Overview

[1] Early in the morning of July 26, 2019, Ryan McQuinn confronted three men in the courtyard of a townhouse development in Scarborough. Two of the men are unknown, but the third was one Steven Tennant, who lived in one of the townhouses. Mr. McQuinn believed they had insulted and assaulted his girlfriend, Jordan Rhora. He was armed with a partially loaded FN Browning .32 calibre semi-automatic handgun. Mr. Tennant was injured in the assault. The events are all captured on video surveillance footage.

[2] After this occurrence, Mr. McQuinn went into hiding for some time at the residence of one Damien Campbell in Mississauga, but he was found and arrested on August 21, 2019. At the time of his arrest, a second prohibited firearm was found in Mr. Campbell’s residence, in addition to the FN Browning handgun that Mr. McQuinn carried on July 26. It was a Cobra Enterprises .42 calibre semi-automatic handgun with its serial number defaced, and was believed to belong to Mr. Campbell, even though Mr. McQuinn was aware of its presence in the residence.

[3] Ryan McQuinn was charged with two co-accused, his girlfriend, Ms. Rhora, and Mr. Campbell, in an omnibus indictment consisting of 20 offences. They arise from the July 26 altercation in Scarborough and the August 21 arrest of Mr. McQuinn and Mr. Campbell:

(i) Counts 1 to 9 are against Mr. McQuinn alone and relate to Scarborough. They include the charges relating to the FN Browning handgun and the charges for breach of bail and a prohibition order on that occasion;

(ii) Counts 10 and 11 involved Ms. Rhora and were withdrawn at the commencement of the trial at the Crown’s request;

(iii) Counts 12 to 18 charged Mr. McQuinn jointly with Mr. Campbell in relation to the possession of the Cobra handgun found in Mississauga on September 26; and

(iv) Counts 19 and 20[^1] under s. 117.01 charge Mr. McQuinn with breach of orders prohibiting him from possessing illegal firearms.

[4] It is important, as I will explain later in these reasons, that Mr. Campbell has fled the jurisdiction. His whereabouts are presently unknown. He remains at large and did not attend for his trial.

[5] Mr. McQuinn pleaded guilty on June 1, 2021, to fourteen of the twenty offences. He pled to all the offences related to possession of the two prohibited firearms, not only his FN Browning used in the Scarborough occurrence but also the Cobra Enterprises handgun that was not in his actual physical possession at the time of his arrest but which he knew was located in Mr. Campbells residence. Mr. McQuinn pled guilty to the breach of orders offences.

[6] Mr. McQuinn pled not guilty to the remaining four charges arising out of the July 26 altercation:

(i) attempted murder of Steven Tennant;

(ii) discharging a firearm at Steven Tennant with intent to endanger his life;

(iii) aggravated assault against Steven Tennant, and

(iv) pointing a firearm at Steven Tennant, without lawful excuse.

[7] On July 14, 2021, I found Mr. McQuinn not guilty of attempted murder and not guilty of discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life, but I found him guilty of aggravated assault, and of pointing a firearm. My reasons are reported at 2021 ONSC 4884.

[8] The issue to be addressed now in this matter is the fit sentence to impose upon this offender for these offences in all the circumstances.

Circumstances of the offences

[9] The Scarborough altercation arose after Mr. McQuinn came to a townhouse complex in Scarborough to confront an individual, Mr. Tennant, who he believed had insulted and assaulted his girlfriend, Ms. Rhora. After entering the central courtyard, Mr. McQuinn could see Mr. Tennant leaning against a railing at the other end. As Mr. McQuinn approached, he was pointing the handgun at them. Mr. McQuinn was angry. He did not fire the handgun at he approached Mr. Tennant, but he did attack him with a “pistol whip” punch to the side of his head. Just then, the gun discharged for the first time. Mr. Tennant lunged at Mr. McQuinn to get control of the gun. It fired a second time as they grappled with each other. Mr. McQuinn then fell to the ground and was beaten and kicked extensively by Mr. Tennant and a friend, who had rushed out of a neighbouring townhouse to assist him. The gun discharged a third time into the ground.

[10] Surprisingly, in the circumstances, no one was killed, although Mr. Tennant did sustain some temporary injuries. Mr. Tennant and his friend fled away to the south. A resident called 911. Police arrived. They found three spent shell casings and one live round on the ground in the courtyard. The entire series of events were captured by the video surveillance cameras positioned at various locations in the townhouse complex.[^2]

[11] As noted, Mr. McQuinn went into hiding but he was located and arrested on August 21, 2019. The second prohibited firearm found that was believed to belong to Mr. Campbell, the Cobra Enterprises .42 calibre semi-automatic handgun, had had its serial number defaced.

[12] Mr. McQuinn admitted that the FN Browning .32 calibre semi-automatic handgun belonged to him and that he was in physical possession of it at the time of the Scarborough occurrence, and when arrested in Missisauga. He pleaded guilty to that offence, and related firearms charges. Mr. McQuinn also admitted that he intentionally pointed that firearm at Mr. Tennant, as well as the other two assailants.

[13] Under count 3, Mr. McQuinn was charged with aggravated assault by wounding, maiming, disfiguring, or endangering the life of Mr. Tennant. I found that it was evident from the video surveillance footage and his own testimony that Mr. McQuinn’s attack on Mr. Tennant happened “intentionally” and on purpose. He meant it to happen. I found that he knowingly and intentionally applied force to Mr. Tennant: see R. v. Godin[^3]. However, Mr. McQuinn’s actions did not cripple, mutilate or disable Mr. Tennant, nor did they cause him to lose the use of some part of his body.

[14] The Sunnybrook Hospital medical records established that Mr. Tennant sustained a penetrating but minor wound in the lower neck, and that the bullet discharged near his left ear. The wound was repaired with a couple of sutures, and Mr. Tennant was discharged home from Sunnybrook the same day, fully mobile and with a full range of motion and neurological function. He did not require a return visit, but he did suffer temporary hearing loss from the point-blank range discharge of the Browning handgun. He has no other residual disability from this attack.

[15] I found that Mr. McQuinn did not intend to endanger Mr. Tennant’s life, but (i) that Mr. McQuinn intentionally wounded Mr. Tennant by his actions, and (ii) that he knew that his attack on Mr. Tennant would be likely to cause the kinds of wounds and injuries that Mr. Tennant experienced. Mr. McQuinn’s evidence and the video and medical records evidence satisfied me beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of aggravated assault under Count 3 and I convicted him of that offence.

[16] The Mississauga occurrence refers simply to the circumstances surrounding Mr. McQuinn’s apprehension and arrest for his participation in the Scarborough occurrence, when he was finally found on August 21, 2019, at 5025 Four Springs Ave, Unit #2405, in Mississauga, Ontario. That condominium residence was evidently owned by one Damien Campbell,

[17] After the July 26 occurrence in Scarborough, Mr. McQuinn went under-cover, so to speak. He quickly moved out of the apartment he had shared with Ms. Rhora. He came to reside at Mr. Campbell’s residence, even though he did not personally know him. Mr. McQuinn had a female friend in the west-end, who he said knew of a place he might stay while he was hiding out and trying to avoid being apprehended by police. The limited evidence suggested that she appeared to have been involved with Mr. Campbell at the time. She asked Mr. Campbell if McQuinn could stay there, and she told Mr. McQuinn that he could. We do not know exactly how many days he stayed there before he was apprehended.

[18] Crown counsel tried, unsuccessfully in my view, to establish more connection between Mr. McQuinn and Mr. Campbell while he was staying there for whatever number of days it was that he lived there, under-cover. However, I accept the relationship was merely one of convenience. I do not think that on his evidence it was Mr. McQuinn’s specific the choice to be with Mr. Campbell. I find that his choice was simply to hide out in that place where Campbell lives, because the woman that he does trust says, “yes, you can stay there.” He plainly told her that he was in trouble, and she interceded to arrange for him to stay there. As I will explain, in my view this affects the gravamen of the second illegal firearms possession charge, and accordingly the appropriate sentence for this offender for that offence.

Circumstances of the Offender

[19] Ryan McQuinn was born and raised in Scarborough, Ontario. He grew up in a stable household with loving and supportive parents. He was raised by his mother, Ms. Linda McQuinn, and his stepfather. His biological father has never been involved in his life. He has a younger sister who also resided with him in the family home. His upbringing and life in his family was uneventful. He was never subject to any abuse or violence in the family home. Mr. McQuinn was residing with his mother at the time of his arrest. He will likely reside with her again when he is released from custody.

[20] Mr. McQuinn has a criminal record. On August 16, 2018, he received a suspended sentence and 12 months of probation on a charge of mischief under $5,000. On December 30, 2019, he was sentenced to 16 months and 15 days and 3 years of probation (less credit for the equivalent of 230 days of pre-sentence custody and a mandatory weapons prohibition under s. 109, for procuring under ss. 286.3(1), and concurrently for deriving a material benefit from trafficking in persons.

[21] Mr. McQuinn moved out at 19 to reside with his girlfriend at the time. Mr. McQuinn has two children from that relationship, a six-year-old son, and a four-year-old daughter. That relationship deteriorated when the mother became increasingly dependent on drugs after the birth of their son. Child protection workers had to become involved due to the ongoing effects on the children of his ex-partner’s substance abuse. Tragically, their mother committed suicide shortly after Mr. McQuinn was admitted to custody on these offences. Both children now reside with their maternal grandmother.

[22] Ms. Linda McQuinn, the offender’s mother, verifies this sad history, but she also confirms that Mr. McQuinn will be welcome to reside with her when he is released from custody once he has served his sentences. She sees her grandchildren regularly and she believes Mr. McQuinn would and should be involved in their lives as well.

[23] Mr. McQuinn has been employed in general labour jobs for over six years, at a lumber yard, as a roofer, and in a candy factory, but most of his jobs were sporadic. Going forward, Mr. McQuinn hopes that he will be accepted to work for his uncle at his tattoo studio in Toronto, since he enjoys the creativity of the tattoo artist’s craft. His mother confirms her hope and expectation that Mr. McQuinn will return to work with them at the tattoo studio when he is released from custody. Neither drugs nor alcohol were significant elements or influences in the offender’s life as it developed.

[24] It is significant, and important to his future prospects, that Mr. McQuinn has attended and completed numerous educational and training programs while in custody, ten in number. Ministry Records confirm that he completed the following institution-based programs: “Being an Effective Father” (May 2020), “It’s a Gamble” (June 2020), “Looking for Work” (November 2019), “Maintaining Employment” (August 2020), “Problem Solving” (October 2020), “Leisure Time” (October 2020), “Recognizing Healthy Relationships” (June 2020), “Understanding Feelings” (July 2020), “Setting up a Budget” (July 2020), and “Substance Use” (July 2020).

[25] It is also important that Mr. McQuinn acknowledges his involvement in the commission of these offences. He told the PSR author that “it was stupid, [and] I regret what I did. I was hot-headed.” He also now realizes that he made a number of “bad choices” over the course of his life. He is upset that his children are not able to see him while he is in custody but knows he has no one to blame but himself. Mr. McQuinn prepared a lengthy letter which he was allowed to read during his PSR interview, and which was read again before me in court. I accept that letter as an honest and sincere expression of his remorse and his self-dissappointment, but also his commitment to a change of direction and determination to take a different positive road going forward.

[26] Mr. McQuinn has rediscovered Christian practices and beliefs during his incarceration, and his pastor, Rev. Joseph Aikonen told the PSR author that he had observed “a big change” in Mr. McQuinn’s conduct. Pastor Aikonen believes the subject was “following some bad people” but has now made changes to improve himself for the better.

[27] Mr. Steven Tennant, the victim of the current offence, was asked to provide a victim impact statement. He told police that he did not know Mr. McQuinn and only learned his name as this matter proceeded through the courts. Mr. Tennant acknowledged the altercation had been about a girl but provided no other comment or detail on the offence. Mr. Tennant was unwilling to provide any statement and has no interest in taking further part in these procedings. He told the interviewer that he had nothing to say, and then departed.

[28] When asked, Mr. McQuinn denied having any gang involvement. Information received from Justice Partner sources in response to inquiries by the PSR author confirm that Mr. McQuinn is not known to be associated to any gangs in the Toronto area, even though his mother observed that his involvement in these offences had a lot to do with his peers at the time and the influence they had on him. She told the interviewer that “he was definitely involved with some bad people.”

[29] As noted, Mr. McQuinn does specifically acknowledge his involvement in the offences, and further indicated that he regrets what he did and realizes the impact this has had, not only on himself but more importantly, on his family and children. Despite his significant progress, the author of the PSR believes that Mr. McQuinn will still need to address several specific areas of concern in order to mitigate the potential for further offending.

[30] Since it is certain that he will be sentenced to a custodial sentence for these offences, he will certainly have the time to address these areas of concern, including: anger management, negative peer association, decision-making abilities, problem solving, promoting pro-social beliefs and attitudes, productive use of leisure time, and developing a better understanding of the thought-behaviour process.

[31] On the other hand, and despite the obvious the very serious nature of the offences he perpetrated here, the PSR author, plainly believes that there is a good potential for Mr. McQuinn to rehabilitate himself. I share this view and the PSR author’s observations that the prospects of success in rehabilitation will depend on Mr. McQuinn’s commitment to make the necessary changes to improve himself by addressing the enumerated areas of concern. In the end, however, should he fail to continue on the path of change upon which he appears to have embarked, and instead continue leading the lifestyle he previously chose, I share the PSR’s concern that he may pose a risk of further recidivism.

[32] In my view, the positive pro-social directions Mr. McQuinn is now turning to are summed up in the last paragraph of his lengthy letter to the court, thar was read into the record:

I truly am sorry for my transgressions and for the physical and emotional hurt that I caused. I'm prepared to take responsibility knowing that the outcome will be part of God's plan. I have a family that loves me and three kids that are waiting for their father to walk through the door. I am ready for the rest of my life and I thank you for the opportunity to finally close (indecipherable) this chapter and work towards a better outcome and better life. Thank you.

Position of the Parties

[33] Crown counsel's position is that the overall appropriate global sentence for Mr. McQuinn in all the circumstances is between seven to seven and a half years, less pretrial custody credit. The Crown’s initial position is higher, but reduced under proportionality principles. The Crown also seeks a DNA order and a s. 109 order for life. Defence counsel confirms those two ancillary orders are unopposed.

[34] The breakdown of the Crown’s proposed global sentence is somewhat complex. Crown counsel set out what he submitted should be consecutive sentences and those that would run concurrently, based on the proposition that there are two separate occurrences, such that the sentences for each should be consecutive. The two occurrences are the assault in Scarborough, and then, nearly a month later, the execution of a warrant at the condominium in Mississauga where the two firearms were found. As well, there are proposed concurrent and consecutive sentences within each group of charges. In fact, the total of the concurrent and consecutive components requested total eight years, but, as I noted, Crown counsel reduced that global number based on the principle of totality.

[35] The "Scarborough incident", the discharge of the firearm and the aggravated assault, is the most serious of the offences which carries a maximum 14-year sentence. The Crown's submission is that the fit sentence for this offence is four years, based on case law, and in particular R. v. Tourville[^4], which Crown counsel says establishes that as the low end of the range for this type of aggravated assault. Given the Crown’s position that this was not the worst of aggravated assaults, even though he argues it falls into the most serious third category, the Crown contends the lower end of the four to six range is appropriate, applying the totality principle.

[36] Counts 8 and 9, the failing to comply with a term of probation and the fail to comply bail offences both relate to the Scarborough incident, The Crown contends that these offences call for sentences to run consecutive to the primary sentence for the aggravated assault. He refers to my decision in R. v. Addow[^5] where I found that the breach of the section 109 prohibition in that case called for a consecutive sentence of nine months. He adopts that position, while acknowledging that the range of sentences for those offences typically will fall within the range of six months to one year. On the fail to comply bail conviction, Crown counsel asks for a further three months consecutive, and thus a total of one year consecutive to the principal sentence of four years.

[37] Thus, adding up the consecutive sentences on the Scarborough incident of 4 years, 9 months and 3 months, the total is 5 years.

[38] In relation to counts 4 through 7, also with respect to the Scarborough incident, Crown counsel asks for concurrent sentences. He observes that my findings relating to the pointing of the firearm could support a consecutive sentence as a separate delict because the firearm was being pointed before the pistol whip. However, since the Crown is seeking a significant sentence overall, he accepts that a one-year sentence for that offence, concurrent to the other firearm related offences in counts 4 through 7, is appropriate: Count 5, using prohibited ammunition in a careless manner; three months concurrent; Count 6 is careless use of the firearm; 6 months concurrent; count 7 is a simple possession of the FM Browning 32 calibre; 2 years concurrent.

[39] In summary, in relation to the Scarborough incident, the Crown calls for a sentence total of 5 years, less pretrial custody, given the nature of the offences and what he considers should be the consecutive and concurrent components.

[40] In the Crown’s submission, the second group of offences arise coincident with the arrest of Mr. McQuinn in Mississauga at Damien Campbell’s residence, where two guns were found, the FN Browning used in the Scarborough incident, and the second, Cobra Enterprises handgun. This occurrence embraces counts 12 through 20. Counts 12 through 15, relate to the Cobra firearm, which was loaded and defaced. For those offences, Crown counsel calls for a sentence to Mr. McQuinn of 3 years consecutive to the Scarborough charges. Counts 16 to 18 relate to the FM Browning handgun used in the Scarborough assault being found in Mississauga, but recognizing it was the same gun used in that shooting, albeit in a different city and a month apart, Crown counsel calls for a concurrent sentence of 2 years for that offence.

[41] There are also breaches of orders and fail to comply offences that arise in the Mississauga context. Crown counsel accepts that the sentence for count 19 should be concurrent with count 8, because it is essentially the same breach, only in a different place at a different time. However, the Crown takes a very different position in relation to count 20, which is also a breach of a section 109 prohibition order, but in relation to a different firearm, the Cobra handgun, that is not embraced within any of the other counts. Crown counsel calls for an additional nine-months consecutive sentence for that breach under count 20, consistent with the result in R. v. Addow, above.

[42] On this basis, the total cumulative sentence sought by Crown counsel for the Mississauga related charges, is 3 years 9 months. Adding the cumulative sentences, 4 years plus 3 years and 9 months for the Scarborough offences, and three year and 9 months for the Mississauga arrest related charges, the global total sentence sought by Crown counsel would be 8 years and 9 months. However, taking account of the totality principle, Crown counsel concedes that the appropriate sentence is a lower reduced global sentence, somewhere in the range of seven to seven and a half years.

[43] Finally, Crown counsel concedes that count 12, the offence under s. 91 of the Code relating to the Cobra firearm, should be conditionally stayed, under the Rule in R. v. Keinapple, because the Crown contends Mr. McQuinn was found guilty of possession of the loaded Cobra in any event. Accordingly, Crown counsel concedes, as the cases establish, that it is really the same offence, with the mere addition that the firearm is loaded.

[44] However, Crown counsel rejects that the same principle applies to the s. 92 offences, because he contends the case law shows they are different offences because it has the added element of the offender knowing that that they were not licenced. There is support in the jurisprudence for this position.

[45] Defence counsel advocates for a lesser sentence for what Mr. McQuinn did in Scarborough, in the range of three and a half to four and a half years, but more properly, he says, between three and a half and four years. He also vigorously distinguishes the application of Tourville in this case to produce the result sought by Crown counsel.

[46] Probably the most important position advanced by defence counsel, however, relates to whether sentences should be consecutive or concurrent, and the length of sentence that is fit relative to the location of the second gun when Mr. McQuinn was arrested in Mississauga. His position is that if I accept that the possession and breach charges relating to the Cobra firearm are a separate delict, which they are, and even if I accept that the sentence for those offences should be consecutive, he advocated that a consecutive sentence of no more than an additional six month’s consecutive should be imposed.

[47] On a worst-case scenario, he acknowledges a year could be imposed, but he is emphatic and vigorous in his position that a year consecutive is excessive. He argues that six months consecutive is appropriate for that Cobra handgun. The simple reason is because it is attributed to be Mr. Campbell's firearm. Mr. McQuinn may have had knowledge of it, but he had no actual possession. Defence counsel argues that Mr. McQuinn cannot fairly be sentenced for the second firearm to which he has only the most tenuous of connections.

Relevant sentencing principles

[48] Sections 718, 718.1, and 718.2 of the Code describe the purposes of sentencing and the principles that are to apply in determining a proper sentence. Those provisions call upon me, as both counsel acknowledge, to place appropriate emphasis on general and specific deterrence and denunciation in addition to rehabilitation of the offender. The goal is to craft a sentence that will contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful, and safe society.

[49] Section 718.1 also requires that a sentence be proportionate. The sentence must speak out against the offence, but not exceed what is just and appropriate given the moral blameworthiness of the offender and the gravity of the offences. I must weigh the objectives in the particular circumstances of the case and take account of the relative importance of mitigating or aggravating factors, in determining where to properly situate this particular offender on the scale of appropriate sentences for similar offences. The sentence imposed must also be consistent with sentences imposed for similar offences.[^6]

[50] Possession of a firearm was previously subject to a mandatory minimum punishment of three years in prison under s. 95(2) of the Code, but this mandatory minimum was declared constitutionally invalid by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Nur[^7]. Nevertheless, Nur also demonstrates that denunciation and deterrence assume a greater importance in the sentencing of crimes involving the possession of firearms and that penitentiary sentences would generally be appropriate for offences at “the true crime end of the s. 95 spectrum of offences,” as Doherty J.A. put it at paras. 52 and 206 of the Court of Appeal decision. Another recent appellate decision in R. v. Morris[^8] confirms that while realistic rehabilitative prospects cannot be ignored, they are subordinate to the primacy that deterrence and denunciation must take in all cases involving illegal handguns.

[51] In this case, Crown counsel insists that the focus must be on denunciation and general deterrence, and separation from society. However, I must also keep sight of the relevance of rehabilitation for a youngish offender, like Mr. McQuinn, who has family support and young children. Nevertheless, in a city plagued by gun violence, Crown counsel is emphatic that I must convey a message of denunciation and general deterrence that is emphatically clear.

Analysis

[52] The background here is what frames the determination of the appropriate sentence. Here, Mr. McQuinn was disturbed by the alleged insult and assault against Ms. Rhora. In response, he picked up a loaded gun, went to a public space at a townhouse complex, and waved the gun around as he approached the victim. He said he wanted to fire it, but did not, but continued to approach Mr. Tennant with the loaded gun, and then pistol whipped him, and then the gun went off.

[53] Crown counsel contended that these events reaffirm why Parliament and the Court of Appeal have said that deterrence must predominate in cases like this, because they show the mischief that can be caused when a person is in a public place, upset about something or someone, not in control of their conduct, and in possession of a loaded firearm in contravention of bail terms, a section 109 order, and in breach of his probation. In this case, plainly only good luck and happenstance prevented Mr. Tennant from being much more seriously injured or worse. That calls for a significant message, but Crown counsel calls for what he describes as a low-end sentence, because Mr. McQuinn is still young, and has young children. As such, I must continue to keep rehabilitation in mind.

(i) Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

[54] Counsel agree that there are both mitigating and aggravating factors present here, that affect the sentencing principles and how they should apply to Mr. McQuinn. The mitigating factors are the following:

(i) Mr. McQuinn is still young. He is not a teen, but he remains young, in his late twenties. Even if not 18 or 19 years old, Mr. McQuinn has fully accepted his responsibility and as is evident from the positive flavour of the Presentence Report, he is undeniably seriously remorseful.

(ii) This factor is reinforced and further emphasized by the candor of his letter, read to the court on the sentencing hearing – thoughtful, insightful, and demonstrative of the development of understanding in how to move forward in life, in a new direction;

(iii) Mr. McQuinn has the strong support of his Mother who attended this hearing and is emotional in her professed support for him, in how he has reconnected with his religious values, and her sincere hope that he can soon again resume a fuller parenting role for his two children;

(iv) To his credit, it is mitigating that at the outset of the trial, Mr. McQuinn pled guilty to sixteen of the 20 charges he faced. I also accept counsel’s position that Mr. McQuinn would have pled guilty to those offences earlier in this matter, were it not for certain procedural issues. Nevertheless, he did plead guilty on those offences and that must enure to his benefit.

[55] The Crown submits in this case, however, that the aggravating features outweigh the mitigating ones. First, he says that Mr. McQuinn is not entitled to the benefit of a guilty plea with respect to the two most serious offences of the Scarborough incident, namely the aggravated assault and pointing the firearm.

[56] This is technically true, but to my mind Mr. McQuinn was in a predicament of prejudice that called for and permitted no other option. He did not plead to the pointing of the firearm, but candidly admitted he had done so in his own evidence. He candidly admitted that he had assaulted Mr. Tennant, even if he did not plead to a particular level of assault as recognized in the Code. With no criticism of Crown counsel, I find myself being somewhat more understanding of his apparent predicament than Crown counsel may have been.

[57] I have no doubt, and I agree with defence counsel that the entire matter could well have been resolved before trial had there not also been the charges of “attempted murder” and “discharging a firearm with the intent to endanger life” present on the indictment. This is no criticism of the Crown’s prosecutorial discretion, but it is also understandable in that situation of competing jeopardies that, faced with those two most serious of charges and knowing he was going to testify, that defence counsel would advise his client, as it appears he did, that he should not plead to any of those four remaining counts, lest he seemingly weaken his circumstances, but instead leave them for me to decide on the evidence at trial.

[58] Mr. McQuinn does have a criminal record, but it is not extensive. What is aggravating, a point which defence counsel also emphasized, is that Mr. McQuinn was charged with another matter and on bail from only a few weeks before on those other charges, at the very time when he went to confront Mr. Tennant.

[59] Those other charges were the procuring and deriving a material benefit from procuring offences for which he was sentenced on December 30, 2019. Mr. Justice Crewe of the Provincial Court imposed that sentence for those offences following his plea of guilty to those offences on July 5th, 2019. But that was only just less than three weeks prior to the Scarborough shooting. So, even though he was given bail pending sentence on July 5, 2019, and obviously expected to comply, only three weeks later he was involved in the Scarborough shooting and the possession of the firearms in Mississauga in August when he was arrested. So much for compliance with court orders.

[60] Mr. McQuinn received a significant sentence of 16 months and 15 days, and 3 years of probation (less credit for the equivalent of 230 days of pre-sentence custody). However, he was also subjected to a mandatory weapons prohibition under s. 109. Yet only days later, when one might have thought he would have been on best behavior, he was breaching the very orders that had just been imposed upon him. There is one other aspect to that matter. It means that Mr. McQuinn was sentenced before now to the other significant matter, and therefore not a first offender because of the mischief charge. The sequence itself is not aggravating, but the circumstances of his bail breach are.

[61] This is certainly one of the more aggravating features here. One would expect having entered guilty pleas to serious offences, and being on bail awaiting sentence, that the offender would be on their best behaviour. Instead, as Mr. McQuinn acknowledged in his evidence, he was at his residence, received a phone call from Ms. Rhora about some trouble on McCowan, and proceeded then to take a loaded firearm to the scene. So, plainly he was not on his best behaviour even though he had just been granted bail. That is why it’s an egregious breach. This was not a circumstance where Mr. McQuinn was still presumed innocent. He had pleaded and was found guilty of the offences, and the matter was put over for sentencing of those serious offences, for which he ultimately received a sentence of effectively two years less a day. Yet he was unable to restrain himself only a few weeks after the had accepted to be bound by those bail terms pending sentencing.

[62] Another aggravating feature is that the Scarborough series of events took place outside, in the middle of a townhouse complex with people present, in the courtyard that is obviously in public, even if it was very early in the morning.

[63] It is aggravating that Mr. Tennant was an unsuspecting, un‑expecting, evidently defenseless complainant when he was sitting on that railing in the courtyard. Soon after the altercation commenced, he became fully involved in it and started to get the upper hand at some point, with the help of his unknown friend. However, at least when he was being approached by Mr. McQuinn with a loaded gun and Mr. McQuinn was pointing it at him, and ultimately pistol whipped him, he was not armed, but simply sitting there minding his own business. This was not a consensual fight, nor does it contain any elements of self-defense at all. That also is an aggravating feature.

[64] It is aggravating that there was a firearm discharged, even if not intentionally and an injury sustained, even if he was released from the hospital the same day.

[65] Finally, Crown counsel contends that it is mildly aggravating that Mr. McQuinn left the scene after the altercation and fled, ultimately taking refuge and hiding far away from Scarborough where he lived, in Mississauga with this Mr. Damian Campbell. The point, in his submission was that Mr. McQuinn’s choice to reside in Mississauga, with another person, where there was another gun located, was the factual matrix that created the scenario for him to be charged with possession of a second gun upon his arrest.

(ii) Range of Sentence

[66] At the outset, I note that Crown counsel and defence counsel both put forward cases to support their respective positions. In his customary thorough manner, Crown counsel, Mr. Fried, prepared a detailed sentencing chart for my consideration. He has also provided me with copies of two dozen cases: (i) three relating to when sentences should be consecutive rather than concurrent[^9], (ii) ten relating to sentences imposed in cases involving firearms and aggravated assault[^10], and finally, (iii) eleven cases on sentences imposed in cases where the offender was convicted of possessing a loaded firearm.[^11] For his part, defence counsel provided copies of seven cases that he contended more closely approximate, or have more significant relevance to this particular sentencing.[^12] I do not intend to review much of this caselaw, but only make mention of the two or three cases that were central to counsel’s arguments and that I found to be of greatest relevance here.

[67] I commence the analysis by referring to R. v. Tourville[^13], because it was the focus of both counsels’ submissions. The Criminal Code stipulates that aggravated assault can potentially result in a sentence of up to 14 years, but the case law guidelines that have been established in that, and other cases referenced in Tourville, assist to situate the fit sentence for an aggravated assault along that extensive potential continuum.

[68] Tourville describes three different levels of gravamen of aggravated assaults, particular characteristics of likely facts and characteristics of the typical offenders at each of those three levels, and that trial judge’s views of the appropriate ranges of sentence for each of those three levels. It is a case that has received appellate approval[^14]. That said, it does only establish guidelines, and the ranges it proposes are not inflexible. They do not detract from the individualized nature of the sentencing process, and the need to determine the fit sentence for this particular offender, in these particular circumstances.

[69] Certainly, this is not a bottom end of the range exceptional case like R. v. Peters,[^15] where a young Aboriginal offender, who had been raised in an abusive environment, but who had no prior adult record, received a suspended sentence and 3 years of probation on a guilty plea to aggravated assault. Mr. McQuinn does not share this background and he obviously has no such expectation.

[70] Neither is this a mid-range sentence case, which have typically involved first offenders and some elements suggestive of consent fights but included circumstances where the accused resorted to excessive force. In those cases, courts have imposed high reformatory sentences of between 18 months and 2 years less a day.

[71] At paragraph 30 in Tourville, Code J. writes that the high end of the sentencing range where sentences of 4 to 6 years imprisonment has been imposed have “generally involved recidivists, repeat offenders, with serious prior criminal records, or they have involved circumstances of ‘unprovoked’ or ‘premeditated’ assaults with no suggestion of any elements of consent or self-defence.”[^16] In para. 31, he characterizes Mr. Tourville’s offence as sitting at the “top of the middle range”, observing that it was neither “unprovoked” nor “premeditated.”

[72] I agree with Crown counsel that the result in this case was not “the worst of aggravated assaults”, but I also find that it must necessarily fall into the most serious third category, subject to some distinguishing features that I will describe. Here, Mr. McQuinn’s attack was “premeditated” in the sense that he proceeded with purpose to the townhouse complex to confront the person who offended Ms. Rhora, but I do not agree it was entirely “unprovoked”, in a general sense, by the alleged previous actions of Mr. Tennant towards Ms. Rhora. It may not be permissible provocation, but those prior actions of Mr. Tennant were certainly what “provoked” the entire episode that followed.

[73] Starting from that Code J.’s categorization, Crown counsel contends the lower end of the four-to-six-year range, is appropriate applying the totality principle, on the basis that it was a premeditated assault with no suggestion of any element of consent or self‑defence. He advocates for a four-year sentence. He finds support for this view in the decisions in (i) R. v. Borde, involving similar facts, but a much more serious injury and more severe criminal record, where the Court of Appeal reduced the offender’s sentence on appeal from five to four years, and (ii), in my earlier decision in R. v. Addow above, but there the assault was much more serious as well, and there were other aggravating factors.

[74] In my view, however, even the request for a sentence of four years is marginally or somewhat higher than appropriate in this case, and that is in part because there is an element of provocation. Moreover, unlike Mr. Borde who was a repeat offender with a serious prior criminal record, in contrast, for the purposes of this sentencing, Mr. McQuinn’s prior record includes only the mischief matter. He is not a first-time offender, but neither is he a multiple recidivist, as most of us would understand that term. Nor is there any evidence relating to the other subsequent procuring offence that can influence the sentence here in an upward direction.

[75] It is interesting to me that in between the middle category in Tourville and the top, most serious category, there is a gap of two years. This gap cannot mean that if an offender’s offence does not fall into the second category, but also not fully into the third, as in my view are the circumstances in this case, that there can be no room for a sentence in the three to four-year range that still conveys the required messaging, but that is also more closely attuned to the nuances of the particular offence. In fact, I do not think counsel are actually very far apart on this point. The defence is not advocating for a “merciful” or “excessively lenient” sentence. He fully accepts that a suitable sentence of not insignificant length is required.

[76] In my view, that is exactly what is required in this case. I consider the appropriate sentence for this component of the global sentence to be three and one-half years. I accept that the firearm possession offence relating to Scarborough should be two years concurrent as requested by the Crown, and for the reasons advocated by Crown counsel, I also accept that the sentences for the breach offences should be 9 months consecutive and three months consecutive for the section 109 and breach of bail offences, for a total global sentence of four and one-half years relating to the Scarborough occurrence.

(iii) Consecutive or concurrent sentences?

[77] It appeared to me that the greatest distance between the sentencing positions of the parties related to the issue of consecutive and concurrent sentences. The issue is fully canvassed in the Court of Appeal’s three decisions in R. v. Houle, R. v. McCue, and R. v. Claros. Moreover, Parliament has made it clear in ss. 718.3(4), that consecutive sentences should be imposed when the offences do not arise out of the same event or series of events.

[78] As a sentencing matter, the decision whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences relates principally to whether the offender is being sentenced for different convictions related to separate events and committed at different times. The issue arises where there is more than one occurrence and also in respect of sentences for breaches of orders. Both aspects are engaged here.

[79] The positions are reflected in Houle and McCue: both comment upon the circumstances where consecutive sentences can and ought to be imposed. In Houle, at para. 4, Laskin J.A. stated as follows:

It was also open to the sentencing judge to impose consecutive sentences for the firearms-related offences. The deference that is due the sentencing judge on matters of sentencing generally applies to the decision whether to make sentences consecutive or concurrent: R. v. McDonnell (1997), 1997 389 (SCC), 114 C.C.C. (3d) 436 (S.C.C.). Although these offences were temporally linked, they constitute invasions of different legally protected interests. The sentencing judge was entitled to bring home the seriousness of the offences by imposing consecutive sentences for the firearms offences. See R. v. Gummer, 1983 5286 (ON CA), [1983] O.J. No. 181 (C.A.). The principal of totality was also satisfied.

[80] In McCue at para. 20, the court observes:

The mischief conviction warranted a consecutive sentence. That offence was entirely distinct from the weapons offences. It should have been treated as a separate and distinct matter for the purposes of sentencing. A concurrent sentence denigrates the significance of the mischief charge and suggests that it is not in and of itself worthy of punishment. Of course, in fixing the appropriate length of a consecutive sentence, a trial judge must have regard to the totality of the sentences to be imposed. Totality concerns can, however, be adequately addressed by adjusting the length of the various consecutive sentences, if necessary.

[81] Finally, in Claros, at paras. 51-53, Paccioco J.A. addresses the application of concurrent sentences in the context of breaches of prohibition orders, or other orders made in the context of the administration of justice:

51 More importantly, the fact that two offences relating to the breach of a prohibition order occur in close succession, or even at the same time, is not a basis for imposing concurrent sentences. The principle that such offences should be served consecutively is intended to ensure that disregard of firearm prohibition orders, imposed in the interest of public safety, does not go unpunished. This principle also recognizes the fact that the breach of a prohibition order is different behaviour than the associate offences, engaging different social interests: R. v. McCue, 2012 ONCA 773, 299 O.A.C. 14 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 21-22; R. v. Addow, 2014 ONSC 3225 (Ont. S.C.J.), at paras. 29-35; R. v. Callaghan, 2017 ONSC 1853 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 80, aff'd on different grounds, 2018 ONCA 969 (Ont. C.A.); and by analogy, R. v. Clouthier, 2016 ONCA 197, 129 O.R. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 55, 60.

52 Similarly, two or more separate violations of prohibition orders generally require their own distinct sentences, unless there is cogent reason to do otherwise given the principles and objectives of sentencing. As I have said, there is no bulk discount.

53 To be fair to the trial judge, there is no doubt that his decision to impose a concurrent sentence on this charge was influenced by totality considerations, and totality considerations can provide a cogent reason for imposing a concurrent sentence or adjusting the length of consecutive sentences: Clouthier, at paras. 55, 60; McCue, at para. 20. But as I have just explained, in coming to his conclusion the trial judge focused improperly on the similarity of the crimes. His reasons for imposing a concurrent sentence in this case were therefore not cogent given the principles or objectives of sentencing.[^17]

[82] The Crown’s argument, based on these propositions, is that the gun offences are entirely distinct offences, temporally and physically. The firearm used in Scarborough is the FN Browning, whereas the firearm discovered a month later in Mississauga is a different firearm –

the Cobra – a completely different gun located in a different city on a different date. Crown counsel conceded that if there had only been the Browning handgun, he would have acknowledged that the FN Browning second breach would appropriately be sentenced concurrently.

[83] However, the Cobra Enterprises handgun is a completely different gun. As such, based upon what Parliament has said in ss. 718.1, and what the courts have said in the decisions noted, it is a separate event, and as such, the sentence for that firearm and any related breaches ought to be consecutive to the Scarborough charge, not concurrent.

[84] I agree conceptually with the Crown on that point, but I reach a different conclusion based on an entirely different aspect of the matter. I find that the sentences for possession of the Cobra firearm should run consecutive to the sentences for the Scarborough offences, but I entirely disagree upon the appropriate length of the sentences that should be imposed for those offences.

[85] I accept that the possession and breach charges relating to the Cobra firearm are a separate delict, and I accept that the sentence for those offences should be consecutive. What I cannot accept is the length of sentence called for by Crown counsel having regard to the actual circumstances of the Cobra related offences.

[86] Counsel for the defence advocated that a consecutive sentence of no more than an additional six month’s consecutive should be imposed, and that even in a worst-case scenario, even though perhaps a year could be imposed, he was emphatic and vigorous in his position that a one-year sentence consecutive would be excessive in these circumstances. I agree.

[87] I find that the nature and the gravamen of the second firearm possession offence and the related sentence for breach of the prohibition order, are entirely different, the latter being almost a technical conviction, but certainly not one that calls out for a sentence of three years for the possession and 9 months consecutive for the breach offence.

[88] I believe I understand why Mr. McQuinn chose to plead to both these offences. Part of his reasoning must certainly have been to ensure that the trial would not become distracted or bifurcated into separate occurrences with the confusion that could cause, and indeed which it has. But his plea also recognized that he was guilty of both offences as a technical matter.

[89] While there is no evidence that it was ever in his actual physical possession, Mr. McQuinn did have knowledge of the presence of the Cobra handgun in Damien Campbell’s residence. In my recollection he did not know how it was that the serial number had come to be defaced, nor who had done that. He testified that he did not. There was no evidence that he knew it was a loaded firearm.

[90] The mere presence of that firearm in that residence, if he knew about it, and he did, is enough to make out the technical elements of the offence. I find, however, that the gravamen of those two offences, and the offender’s degree of moral responsibility for them is minimal, and that it is deceptive to artificially elevate them, for this particular offender. As such, I find that it would be retributive without adequate reason or public benefit, and crushing to this offender, to sentence him to a total sentence of three years and nine months for the two Cobra firearm offences he pleaded to, because he was technically guilty, but where the degree of his moral responsibility for those offences is de minimis, and where he has only the most tenuous of connection to that firearm.

[91] Mr. McQuinn, to his credit, pled guilty to possession of a gun that he was alleged to know about, whether it was actually in his possession, which it was not, or jointly, or constructively possessed. The manner of the “possession” does not really matter. He had knowledge but chose to plead. He did not require that the Crown run a trial on the Mississauga arrest related gun offences, with the different officers who would have had to be called to testify. He pled to it and must receive not only the benefit of that plea, but also the benefit of his expressed remorse relating to it, although it was arguably not in his control.

[92] Returning to its core, this case is not about what happened on the day he was arrested in Mississauga, and whether an additional handgun was located. The facts appear to be that the Cobra belonged to Mr. Campbell, though both he and Mr. McQuinn were charged with its possession. Instead, as it relates to this offender who is being sentenced here today, this case is all about what happened in Scarborough. In my view it distorts the true picture and the real required focus of this sentencing to permit almost half of the ultimate sentence sought by Crown counsel to be in respect of what the police had the good luck to find when they happened to arrest Mr. McQuinn in Mississauga, but over which he had no real meaningful control, notwithstanding his knowledge.

[93] I find that the sentence called for by Crown counsel, while otherwise possibly appropriate in general terms, is excessive given the circumstances here. A sentence of nine months for the possession and three months for the breach offence, consecutive to each other and to the sentences for the Scarborough offences, totalling one year, is the sentence that I find to be appropriate for that technical possession of the Cobra handgun. Mr. McQuinn may have had knowledge of it, but he had no actual possession of what appears plainly to have been Mr. Campbell’s firearm. Mr. Campbell has fled. He is in the wind. I doubt we will ever see him again, but if we do, then he can be charged with the possession offence. In those circumstances, I have concluded it would be harsh and unfair to call upon Mr. McQuinn to pay excessively for what is essentially Mr. Campbell’s offence as principal.

[94] In the result, combining the sentences I have determined are appropriate for the main focus, the Scarborough assault, and for the secondary offences relating to the Cobra firearm alone, I reach a global sentence, consecutive and concurrent of five and one-half years, that is, 66 months before credit for pre-trial custody.

(iv) Pre-trial custody credit

[95] Defence counsel subpoenaed institutional records for the Toronto South Detention Centre during the relevant period of Mr. McQuinn’s incarceration to assist in determining the extent of pre-sentence custody credit that Mr. McQuinn should receive in relation to these offences.

[96] The records provided show in stark detail that inmates are required almost daily to endure partial or full institutional shutdowns, and thus to be confined in their cells for almost the entire day, without access to showers and other basic amenities of life. Mr. McQuinn took up residence at the TDSC on August 23, 2019. Since that time, he was in complete or partial lockdown for 392 of the 418 days he has spent in custody, that is, over 90% of the entire time period. On its own, this is disturbing, but the depth of the problem in our detention facilities is underlined and highlighted by the fact that except for 12 of those 392 days, the remaining 380 days of lockdown have been attributable to one single recurring failure, and that is staff shortages, an inadequate number of corrections officers to meet the day-to-day requirements of running a detention centre.

[97] Against this background, Crown and defence counsel have agreed that Mr. McQuinn is entitled to 627 days of credit under R. v. Summers[^18] (418 days in pre-trial custody on these matters x 1.5 = 627 days). Counsel have also agreed that Mr. McQuinn should receive 190 days of credit under R. v. Duncan[^19] in respect of institutional lockdowns and the effects of Covid 19.

[98] In total, as a result, Mr. McQuinn is to receive 627 days of Summers’ credit and 190 days of Duncan credit, for a total pre-trial credit entitlement of 27 months, that is, two years and three months.

Disposition

[99] In his submissions, defence counsel emphasized that it was not his intent to suggest a lenient sentence for Mr. McQuinn, that he was not suggesting a merciful sentence, nor was he advocating for a light sentence. Instead, he insisted that he was advocating for the appropriate and fit sentence that the authorities, and the particular facts suggest should be in play in this case. In fact, the same point applies equally, in reverse, to Crown counsel’s submissions. I found the positions of both Crown and defence counsel to be carefully thought through and responsibly put forward. I found that they were not actually that far apart on their positions relating to the Scarborough events that are the real focus of this case, and materially differed only in the different manner in which they looked at the Mississauga firearms offences, based on entirely different characterizations of those offences.

[100] Further, turning to the offender, Mr. McQuinn, I have been impressed with this man and the promise for rehabilitation and a return to a lawful life that I believe lies ahead of him, largely instigated by evidently having experienced his own Road to Damascus conversion and pursuing education even while institutionalized to help him get there. Nevertheless, this cannot take away from the serious nature of these offences and their call for a serious sentence.

[101] Mr. McQuinn, please stand. As you have heard, for the reasons I have explained, I have determined that the fit and appropriate global sentence for you is a penitentiary sentence of five and a half years, before pre-sentence custody credit. As such, after applying the credit that is due to you of two years and 3 months, I sentence you to serve a remaining sentence in this matter of 39 months, that is three years and three months. The ancillary orders agreed to on consent will go.

[102] In terms of the individual components of the sentence, they are as follows:

Count 3: aggravated assault (July 26)(ss. 268(2)): 3 years and 6 months

Count 4: point firearm (July 26)(ss.87(1)): 1 year concurrent

Count 5: careless use of ammunition (July 26)(ss. 86(1)): 3 months concurrent

Count 6: careless use of firearm (July 26) )(ss. 86(1)): 6 months concurrent

Count 7: unlicenced possession FN Browning firearm (July 26)(ss. 91(1)): 2 years concurrent

Count 8: possession FN Browning firearm while prohibited from doing so as a term of probation (July 26)(ss. 117.01(1)): 9 months consecutive to count 3

Count 9: fail to comply recognizance (July 26)(ss.145(3)): 3 months consecutive to count 8

Count 12: unlicenced possession Cobra firearm (August 21)(ss.91(1): Conditionally stayed under R. v. Kienapple

Count 13: knowing unlicenced possession of Cobra firearm (August 21)(ss. 92(1)): 9 months, concurrent

Count 14: possession of loaded Cobra firearm (August 21)(ss. 95(1)): 9 months, concurrent

Count 15: possess Cobra knowing it was defaced (August 21)( ss.108(1)(b)): 9 months, concurrent

Count 16: unlicenced possession of restricted Cobra firearm (August 21) (ss. 91(1)): 9 months, concurrent

Count 17: knowing unlicenced possession of FN Browning firearm (August 21)(ss.92(1)): 9 months, concurrent

Count 18: possession FN Browning knowing it was defaced (August 21)(ss. 108(1)(b)): 9 months concurrent

Count 19: possession FN Browning firearm while prohibited from doing so as a term of his bail (August 21)(ss. 117.01(1)): 3 months concurrent to count 8, and

Count 20: possession Cobra firearm while prohibited from doing so as a term of his bail (August 21) (ss. 117.01(1)); 3 months consecutive to count 9.

[103] Mr. McQuinn, we’ve been together on this road as your trial has unfolded since last July, but that road comes to an end today. However, I do have a couple of things to say to you before we go our separate paths.

[104] First, as I know you now appreciate, these are very serious offences. And, except to the extent Mr. Campbell was to blame for the Cobra firearm, you alone were to blame for these offences.

[105] You were very lucky, Mr. McQuinn, that the events on July 26, 2019 in Scarborough did not unfold much worse. Mr. Tennant could have been much more seriously injured or killed. You testified before me that you only wanted to scare them and fire the gun into the air, but had Mr. Tennant been killed, you would likely have been found guilty, not of attempted murder, but of at least manslaughter if not second-degree murder. I would not have needed to reason through to the sentence that I have determined is fit and appropriate for you in this case. It would have been a much shorter exercise. You would or could have been sentenced to a sentence of 25 years of life imprisonment with the only question being when you could apply for parole, certainly no sooner than after ten years.

[106] Instead, there is light at the end of the tunnel for you. I sincerely hope you will heed the messages that are being sent to you, continue on the revised path you appear to have chosen, and as soon as your conduct permits, be able to be released on parole to assume the important role of father and caregiver that your children call upon you to provide.

[107] I wish you success on that path.

Michael G. Quigley J.

Released: January 22, 2022

COURT FILE NO.: CR 20-30000365-0000

DATE: 20220122

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

and –

RYAN MCQUINN

Defendant

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

Michael G. Quigley J.

Released: January 22, 2022

[^1]: The period of the offence charged in Count 20, breach of an order, was incorrectly shown in the indictment as April 15, 2011, instead of April 15, 2018. With the consent of counsel, I amended that charge in the indictment to reflect the correct dates.

[^2]: The three video clips recorded by the video surveillance cameras located as 410 McCowan Road in Scarborough were entered as Exhibits 3-A, 3-B, and 3-C.

[^3]: 1994 97 (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 484.

[^4]: 2011 ONSC 1677.

[^5]: 2014 ONSC 3225.

[^6]: R. v. Nasogaluak , 2010 SCC 6.

[^7]: 2015 SCC 15

[^8]: 2021 ONCA 680, [2021] O.J. No. 5108

[^9]: R. v. Houle, 2008 ONCA 287; R. v. McCue, 2012 ONCA 773; R. v. Claros, 2019 ONCA 626.

[^10]: R. v. Bellisimo, 2009 ONCA 49; R. v. Tourville, 2011 ONSC 1677, [2011] O.J. No. 1245 (S.C.J.); R. v. Pomanti, 2017 ONCA 48; R. v. Borde, 2003 4187 (ON CA), [2003] O.J No. 354 (C.A.); R. v. Williams, [2015] O.J. No. 4119 (S.C.J.); R. v. Williams, 2016 ONCA 937; R. v. Schneider, [2017] O.J. No. 3495 (O.C.J.); R. v. Ressor, [2018] O.J. No. 6182 (O.C.J.); R. v. Reesor, 2019 ONCA 901; R. v. Ferdinand, [2018] O.J. No. 6573 (S.C.J.).

[^11]: R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15, [2015] 1 SCR 773; R. v. Marshall, 2015 ONCA 692, [2015] O.J. No. 5348 (C.A.); R. v. Khiar, [2015] O.J. No. 4701 (S.C.J.); R. v. McKenzie, 2016 ONSC 5025, [2016] O.J. NO. 4273 (S.C.J.); R. v. Mansingh, 2016 ONSC 94, [2016] O.J. No. 92 (S.C.J.); R. v. Mansingh, 2017 ONCA 68, [2017] O.J. No. 379 (C.A.); R. v. Jama, 2018 ONSC 1252, [2018] O.J. No. 1130 (S.C.J.); R. v. Williams, 2018 ONSC 5409; R. v. Thavakularatnam, 2018 ONSC 2380, [2018] O.J. No. 2038 (S.C.J.); R. v. Mahamet- Zene, [2018[ O.J. No. 1003 (S.C.J.); R. v. Mohiadin, 2021 ONCA 122 varying 2020 ONSC 47.

[^12]: R. v. Purcell, 2007 ONCA 101; R. v. Addow, 2014 ONSC 3225; R. v. Kane, 2019 ONSC 6910; R. v. Sangster, 2021 ONCA 21; R. v. Walters, 1993 1888 (BC CA), [1993] B.C.W.L.D. 1148, 26 B.C.A.C. 11.

[^13]: R. v. Tourville, above, at paras. 27-31.

[^14]: See for example, R. v. Pomanti, 2017 ONCA

[^15]: R. v. Peters, 2010 ONCA 30.

[^16]: Tourville, at paras. 27-30.

[^17]: R. v. Claros, 2019 ONCA 626, [2019] O.J. No. 3910.

[^18]: 2014 SCC 26.

[^19]: 2016 ONCA 754

R. v. McQuinn, 2022 ONSC 374

Case Summary

Overview

Circumstances of the offences

Circumstances of the Offender

Position of the Parties

Relevant sentencing principles

Analysis

(i) Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

(ii) Range of Sentence

(iii) Consecutive or concurrent sentences?

(iv) Pre-trial custody credit

Disposition

Judge

Counsel

Parties

Areas of Law

Fact Patterns

Issues

Statutory Provisions 9

Legal Tests 3

Legislation 1