

BEFORE: Fowler Byrne J.

COUNSEL: Ajay Duggal, for Kuldeep Gill and Amarjit Gill, by the Estate Trustee Kuldeep Gill Harpreet Sachdeva, for Karnail Gill

HEARD: February 16, 2022 by videoconference

JUDGMENT

[1] Ms. Kuldeep ("Kuldeep") Gill and Mr. Amarjit Gill ("Amarjit") were spouses. Amarjit died on March 2, 2021, and Kuldeep has been appointed the Estate Trustee of the Estate of Amarjit Gill ("the Estate"). Mr. Karnail Gill ("Karnail") and Amarjit were brothers.

[2] There are two applications before me. Kuldeep and the Estate seek the following:

a) A declaration that they are 100% owners of 134 Cutters Crescent, Brampton, Ontario ("the Property") to the exclusion of Karnail, and that title be amended to reflect that;

b) An order that Karnail pay arrears in rent to Kuldeep and the Estate in the sum of $1,000 per month from January 21, 2003 to June 30, 2017, fixed in the sum of $173,307.34 or as proven; and

c) An order that Karnail pay 33% of all utilities, mortgage and property tax for the Property to Kuldeep and the Estate for the period of January 21, 2003, to June 30, 2017, fixed in the sum of $62,073.83 or as proven.[^1]

[3] Karnail seeks the following:

a) An order that the Property be listed for sale, and that he control that sale, or that he choose the listing agent;

b) That he be given exclusive possession of the Property pending the sale in order to ready the Property for the market; and

c) That upon the sale, and after the usual deductions are paid, that he be paid one-third of the remaining proceeds of sale of the Property, subject to adjustments that include occupation rent, rental income, repairs to the Property and costs.

[4] In support of these applications, the parties and Mr. Tarsem Singh Sidhu ("Sidhu") filed affidavits. Cross-examinations on those affidavits took place and the transcripts were filed.

I. Issues

[5] As a result of the relief sought, the following issues must be determined:

a) Can this be determined on affidavit evidence or is trial required?

b) Is Kuldeep and the Estate's claim to full ownership to the Property statute-barred?

c) Who are the beneficial owners of the Property?

d) If Karnail is a beneficial owner, should the Property be sold?

e) If the Property is sold, how should the proceeds of sale be divided?

f) If Karnail is not a beneficial owner, does he owe any money to Kuldeep or the Estate, or does Kuldeep or the Estate owe him anything?

II. Background

[6] Karnail, Amarjit, and their extended family were first generation Canadians who worked hard to establish themselves and, in so doing, pooled their resources to purchase various properties. Karnail and Amarjit's mother, Chand Kaur Gill ("Chand"), oversaw many of these transactions. In India, she was the Sarpanch – roughly translated as a village head or leader – and, as a result, held a great deal of authority within her family.

[7] Amarjit and Karnail came to Canada in or about 1992. In 1999, Amarjit and Kuldeep were married and Kuldeep moved to Canada to live with Amarjit. In 2001, Amarjit, Karnail, and their maternal nephew Tarsem Singh Sidhu ("Sidhu") purchased a property at 57 Millstone Drive in Brampton ("Millstone"). They took title as tenants in common, with an equal interest. Amarjit, Karnail, and Sidhu each contributed $4,000 towards the down payment and took title as tenants in common. While they lived together, they each contributed one-third of the mortgage, taxes, insurance and utility bills, in addition to paying for groceries. During that time, Chand, who also lived there, managed all the finances, collecting the money that everyone owed and made sure all was paid.

[8] Sidhu was married in 2001 and she moved in with Chand, Sidhu, Amarjit, Kuldeep, and Karnail. There was some tension in the house between Kuldeep and Sidhu's wife. Chand decided that it would be better that the two wives and their families live separately. Chand suggested that the property should be valued; then, Sidhu and his family could buy out Amarjit, Karnail, and their families, or the reverse could happen.

[9] Eventually, Sidhu indicated that he wanted to purchase the interest of Amarjit and Karnail in Millstone. A family friend who was a real estate agent valued the property and prepared the sale documents. The real estate agent also agreed to help Amarjit, Kuldeep, Karnail, and Chand find a new place to live.

[10] Not long after, the real estate agent found the Property for Amarjit, Kuldeep, Karnail and Chand. While the parties' evidence of their intentions at that time diverge, the following is uncontested:

a) Karnail and Amarjit used the proceeds of the sale of their interest in Millstone to purchase the Property;

b) The down payment required was $28,921.22;

c) Karnail paid $10,000 towards the deposit;

d) The real estate lawyer was directed to put title in the names of Amarjit, Kuldeep, and Karnail – all owning a one-third interest, as tenants in common;

e) Amarjit, Kuldeep, and Karnail were all equally liable under the first mortgage on the Property;

f) After the purchase was completed on January 21, 2003, Amarjit, Kuldeep, and their young family, along with Karnail and Chand, all moved in; and

g) Almost immediately, they rented the basement of the apartment for $500 per month. This rent was subsequently raised to $600, although the exact month and year of that increase is unknown.

[11] One of the main disputes between the parties was the nature of Karnail's payment of $10,000. Karnail maintains it was his investment in the Property, equal to that of Amarjit and Kuldeep. Karnail states that all three parties had discussed it beforehand, and they had all agreed to hold title as tenants in common, all having an equal ownership interest. He maintains that the conversation was witnessed by Chand and Sidhu.

[12] Kuldeep maintains that she and Amarjit never intended to live with Karnail, but he could not find other accommodations. Given that Karnail was not married and was their family, they agreed that he could live with them. Kuldeep maintains the $10,000 was a loan and that it was required only because they needed a larger house to accommodate him. There was never any discussion about when the alleged loan would be repaid, nor if any interest was payable on it. At the same time, though, Kuldeep maintains that she took the money on the understanding that Karnail could live at the Property free of charge for as long as he wanted. She also gave evidence that, despite that alleged agreement, she and Amarjit asked Karnail several times to move out before he did so in 2017.

[13] The parties agree that there is no documentation that would indicate the nature of Karnail's payment of the $10,000 and whether the ownership interest in the Property was anything different from what is reflected on title.

[14] The other main point of contention between the parties is whether Karnail continued to contribute to the upkeep of the Property. Karnail maintained that he paid the sum of $550 each month, in cash, directly to Kuldeep, who managed matters with Chand. He states that Kuldeep advised him of this sum, taking into account the rental income received and directed to the Property expenses. Karnail states he was very reliant on Kuldeep. Kuldeep was approximately twenty-five years younger than him and thirty years younger than Amarjit. Karnail was illiterate and needed Kuldeep to drive him to the bank and assist in withdrawing the money. He relied on her to explain any documentation he was asked to sign. He claims she drove him at least once per month to get the cash, which he would give to her. He never asked for verification of the household expenses: he just trusted Kuldeep. When she was not available to drive him, Karnail would ask Sidhu to drive him. Sidhu confirmed that every three to four months, he would drive Karnail to the bank to withdraw money to give to Kuldeep. Unfortunately, Karnail did not produce any bank statements to verify this himself.

[15] Kuldeep claims that Karnail contributed nothing to the upkeep of the home while he resided there. Other than her affidavit and cross-examination, she provided no other evidence that she and Amarjit alone supported the upkeep of the Property.

[16] Unfortunately, in 2014, Chand died. Had the family matriarch still been alive, I suspect that matters would not have resorted to litigation.

[17] The parties' evidence aligns again in June 2017. They agree that Karnail had a serious alcohol issue and that living with him became intolerable. Karnail was asked to leave in June 2017; he subsequently moved in with his nephew Sidhu. Karnail claims he continued to pay his $550 each month until January 2018, when he returned to India for an extended visit (although Kuldeep again denies receiving any money). Amarjit returned alone to India around that time, never to return on any permanent basis. It does not appear, though, that he and Kuldeep separated. At some point, Kuldeep's mother moved into the Property.

[18] Karnail maintains that in or about September 2017, he asked that Amarjit and Kuldeep purchase his interest in the Property. He stated that they originally agreed but then changed their minds. Karnail left the matter alone for a while, but eventually, by the summer of 2019, he retained counsel and started demanding the sale of the house.

[19] By October 2019, the mortgage had been reduced to approximately $93,000, and there was considerable equity in the home. One can only assume that the equity has continued to grow.

[20] As indicated, in March 2021, Amarjit passed away. On February 4, 2022, the parties obtained an Order to Continue, an order consolidating the two applications, and the title of proceedings was amended accordingly.

III. Analysis

A. Should this Go to Trial?

[21] Rule 14.05(3) of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure states that a proceeding may be brought by way of an application if, inter alia, the relief sought is a declaration of an interest in land or in respect to any matter where it is unlikely that there will be any material facts in dispute which would require a trial. I am also cognisant of rule 1.04(1), which directs me to interpret the Rules in a manner so as to secure the just, most expeditious, and least expensive determination of this proceeding on its merits.

[22] Karnail submits that a trial is not necessary. Kuldeep and the Estate did not argue that a trial was necessary.

[23] Clearly, Kuldeep and the Estate are seeking a declaration that Karnail's interest in the Property is being held in trust for them. I do acknowledge that there are facts in dispute, but there is sufficient evidence, other than what Kuldeep and Karnail say, that allows me to decide this matter without making any findings of credibility on material facts.

[24] These two applications have been outstanding for some time. One of the main parties has since died. The parties have had sufficient time to gather whatever evidence they wanted in support of their position. They were content to rely on affidavits, which were subject to cross-examination.

[25] Accordingly, I am satisfied that I can determine this matter based on the written record before me and counsel's submissions.

B. Is Kuldeep and the Estate's Claim Statute-Barred?

[26] This claim is not statute-barred.

[27] An action to recover land must be brought within ten years after the right to bring such action first accrued to the person bringing it: Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15 ("RPLA"), s. 4. Section 4 also applies to equitable claims for property based on the remedy of constructive trust, even if the claimant seeks a monetary award in the alternative: McConnell v. Huxtable, 2014 ONCA 86, 118 O.R. (3d) 561, at paras. 38-40.

[28] In this case, though, the limitation period has not yet commenced. In Waterstone Properties Corporation v. Caledon (Town), 2017 ONCA 623, the Court of Appeal for Ontario explained that, under s. 5(1) of the RPLA, possession can operate to postpone the commencement of the limitation period. If the claimant has been in possession of the land in which it seeks an interest, s. 5(1) postpones the commencement of the limitation period to the time of dispossession or discontinuance. This includes not only claims for possession, but also any claim for land by the judgment of the court, including claims for a declaration in respect of lands and claims to ownership of land advanced by way of a resulting or constructive trust: at para. 32. See also Hartman Estate v. Hartfam Holdings Ltd. (2006), 2006 266 (ON CA), 263 D.L.R. (4th) 640 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 34.

C. Who Owns the Property?

[29] Karnail owns one-third of the Property as a tenant in common, as clearly indicated on title. Accordingly, the onus is on Kuldeep and the Estate to show that Karnail is holding title in trust for them.

i. Resulting Trust

[30] Kuldeep and the Estate claim that they own Karnail's share by way of a resulting trust. I disagree.

[31] A resulting trust arises when title to property is in one party's name, but that party, because they gave no value for the property, is under an obligation to return it to the original titled owner: Pecore v. Pecore, 2007 SCC 17, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 795, at para. 20. This is a rebuttable presumption. In other words, it is a presumption the court will make if insufficient evidence is adduced to displace the presumption. The presumption shifts the burden of persuasion to the opposing party who must rebut the presumption: Pecore, at para. 22. The burden of proof on the opposing party is on the balance of probabilities: Pecore, at para. 43.

[32] The presumption of a resulting trust applies to gratuitous transfers. Where a transfer is made for no consideration, the onus is placed on the transferee to demonstrate that a gift was intended. This is because equity presumes bargains, not gifts: Pecore, at para. 24.

[33] The present facts do not suggest a gratuitous transfer, so the presumption of a resulting trust does not apply. All parties agree that Karnail advanced $10,000 at the time of the purchase of the Property. This was almost exactly one-third of the deposit required and he was also equally obligated under the mortgage. In return for these monies, Amarjit, Kuldeep, and Karnail were all registered as one-third owners, as tenants in common. There is no resulting trust in this case.

ii. Constructive Trust

[34] Kuldeep and the Estate also argued that they own Karnail's interest in the Property by way of a constructive trust. Again, I disagree.

[35] A constructive trust is a remedy available if the court finds that there has been an unjust enrichment. In order to establish unjust enrichment, Kuldeep and the Estate must show that there was an enrichment of or a benefit to Karnail, a corresponding deprivation to Kuldeep and the Estate, and the absence of a juristic reason for the enrichment: Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 269, at para. 32. If unjust enrichment has been established, the court must determine whether Kuldeep and the Estate are entitled to a constructive trust, being a proprietary remedy, or to monetary compensation.

[36] The first remedy the court should consider is a monetary remedy. A monetary remedy can be calculated based on value received or via a quantum meruit calculation. If and only if monetary damages are inappropriate or insufficient and there is a sufficient substantial and direct link or causal connection between the contributions and the acquisition, preservation, maintenance, or improvement of the property, the court may make a proprietary award by impressing the property with a constructive trust. Kerr, paras. 47, 55, 80-87, Lesko v. Lesko, 2021 ONCA 369, 57 R.F.L (8th) 305, at para. 14, Martin v. Sansome, 2014 ONCA 14, 118 O.R. (3d) 522, at paras. 52, 58; Moore v. Sweet, 2018 SCC 52, [2018] 3 S.C.R 303, at para. 91.

[37] I find that Karnail has been enriched to the extent that he owns one-third of the Property as it is currently registered on title. Kuldeep and the Estate are deprived of the same one-third ownership. The main issue is whether there is a juristic reason for this enrichment.

[38] As I have indicated, I find that Karnail did contribute one-third of the cash required to close the transaction and agreed to be equally liable under the mortgage, just as Kuldeep and Amarjit were. Accordingly, at the beginning, the juristic reason for his enrichment was because he paid for it.

[39] I also find that, on the balance of probabilities, Karnail did continue to contribute to the Property. I make that finding based on evidence that does not require credibility findings. In addition, even if a finding of credibility were to be required, I favour the evidence of Karnail.

[40] There are three pieces of uncontested evidence pointing to Karnail's ongoing contributions to the Property.

[41] First, in 2019, Karnail retained counsel to compel Kuldeep and Amarjit to either buy him out or sell the Property. Karnail has provided evidence that his lawyer, Ms. Sachdeva, was in communication with Kuldeep and Amarjit in July 2019. In a letter dated July 26, 2019, Ms. Sachdeva stated:

During our conversation, you indicated that you were in the process of arranging mortgage in order to purchase my client's interest in property. You requested one month extension in order to make these arrangements. To date I have not heard from you or your counsel.

[42] Kuldeep never disputed this communication, nor did she provide any communication disputing that they were making arrangements to buy him out. It is unlikely that those conversations would have taken place had Kuldeep and Amarjit not believed Karnail to have had an ongoing ownership interest in the Property.

[43] Second, no one denies that the mortgage must have been renewed on several occasions between 2003 and now. Accordingly, Karnail must have signed mortgage renewal documents on each of those occasions as an owner and continued to assume substantial risk. Kuldeep has provided no evidence that Karnail has ceased being responsible under the mortgage.

[44] Third, it is uncontested that there were tenants in the basement from the time they purchased the house. Given that Karnail was an owner on title, he was entitled to his share of the rent payments. Kuldeep or Amarjit collected the rent and never gave anything to Karnail. Accordingly, as he was not paid his share, I infer that Karnail contributed his one-third share of the rent since 2003 to the household, which was anywhere between $166 to $200 per month, depending on whether the rent was $500 or $600.

[45] Accordingly, I find there to be ample evidence that Karnail continued to contribute to the value of the Property, and was considered an owner, without having to make a credibility finding as between Karnail and Kuldeep. If I were required to make a finding of credibility, though, as between Kuldeep and Karnail, I would prefer the evidence of Karnail.

[46] I make this finding for a few reasons. First, Kuldeep's evidence was contradictory in many respects. She maintains that the $10,000 advanced by Karnail was a loan, but later seems to indicate that it was a payment up front for Karnail's contribution to rent or utilities. At one time, she said the agreement was that Karnail could stay as long as he wanted, but then she gave evidence that she and Amarjit asked him on a number of occasions to find his own place.

[47] When considering this conflict in the evidence, it is notable that, in cross-examination, despite her position, Kuldeep maintained that she did not remember much from 2002 and 2003, which was the time of the purchase of the Property, including what she told the real estate lawyer and the first mortgagee.

[48] Second, Sidhu gave evidence that he drove Karnail to the bank from time to time to get money for Kuldeep. While I acknowledge that a great deal of Sidhu's evidence is hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible, he was a firsthand witness to Karnail going to the bank and withdrawing cash for Kuldeep. He also was a firsthand witness to a conversation between Kuldeep, Amarjit, Karnail, and Chand in which it was agreed that Kuldeep, Amarjit, and Karnail would be equal one-third owners. I am sure that Chand would have insisted that both her sons were on title as they were on Millstone.

[49] Third, during the period of his ownership, Karnail gave evidence that Kuldeep asked him for the sum of $1,500 towards a paint job for the house, which costed $4,500. While Kuldeep denied this ever occurred, Sidhu provided evidence of how he went to speak to Kuldeep on Karnail's behalf to verify the cost of this paint job.

[50] Sidhu's evidence, on two occasions, contradicts that of Kuldeep. However, Sidhu has nothing to gain from his evidence, as he has no interest in the Property.

[51] I acknowledge that Karnail did not provide bank statements showing his monthly withdrawal, but Kuldeep was equally deficient in her evidence. She provided bank statements only for the account from which the mortgage was paid. These statements show that each month, deposits were made to that account to just cover the mortgage. Kuldeep provided no other evidence that these deposits came from either her, Amarjit, or the tenant. If these deposits originated from only these sources, she could have provided evidence of the money coming from her own bank account or obtained an affidavit from the tenant. She did neither. Given that she has the onus of showing unjust enrichment, this omission is more detrimental to her claim.

[52] Accordingly, I find that there was a juristic reason for Karnail's one-third interest in the home. He paid for his interest, both when it was purchased and until January 2018, when he went to India. As a result, no unjust enrichment has been proven. When there is no unjust enrichment, there can be no constructive trust.

iii. Other Arguments of Kuldeep and the Estate

[53] In paragraph 45 of their factum, Kuldeep and the Estate state:

45. …the statutory presumption that registered title is conclusive evidence of the ownership of legal and beneficial interests can be rebutted in some circumstances. It may be rebutted by the operation of the presumption of resulting trust, where there is an agreement between the parties that is contrary to the registered title, or to take account of the underlying equitable interests between the parties: Bajwa v. Pannu, 2007 BCCA 260.

[54] As already indicated, this is not a situation in which a resulting trust arises. Also, I have already found that Kuldeep is not entitled to the equitable remedy of a constructive trust. I have also found no evidence of an agreement that Amarjit, Kuldeep, and Karnail would be anything other than one-third owners of the Property. The case law that Kuldeep and the Estate relied on is otherwise outdated, or from British Columbia, which is not binding on this court.

D. Should the Property be Sold?

[55] Given that I have found Karnail to be an owner of the Property, he is entitled to an order that it be sold under Section 2 the Partition Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.4.

[56] Amarjit has been deceased for more than a year, so Karnail is not prohibited from making this application: s. 3(2), Partition Act.

[57] In their factum, Kuldeep and the Estate have set out the circumstances in which a sale should not be ordered, such as when a party acts maliciously, oppressively, or with a vexatious intent. I have seen no evidence of Karnail acting in this way.

[58] Despite Karnail's right to compel the sale of the Property, I see no reason for Karnail to occupy the Property to the exclusion of Kuldeep and her family and have to sole carriage of the sale. The parties should be afforded the opportunity to work cooperatively and obtain the best price for the Property, to all their advantage. If either party wishes to purchase the other's interest, they should have an opportunity to do so as well.

D. Once Sold, Should Any Adjustments be Made?

[59] Given that Karnail is an owner of one-third of the Property, he should be responsible for one-third of the mortgage, the property taxes, and the insurance. He is also entitled to collect one-third of the rent received. This accounting should be made prior to the closing of any sale.

[60] Kuldeep and the Estate are not entitled to rent from Karnail. As an owner, he is not required to pay rent. Instead, he contributed to the mortgage, taxes, insurance, and utilities.

[61] Karnail also seeks occupation rent for the period in which he had been prevented from utilizing his equity in the home.

[62] In the Court of Appeal decision of Griffiths v. Zambosco (2001), 2001 24097 (ON CA), 54 O.R. (3d) 397 (C.A.), at para. 49, Osborne J.A. stated that a judge has jurisdiction to order that occupation rent be paid if it is reasonable and equitable to do so. The relevant factors to be considered will vary from case to case.

[63] In this case, I do not find that it would be equitable for Karnail to be awarded occupation rent. He has not contributed anything over and above his share of the rent since January 2018. Karnail has never been excluded from the Property by reason of an order for exclusive possession. In addition, Karnail waited two years himself before he sought his interest in the Property. The matter was also delayed by Amarjit's death, and Karnail would have been prevented from pursuing this application in any event until one year after this death. Finally, the suspension of court operations by COVID-19 is not the fault of any party.

[64] Finally, I do not accept the evidence Karnail proffered as to the value of his claim for occupation rent. In order to award such a claim, I would need opinion evidence from an expert in this area who could be cross-examined on the values provided. The evidence offered is insufficiently reliable.

IV. Conclusion

[65] For the foregoing reasons, I make the following orders:

a) Karnail, Kuldeep, and the Estate are each one-third owners of the Property, as tenants in common;

b) Each party shall have 28 days from the date of this order to make an offer to purchase the other's interest in the Property;

c) If an agreement is not reached in 28 days, Karnail shall, within 7 days, provide the name of 3 real estate agents who he agrees may list the Property;

d) Within 7 days of receiving that list, Kuldeep shall choose one of those listing agents, who shall be the listing agent for the Property; if she fails to choose, Karnail shall have sole authority to pick the listing agent;

e) All parties shall cooperate fully in signing the listing agreement; they shall follow the advice of the listing agent as to listing price as well as any repairs or refresh that are required; the costs of any repairs or refresh shall be born by Karnail, Kuldeep and the Estate equally;

f) The Property shall be listed within 14 days of the listing agreement being signed, or as agreed by both parties if the listing agent so advises;

g) The parties will cooperate fully in considering all offers and making counteroffers; in the event they disagree, they shall follow the recommendations of the listing agent;

h) If either party is not cooperative and does not consider reasonable offers and counterproposals in a timely manner, or if a party does not follow the recommendations of the listing agent in making the Property ready for sale and available for showings, or if a party is disruptive or impedes the sale of the Property in any way, the other party may bring a motion on an urgent basis, seeking to have sole authority to list, sell, and close the Property without the other's consent or signature;

i) Prior to the closing of the Property, Kuldeep shall provide evidence of all mortgage payments, property tax, and insurance payments made on the Property since January 2018, as well as evidence of all rent payments received since January 2018; Karnail shall be responsible for one-third of all the payments made by Kuldeep, less one-third of the rental income received by Kuldeep ("Ownership Adjustment");

j) Upon closing of the sale of the Property, after payment of any registered encumbrances, the usual real estate adjustments, and real estate legal fees, the proceeds shall be divided as follows:

1. one-third to Karnail, less the Ownership Adjustment;

2. one-third to Kuldeep, plus one-half the Ownership Adjustment;

3. one-third to the Estate, plus one-half of the Ownership Adjustment;

k) if the parties cannot agree on the Ownership Adjustment, they may contact my judicial assistant at Zoe.Chen@ontario.ca to arrange a Zoom conference at 9:00 a.m. in order to deal with the issue;

l) The parties are encouraged to resolve the issue of costs themselves. If they are unable to, they are to serve and file their written costs submissions, single-sided and double spaced, limited to two pages, plus their Costs Outline, on or before August 26, 2022; the other party may file responding written submissions, with the same size restrictions on or before September 19, 2022; and

m) The remaining relief sought in both applications is dismissed.

Fowler Byrne J.

DATE: August 9, 2022

COURT FILE NO.: CV-19-0005231-000

DATE: 2022 08 09

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: Karnail Gill v. Amarjit Gill, by the Estate Trustee Kuldeep Gill and Kuldeep Gill (CV-19-0005231-0000)

AND RE: Kuldeep Gill and Amarjit Gill, by the Estate Trustee Kuldeep Gill v. Karnail Gill (CV-20-0000829.0000)

COUNSEL: Ajay Duggal, for Kuldeep Gill and Amarjit Gill, by the Estate Trustee Kuldeep Gill Harpreet Sachdeva, for the Defendant Karnail Gill

ENDORSEMENT

Fowler Byrne J.

DATE: August 9, 2022

[^1]: In their Notice of Application, Kuldeep and the Estate seek twenty percent (20%) of these expenses, but in Kuldeep's cross-examination, she indicated that 20% was a mistake, and that she meant to claim one-third, or thirty-three percent (33%).