ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
– and –
Sandra Cameron
Defendant
Barb Glendinning, for the Crown
John Hale, for the Defendant
HEARD:
January 17,18,19,21,24,25,26,27,28, 2022
April 11,12,14,19,20,21,22,25,28,29, 2022
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
lacelle, j.
[1] Sandra Cameron worked as the tax collector for the Township of North Glengarry (“TNG”) between the years 2008 and 2016. Before that, she was the assistant tax collector for a few years.
[2] In the course of her employment with the Township, Ms. Cameron is alleged to have committed a number of offences. She is charged with the following offences, all of which are alleged to have occurred between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2017:
breach of trust, contrary to section 122 of the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (by manipulating data and issuing false tax bills and tax certificates);
defrauding the Township of North Glengarry and its taxpayers, contrary to section 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code of Canada;
knowingly make false statements in writing with the intent that they should be relied upon by taxpayers and the Township of North Glengarry, contrary to section 362(1)(c) of the Criminal Code of Canada;
committing mischief in relation to data by rendering tax account data contained in the Vadim system meaningless, useless and ineffective, contrary to section 430(5) of the Criminal Code of Canada;
knowingly causing forged documents (multiple tax bills and tax certificates) to be issued to taxpayers and their lawyers as if they were genuine, contrary to section 368(1)(a) of the Criminal Code of Canada.
Overview of the evidence
[3] The narrative of the Crown’s allegations against Ms. Cameron were presented largely through the evidence of Linda Lancaster. A summary of her evidence follows.
[4] Ms. Lancaster was the tax collector in South Glengarry Township until her retirement. At the request of officials in North Glengarry, she assumed the tax collector position for the TNG upon the accused taking a sick leave in December of 2016. She agreed she could only speculate as to what the practice and procedures had been in North Glengarry in earlier years.
[5] Ms. Lancaster was working in this position in 2017 when irregularities in the tax department at the TNG became apparent. She stated that when the property tax notices were mailed out, the phone “started ringing off the hook” with taxpayers asking about how they were showing taxes past due. Ms. Lancaster ultimately assisted police and accounting officials with the subsequent investigation into these complaints, which led to charges against the accused.
[6] Ms. Lancaster provided a great deal of information about a variety of topics. What follows is a brief summary of those parts of her evidence that are most central to an understanding of the issues in this trial.
The Vadim system
[7] The computer software used by TNG for tax administration and other issues was created by a company called “Vadim”. The software was used throughout Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry. An individual from the company, Lorraine Drinkwalter, provided training to Ms. Lancaster and other employees. Employees also had the opportunity to attend conferences run by Vadim. Ms. Lancaster also said a binder called “Tax Collection Procedures” was kept in the tax collector’s work area. She understood it had been prepared by a summer student working at the TNG.
[8] As far as Ms. Lancaster could recall, the transition to the Vadim system took place in 2006-2007. It was her recollection that 2006 was the year when tax accounts began to show Vadim’s recording of interim billings, penalties, payments, interest, and other information not noted by the software in use before Vadim.
[9] Not all employees had the same access to the modules in the Vadim system. The treasurer determined what level of access to give each employee. Even with access to a certain module, there were varying degrees “of what they could do”.
[10] Ms. Lancaster found it challenging to learn the Vadim system. Parts of the system were confusing. While it was simple to use in some respects, it was quite complex in others. It took her about one and a half to two years to get to the point where using the system came naturally. She was aware that others who used it expressed frustration about the system at a Vadim-sponsored conference in Gananoque some four to five years after it was implemented. While the accused was also at that conference, Ms. Lancaster could not recall if she was one of the people complaining about Vadim.
[11] Ms. Lancaster agreed that Vadim had a number of default settings for various transactions, and “many clicks of the mouse” would be required to opt out of these settings. She said that great care had to be taken to ensure that you arrived at the correct result when operating the software.
Usernames, passwords, and access to Vadim
[12] Employees were given usernames to access Vadim and ultimately could set up their own passwords. In many instances, Vadim permitted the identification of the operator who made an entry into the system.
[13] While employees could log in to Vadim from another employee’s workstation, the only way to log in to someone’s Vadim’s account was to use their username and password. It was Ms. Lancaster’s practice never to share her password with anyone.
[14] As far as Ms. Lancaster could recall, either her computer or Vadim required that the password be updated on a regular basis. She could not recall which.
[15] It was Ms. Lancaster’s recollection that users would be timed out of Vadim if the computer was not used within a set time, and that this was true in 2006, at least in South Glengarry.
Live v. test
[16] The Vadim system allowed users to operate in either a “live” or “test” environment. As Ms. Lancaster understood the system, the purpose of the test environment was to permit preliminary work on difficult transactions. In other words, operators could practice how they would enter a transaction in the test environment. The test system was not current in its information and in order to operate with up-to-date information, a request had to be made to IT support personnel to copy information over to the test environment from the live environment. The live system was the one used to conduct actual transactions. A record of transactions was kept in the live system.
[17] At the time of the alleged criminal activity, there was no way to tell the difference between a document prepared in the live environment or the test environment. This issue was rectified in 2017 as a result of the investigation of complaints that led to these charges.
Tax certificates
[18] Tax certificates were produced upon request of a lawyer or taxpayer. They were generated by the Vadim system. In preparing a tax certificate, the tax collector would be required to certify that the information provided was a true representation of the tax account on that particular day. Tax certificates, according to Ms. Lancaster, were only issued in the live system. She never had any occasion to issue one through the test environment. Further, she testified that they should never be issued in the test system because you could not be sure if the data was accurate as to amounts owing unless you had copied the information from the live to test environment.
[19] Tax certificates were uniquely and consecutively numbered. It was not possible in the live system to have two tax certificates with the same number.
The payment process
[20] Various methods could be used by taxpayers to pay their taxes, including by cash, cheque, online banking, or the bank in conjunction with a mortgage payment.
[21] Some taxpayers could set up a pre-authorized payment. However, their taxes had to be up to date to permit this form of payment. While Ms. Lancaster was initially adamant that the policy required this payment to be taken the first banking date of the month, she later agreed that the practice in North Glengarry was to process such payments later.
[22] In the TNG, as far as Ms. Lancaster could tell from her review of various files, payment was received by the tax collector or the assistant tax collector, and later by a receptionist.
[23] Monique St-Denis was the receptionist for a period of time, including when Ms. Lancaster worked for the TNG. In Ms. Lancaster’s opinion, Ms. St-Denis was not adequately trained in the Vadim system. From time to time, Ms. Lancaster would be called to the reception to correct mistakes Ms. St-Denis made with receipts when taxpayers came in to pay their bills. This lessened as Ms. Lancaster’s time at the TNG went on.
[24] Ms. Lancaster noticed no pattern in the mistakes made. Ms. St-Denis’s primary job was to receive payments from taxpayers, but she also created forms and did other work. She made mistakes in entering receipts and required help to balance her cash. Mistakes were discovered right away when she entered a receipt, or the next morning when the bank deposit and balancing of accounts occurred. When Ms. Lancaster had to assist with corrections, this would generally be done from Ms. St-Denis’s workstation. Ms. Lancaster would do the reversal since Ms. St-Denis did not have the password required. She agreed that the password may have originally been “cash”. She said that information about the reversal and who it showed did it depended on whose workstation it was performed on. She also said that the reversal required the entry of the person’s username and password.
[25] Where taxpayers provided one payment (e.g. a cheque) to pay the taxes on multiple properties, the payment entry seems to have often been recorded as a cheque even if the payment was in cash, and was often entered as one roll number rather than multiple roll numbers (where the total payment provided was to satisfy multiple tax bills). This issue was discovered when investigating the complaints that came in after the accused left on sick leave.
Property tax bills
[26] Property tax bills went out in early February every year. A final bill was sent out in late June or early July and provided for payment in two installments. The first payment was due by the end of February, while the last installment was due by September 30.
[27] Property tax bills were printed by the Vadim system. The system provided no way to create a record of the exact bill sent to the taxpayer. Consequently, to have a record of what was actually sent to the taxpayer, a pdf copy had to be made. It was Ms. Lancaster’s practice when working in South Glengarry to take this step, where records going back at least seven years were kept by the Township. There was no practice in the TNG of saving a pdf version of the tax bill sent to the taxpayer.
[28] Ms. Lancaster raised the problem of the inability of the Vadim system to record this information with the company. She reported Vadim requested input from its users on this issue and said “that was put forward many times”.
[29] When printing a tax bill in Vadim, the default setting for the document was such that it would not show amounts past due. It was possible, however, to select the option of “show past due” and to save that option so that bills would always show what was owing on the account. Ms. Lancaster testified that a bill should always show what was owing, and so this box should be checked off and this option saved. If this setting was not saved, the operator would have to click a box with every use to ensure that any bill printed also showed the amounts past due.
[30] If a taxpayer did not receive a tax bill that reflected the amounts past due, they would never know that an amount was due unless they were sent a reminder notice.
[31] Further, without having the tax bill that was sent to the taxpayer, there was no way of knowing if the taxpayer was advised of the true balance on the account at the time the bill was sent.
Reminder notices
[32] The Vadim system did not have an automated way to ensure that reminders were sent out for accounts where the owners were in arrears. It was the responsibility of the tax collector to be aware of which properties required notices. Ms. Lancaster testified that it was best practice to send reminder notices out after the second installment date had passed, and that reminder notices should be sent out at least once a year to taxpayers who were in arrears. The only way to have a record of a reminder notice that was sent was to save a copy.
Reversals of payments
[33] Payments could be reversed in the Vadim system. In order to reverse a payment, various steps had to be taken. The payment process included creating a “batch” number and a deposit number. Batches and deposits would have to be balanced, and then posted to the general ledger. A batch could be kept open until the operator directed Vadim to close it. While it was not good practice to do so, it was possible to keep a batch open all month. It was also possible for more than one person to contribute receipts to a batch if they knew how to do so.
[34] A reversal might be necessary where, when balancing a batch and deposit, it became clear that a number had been mis-entered. In these instances, there would be a follow up entry with the correct amount.
[35] Another circumstance requiring a reversal might occur when the Township treasurer or deputy treasurer had balanced their bank account and determined that the total amount for a deposit was incorrect. In this instance, the tax collector might be asked to pull out the batch and deposit listing to investigate. It might be that a receipt was mis-entered, or a roll number was entered incorrectly (but was a valid roll number). In these cases, the tax collector would have to reverse the entry on the tax account because it was made incorrectly. This type of error relates to manual key entry. Ms. Lancaster testified that in that circumstance, she would expect to see some indication noted in the file that this was the reason for the reversal . There were two options in Vadim to add notes to the file to this effect and explain how the error was fixed.
[36] Where errors were not caught and corrected, Ms. Lancaster said that she would expect that when tax notices were sent out indicating amounts past due, or when reminder notices were sent, the taxpayer would be informed of what the Township said was owing. If the taxpayer contested this and said they had in fact made a payment, they would be asked to show proof of that payment. This would cause an investigation of the circumstances to occur, and the error might then be discovered and corrected.
[37] Payments and subsequent reversals are documented within Vadim in a report referred to as an “audit trail report”. The name of the operator who entered the transaction appears on the report. In the case of payments, the date and time of the payment is noted. In the case of reversals, while the date is noted, all reversals show the same time – midnight. Ms. Lancaster did not know why that was. The operator has no control over this information. She also did not know why the operator’s name appeared in all capital letters for reversals. It was her understanding that the username on the document reflected the workstation used and it identified whoever had accessed the system.
Downloading the information from MPAC into Vadim
[38] Twice a year, the tax collector would receive a CD from the Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (“MPAC”) that updated property tax information. The tax collector was responsible for downloading the data from the CD into Vadim. Ms. Lancaster said the operator had to be careful to not override information in Vadim that was more current about who owned a particular property. A box on the relevant Vadim screen had to be checked to not override this information during the download. If this was not done, manual entries were required to correct the information.
The documents found in the area of Ms. Cameron’s workstation
[39] Ms. Lancaster testified about documents that were found in the area of Ms. Cameron’s workstation after Ms. Cameron went on her sick leave. Some were in a credenza, some in a rolling filing cabinet. If all the documents had been placed in a pile, she estimates there would have been a few that were ten to twelve inches thick.
[40] The filing cabinet contained files where taxes had been owing for more than three years. Ms. Lancaster did not think there was anything unusual about this. As the tax collector, you might want easy access to particular files.
[41] At least some of the documents in Ms. Cameron’s work area were tax bills. Ms. Lancaster testified that as the tax collector, you might keep such documents to remind you that you had an adjustment to do on the account. While she could envision a practice of setting aside a bill where the tax collector expected an imminent change (such as when a property assessment was under appeal), she said the better practice would be to put a note on the tax bill that there was an event pending and send the bill.
[42] Ms. Lancaster estimated there were thousands of documents in the area of the accused’s workstation. There were also documents relating to other things, like local improvements. Ms. Lancaster could not say whether there were issues with any of the tax files to which the tax documents pertained. She did not go through the documents.
[43] Ms. Lancaster also confirmed that there was a shredder in the office, and documents could be easily destroyed.
[44] Given the state of the work area used by Ms. Cameron, Ms. Lancaster agreed that in some aspects of her job, Ms. Cameron was very disorganized. She also noted that Ms. Cameron was very organized in other aspects.
Tax Roll 2 – Property owners: Seguin/Doyle/Barr
[45] On her first day of work for the TNG, Ms. Lancaster dealt with a letter that had been received in the office in December of 2016, between the time the accused went on sick leave and the time Ms. Lancaster took over the tax collector position in early January of 2017. The letter was from a lawyer asking that a change in ownership be noted in respect of property that had been purchased by the Doyles. When Ms. Lancaster went into the system to change the ownership information on the tax account, she noticed there were taxes owing and past due. She contacted the lawyer and informed him.
[46] The lawyer for the Doyles and the prior owners provided a copy of the tax certificate that had been provided to them. It showed no arrears for the years 2014 and 2015. While it identified an upcoming amount that was due ($830), the certificate stated that there were no amounts owing from prior years. The signature on the tax certificate was in the name of the accused. Her office telephone number was hand-printed below the signature line. It was dated August 3, 2016.
[47] Ms. Lancaster then began an examination of the tax account. She determined that the tax certificate provided to counsel had not been issued in the live system, but in the test system. She arrived at this conclusion after searching in Vadim for the tax certificate the lawyers had provided to her. She could not find it. The only tax certificate issued in relation to that property that she could find was issued in 2006.
[48] Ms. Lancaster also created a new tax certificate for the day before the tax certificate that had been provided to counsel. According to this document, the amount owing for unpaid arrears as of a day before the tax certificate provided to counsel was $6,866.45, and included amounts owing in 2014, 2015 and 2016.
[49] In reviewing the records for the property roll number, Ms. Lancaster concluded that the accrual of arrears began as a result of an increased assessment by MPAC effective in November of 2007. She said that the taxpayer would have received two notifications about the increase to their taxes. They would be notified first by MPAC, and then by receiving a supplementary tax notice.
[50] In this instance, notwithstanding that there were unpaid arrears from 2007, the taxpayers were permitted to go on a preauthorized payment plan that came into effect at the beginning of 2008. This was contrary to council’s policy.
[51] Ms. Lancaster also discovered there had been a number of reversals of payments on this tax account. The receipts involved were cross-referenced to their corresponding audit trail report, which permitted Ms. Lancaster to confirm the operator during those transactions. The operator was “scameron”.
[52] Ms. Lancaster testified that a reversal might occur if a payment had been entered incorrectly, or if an error was discovered when trying to balance various figures for the purpose of a bank deposit or when posting to the general ledger. In those instances, however, you would also see the new correctly entered figure on the tax account documents. In this case, there were at least eight reversals on the account between 2010 and 2016. This is not something she would expect to see on an individual tax roll account. In at least one instance, the reversal was on the same date as a “true payment” (a payment that was not subsequently reversed). The operator for both transactions was “scameron”.
[53] Ms. Lancaster was asked what this signified to her. She responded: “That payments are being entered and leaving an incorrect balance on the account until some type of transaction happens, whether a true payment, or a request for a tax certificate … there should not be that many reversals on a tax account reducing the balance, then accepting a real payment, and then reversing a payment back onto the account … it is a red flag to see this many reversed receipts without an explanation”.
[54] Ms. Lancaster was directed to a reversal by operator “scameron” in 2010 that was not proximate to the issuance of a tax certificate. When asked if she could say what triggered this reversal given that no tax certificate was issued, she suggested there had been some kind of verbal request to the operator that prompted the reversal. When she was asked what benefit there might be to crediting an amount to the account and then reversing it three weeks later, she said this had the effect of putting the account back up to where it should be. She testified that in her view, “something triggered this entry, whether it was a phone call or email from lawyers or [the property owners] indicating they were about to sell their property … this could have been the trigger to the operator to enter the reversal”.
[55] The file also contained a letter from 2010 from a lawyer involved in the sale of the property at that time. The letter noted that a cheque was provided in the amount given verbally by “Sandra”.
[56] Ultimately, the Doyles were not required to pay the amount that Vadim showed was owing at the time of Ms. Lancaster’s investigation. There was no record of reminder notices having been sent to them prior to 2017. Because the Township could not show that the taxpayers were advised of the amounts that were owing, these were “written off”. In this case, the amount was $7,478.01.
Tax Roll #13 Property owners: Germain/Gordon
[57] Another tax account reviewed by Ms. Lancaster related to a property referred to as Tax Roll #13 during the trial. The issue with this account was a misapplication of a payment.
[58] Documents from this file showed that on February 21, 2014, the TNG had received a daily payment report from a bank confirming payments from two taxpayers named Mr. Germain and Mr. McMillan. Mr. Germain’s tax payment was in the amount of $529.81.
[59] Receipts reprinted from Vadim showed that operator “scameron” entered the payments on February 24, 2014. The receipts indicated that the Germain payment was for $265.98, not the $529.81 indicated on the bank’s report. The remainder of the funds were directed to the account of a third taxpayer, Rita Taylor.
[60] Ms. Lancaster confirmed that a payment should not be applied anywhere except to where the property owner was directing the payment to be applied, and that the full amount of the payment should be indicated.
[61] Notwithstanding that the misallocated payment resulted in a shortfall to Mr. Germain’s account due to penalties and interest for the unallocated portion of his payment, Mr. Germain was provided with a letter dated September 29, 2016, stating that his property taxes for the year 2015 were paid in full. This was not accurate.
[62] In fact, according to the investigation and documents in the Vadim system, arrears of $439.10 were owed. This amount was written off by the TNG following its investigation since it had evidence that Mr. Germain had, in fact, made his payment in full in 2014. In addition to the documents within the Township’s possession, Mr. Germain also brought in his bank receipt showing he had made the payment.
[63] Ms. Lancaster also testified that no funds were applied at all to the McMillan-owned property.
[64] When asked about the consequence of these misallocated payments, Ms. Lancaster said that the consequence for Mr. Germain is that he was told he was in arrears in 2017 for an amount for which there is proof in the file that he had in fact paid. The amount he was told he was in arrears was the penalty and accrued interest from the misapplied portion of his payment.
[65] A further consequence of that misapplied payment was that the tax account for Rita Taylor would have shown a payment to reduce her tax account, when in fact she had not made any payment in that amount. She benefited from that entry. As for Mr. McMillan, who had also made a payment through the bank, he did not benefit from that payment on that date and would have been advised he was in arrears “unless further manipulation was made to his account”. This would have resulted in him incurring penalties and, potentially, annual interest.
Tax Roll #1 Property owners: Picard/Ranger
[66] The issue for this account also related to an allegedly fraudulent and inaccurate tax certificate provided to a lawyer.
[67] Ms. Lancaster’s investigation of the Vadim documents for this account showed a missed payment in September of 2007. A series of payments and reversals then took place in October of 2007. They were done by operator “scameron”. After this, penalties and interest began to accrue such that through to 2010, the amount payable on the account was never reduced to zero.
[68] The file also showed that on July 13, 2011, a tax certificate was issued to lawyer P. Serdyk. The certificate stated that the account had a zero balance for outstanding tax arrears. It was signed by Micheline Larocque for Sandra Cameron.
[69] The file documents also show that prior to that certificate being issued, a reversal was done on the account by operator “scameron”. The reversal of $509.99 brought the account balance to zero. This meant that the tax certificate could show that nothing was owing.
[70] Subsequently, on August 2, 2011, a reversal of the payment from July 13, 2011 was made by operator “scameron”. This reversal had the effect of showing that there were amounts past due on the account.
[71] The review of the file showed that there were seven reversals of payments on the account between 2007 and 2011. There were no subsequent entries for any of these that suggested the reversal occurred because a number was mis-entered. There were no notes in Vadim explaining why the reversals had occurred.
[72] According to Ms. Lancaster, this number of reversals on a file is not common. Further, she testified that they all “occurred because of some event or payment that was about to happen”. She explained that the reversals she observed were relative to a tax certificate being issued showing false amounts owing, or payments that taxpayers were actually making that were subsequently reversed. In some cases where interest was going to be charged, a receipt was entered and it reduced the charges to the point that interest would not be charged to the account.
[73] The result was that the arrears owing to the TNG were not reducing as they should be if normal processes were being followed. Ms. Lancaster testified that this should have been a red flag to the Township’s treasurer and its auditors.
[74] The investigation of activities on this account included an interim tax bill from 2016, brought into the Township by the Picards. There were no amounts showing as being due on that bill. While Ms. Lancaster initially testified that there was whiteout on the bill, she later stated she could not be sure that this was the case for this bill. Regardless, the bill was showing that no amounts were past due when this was not the case. The bill did not reflect the true amount owing on the account, which was $3,610.26.
[75] Ms. Lancaster did not find any evidence in the file that any reminder notices had been sent out regarding these arrears. None were saved. There was no notation within Vadim referencing the issuance of a reminder notice.
[76] Consequently, the Township adjusted the Picards’ account and wrote off $1,167.21, which represented the accrued penalties and interest that originated with the missed payment in 2007.
[77] Because the file showed that the property owners for this account both consistently paid their bills, Ms. Lancaster said this suggested that the Picards were not shown that they had past amounts due or sent any reminder notices. After three years’ worth of penalties and interest had accrued, she would expect a reminder notice to be issued given the more significant consequences for the property owners. Ms. Lancaster said she did not locate any document from this file in Ms. Cameron’s filing cabinet that contained files with taxes owing for over three years.
Tax Roll #10 Property owners: Menard/Leblanc
[78] The allegation involving this account is that a fraudulent and inaccurate tax certificate was issued by the accused through the use of Vadim’s test environment.
[79] The documents presented during Ms. Lancaster’s testimony demonstrate that this tax roll account had a zero balance at the beginning of 2007, and then fell behind. Penalties and interest were charged for the subsequent years.
[80] In 2016, a request was received for a tax certificate by lawyer J. Bergeron. A certificate was issued in the name of Sandra Cameron indicating that there were no past due amounts on the account. Below the signature line, Ms. Cameron’s office phone number was handwritten.
[81] In 2017, the new owner of the property, Mr. Leblanc, contacted the tax department about his account being in arrears. This initiated Ms. Lancaster’s investigation of this account. She could not find a copy of the tax certificate in Vadim, which indicates it was not issued in the live environment. Further, she located a tax certificate with the same number – this one had been issued months earlier to a different lawyer.
[82] Ms. Lancaster recreated a tax certificate for the day before the property’s sale, and it showed that at that time, there was a total of $3,114.26 past due, in addition to upcoming taxes levied.
[83] In this case, the previous owner (Mr. Menard) produced a copy of a cheque that had been used to pay his account in 2007. Ms. Lancaster concluded that the cheque was not applied, as Mr. Menard directed, to this roll number (the cheque was for the taxes due on a number of properties, including this one). She was unable to find any deposit cheque in that amount. Further, Ms. Lancaster said it appeared that the taxpayer was never notified of any amounts past due and interest, at least on their tax bills.
[84] Consequently, the Township wrote off the amounts owing on the account in 2017, which by then totalled $3,519.88.
Tax Roll #7 Property owners: Sultan/Delormes/Burke/Beauclair
[85] This tax roll investigation led to another allegation that Ms. Cameron issued or caused to be issued fraudulent and inaccurate tax certificates. Another employee of the Township, Ms. Wray, assisted the Ontario Provincial Police (“OPP”) with this part of the investigation.
[86] During her testimony, Ms. Lancaster reviewed a number of documents and provided an overview of the events alleged.
[87] The first problematic tax certificate was dated May 24, 2013 and was provided to lawyer P. Syrduk. It was signed by Micheline Larocque for Ms. Cameron. It indicated there were no amounts past due. However, other Vadim documents show that the balance owing as of that date was $4,968.38.
[88] Ms. Lancaster confirmed this certificate was issued in the live environment. Other Vadim documents also showed that operator “scameron” entered a receipt on the same date. The receipt was for a payment of $4,968.38. The payment had the effect of reducing the amount owing on the account to zero. The payment was subsequently reversed by operator “scameron” on June 3, 2013.
[89] A second tax certificate was issued on May 25, 2016 and was provided to lawyer M. MacLean. It was signed by Sandra Cameron and her office phone number was handwritten under the signature line. It indicated there were no amounts past due.
[90] Ms. Lancaster testified that this tax certificate would not have been issued in the live environment, but in the test environment. She knew that because, when she tried to reprint it based on the roll number, it is not available in the live environment. Instead, she found that tax certificate was issued to another roll number and a different law firm. Based on other Vadim records, Ms. Lancaster determined that the actual amount owing at the time was $7,248.00.
[91] In addition to these irregularities, Ms. Lancaster testified that there were a number of reversals on this account going back to 2011. A number of these preceded a true payment on the account.
[92] Ultimately, the Township also wrote off amounts owing for this account totaling $8,243.16.
[93] Ms. Lancaster was asked whether, following her review of the 14 files that are the subject of the charges, there was a particular theme throughout. She said there was. She said that payments entered by operator “scameron” were entered in the system in the live environment, in some cases preceding a true payment. There were also instances where the payment was entered by the operator to reduce the payment down to zero, at which time a tax certificate was issued, in some cases in the live environment, and sent to a lawyer showing nothing was due and owing when in fact there were arrears owing. In some instances, she was unable to trace the tax certificates provided by the lawyers in the live environment and she determined that these tax certificates were produced in the test environment.
Who benefitted from the transactions?
[94] At various points in her testimony, Ms. Lancaster was asked to explain who might benefit from a particular transaction.
[95] She said that where reversals were done proximate to a request for a tax certificate, the tax certificate would not show the true amounts past due. The taxpayer would benefit by not having to pay interest on amounts due.
[96] Taxpayers would also benefit if they were placed on an automated payment plan despite having outstanding balances due. This was because the default settings in Vadim were such that penalties and interest would not continue to be assessed on those accounts. The municipality was therefore not collecting interest payments that were due.
[97] Ms. Lancaster did not offer any insight into any benefit that might otherwise be obtained by entering a payment and then reversing it a number of weeks later.
[98] At one point during cross-examination, Ms. Lancaster was asked if she was suggesting a scheme by operator “scameron” to dishonestly help taxpayers by showing that they owed no taxes. She replied: “The suggestion is that those receipts are entered in many cases incorrectly to show incorrect balances on the tax accounts prior to various events, e.g. a tax certificate requested by a lawyer”. She said that in some cases, accounts were not charged the correct amount of interest and emphasized this was all she was saying.
[99] Ms. Lancaster was then asked the following: if the operator intended to somehow assist the seller in a property sale by showing there were no arrears owing, would it not make sense to credit an amount that wiped out the arrears? She was then asked whether she saw anything in that scheme that benefited the operator who created the false receipt and false reversal. Ms. Lancaster said that while it was only a suggestion, a benefit could be that the operator did not have to deal with an angry taxpayer questioning where arrears came from and explain things to them in detail.
[100] When she was asked to confirm she could not see any financial benefit to the operator from this scheme, she said “I can’t answer that because we don’t have the records back in 2007-2008”. When she was asked whether any of the payments could be diverted into personal funds, she said she had no way of knowing that.
[101] Ms. Lancaster re-iterated again, later in her testimony, the potential benefit of not having to deal with an irate taxpayer questioning why there were arrears owing on the tax account when they were led to believe that nothing was past due. She was deducing that taxpayers would have paid what they were billed, and confirmed there was no way of knowing if a tax bill had not been mailed out to a particular taxpayer.
[102] Ms. Lancaster was asked whether she found any notes in Ms. Cameron’s workstation that referenced reversals to be made in the future. She said she did not and added that just because she did not find them did not mean there were some she did not find. She appeared to agree that there had to be some kind of record kept because of the volume of reversals that took place. Later in her testimony, she disagreed that it would take a lot of organization or planning to keep track of receipts to be reversed, explaining that Vadim could be searched by using batch and deposit numbers, as well as roll numbers.
[103] She noted that after Ms. Cameron had gone on sick leave, she found “diaries” (which she described as like a calendar/agenda book) which were turned over during the investigation. She did not see any notes regarding reversals in those books.
[104] Ms. Lancaster was not aware of any personal connection between Ms. Cameron and any of the property owners involved in the problematic transactions.
Reversals by operator “scameron”
[105] Ms. Lancaster reviewed a spreadsheet containing data relating to the reversals done by operator “scameron” (Exhibit 26). A number of these occurred on the same day as the receipt was entered. In other instances, more than two weeks had elapsed, with the longest gap being 35 days. Ms. Lancaster said that typically, if a cashier error had been made in entering a payment, the reversal would be done within a day or two.
[106] The spreadsheet referenced 2212 reversals over a number of years. It indicated that in the year 2012, 859 reversals were entered by “scameron”. In Ms. Lancaster’s experience, this was greatly above normal.
The evidence of Johanna (a.ka. Annie) Levac
[107] Johanna Levac was the treasurer for the TNG during the timeframe of the alleged offences. She and the accused had worked together for years by that point. They met while working for another township in 1995.
[108] Ms. Levac was no longer working for the TNG when she testified. She had been “terminated with cause”. It was her understanding that the TNG took the position that she had not properly done her job. Ms. Levac disputes this. There is ongoing litigation in respect of her dismissal.
The accused’s positions and responsibilities
[109] Ms. Levac confirmed that Ms. Cameron’s role in the office changed over time before she stopped working at the TNG in early December of 2016.
[110] Prior to 2008, Ms. Cameron was the assistant tax collector for a number of years, working alongside Jean McLeod who was the tax collector. When Ms. McLeod retired, Ms. Cameron was the successful applicant for the tax collector position. She started this position in early 2008. She had been the assistant tax collector for about five years at that point.
[111] When Ms. Cameron became the tax collector, a new assistant tax collector was hired. Micheline Larocque assumed the role shortly after Ms. Cameron moved into her new position. When Ms. Cameron had the position, the assistant tax collector worked fulltime. Ms. Larocque worked in the position only half-time.
[112] The tax collector was responsible for a number of tasks. This included sending out property tax billings (including an interim billing in February and the final billing in June), all adjustments, minutes of settlement, transactions regarding appeals of property assessments, and reminder notices. Ms. Levac said these were usually sent out six to seven times a year to remind people when they owed money. For many years, the tax collector was also responsible for counting the cash, and she balanced the taxes on a monthly basis. As Ms. Levac put it, “anything with tax collection funneled through that position”. She confirmed that only the tax collector had the authority to authorize a taxpayer to start on a preauthorized payment plan.
The Vadim system
[113] Ms. Levac was familiar with the Vadim system. It was her recollection it had been in use in the tax department since 2007 (she also said the tax module was implemented in 2006). There was an overlap period when both Vadim and the old system were in use. Following that, outstanding balances on approximately 6,000 accounts were transferred to Vadim. She could not recall if the system was fully implemented in 2006 or 2007. Ms. McLeod, Ms. Cameron, and someone from Vadim were involved in ensuring that the required information was carried over from the old system into Vadim.
[114] When the software was adopted, she had received an overview of how the modules worked. Her own work was done in Vadim using a general ledger and budgeting module.
[115] According to Ms. Levac, the initial training on Vadim was done over three days with Lorraine Drinkwalter. Ms. McLeod and the accused attended that training, which included another employee as well. At the time, Ms. Cameron was being trained as a back up to Ms. McLeod. She was only working part time as an assistant tax collector and her time was split with other departments.
[116] Ms. Levac agreed that the training did not use actual file data but involved hypotheticals. There was no opportunity to do live entries. The training also occurred several months before the tax module was implemented and employees did not actually start using Vadim after this training.
[117] Thereafter, there were Vadim conferences that employees could attend, and the area’s tax collectors and their assistants also met and had occasions to learn from one another. Ms. Levac said that Ms. Cameron had attended at least three or four Vadim conferences. Vadim also had a support line where assistance could be sought.
[118] Ms. Levac said she was not aware of any policies in place around the use of the test environment in the tax module. She understood that the test environment was a working tool. There was nothing to distinguish documents done in the test environment, though this changed after the accused left the Township.
[119] Ms. Levac had the authority to grant access to Vadim to employees. Not all employees had the same access. Over time, certain parts of the tax module were made available to the receptionist so that person could see what was owing on an account when a taxpayer came in. The receptionist could then conduct all deposits and enter payments when residents came in. The receptionist did not have the authority to make changes to accounts but could access information. The tax collector and assistant tax collector, as well as the treasurer and her deputy, had the authority to make corrections or adjustments.
[120] The receptionist position was held by Ms. St-Denis, and then by Chloe Crack and other individuals whose names Ms. Levac could not recall. Ms. Crack was given more authority under the Vadim tax module because she was also acting as the assistant tax collector for a time after Ms. Larocque had moved on. She would also have been able to make “adjustments”. Ms. Levac explained that this term was not the same as a “reversal”, but referred to things like dealing with a NSF cheque, or adjusting an account to credit penalties and interest when a payment was received but not processed on the last day taxes were payable.
Evaluations of the accused’s performance
[121] Ms. Levac was responsible for employee evaluations in her office, including for the tax collector. For the most part, these were conducted annually.
[122] In 2008, as part of her evaluation of the accused’s job performance, Ms. Levac recommended that the accused be moved up to a level 4 pay grade – this was the second highest pay grade. By February of 2009, she was recommending that Ms. Cameron be moved to level 5, which was the top level.
[123] The performance evaluations referenced recurring issues. For instance, Ms. Cameron’s lack of organization was a persistent theme. She had a habit of piling papers on her desk and not filing them as she should so other people in the office could also access information from the file. Performance evaluations done with input from other employees also remarked on her lack of organization.
[124] Ms. Levac confirmed that dealing with taxpayers was a difficult part of the job. Some would get vocal “and take it out on staff”. Ms. Levac said the accused did a good job and handled them quite well. She gained confidence in this area over the years. If there was a very angry taxpayer who was complaining about the taxes assessed, Ms. Cameron would refer them to Ms. Levac. Calls relating to potential errors in accounting were handled by Ms. Cameron. She assumes Ms. Cameron dealt with them because those calls did not come to her.
[125] Ms. Cameron was consistently evaluated at the top of the scale for following rules and regulations. Ms. Levac said, “there were never any issues there”. She scored consistently highly for respecting public funds. Ms. Levac agreed that the accused seemed deeply committed to her job and that she was a dedicated employee with impeccable attendance.
[126] In an evaluation from 2001, the accused identified that she needed to be more organized and prioritize work over personal issues. Ms. Levac agreed the accused could have been referring to having to assist her brother who had significant health problems.
[127] Ms. Cameron also identified the need for training, including on Vadim when it was in its first year of use. She identified her objective of focusing “on a new attitude toward change” and gave as an example the Vadim system. Ms. Levac recalled that at the time there was a lot of resistance from Ms. McLeod, Ms. Cameron, and other staff to using Vadim since they were comfortable with the old system. In later years, Ms. Cameron did not raise with Ms. Levac any ongoing issues or difficulties with Vadim. Evaluations from other years noted Ms. Cameron’s intention to become more proficient with technology and not need IT staff’s assistance as much (2007), and requests for additional training in Vadim (2007) or “any information or courses available” (2011).
[128] Ms. Cameron also identified in 2011 that she had missed some errors in checking certain accounts. She intended to work on “lowering tax arrears” and being more diligent in catching errors. Ms. Levac recalled that at the time, the tax arrears in the Township were quite high. They had escalated since the recession in 2008. People were falling behind on their taxes and it was a pervasive problem. To her knowledge, it was a common problem across other municipalities in the region. In the evaluation for 2012, Ms. Levac noted that Ms. Cameron “strives to reduce tax arrears”. She said that at this time, she was not aware of any reminder notices that were not going out.
[129] The 2012 evaluation also included a comment by Ms. Levac that Ms. Cameron had “excellent knowledge in the property tax module in Vadim”.
[130] In the final evaluation done in 2013 (in respect of the accused’s job performance for 2012), Ms. Levac noted in the evaluation that Ms. Cameron met all deadlines for tax billings; she met all standards; she respected public funds; she did not require supervision; she was willing to accept additional work; and she welcomed new responsibilities. Ms. Cameron was described as a “very reliable and dependable employee”.
Reversals
[131] Ms. Levac testified that reversals were necessary from time to time but should not happen often. They would be necessary where a payment was mistakenly posted to the wrong account. In those cases, she expected there would be some kind of explanation noted.
[132] It was Ms. Levac’s practice to make a note providing an explanation when she was asked by the receptionist to do a reversal. After she had made the correction, the receptionist would then make the proper posting. When Ms. Levac was making the reversal entries, she logged in and out of Vadim using her own credentials. The receptionist’s transactions would be done under her own credentials.
[133] Ms. Levac became aware of all the reversals that had occurred in the tax department after the 2017 investigation. At the time, she was not aware. She said she never had any reason to go into Vadim to look at spreadsheets such as the one compiling all the reversals made by operator “scameron” (Exhibit 26).
Username and password access to Vadim
[134] The username for Vadim reflected a pattern using the employee’s names. Ms. Levac agreed it would have been easy to determine another employee’s username.
[135] It was Ms. Levac’s recollection that passwords for Vadim eventually had to be changed on a monthly basis. However, there were no policies in place regarding security in the early stages of using Vadim. It was not necessary to have complicated password with special characters in the early years. She agreed that when it became necessary to change passwords monthly, it could have been possible to use a prior password. In other words, it was possible to alternate between two passwords indefinitely.
[136] Inactivity in Vadim would result in an employee being logged out. Ms. Levac believes Vadim always had this feature and recalled that it was frustrating to staff. She agreed that over time, various security features were tightened in Vadim, including the amount of inactive time allowed before being automatically logged out.
[137] Ms. Levac was asked if she agreed that it was fairly common for the accused to allow others in the office to make a quick entry using the accused’s credentials in Vadim. Ms. Levac said she was not aware of that. She also suggested that would not have happened since other employees did not have training or experience in conducting certain transactions in Vadim.
Reminder notices
[138] Reminder notices were sent out to taxpayers in arrears at various times after billing dates had passed (e.g. in May, June, October, November and December). The notices were printed on green paper. As far as Ms. Levac knew, they were being sent out. She could see staff working on them when she was in the tax collector’s work area.
[139] Ms. Levac said she remembered one occasion where she asked the accused why she was flipping through the reminder notices. The accused said she knew that some taxpayers were appealing and there might be an adjustment on the account, and she wanted to put a note on the file. Ms. Levac did see the accused putting such notes on files. She was also aware that if a taxpayer had multiple properties, the accused would pull all the notices for the same owner together to save on postage. Ms. Levac said there was nothing untoward about that. She thought the accused “was doing her due diligence” and that it was a nice gesture to make a notation on their reminder notices. Ms. Levac saw the notations the accused made in 2017 because some were still on her desk that had not been mailed out yet. In other instances, she saw the notation when residents brought in their documents.
[140] Ms. Levac also saw some of the letters that the accused sent out with the reminder notice. She said they had worked together to bring the arrears down, particularly where the taxpayer was more than three years in arrears.
Reversals
[141] Ms. Levac believed that it was possible to reverse a whole batch in Vadim, even one with many entries. The entries would all be reversed together.
[142] She agreed the spreadsheet containing reversals by “scameron” referenced separate lines for entries from a single batch. Some of these batches contained upwards of 100 individual entries. It was suggested to her that reversing these entries from the same batch on different dates would require a high degree of organization. Ms. Levac answered that she knew that in 2017 the auditors questioned these entries, and she could not answer why such transactions would be done. The money was in and out and it did not make sense.
The improper use of the cash box
[143] There was a cash box in the office that was used to store cash that taxpayers used to pay their bills. Cheques were placed in the box as well. The cash and cheques were taken to the bank daily after the deposits were balanced.
[144] Ms. Levac became aware that some staff were borrowing from the cash box. They would place an IOU in the box and withdraw funds. She agreed it was also common for employees, including the deputy treasurer, to write a cheque to the Township and then take the corresponding funds from the cash box. She agreed these practices made it problematic to manage, as these were non-tax paying transactions. She put a stop to both practices and employees were advised they could not use the cash box to make personal withdrawals.
Ms. Levac’s observations of irregularities in the tax department
[145] After Ms. Cameron left on sick leave in December 2016, Ms. Levac hired Linda Lancaster to act as the tax collector at the beginning of 2017. One of the first things she started to do was organize payments for persons on a pre-authorized payment plan. Ms. Lancaster told her that a number of these taxpayers had outstanding balances. This was a red flag.
[146] As the month progressed and the interim tax bills went out, phone calls started coming in from taxpayers who had arrears owing. It was then that Ms. Levac definitely realized that something was amiss.
[147] Some of the phone calls from upset taxpayers were referred to Ms. Levac.
[148] In one instance, Ms. Levac spoke with the son of a senior taxpayer who was questioning why his mother had been sent a reminder notice indicating she had a balance owing. Ms. Levac informed him that his mother appeared to have missed a payment and that penalties and interest had been accruing for ten years. The son ultimately produced a receipt for the taxes that the Township alleged had not been paid. The receipt indicated the amount owing had been paid in full in cash. Ms. Levac apologized, told the taxpayer’s son it was their error, and adjusted the taxpayer’s account. The Township wrote off the penalty and interest.
[149] After Ms. Cameron left, two employees cleared her work area. Everything was put in boxes. The documents included reminder notices and tax bills that had not been mailed out to taxpayers. Ms. Levac said that it should not be common to not send out these documents. A document might be held back if the tax collector knew there was a large appeal pending. She remembered one time asking the accused why certain tax bills were not mailed out. The accused said she had to go through them because some were waiting for credits and she wanted to put a notation so that when the resident received the bill, the taxpayer would know what was happening in the process. This would avoid a phone call. Ms. Levac said that seemed to be a logical explanation.
[150] Ms. Levac also testified about an incident in 2014 that led to the accused tendering her resignation. She did not end up following through on that. Ms. Levac convinced her not to.
[151] The incident in 2014 involved another employee in the office, Sylvie Major, who had discovered her uncle’s account had tax arrears. Because she knew her uncle to always pay his bills, Ms. Major looked into the situation. She brought to Ms. Levac’s attention that the payment made by her uncle had not been properly allocated to his account. His payment was part of a group of four to five payments from other taxpayers that had been made to the Township by their bank.
[152] Ms. Levac confronted Ms. Cameron about this very serious issue. She did so in the presence of the Chief Administrative Officer for the Township, Dan Gagnon, in the office boardroom. The accused said she did not know what she did and that maybe it was the medications she was on (Ms. Levac demonstrated that Ms. Cameron was holding her head as she said this). Ms. Cameron said something to the effect of “I must have screwed up”.
[153] The accused went to her workstation afterward. Within a half hour, Mr. Gagnon came to Ms. Levac with a letter of resignation from Ms. Cameron. Ms. Levac called Ms. Cameron up to her office. The accused said she was handing in her resignation in view of the fact that Ms. Levac no longer trusted her. Ms. Levac told the accused that the tax collector position was a good job with very good benefits and not to walk out if she had made one mistake. She said if only one error had been made, they could correct it. The accused was emotional during this conversation, almost in tears. The accused reiterated that she did not know what happened and she must have screwed up.
[154] While Ms. Levac was aware that the accused had health issues, she was not aware of the accused having an appointment with a cardiologist on the same day. When it was suggested to her that in fact the accused had gone to the hospital between the conversation in the boardroom and the conversation in her office, Ms. Levac said she did not believe there would have been enough time for that given the time between the conversations.
[155] Afterwards, Ms. Levac and her deputy, Ms. Kitchen, went through six months of cash receipts to make sure the postings had been done properly and there were no other issues of a similar nature. The focus of their investigation was to make sure that money that was deposited had been applied to the proper accounts. They were not looking for receipts that were reversed.
The normal process for the discovery of errors or irregularities
[156] Ms. Levac agreed that if receipts were created for fictional funds that were not actually paid to the Township, this would be picked up very quickly. This is because the deposits for the bank were balanced daily. It would be a huge red flag if a receipt was created and there was no corresponding deposit. Ms. Levac would be notified if there was an issue with a deposit.
[157] If the funds had actually been deposited but the receipt was credited to the wrong taxpayer, then the bank balance would still be what it is supposed to be. The error would not be picked up in that daily balancing. A posting error might only come to Ms. Levac’s attention when a taxpayer discovered the error and complained.
[158] Ms. Levac said she got a monthly tax reconciliation to make sure all accounts were balanced. She never came across anything of concern when either Ms. McLeod or Ms. Cameron were the tax collectors.
[159] There were also regular audits. Twice a year, the Township’s finances were audited. The auditors dealt with the accused and were able to ask her for documents. Nothing of concern was reported to Ms. Levac following the audits. The auditor might make a “small” recommendation, and Ms. Levac would ask if there were any red flags she should be concerned about. None were ever identified to her.
[160] Ms. Levac was also asked about the process for issuing a tax certificate. She was asked about the tax certificate issued in Tax Roll #1, and whether she could explain how a tax certificate might show no arrears owing when they are indicated on the client inquiry document in Vadim. Ms. Levac noted that in this situation, there had been a reversal, so that when the tax certificate was issued there was a zero balance. This was not a proper method, because the amount owing on a tax certificate is as of a specific date. She could not think of any scenario where a tax collector would go into Vadim and not recognize there were arrears owing as of the date the tax certificate was requested. She said they would see it right away.
[161] Ms. Levac was asked the following: whether or not the original problem was from a misapplied payment, by 2011, should the tax collector have realized that there was a problem with this account? Ms. Levac replied “Yes, I would have said there is something going on, there is no reason for that”. She added that if there was an issue with the Vadim system, it should have been brought to her attention. Nothing was.
Items found in the accused’s work area
[162] Ms. Levac confirmed that after the accused went on sick leave, she asked two employees to clean out her work area. Ms. Levac and another employee went through the boxes afterwards. She did not recall finding anything that could be called a diary, notebook or steno pad. She did recall finding notes on loose pieces of paper.
[163] Ms. Levac was asked about reminder notices that were found in Ms. Cameron’s work area. She said they were recent, dating within four months of Ms. Cameron’s leave. While she said she would be guessing at this point, she estimated that about half of the documents found in Ms. Cameron’s work area were reminder notices and half were tax bills.
The tax roll accounts investigated in 2017
[164] Ms. Levac confirmed that transactions from 2007 are from when Ms. McLeod was the tax collector and the accused was the assistant tax collector.
[165] During cross-examination, Ms. Levac reviewed the spreadsheets that had been prepared showing the losses allegedly sustained by the Township. She reviewed this spreadsheet in most of the fourteen files that were the focus of the OPP investigation and resulted in these charges.
[166] In a few instances, Ms. Levac agreed there were accounting or data entry errors made. In one instance, she agreed that the spreadsheet included losses in relation to funds that a taxpayer had proved had been paid by supplying the relevant receipt. This was a different incident than the one involving the senior taxpayer whose son had called to complain.
[167] In all instances, including the instance with the senior taxpayer whose file was not a focus of the OPP investigation, Ms. Levac agreed that the original source of the penalties and accrued interest not paid on the account dated to a period between 2006 and 2008, when Ms. McLeod was the tax collector and the accused was the assistant tax collector. Since many of these taxpayers were otherwise up to date in paying their bills, she agreed that it was possible or even likely that the taxpayer had in fact paid a tax installment and this had not been properly recorded in the Township’s records.
[168] A summary of Ms. Levac’s evidence in relation to each tax roll file follows.
Tax Roll #1
[169] Ms. Levac agreed that the documents available for this tax roll showed that between 2008 and 2016, the taxpayer paid in full all amounts owed for their annual taxes.
[170] She further agreed that the root problem causing the accumulation of penalties and interest for a period of ten years was a shortfall in paying what was owed in 2007. When she was asked if she agreed on a balance of probabilities that given the taxpayer’s history of payment, that it was likely that they had paid in full in 2007 and the payment was not showing up for some reason, she said “it didn’t get credited to the account, no”. She agreed the only way to know if the taxpayer made the payment was to reference the municipality’s bank records or be provided with proof of payment by the taxpayer.
Tax Roll #2
[171] This was another tax account where the shortfall in payment dated from 2007. Notwithstanding that a Vadim document indicated the taxpayer owed over $2,000 at the end of 2007, the account was placed on a pre-authorized payment plan that began in 2008. Ms. Levac agreed it was very possible that this pre-authorized payment plan might have been set up by Ms. Cameron’s predecessor, Ms. McLeod, in December of 2007. She said either Ms. Cameron or Ms. McLeod could have done so in that time frame.
[172] Ms. Levac agreed that the taxpayer was generally up to date with the payment of annual taxes billed after that.
Tax Roll #3
[173] In this file, the root problem leading to penalties and interest being charged arose in 2006, when there was a shortfall in payment of $1,300. After that, the amounts owing accumulated year after year. It resulted in a write-off by the Township of $7,111.
[174] Ms. Levac agreed this was the third file where the initial problem arose during the transition between the old tax software and Vadim.
Tax Roll #4
[175] In this file, Ms. Levac agreed that the figure used in the spreadsheet for the beginning balance in 2006 was in error.
[176] She further agreed that the root problem in this file related to a missed payment in 2007, and that this was during the transition period between the old software and Vadim. She agreed that it was possible the payment was either missed or misallocated.
Tax Roll #6
[177] Ms. Levac agreed that the taxpayer in this file paid what was owed “give or take a few dollars” for every year between 2008 and 2016. A shortfall of $400 was noted in 2007. She agreed that 2007 was an anomaly in the payment history. She was asked if she agreed there was a very strong possibility that the taxpayer actually did pay their taxes in full in 2007 but that this was somehow not credited to the account. She replied: “that is very possible”.
[178] Ms. Levac also agreed that if the taxpayer had paid in full, they would not in fact owe any penalties and interest. She agreed in that scenario, the Township would not be out any money.
Tax Roll #7
[179] In this file, the shortfall in payment was a little over $800 in 2007. The taxpayer’s history otherwise showed a history of being up to date during most years before and after 2007.
[180] Ms. Levac agreed that 2007 was an anomalous year in the taxpayer’s history. Further, three of the four payments required in 2007 were made in full. Only one installment was missed in July. As of 2017, this missed payment led to a further amount owing of over $1,000 in penalties and interest.
[181] Ms. Levac agreed that there was a strong likelihood that the taxpayer had made the July payment but for some reason it was not credited to the account. She agreed that without the municipality’s bank records, it was not possible to conclude that the municipality had in fact suffered a loss in this case.
Tax Roll #8
[182] The taxpayer in this file was up to date by the end of both 2006 and 2007. They also paid the annual taxes levied between 2009 and 2017 in full. In 2008, however, there was a shortfall of approximately $500.
[183] Ms. Levac agreed that the spreadsheet prepared for this file was inaccurate, since it showed an opening balance of $27 in 2008, while other Vadim documents indicate nothing was owed. Nevertheless, this amount was included in the write-off by the Township.
[184] Ms. Levac agreed this was another file that showed the taxpayer had failed to make a payment for one installment, and that it did not make sense given the payment history that the taxpayer would fail to pay one installment. Further, the taxpayer in this case provided the Township with proof the payment had, in fact, been made. His receipt showed he had paid in cash. It was initialed “JB”, which Ms. Levac believes was Jennifer Bourdon, who had worked as a receptionist in the office. The receipt was dated July 29, 2008. Ms. Levac agreed that we know that a payment made by this taxpayer was not recorded in the Vadim client inquiry document. She said she would have expected that Ms. Bourdon would have included the receipt in the cash for the day, and that the tax collector or assistant tax collector would have inputted the transaction and conducted the balancing.
[185] Penalties and interest were assessed as a result of the allegedly missed payment. Ms. Levac agreed that because the Township had actually received the payment on time, there was no loss to the Township. Even though she made a note in the file that the taxpayer had provided proof of payment, this amount was written-off by the Township.
Tax Roll #9
[186] Ms. Levac agreed that the spreadsheet prepared for this file made reference to a different roll number than the Vadim client inquiry document that was otherwise said to document the transactions on the account. She did not understand why.
Tax Roll #10
[187] This file involved another taxpayer who appeared to pay their bill in full every year but who fell short in 2007. Ms. Levac agreed this could be another instance where the taxpayer had paid but was not credited for the payment in 2007.
[188] At this point, Ms. Levac indicated that what surprised her about all of these cases was that the taxpayer did not realize for ten years that they had a balance owing. The balance owing for arrears should have shown up on the 2008 bill and thereafter. It surprised her that with new bills showing arrears and reminder notices, that the taxpayer would not have known for ten years that a balance was owing.
Tax Roll #11
[189] In this file, the taxpayer was up to date between 2002 and 2007. One installment was not paid by the late September due date in 2008. Ms. Levac agreed this could well be a situation of a payment that was received but not applied to this account, saying she really did not know if that payment had been made.
Tax Roll #12
[190] The taxpayer in this file was up to date at the end of 2006, and again after 2007. A shortfall was noted in 2007, which resulted in penalties and interest. Ms. Levac agreed that 2007 was an anomalous year in the taxpayer’s payment history. She could not say if the payment missed in 2007 was not made or not properly credited.
Tax Roll #13
[191] Ms. Levac was unable to say whether this account involved the same deposit with a misallocated payment that she had confronted Ms. Cameron about in 2014.
Other issues
[192] Ms. Levac agreed that taxpayers who were in arrears could arrange with their bank to pay on a monthly basis, but this kind of payment was not referred to within the tax department as a “pre-authorized payment plan”. Such payments could be set up since penalties and interest would continue to be charged to the account. It was suggested to Ms. Levac that from time to time, though relatively rarely, she allowed someone to be placed on a pre-authorized payment plan even though they owed arrears. She said she would never authorize that. If she authorized anything, it was not to permit a pre-authorized payment plan but monthly payments.
[193] While Ms. Levac said she had never heard of employees having any problems downloading the MPAC disc to Vadim, she agreed that it was possible that printing tax bills became problematic, and that the process of printing bills had to be started over. She thought in that case there would be a report available to show which documents had not been printed.
[194] Ms. Levac never saw anyone other than the accused use the accused’s workstation. Similarly, she never saw the accused using someone else’s workstation, except potentially when training was in session.
The beneficiary of the problems in the tax department
[195] Ms. Levac was asked if she ever saw any sign that the accused benefitted in any way from the accounting irregularities discovered in 2017. She said she had no reason to think that way at all. She did not see any change in the accused’s lifestyle. She was asked if any of the transactions, including reversals, put any money in Ms. Cameron’s pocket. She said she could not see how it would.
[196] Ms. Levac said in some cases there was a benefit to the taxpayer. She agreed, however, that in some instances, she really could not say if the taxpayer had actually paid the amount owing.
Additional evidence adduced by the Crown
[197] Additional evidence was given by other employees of the Township. Their evidence was consistent to the effect that after Ms. Cameron went on her leave, various problems with the tax accounts were reported by taxpayers or otherwise came to their attention.
[198] Their evidence differed about what passwords and usernames were required to log into Vadim, which is not surprising given the passage of time. However, no witness agreed that they had ever used Ms. Cameron’s credentials to perform any functions in Vadim.
[199] Many of the witnesses testified that Ms. Cameron was usually the first person in the office in the morning, and that she stayed to the end of her full shift or later. Ms. Cameron had to be forced to take vacations.
[200] What follows is a summary of the more salient points in the evidence to the issues in dispute in this case.
The evidence of Rick Elderbroom
[201] Rick Elderbroom is responsible for IT services for the Township and has been for 17 years.
[202] Mr. Elderbroom was asked about how Vadim showed certain information in certain documents. He was not aware of whether there was any significance to the username being indicated in upper- or lower-case lettering, or why that might be happening. He theorized it might be because a different module was being used for each type of entry. He could not explain why receipts showed specific times for each entry, while reversals were consistently shown as having been made at midnight. He said: “I assume it is a glitch in the reporting system of this particular module that it is not pulling up the time”.
[203] Mr. Elderbroom was asked if he was aware of the system crashing during the printing of tax bills. He confirmed that he was aware of the printer freezing and that employees would need to re-print or start over. He said this did not happen often.
[204] Mr. Elderbroom confirmed it was possible to be logged into both the test and live systems of Vadim at the same time. While in the test environment, there was nothing on the screen to “scream at you that you are in the test module”. While there was an indication on the screen about which system you were in, it was not prominently displayed. He agreed that if one was going back and forth, it might be easy to lose track of which system you were in.
[205] Mr. Elderbroom was aware of issues arising from importing data from MPAC. He assisted Ms. Cameron in downloading this information. He agreed that information about who owned a particular property could be several months out of date.
The evidence of Micheline Larocque
[206] Ms. Larocque worked for the Township for 16 years up until June of 2018. In 2008, she became the assistant tax collector.
[207] Ms. Larocque recalled that Ms. Cameron did talk to her about problems in transitioning from the old system to Vadim. Ms. Larocque was aware of problems in transferring information over from MPAC.
[208] Ms. Larocque said she had never done any reversals of more than a few dollars. She only made such reversals where a payment was entered the day after it was made and a minimal amount was added as a penalty. Any reversals she made were under her name.
[209] Ms. Larocque was involved in sending out reminders to taxpayers who were in arrears. She helped in posting them. She said Ms. Cameron would keep some of those notices because she said she had to review them. Ms. Larocque could not say what proportion of the reminders Ms. Cameron kept.
[210] Ms. Larocque was involved in issuing tax certificates. She said that the client inquiry document was not what she would see when going into Vadim to prepare a tax certificate. Vadim generated the tax certificate. She did not check it for accuracy before sending it to the lawyer who requested it. She said that doing a tax certificate was not complicated and was not something you should be doing in the test environment. She agreed, however, that Ms. Cameron had more complex tasks to complete and that Ms. Cameron had to go into the test system to do these things.
[211] Ms. Larocque agreed with the suggestion that when in “test”, nothing jumps out on the screen to tell you that you are in the test system. She agreed you would have to be looking carefully. She recalled there were “little icons” – one said test, the other said live.
[212] Ms. Larocque testified that every year, there were problems because of information downloaded from MPAC. Some people got bills for properties they did not own. In other instances, bills were sent back because the taxpayer did not live there anymore. She also recalled problems with printing bills. The only way they would know if someone had been missed in the re-print effort was if someone came in and said their tax bill was missing.
The evidence of Chloe Crack
[213] Chloe Crack worked for the Township from 2013 to 2019. For a few years, she was employed as the receptionist. She also performed other duties relating to property tax, including issuing tax certificates. In 2016, she moved to the recreation department and no longer did work relating to taxes.
[214] Ms. Crack began to notice what she felt were odd transactions. Taxpayers would come in and indicate they owed something different than what was indicated in Vadim. She would direct those taxpayers to Ms. Cameron. Ms. Cameron would then make adjustments on the account.
[215] As this started to happen more and more, Ms. Crack thought it was odd that so many accounts were not up to date when they should have been. Her instinct was that something was off, and she started taking screenshots from the accounts to protect herself.
[216] Ms. Crack began to take screenshots of the account balances in Vadim before she talked to Ms. Cameron, and a further screenshot after Ms. Cameron had made the adjustment on the account. She felt this was happening far too often and did not understand why. Consequently, she brought her concern to the attention of Ms. Levac and provided Ms. Levac with pdfs of the screenshots for about 10-12 accounts.
[217] As far as she knew, Ms. Cameron would have been aware that a concern had been raised about these adjustments. The situation did not resolve after that. The transactions “stepped up”. There were another 50 or so over a year and a half to two years.
[218] Ultimately, Ms. Crack brought her pdfs of the screenshots for about 25 accounts to Ms. Levac. She kept the others as proof for herself if she ever needed it. She did not keep copies of what she provided to Ms. Levac. She shredded the remaining documents when she stopped working in the tax department and began a full-time position in another department.
[219] Ms. Levac did a “post mortem” with her and said only that Ms. Cameron needed to make adjustments to the account. Ms. Crack said she was told these were just year end adjustments. She agreed that Ms. Levac seemed to verify that these were proper adjustments.
[220] Ms. Crack agreed that she had no way of knowing what the accurate figure was for the balances on the tax accounts, and for all she knew, when Ms. Cameron made the adjustments, they could have been “correct adjustments”.
[221] Ms. Crack also agreed that adjustments were occasionally necessary in circumstances where a taxpayer owned more than one property and their tax payments did not get properly allocated to each property. When she began working in the department, she did not know to inquire about how payments should be distributed when she received payments at the reception. On those occasions, Ms. Cameron informed her that the payment had to be reflected on each different tax roll account.
The evidence of Monique St-Denis
[222] Monique St-Denis continues to be employed by the Township. She is the receptionist. She performed duties for the tax department when Ms. Cameron was the tax collector.
[223] Ms. St-Denis testified that there were occasions when taxpayers disputed information she gave them about their tax accounts. On those occasions, she would ask Ms. Cameron to come and speak with the taxpayer. She agreed that in the majority of those situations, Ms. Cameron would tell the taxpayer that the system was accurate and they owed money. On some occasions, Ms. Cameron would accept the taxpayer’s explanation and make adjustments to the account.
[224] Ms. St-Denis also testified about putting white out on the final tax bills for taxpayers who were on pre-authorized payment plans. She said Ms. Cameron asked her to do so. Ms. Cameron had directed her to do so because she did not want to upset these taxpayers by having an amount showing as owing when their payments were being taken automatically. Ms. Cameron said she did not want the residents to call her and to white out the amount owing because Ms. Cameron had adjustments to do to their accounts.
[225] Ms. Cameron was open about the fact that she was asking to have that part of the bill whited out. Ms. St-Denis agreed that sometimes residents would come in a foul mood and would become outraged if the paperwork said they owed more than they felt they did. Some taxpayers came in to ask why there was whiteout on their bill. She would refer them to Ms. Cameron.
[226] Ms. St-Denis agreed that sometimes payments were credited to the wrong tax roll in instances of taxpayers who owned more than one property. That was a type of adjustment that had to be done from time to time. She agreed that it was not unusual for there to be a mix up in how money got attributed to the properties owned by the taxpayer. People would then come in upset about any suggestion that they owed money. These types of problems were also common with properties that had severances.
The evidence of Jennifer Wray
[227] Jennifer Wray worked for the Township in 2016. While she worked under the supervision of Mr. Elderbroom in the IT department, she also assisted with other duties.
[228] Ms. Wray testified about helping Ms. St-Denis white out the balance due on approximately 500 tax bills. Ms. St-Denis was the person who asked her to do this and it took them two days to complete. The work was performed at the front desk.
[229] Ms. Wray also assisted with filing for Ms. Cameron. Her recollection was that because of health issues, Ms. Cameron was “way behind”. She agreed that Ms. Cameron would just let files pile up rather than go and file them.
The evidence of Sgt. Armit
[230] Sgt. Armit works with the anti-rackets division in the OPP. He became the lead investigator in this case after first being asked to assist in May of 2018.
[231] Sgt. Armit testified that the material provided by the Township was very difficult to comprehend. It was not until they interviewed Linda Lancaster that police felt there was evidence of criminality.
[232] Sgt. Armit confirmed that police never had grounds to seek records from Ms. Cameron’s financial institution. A search on FINTRAC, however, indicated that there had not been any suspicious transactions reported by her financial institution. Police received no information about Ms. Cameron’s lifestyle that suggested that she was living beyond her means.
[233] Sgt. Armit testified that due to the problems with the Township’s record retention practices, the fruits of the investigation did not support charges for theft of funds. He said that the struggle they had in the investigation was that they had to rely on documents brought to them by taxpayers. Sometimes these documents indicated that the taxpayer had in fact paid their bills when the Township was saying they owed money. When the taxpayer had kept records, this greatly assisted their investigation. However, not everyone they interviewed was able to provide them with documents.
[234] Sgt. Armit effectively agreed that the lack of records and the passing of time combined with technology issues prevented him from drilling down to see if the Township lost money “somewhere down the road”.
[235] While the investigation indicated that some of the reversals on accounts that were of concern to investigators started in late 2007, Ms. McLeod was not interviewed. Sgt. Armit was not aware if she was still alive.
The evidence of the accused
[236] The accused started working for the Township in 1995. Prior to that, she had worked for the federal government for ten years. Her recollection was that she assumed the duties of the assistant tax collector in 2004. She replaced Jean McLeod as the tax collector in 2008.
[237] Ms. Cameron said she enjoyed her work. She was always early and would stay late if required. She had a good attitude toward her employer. She thought she had a good relationship with her supervisor, Ms. Levac.
[238] Ms. Cameron left her position as the tax collector in December of 2016. When she first left, she thought she had a flu and would be back in the office soon. As it turned out, she had a blood infection that resulted in damage to her heart and required her to undergo heart surgery. She never returned to work. Before this, she had taken a medical leave from work when she took a stress leave in 2003.
[239] Ms. Cameron testified that her health and that of her brother were stressors while she was employed with the Township. These were the personal issues that were referred to in her performance reviews. She had diabetes, which she described as “way out of hand” in her last few years of work. Earlier in her work as the tax collector, her brother, who is deaf, had significant health issues and required her assistance in getting health care because of his disability.
[240] Ms. Cameron said she did not like the Vadim system when it was introduced. She found it difficult to learn. Compared to the software in use before, there were a lot more steps to certain processes. Severances, in particular, were very difficult to deal with in Vadim.
[241] The accused denied that there was ever a time where she inputted data that she knew was not true or accurate. She denied she had ever produced a document she knew did not contain accurate information. She denied she had ever done anything in the course of her employment intended to benefit herself, her family, or her friends, or that she knew would cause loss to the Township. She said she always “worked to my best” for the Township. She said she never did anything she knew would cause the Township to lose money or that might cause it to suffer some loss.
[242] Ms. Cameron was asked about the many receipts and reversals that were reviewed in the course of the trial and that were made with her username. She said she did not know why those would have been done. She said if she could sit at her desk and go back through the information, maybe there was a reason. She said she did not just turn around and do it on purpose.
[243] Ms. Cameron described a number of problems she had with doing her work that were the result of issues with technology, whether Vadim or otherwise. For instance, sometimes when she was printing tax bills, the system would quit in the middle of a print job. Sometimes, she might forget to click a box in the program settings and would have to redo the printing. She thought that the tax bills found in her desk drawer after her departure involved tax bills printed as a result of those types of errors. Because she knew what they were, she did not label them. While there was a shredder in the office, she had not shredded those bills.
[244] Ms. Cameron also testified about errors that she made. For instance, when printing tax bills, if she missed clicking a box, the arrears owing would not show. In those instances, she had not realized her mistake and did not do it on purpose.
[245] Ms. Cameron recalled the incident in 2014 when she tendered her resignation. She described Ms. Levac pulling her aside and asking her about the account of Ms. Major’s uncle. She said “I really messed up”. Her diabetes at the time was “haywire”. She was “really really upset” but also had to go see her doctor that day. When she came back from that appointment, she tendered her resignation. She spoke with Ms. Levac again, who told her that if it was a mistake, they would fix it. She was aware that subsequent investigations were done of her work and said that she was asked by Ms. Levac to correct a few mistakes that were found as result. Nothing like the mistake made on the account of Ms. Major’s uncle was brought to her attention.
[246] Ms. Cameron said she only ever used three passwords, and that she was aware of the passwords used by other employees. However, she was not aware of any other employee ever using her password to enter into the Vadim tax module, or logging onto her computer in her name. She was not aware of any significance to the username appearing in lower-case or capital letters. She did not think she had ever noticed that when she worked for the Township.
[247] Tax certificates were sometimes issued by others, according to Ms. Cameron. She did not necessarily review all of them before they were issued. She trusted that Ms. Larocque and Ms. Crack were doing them properly and that the information in the system they were relying on to produce them was correct.
[248] Ms. Cameron testified about “glitches” that occurred working in Vadim. One of these involved the disappearance of cash entries, which required staff to re-enter the transaction. This issue was addressed with Vadim and occurred around ten or so times.
[249] In addition to reviewing entries for specific tax rolls with Ms. Cameron, the Crown put to Ms. Cameron that the sheer number of reversals in her name suggested they were done deliberately. Ms. Cameron replied: “I know there was an awful lot of reversals done but I don’t remember these people paying or not paying. I don’t understand why they were done, I would have no reason to do them”. She said she would not have deliberately done a reversal “just to do a reversal”. She also said, “if I did it, there must have been a reason, but I don’t remember … it is going into the sixth year since I’ve looked at a computer screen with these types of documents”. Her evidence about the individual tax rolls was similar in its substance. She generally testified to the effect that she did not remember or have any explanation for the transactions identified on each account, but “there must have been a reason”.
[250] Ms. Cameron denied that she had deliberately and intentionally worked in the test system and manipulated the data in this system to produce false tax certificates knowing that this would not show up in an audit report or client inquiry. She said she often worked in the test environment, particularly when working on an account with a severance, or in preparing final tax bills since these were more complicated. She suggested she might not have realized she was working in the test system when some of the documents on an account were produced by her.
[251] Ms. Cameron denied the suggestion made by the Crown that she took some money and meant to pay it back and all this snowballed and her manipulations were meant to cover this up. She said she never took any money. She also denied the suggestion that she had, over the years, made so many errors in her work that she was deliberately manipulating the accounts to cover up her own ineptitude. She replied that she was not saying she did not make errors and stated that she was not perfect. She denied manipulating the accounts. She said she would not do anything on purpose.
The legal principles
The fundamental principles of criminal law
[252] In our law, an accused person is presumed innocent until proven guilty. It is the Crown who bears the burden of proving any criminal offence charged beyond a reasonable doubt. That burden never shifts. An accused person is not required to prove his or her innocence. Our law requires that if a judge has a reasonable doubt about whether the accused committed a criminal offence, the accused must be acquitted.
[253] In a case like this, where the accused has testified and presented evidence, the case of R. v. W.(D.), 1991 CanLII 93 (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742 directs the court in its approach to the evidence. The W.D. test applies not just to an accused person’s testimony, but to any defence evidence and any potentially exculpatory evidence, whether led by the defence or the Crown: R. v. Smith, 2020 ONCA 782, 69 C.R. (7th) 126, at para. 12. In short, the test tells me that if I believe the accused’s evidence, or it leaves me with a reasonable doubt after I have considered it in the context of all the evidence, the accused must be acquitted.
[254] It is important to note, however, that in deciding a case, a judge is not simply comparing each account and deciding which account to believe. Trials are not credibility contests where the more credible witness’s account necessarily carries the day. It is also important to note that a judge can believe a witness but still be left with a reasonable doubt about what happened after considering all of the evidence. As has been noted by our Court of Appeal, “a reasonable doubt can survive a finding that [a] complainant is credible”: R. v. T.A., 2020 ONCA 783, at para. 29, citing R. v. J.W., 2014 ONCA 322, 316 O.A.C. 395, at para. 26.
[255] Further, even if a judge disbelieves the evidence given by an accused person, or is not left with a reasonable doubt based on the accused’s evidence, this does not mean that the Crown has proved its case. A judge must always determine whether the Crown has proved each element of every offence charged beyond a reasonable doubt. This will only happen when there is evidence that the judge accepts that supports each element the Crown is required to prove.
[256] As for what is meant by “reasonable doubt”, it is not an imaginary, far-fetched or frivolous doubt, and it must not be based upon sympathy or prejudice. It is based on reason and common sense. It is logically derived from the evidence or absence of evidence: R. v. Bryce (2001), 2001 CanLII 24103 (ON CA), 140 O.A.C. 126(C.A.), at paras. 13-20. Probable or likely guilt is not sufficient to meet the standard in a criminal trial. But the burden of proof is also not impossibly high. The Crown is not required to prove its case to an absolute certainty.
[257] If, at the end of the case, a judge concludes only that the accused is likely or probably guilty, the accused must be acquitted. Before an accused may be found guilty, and face the consequences of a conviction, a judge must be sure that the accused committed the offence charged (see D. Watt, Watt’s Manual of Criminal Jury Instructions, 2nd Ed., Thomson Reuters Canada Ltd., 2015, Final 13, “Reasonable Doubt”, at pp. 261-267; and R. v. Lifchus, 1997 CanLII 319 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320, at paras. 36-40).
Circumstantial evidence
[258] Counsel agree that the case for the Crown is based entirely on circumstantial evidence. This means that for every offence charged, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused’s guilt is the only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from the whole of the evidence.
[259] A trier of fact must guard against the risk of “filling in the blanks” by too quickly overlooking reasonable alternative inferences and be vigilant about the path of reasoning involved in drawing inferences from circumstantial evidence. An inference of guilt drawn from circumstantial evidence must be the only reasonable inference that such evidence permits. The inferences that may be drawn from any set of facts must be considered in light of all the evidence and the absence of evidence, assessed logically, and in light of human experience and common sense: R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 1000, at para. 30.
[260] It is important to confirm that in assessing circumstantial evidence, inferences consistent with innocence do not have to arise from proven facts. To hold otherwise would reverse the burden of proof. As explained in Villaroman, “[t]he issue with respect to circumstantial evidence is the range of reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it. If there are reasonable inferences other than guilt, the Crown’s evidence does not meet the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt”: para. 35. Accordingly, an alternative theory to guilt is not “speculative” only because it arises from a lack of evidence: Villaroman, at para. 36, R. v. S.B.1., 2018 ONCA 807, 143 O.R. (3d) 81, at para. 131.
[261] As further directed in Villaroman at paras. 37-38
When assessing circumstantial evidence, the trier of fact should consider “other plausible theor[ies]” and “other reasonable possibilities” which are inconsistent with guilt … I agree with the appellant that the Crown thus may need to negative these reasonable possibilities, but certainly does not need to “negative every possible conjecture, no matter how irrational or fanciful, which might be consistent with the innocence of the accused” … “Other plausible theories” or “other reasonable possibilities” must be based on logic and experience applied to the evidence or the absence of evidence, not on speculation.
Of course, the line between a “plausible theory” and “speculation” is not always easy to draw. But the basic question is whether the circumstantial evidence, viewed logically and in light of human experience, is reasonably capable of supporting an inference other than that the accused is guilty. [citations omitted, emphasis in original.]
[262] Ultimately, circumstantial evidence does not have to “totally exclude other conceivable inferences”: Villaroman, at para. 42, S.B.1., at para. 153. Further, alternative inferences must be reasonable, not just possible: Villaroman, at para. 42.
Analysis
Findings of fact
[263] As I have said, the Crown must prove every element of the offences charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
[264] The scenario presented by the Crown involves, at its core, an allegation that the accused manipulated data in the Vadim system and issued documents containing information she knew to be false. The Crown accepts that it is unable to show why the accused did this, and that there is no evidence the accused in any way benefited from her alleged conduct.
[265] In considering the evidence as a whole, including the evidence of Ms. Cameron, I am able to arrive at the following conclusions beyond a reasonable doubt:
a. An unusually high number of payments and reversals were made in the Vadim system using the accused’s username. There is no compelling evidence that anyone other than the accused was the person who made the entries;
b. A number of payments and reversals coincided with correspondence from a taxpayer or their lawyer about the status of the account, and about what taxes remained owing. Entries were made by the accused that allowed for the issuance of a tax certificate indicating nothing was owing. For instance, in respect of tax roll #7, a payment was noted in the system by Ms. Cameron that had the effect of reducing the amount payable to zero on the same day she issued the tax certificate showing nothing was owing. Just over a week later, a subsequent reversal of that payment was made by the accused that had the effect of returning the account to its balance prior to the request for a tax certificate (see the summary regarding Tax Roll #7 as given in the evidence of Ms. Lancaster);
c. In 2014, the accused was made aware of a circumstance in which the funds paid by the uncle of Sylvie Major had not been properly directed to his account. The accused offered to resign as a result. Further investigation was done at that time to see if there were any other accounts with similar issues. A few errors were located, but no wrongdoing was suggested by anyone at the Township as a result of their review of their records at that time;
d. A number of tax certificates were issued in the test system by Ms. Cameron, including a number after the year 2014 (see again Tax Roll #7);
e. There is no evidence that the accused has benefitted in any way from the conduct alleged by the Crown. There is no evidence that suggests she had any change to her lifestyle. There are no banking records that show any anomalies that suggest a financial benefit to her from anything she did while employed with the Township;
f. There is no evidence that the accused knew any of the taxpayers involved in the unusual transactions and no basis to conclude that she was seeking to benefit or target any particular taxpayer. Indeed, the only taxpayer to whom she had a personal connection, her nephew Corey Cameron, had a payment made by him misallocated by Ms. Cameron, and also received a payment misallocated from another taxpayer;
g. At the time that many of the originating issues with the taxpayer accounts arose (e.g. between 2006 and 2008), employees in the Township were beginning to transition from one software program to Vadim. This transition was not an easy one by all accounts. It is an easy conclusion that this was a time where errors in Vadim would have been more likely than in later years when the Township’s employees had more experience with the system. For instance, Ms. Lancaster confirmed that the default setting in Vadim was such that when printing tax bills, the bill would not show amounts past due. It was necessary to click a box and save it to ensure any bill printed also showed amounts past due. There is no way of knowing if this was an error that was made at the time of the originating problems or not;
h. This is because there are no records available to show what information was or was not provided to taxpayers from the time of the originating problems. It seems that all of the originating problems in the tax accounts highlighted by the Crown were because of a missed payment by a taxpayer. However, there are no records available to show whether the taxpayer was notified of the taxes owing at the time they were first owed. The only records regarding payments made have come from taxpayers who have retained their receipts for over a decade;
i. At the time of the originating problems, Ms. Cameron was the assistant tax collector, and the responsibilities of the tax collector were held by Ms. McLeod. Ms. McLeod was not interviewed by investigators and has not provided evidence in this trial. There is insufficient evidence to conclude that whatever the originating problem was for various tax files, Ms. Cameron was the person responsible. There is no basis to conclude that she would have been in a position to even identify those taxpayer accounts that had been affected by any errors or other irregularities;
j. It is not clear where and how the Township may have lost money as a result of these originating problems given the lack of records from that time period and the remaining state of the evidence, which includes evidence that at least some taxpayers did in fact pay tax installments and were not credited for doing so in the Vadim system. The Crown has not proved any loss in this case beyond a reasonable doubt;
k. While some of the entries made by Ms. Cameron correspond to other events in the tax file (such as a request for a tax certificate), not all of them do.
The analysis on each count charged
[266] While the indictment includes five different charges, the Crown no longer seeks a conviction on count 3 since it does not seem intended to capture circumstances of the kind alleged here. The accused will be found not guilty on this count.
[267] My analysis therefore will focus on whether the Crown has met its onus on the remaining four counts.
Counts 1, 4, and 5
[268] The issues in counts 1, 4, and 5 all rise and fall on whether the Crown has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused engaged in manipulations of the tax data in Vadim for reasons other than the performance of her obligations as the tax collector.
The positions of the parties
[269] The Crown argues that the sheer number of payments and reversals made in unusual circumstances, including dates that were proximate to the issuance of tax certificates or tax bills, shows that the accused was engaged in a scheme to manipulate the tax data. While it is unable to say why she was doing this (which is an issue it does not have to prove in any case), the Crown says that it cannot be a coincidence that on so many occasions, the entries made by the accused reduced the amounts payable by taxpayers to zero, or reduced their arrears owing, and that these entries were so often very close to the issuance of tax certificates or tax bills.
[270] The Crown argues that the fact that these entries were made by the accused leads to the inescapable inference that she must have had a dishonest or criminal intent when making the entries. This is the only reasonable inference that can be drawn on the whole of the evidence.
[271] The Crown agrees that an inescapable feature of its theory is that the accused must have been keeping track of all these accounts and adjusting them on a schedule or prompt of some kind. While the Crown acknowledges that there is no other evidence to support the existence of such a scheme, it says that the court can infer it from the remaining evidence.
[272] The defence argues that the accused should be believed when she says she never made an entry for a dishonest purpose and would never have done anything to harm the Township. At a minimum, her evidence, considered as part of the whole of the evidence, should leave the court with a reasonable doubt about whether the Crown has proved any of counts 1, 4 and 5.
[273] The defence emphasizes certain circumstances and gaps in the evidence. First, there is no evidence that provides a coherent motive for the conduct alleged. The transactions start in 2007 and there are hundreds or thousands after that until 2016. It is inconceivable that the accused, who was law abiding and a dedicated civil servant, spent the better part of a decade “ripping off the township”.
[274] A second related point is that there is no proof of any benefit to the accused. There is no evidence the accused had anything other than a frugal lifestyle. There is no evidence of unexplained deposits in her bank account. There is no evidence anyone ever saw her taking money. There is no evidence she materially benefitted from any of these transactions.
[275] Third, if the accused were carrying out a years-long ongoing fraud affecting hundreds of taxpayers and involving hundreds or thousands of transactions, this would require tremendous organization to ensure that things balanced, and to keep track of when to reverse something or indicate a payment was made. In contrast, the evidence on the trial is to the effect that the accused was a disorganized person whose problems with organization skills were routinely highlighted in her performance appraisals. The defence says there is no evidence the accused was covering up anything – just that she was a disorganized person doing her best.
[276] Finally, the defence emphasizes that throughout the years she was allegedly committing these offences, the accused was being supervised. Initially she was supervised by Ms. McLeod when she was the tax collector. At all times, she was supervised by Ms. Levac, the treasurer. In addition to this, an accounting firm conducted audits twice yearly, and would randomly select certain files to examine as part of its work. At no time were any issues with the accused’s performance brought to her attention, save for the incident in 2014 that prompted further examination of her work with no resulting concerns being expressed. In all the circumstances, including the accused’s evidence denying any wrongdoing, the defence submits that the Crown cannot prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Analysis
Count 1
[277] I begin by considering the issues as they relate to count 1, which alleges a breach of trust in connection with the accused’s duties of her office as an official tax collector. She is alleged to have committed this offence by “manipulating data, issuing false tax bills and tax certificates”.
[278] The elements that must be proved in proving the offence of breach of trust were considered by the Supreme Court in R. v. Boulanger, 2006 SCC 32, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 49. Only one of the issues in the five-part test is raised here – that is whether or not the Crown has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused “acted with the intention to use his or her public office for a purpose other than the public good, for example, for a dishonest partial, corrupt, or oppressive purpose”: Boulanger, at para. 58.
[279] The defence concedes that if I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused manipulated data for some purpose other than to correct mistakes and that she did so to cover something up or help herself in some way, this would satisfy the elements of this offence. However, the defence says that in this instance, at best, there is speculation as to what the “non-public good purpose” might be.
[280] The Crown says that if the accused is found to have falsified tax certificates and tax bills and manipulated data, given the implications for the tax system, this can only be characterized as a non-public good purpose. It also says that if the accused was making these entries to address other problems that she was aware occurred with Vadim’s accounting, then she had an obligation to bring this issue to the attention of her supervisors and her ongoing manipulations were a non-public good purpose. The Crown argues that the weight of the evidence contradicts the accused’s evidence and it should be rejected, or not give rise to a reasonable doubt.
[281] As I have already outlined, this is a circumstantial case. To be sure, circumstantial evidence is not a lesser form of evidence, and cases based on circumstantial evidence run the gamut as to their strength.
[282] In this instance, the case is far from coherent. When I consider the whole of the evidence, it is clear that there were a number of irregularities in how the tax department functioned during the years that were the focus of the evidence. It is clear, for instance, that some taxpayers made payments that were not reflected in the Township’s records. It is clear that employees made mistakes from time to time that needed to be corrected. It is clear that a practice developed where certain employees used the cash box for personal purposes. It is clear that the record keeping by the Township had significant gaps that make reconstructing many events difficult. None of this is the result of anything done by Ms. Cameron.
[283] It is also clear that Ms. Cameron was the subject of supervision, and her work would have been reviewed in various audits. Engaging in the scheme alleged in these circumstances would certainly have been risky. Nothing in the audit process raised any red flags over the years, and Ms. Cameron routinely received positive performance appraisals, including assessments of her respect for public resources.
[284] Further, it is clear that Ms. Cameron had significant problems with her organizational skills and that, as the defence suggested, this was a recurring theme in her performance appraisals. Other evidence called in the trial also highlighted her disorganization. In particular, the evidence about the stacks of documents found in her desk after she departed, which were documents that were never related to any of the tax files examined in this trial, tends to show that the accused was not a model of organization.
[285] The evidence about engaging other staff to white out amounts due on tax bills for people on pre-authorized payment plans also shows that the accused had an approach to her job that was not as careful as many would hope given her responsibility for taxpayer funds. All the same, this conduct occurred with the participation of other township employees. Ms. Cameron clearly saw no problem with it and was not trying to hide it – she enlisted another employee to assist her with it. This appears not to have been raised as an issue by the other employees, or Ms. Cameron’s supervisor, even though it appears this process took two days and was conducted in a visible location within the Township’s office.
[286] Along with this evidence, I consider Ms. Cameron’s denials. Ms. Cameron presented in a credible way when she testified. I agree with counsel’s characterization of her as having answered questions spontaneously, directly, and completely. She was not evasive or argumentative. To the extent that she had no memory of much of what she was asked about, in the circumstances, this is understandable. A lot of time has passed since these events occurred and the types of transactions she was asked about could not be expected to stand out in a person’s memory so long after the events.
[287] I also consider the evidence of Ms. Crack about bringing her concerns about a number of adjustments on accounts to the attention of Ms. Levac shortly after they occurred. It appears nothing came of that concern. While the evidence about what Ms. Levac told Ms. Crack is hearsay, there was nothing in the evidence of Ms. Levac that suggested that she had cause for concern because of anything other than what was reported to her by Ms. Major about her uncle’s account.
[288] There is no doubt that in addition to the number of entries made by Ms. Cameron, the most compelling aspect of the Crown’s case is the timing and circumstances in which some of the entries are made. An inference that the accused must have made these entries with a dishonest, deceitful or criminal intent is certainly available based on that evidence. However, I have a reasonable doubt that this is the only reasonable inference that arises on the whole of the evidence.
[289] When I consider all the evidence, I find it difficult to believe that the accused would have been able to keep a complex scheme of payments and reversals afloat. I find it easy to believe that she made many mistakes and was disorganized, and that her approach to her duties left genuine questions about how well suited she was to have this important position.
[290] My confidence that Ms. Cameron was running an elaborate scheme to make false entries for some non-public good purpose is further eroded because, on the evidence presented during the trial, there is no reason for her to have been doing so. I want to be clear that I am aware that the Crown need not prove the accused’s motive, or that she benefited in any way from her conduct in proving any of the offences charged. In the circumstances of this case, however, the absence of evidence of motive contributes to my lack of certainty about what the accused’s state of mind was when she made the various entries.
[291] Despite the compelling features of the Crown’s case, I find myself with a reasonable doubt that when the accused made the entries in Vadim that are said to constitute data manipulation, or when she issued tax certificates and tax bills, that she was doing so with a non-public good purpose.
[292] Inherent in this conclusion is a finding that that the Crown has not met its burden on counts 3 and 4. To be clear, I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed mischief in relation to data (count 4), or that she knowingly caused forged documents to be issued (count 5). This is because the evidence does not permit me to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had the necessary criminal state of mind for each of these offences when she made the entries or documents at issue.
Count 2 - Fraud
[293] With respect to count 2, there are additional problems of proof that lead me to a finding of not guilty on this count.
[294] Count 2 alleges that Ms. Cameron defrauded the Township of North Glengarry and its taxpayers “of monies”.
The positions of the parties
[295] The defence says this charge fails because there is no evidence of loss or risk of loss. The defence says that the Crown’s position is essentially that “we can’t prove it, but we’re guessing there must have been a loss and this is why reversals are being done and false tax bills are being created”. This does not amount to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly where the evidence showed over and over that taxpayers had proof of payment for taxes that the Township said had been unpaid, and for which it had charged penalties and interest. The defence says that even setting aside the accused’s evidence that she did not do anything dishonest, the court should have a reasonable doubt based on the evidence led by the Crown.
[296] In response, the Crown’s theory of the accused’s liability on this count appears to have shifted. It does not advance the position that the loss or risk of loss arises from the Township writing off certain sums it says it was owed but did not collect because of Ms. Cameron’s actions. The Crown now takes the position that after the accused became the tax collector in 2008, a series of manipulations to tax accounts continued or began. As the tax collector, the accused had an obligation to determine why these reversals were all necessary and to get to the heart of the problem at an early stage so that the Township was not put to the expense of hiring forensic accountants to try to make some sense of all of these tax files. This, the Crown says, is the deprivation that the Crown has proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
[297] In reply, the defence argues that the Crown’s view of “deprivation” is far too broad. Deprivation must be a direct consequence of the accused’s conduct, not the collateral consequence. Otherwise, any time a criminal defendant causes an investigation to be undertaken (which would cause the expenditure of public funds), they would be guilty of fraud. The defence also emphasizes the absence of any evidence about any cost associated with the work done by the forensic accountants.
The law
[298] To prove the offence of fraud, the Crown must prove the following essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt (see Watt’s Manual of Criminal Jury Instructions, Final 380, “Fraud”, at pp. 1000-1003):
i. That the accused deprived each named complainant of something of value;
ii. That the accused’s deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means caused the deprivation;
iii. That the accused intended to defraud the named complainant; and
iv. That the value of the property exceeded $5,000.
[299] R. v. Zlatic, [1993] 2. S.C.R. 29 and its companion case R. v. Théroux, [1993] 2. S.C.R. 5 confirm that the actus reus of fraud will be established by proof of:
the prohibited act, be it an act of deceit, a falsehood or some other fraudulent means; and
deprivation caused by the prohibited act, which may consist in actual loss or the placing of the victim’s pecuniary interests at risk (see Zlatic, at p. 43, Théroux, at para. 20).
[300] “Deprivation” does not require evidence that the complainant suffered an actual economic loss. The complainant’s economic or financial interests must be proved to have been at risk, however: Zlatic, at p. 48, Théroux, at p. 16.
Analysis
[301] In my view, the issue in this case is whether or not the Crown has proved the actus reus of the offence.
[302] I have already indicated, in effect, that I have a reasonable doubt that the Crown has proved the “prohibited act”. I also have a reasonable doubt is has proved “deprivation”.
[303] The evidentiary record for this case is such that it is impossible to conclude what money was and was not owed to the Township in the tax files examined in this case over the years at issue, and what, if any, penalties and interest were properly applied given the clear irregularities that occurred in the period between 2006-2008. There is insufficient evidence to conclude what, if any, responsibility Ms. Cameron would have had for those irregularities.
[304] The Crown appears to have accepted this state of affairs and now argues that the deprivation in this case was causing the Township to have to expend funds for forensic accounting. I agree with the position of Mr. Hale on this issue. There is no evidence whatsoever that allows me to know what the costs of accounting services were. More critically, I also agree that the new Crown theory of deprivation is too remote – I do not believe this type of collateral consequence fits within the meaning of “deprivation”.
[305] Since the Crown cannot prove either the “prohibited act” or “deprivation” beyond a reasonable doubt, this count fails, and the accused will be found not guilty.
Conclusion
[306] At bottom, I have a reasonable doubt that the accused had the required criminal state of mind when she made these entries and issued these documents. As was acknowledged by counsel for the defence, there are certainly reasons here to be suspicious about what was going on. It may be that a civil court would conclude that Ms. Cameron probably engaged in data manipulation and deliberately issued inaccurate tax certificates and tax bills. But my task here is to consider whether the evidence presented meets the very high threshold of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on every element of every offence charged.
[307] There are simply too many problems with this case for me to be so satisfied. As I have said, our law ensures that a person is not made to face the consequences of a criminal conviction, including being labeled a criminal, unless the trier of fact is sure they have committed the offence charged. I cannot reach that level of certainty here, where there are so many gaps in the documentary evidence, where there are so many problems with the reliability of the information about various taxpayer accounts (apart from anything Ms. Cameron was alleged to have caused), where there is no motive or benefit to the accused that has been proven, and where the accused has testified credibly denying the allegations. I am not sure enough of what happened here to find the accused committed any criminal offence.
[308] Accordingly, I find the accused not guilty on all counts.
The Honourable Justice Laurie Lacelle
Released: July 15, 2022
COURT FILE NO.: 20-47
DATE: 2022/07/15
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
– and –
Sandra Cameron
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The Honourable Justice Laurie Lacelle
Released: July 15, 2022

