COURT FILE NO.: CV-20-00004304-00
DATE: 2022 06 22
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
ANMOLDEEP SINGH, IN TRUST, 2774012 ONTARIO INC., 1336995 ONTARIO LTD. Operating as ZET TINT and Z. BLACK TINT & WRAP
Plaintiffs
and
2722296 ONTARIO INC., 2776901 ONTARIO INC. and TANVI OHRI
Defendants
BEFORE: RSJ RICCHETTI
COUNSEL: B. N. Radnoff and D. Augruso for the Plaintiffs
P.E. Du Vernet for the Defendants
HEARD: June 13, 2022
ENDORSEMENT
THE MOTION
[1] While the Notice of Motion seeks broader relief, at this hearing the Defendants, 2722296 Ontario Inc., 2776901 Ontario Inc. and Tanvi Ohri (collectively “the Defendants”) only sought the following relief:
a) To discharge the Certificate of Pending Litigation obtained on January 11, 2021 (the CPL) on Unit 17, Level 1, PSCP 1072, being Unit 17, 181 Rutherford Road South, Brampton (the Premises).
b) An order that the Defendants have immediate possession of the Premises.
c) In the alternative to the above relief:
• That the Plaintiffs, Anmoldeep Singh, 2774012 Ontario Inc., 1336995 Ontario Ltd. operating as Zet Tint and Z. Black Tint & Wrap (collectively “the Plaintiffs”), post the full purchase price into court (or as otherwise may be agreed) to the credit of this action.
• That the Plaintiffs pay the interim occupancy costs to date and to the date of trial or date of vacant possession.
THE FACTS
[2] The Premises is a unit in an industrial condominium complex located in Peel.
[3] 2722296 Ontario Inc. (Owner) was the owner of the Premises in 2020.
[4] The Premises was for sale and was vacant as of June 2020.
[5] Anmoldeep Singh (Anmoldeep), in Trust and the Owner entered into an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) which included the following:
(a) The purchase price for the Premises was $960,492 (the “Purchase Price”);
(b) Anmoldeep would pay three deposits as follows, to be held in trust, by the Owner’s solicitors (the “Deposits”);
(i) $25,000 within 24 hours of executing the APS (the “First Deposit”);
(ii) $25,000 within 15 days after the APS is executed (the “Second Deposit”); and,
(iii) $25,000 within 30 days after the APS is executed (the “Third Deposit”).
(c) The APS was to close on October 30, 2020, (the “Closing Date”);
(d) The Owner would install certain specified improvements on the Premises and would ensure that certain other specified items (i.e., the plumbing and drain) worked properly; and
(e) Anmoldeep would immediately occupy the Premises and pay an interim occupancy rent of $1,000 per month beginning July 1, 2020 (the “Interim Occupancy rent”).
[6] Of significance, the APS also contained terms that, in the event of termination, through no fault of Anmoldeep, Anmoldeep was entitled to a return of his deposit but not entitled to any damages. Further, the APS provided that Anmoldeep would not seek or obtain a CPL. (See para. Z.18 of the APS)
[7] Anmoldeep provided a bank draft for the first deposit on June 29th (although not within the 24 hours required by the APS). But it came from a third party. The Defendants allege that the bank draft was dishonoured. The Plaintiffs deny this. What is clear is that the bank draft was never cashed/deposited. This was known to Anmoldeep in early July. What is also clear is that the remaining two deposits were not provided at or around that time by Anmoldeep or anyone else.
[8] Nevertheless, Anmoldeep went into possession of the Premises on July 1, 2020, and commenced to operate his business from those Premises.
[9] On July 21, 2020, the Owner sent an email demanding the further deposits and replacing the first deposit draft. Anmoldeep and others involved in the purchase, deny having received this email (although sent to the same email address as other communications from the purchasers). Further, this still does not explain the earlier failure to provide the second and third deposits in accordance with the APS.
[10] On July 28, 2020, the Owner sent a Notice of Default terminating the APS and demanding vacant possession. Anmoldeep also denies receiving such Notice although it makes sense that such a notice would have been forthcoming at the time given the failure to provide the remaining deposit cheques.
[11] The Owner entered into an agreement to sell the Premises to another purchaser. This came to the attention of Anmoldeep on or about August 18, 2020.
[12] Anmoldeep claims that the Owner then engaged in conduct to get Anmoldeep to vacate the Premises. I make no such finding as the evidence is highly disputed, is capable of various interpretations based on the motion materials nor is it necessary for me to make such a finding to decide this motion.
[13] On August 27, 2020, Anmoldeep and the Owner entered a written amendment to the APS (Amended APS) which provided:
a) Anmoldeep would provide the three deposit cheques;
b) The Owner would repair or install a new North Door. The removal of the asphalt and the installation and repair of the North Door was to be completed by August 31, 2020, failing which Anmoldeep could hire his own contractor to perform these tasks and deduct the cost from the Purchase Price;
c) The Owner would install a new South Door prior to the Closing Date, failing which a $25,000 credit would be applied toward the Purchase Price in favour of Anmoldeep; and
d) The rest of the APS remained effective including the $1,000 per month Interim Occupancy rent.
[14] Anmoldeep provided the deposit cheques/drafts in late August 2020 and were subsequently negotiated by the Owner.
[15] The sale of the Premises was back “on track”.
[16] Anmoldeep alleges there was an agreement in September to extend the Closing Date because the Owner could not complete its obligations under the Amended APS. Its not clear why Anmoldeep sought this extension or why the extension was required so soon after the Amended APS or is consistent with other evidence that the work under the APS was being done. The Owner denies having agreed to any extension at this time or any other time. In any event, no such valid amendment was executed to the Amended APS since it was not signed by both parties (a requirement of the APS).
[17] As for the repairs to the damaged door, it is not clear from the evidence whether the Owner didn’t complete all its obligations under the Amended APS or Anmoldeep prevented the Owner from completing its obligation regarding the repair or replacement of the door.
[18] There was an inspection on October 12, 2020, of the Premises. An inspection is typically done prior to closing. Everything but the door was “signed off” by “Anmoldeep Singh”. This appears to be consistent with all the other evidence. Once again, Anmoldeep denies he attended and signed the inspection report although it makes little sense that two weeks later, Anmoldeep’s lawyer would tender without having completed a final pre-closing inspection. Further, it appears that a contractor, on behalf of the Owner, went to the Premises to repair the garage door identified in the Amended APS on two occasions to repair the door but was denied access.
[19] On October 23, 2020, Anmoldeep’s solicitor wrote to the Owner’s lawyer setting out:
a) That the work on the doors was not completed and sought a $75,000- $85,000 credit to the purchase price for the South Door and $25,000 credit to the purchase price for the North Door. Essentially, Anmoldeep was going to withhold $110,000 from the purchase price on closing;
b) That environmental compliance report be provided;
c) That Anmoldeep’s bank would not provide financing because it was “aware” that another agreement to sell had been executed (although there is no suggestion this other agreement was registered or an impediment to closing);
d) That the APS closing be postponed to December 15, 2020, based on a “notice of the postponement” delivered on September 18, 2020; and
e) That other unspecified Plumbing and HVAC work was not completed.
[20] When looked at its entirety, this letter appears to be a purchaser who does not want to or cannot close the APS. I say this because it was clear that no environmental report could be called for under the APS, the amounts claimed for credit were not consistent with the requirements set out in the Amended APS which required a credit for the actual work done rather than an estimate, the wording of the alleged “extension agreement”, and the unspecified uncompleted work.
[21] Discussions continued up to October 30, 2020, regarding an extension and terms of such an extension. No agreement was reached.
[22] The response to the October 23, 2020, letter came on October 30, 2020, from the Owner’s lawyer:
a) That the doors were complete except for one which could not be completed because Anmoldeep prevented the Owner’s contactor from accessing the area to repair it (with documents to support this access refusal).
b) The letter referred to a third door which is not set out in the Amended APS.
c) That there was no obligation to provide the environmental report as per the APS.
d) That there had been no agreement to extend the closing.
e) That the HVAC and plumbing were in good working order.
[23] Notwithstanding this response, the Owner was prepared to extend closing to November 16, 2020, on certain terms, including that Anmoldeep demonstrate he had a mortgage commitment or financing to close. More importantly, the Owner required that Anmoldeep vacate the Premises immediately which would essentially have closed the business operations.
[24] Anmoldeep’s lawyer immediately wrote back stating that the terms were not acceptable. Anmoldeep’s lawyer purported to tender by emailing a copy of the closing documents including a copy of a certified cheque in the amount of $896,097.83 (being the purchase price $960,492, less the deposits $75,000 and minor adjustments proposed by the Owner’s lawyer).
[25] The Owner’s lawyer wrote back the same day, alleging that Anmoldeep was in breach and that the Amended APS was terminated.
[26] There was also the issue of the “interim occupancy” tenancy. A Notice terminating the Interim Occupancy was sent by the Owner but Anmoldeep denies receiving this. In any event, whether the Interim Occupancy was terminated is in dispute.
[27] Anmoldeep purported to assign his rights under the Amended APS to 2774012 Ontario Inc.
[28] On November 9, 2020, the Owner transferred the property to 2776901 Ontario Inc. The reason is not clear and does not appear to be relevant to this motion since the CPL affects title regardless of who the registered owner is.
[29] There is one other fact which I have not addressed above because some of it is disputed, and it is not clear exactly what Interim Occupancy rent amounts were received (i.e., accepted and negotiated) by the Owner. During the interim occupancy period, Anmoldeep was to pay $1,000 per month Interim Occupancy rent. Anmoldeep states that the Interim Occupancy rent cheques (to October 2021) were delivered to the Owner although most, if not all, were not cashed. The Owner denies that all the Interim Occupancy rent cheques were delivered. In any event, the Owner states that no occupancy rent cheques have been delivered since October 2021 and this appears to be undisputed. Whether this constituted a breach of the APS and/or the Amended APS is not decided by me.
[30] This action was commenced on November 18, 2020, by Anmoldeep, the assigned company 2774012 Ontario Inc. and 1336995 Ontario Ltd., the operating business corporation.
[31] On December 22, 2020, the Plaintiffs brought the motion for a CPL, relying solely on a law clerk’s affidavit that appended the Statement of Claim – not even a copy of the APS, not the Amending agreement, not any of the facts (agreed upon or disputed) set out above – NOTHING. No reasonable explanation is provided for this failure.
[32] Nevertheless, the CPL was granted by the court on January 4, 2021.
[33] The motion, supporting materials and the CPL were NOT served forthwith as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure. Again, there is no explanation for this in the motion materials.
[34] The motion to set aside the CPL was brought promptly by the Owner in March 2021 on receiving information that the CPL order was granted.
[35] Unfortunately, the death of Anmoldeep’s first counsel, changes in counsel, amendments to pleadings and given the delays and backlog created by COVID-19, this motion was finally heard on June 13, 2022.
THE POSITION OF THE PARTIES
[36] The Defendants submit that the CPL should be discharged because:
a) There was materials non-disclosure on the ex parte motion to obtain the CPL.
b) There is no reasonable interest claimed by the Plaintiffs in the Premises; and
c) Considering and balancing the “Dhunna” factors, this court should exercise its discretion to vacate the CPL.
[37] The Plaintiffs admit that no full and frank disclosure was made on the ex parte motion to obtain the CPL. However, the Plaintiffs submit that this is only one factor in the exercise of the court’s discretion. When all the relevant factors and circumstances are considered, the Plaintiffs submit that the court should exercise its discretion to allow the CPL to remain on title, on terms if necessary.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
[38] Section 103(6) of the Courts of Justice Act provides:
(6) The court may make an order discharging a certificate,
(a) where the party at whose instance it was issued,
(i) claims a sum of money in place of or as an alternative to the interest in the land claimed,
(ii) does not have a reasonable claim to the interest in the land claimed, or
(iii) does not prosecute the proceeding with reasonable diligence;
(b) where the interests of the party at whose instance it was issued can be adequately protected by another form of security; or
(c) on any other ground that is considered just,
and the court may, in making the order, impose such terms as to the giving of security or otherwise as the court considers just.
[39] Granting an order discharged a CPL is highly discretionary dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
[40] The test to discharge a CPL is the same test as to obtain a CPL. See Perruzza v. Spatone, 2010 ONSC 841 at para 20.
[41] In Perruzza, para. 20, Master Glustein set out an approach to deciding a motion to discharge a CPL.
(i) The test on a motion for leave to issue a CPL made on notice to the defendants is the same as the test on a motion to discharge a CPL (Homebuilder Inc. v. Man-Sonic Industries Inc., 1987 CarswellOnt 499 (S.C. – Mast.) (“Homebuilder”) at para. 1);
(ii) The threshold in respect of the “interest in land” issue in a motion respecting a CPL (as that factor is set out at section 103(6) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 43) is whether there is a triable issue as to such interest, not whether the plaintiff will likely succeed (1152939 Ontario Ltd. v. 2055835 Ontario Ltd., 2007 CarswellOnt 756 (S.C.J.), as per van Rensburg J., citing Transmaris Farms Ltd. v. Sieber, [1999] O.J. No. 300 (Gen. Div. – Comm. List) at para. 62);
(iii) The onus is on the party opposing the CPL to demonstrate that there is no triable issue in respect to whether the party seeking the CPL has “a reasonable claim to the interest in the land claimed” (G.P.I. Greenfield Pioneer Inc. v. Moore, 2002 CanLII 6832 (ON CA), 2002 CarswellOnt 219 (C.A.) at para. 20);
(iv) Factors the court can consider on a motion to discharge a CPL include (i) whether the plaintiff is a shell corporation, (ii) whether the land is unique, (iii) the intent of the parties in acquiring the land, (iv) whether there is an alternative claim for damages, (v) the ease or difficulty in calculating damages, (vi) whether damages would be a satisfactory remedy, (vii) the presence or absence of a willing purchaser, and (viii) the harm to each party if the CPL is or is not removed with or without security (572383 Ontario Inc. v. Dhunna, 1987 CarswellOnt 551 (S.C. – Mast.) at paras. 10-18); and
(v) The governing test is that the court must exercise its discretion in equity and look at all relevant matters between the parties in determining whether a CPL should be granted or vacated (931473 Ontario Ltd. v. Coldwell Banker Canada Inc., 1991 CarswellOnt 460 (Gen. Div.); Clock Investments Ltd. v. Hardwood Estates Ltd., 1977 CanLII 1414 (ON SC), 1977 CarswellOnt 1026 (Div. Ct.) at para. 9).
Non-Disclosure of Material Facts on the Ex Parte Motion to obtain the CPL
[42] Clearly, there was material non-disclosure on the ex parte motion to obtain the CPL. After all, the Statement of Claim is nothing more than unsworn allegations and there was no factual evidence before the court to support the necessary findings to grant the CPL.
[43] There is no dispute that the law requires full and frank disclosure of all material facts, bearing on the relief sought, to be made on an ex parte motion.
[44] I accept that the failure to make material non-disclosure in an ex parte motion to obtain a CPL is a significant factor in favour of granting an order discharging the CPL (as it would with any other ex parte order obtain in such a fashion). I do not go so far to say that material non-disclosure in the ex parte motion will or must result in the discharge of the CPL. It may or may not depending on all the circumstances and the exercise of this court’s discretion.
[45] In Telus and Clayton, 2012 ONSC 1798, the court expressly rejected the submission that the failure to make full and frank disclosure requires an order the be vacated or discharged:
[12]…An inflexible application of the duty of full and frank disclosure is to be avoided. Imperfections, including the omission of inconsequential facts, are not always fatal. (see Robert Sharpe, Injunctions and Specific Performance, Looseleaf Ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2001), para. 2.45) Even a finding of material non-disclosure does not automatically lead to the loss of the remedy; it engages the exercise of judicial discretion. If, on the totality of the evidence, it appears appropriate that the order ought to be allowed to stand, it will be permitted to remain in effect. In my view, this is such a case.
[46] Similarly, in Persaud v. Ramawad, 2021 ONSC 5888, while the court strongly disapproved the moving party’s failure to make full and frank disclosure, the court concluded:
[75] Having said that, in my view, the present state of the law in Ontario is that while material non-disclosure may be a stand-alone ground to discharge a CPL, it does not automatically result in the loss of the CPL. Material non-disclosure is an important factor to be considered in the balance. The overarching concern remains, however, whether in all the circumstances – considering all of the equities – the interests of justice favour the discharge. See K.A. v. Mitchell, [2013] O.J. No. 2889 at para. 19. In this instance, I find that they do.
Triable Issue of the Claim to an interest in the Land
[47] The onus is on the Owner to establish this threshold issue, and it has not met the onus on this issue.
[48] The Owner submits that the Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a triable issue with respect to their claim to an interest in the Premises.
[49] I reject the Defendant’s position on this issue.
[50] The threshold to establish the triable issue is low. In this case, that threshold has been established. There was a valid and binding Amended APS on October 30, 2020. The issue is who breached the Amended APS. That is a triable issue. If Anmoldeep (or the Assignee) succeed, they are, or may be, entitled to specific performance which has been claimed. I cannot say that the Plaintiffs’ action is frivolous or without merit based on the evidence before me.
[51] The competing positions put forward by the Owner’s lawyer and Anmoldeep’s lawyer leading up to and on October 30, 2020 cannot be fairly and justly determined based on the affidavit evidence filed. Essentially, to conclude as submitted by the Owner, in the circumstances of this case, would require this court to attempt to make a summary determination on the merits of the action in favour of the Owner.
[52] I am satisfied that a triable issue with respect to the claim to an interest in the Premises has been demonstrated.
The Factors
[53] I now turn to the factors to be considered in the exercise of this court’s discretion.
Failure to make Full and Frank Disclosure
[54] The Owner points to the provision in the APS that prevents the registration of a CPL as a fundamental and material non-disclosure. I am not persuaded that this non-disclosure was necessarily fatal to the motion for a CPL. On one version of the evidence, the Owner sought to avoid closing the Amended APS or may have breached the Amended APS. Nevertheless, Anmoldeep’s lawyer tendered on the Owner’s lawyer without deductions except for the deposits, using the Statement of Adjustments proposed by the Owner’s lawyer, produced a copy of a lawyer’s certified cheque for the closing funds and provided copies of the closing documents executed by Anmoldeep/the Assignee. This was rejected by the Owner on the same day alleging termination of the APS. Considering these circumstances, I am not persuaded that the APS term, which prohibits the registration of the CPL, would necessarily have prevented the issuance of the CPL order. See Ma v. Ideal Developments Inc., 2022 ONSC 963 at paras. 60-63. See also McGrath v. B.G. Schickendanz Homes Inc, [2000] O.J. No. 4161 at paras. 63-69. Where the seller terminates the agreement to sell, the seller cannot rely on the “no CPL registration” clause. To allow such a clause to be enforceable in all cases where such a clause exists would defeat the intent behind s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act, which is that a CPL, where appropriate, preserves any dealing with the property pending the determination of entitlement to the property where specific performance is claimed.
[55] It will be for a trial judge to determine whether the tender was proper in law and pursuant to the Amended APS and whether the Owner’s termination was proper and valid.
[56] I remain of the view that this factor is troubling and weighs in favour of discharging the CPL.
Shell Corporation
[57] The parties dispute whether the evidence shows that the Plaintiffs corporations are or are not shell corporations.
[58] It does appear that Anmoldeep did assign the Amended APS to the numbered company on or about the Closing Date. And that another separate corporation was established to operate the business in the Premises.
[59] 1336995 Ontario Ltd. operated the business for quite some time while being a cancelled corporation.
[60] The Interim Occupancy rent cheques came from another unknown company.
[61] The Plaintiffs have not paid the Interim Occupancy Rent for many months and for much of the period (even if they delivered cheques), there has been no financial cost to their occupancy.
[62] There apparently are a few municipal violations by the business operating in the Premises.
[63] I reject the Plaintiffs’ counsel’s submission that the fact, the business is operating, is some evidence that the Plaintiffs’ corporations are not shell corporations. One corporation was established to accept title. A second corporation was established to operate the business. Do either of these corporations have any assets? That is unknown. What is known is they have operated a business from the Premises for almost two years, made changes to the Premises, and have not paid much more than the $75,000 Deposits.
[64] This factor favours either discharging the CPL or imposing substantial terms to ensure that the APS/Amended APS can and will close if the Plaintiffs are successful in their claim for specific performance.
Uniqueness of the Premises
[65] The Plaintiffs submit that the Premises are unique. They point to the time it took to find these Premises and evidence from various real estate agents as to the uniqueness of the Premises and the difficulty or inability to find similar premises, in the same area, at a similar price.
[66] I am not persuaded that “at a similar price” is necessarily evidence of uniqueness in these circumstances.
[67] This is a non-descript 3500 square foot industrial unit in an industrial area in Brampton.
[68] I reject that there is anything unique about the Premises. Damages could be calculated for the acquisition of another property from which to operate the business.
[69] However, this is an ongoing business.
[70] Calculating damages is always much more difficult with an ongoing business operation. More so, where the established business would have to shut down, relocate to another area and recommence business operations.
[71] Second, the Owner is the one who included a term that if the APS was terminated, Anmoldeep would not be entitled to damages. It does not lie for the Owner to now take the position that damages are an adequate remedy.
[72] Third, the Owner’s sole interest is (or should be) to ensure the closing takes place – in other words, receiving the purchase price. The claim of the Owner is easily calculable – the purchase price and loss of use of those funds until paid.
[73] Fourth, it was the Owner that permitted Anmoldeep to occupy the Premises and commence operating the business prior to closing. And when the Interim Occupancy rent was not paid, what did the Owner do? Nothing. And when the APS didn’t close on October 30, 2020, what did the Owner do? Nothing for several months until after this action was commenced and learned of the CPL.
[74] To now allow the Premises to be sold to some third party by evicting the Plaintiffs and the operating business, a very disruptive situation, appears to be inequitable. The impact to the Owner can be overcome by ensuring the appropriate terms be put into place.
[75] This factor favours maintaining the CPL on title.
The APS term for the non-registration of the CPL
[76] Anmoldeep has terminated the APS/Amending APS. As stated above, the Owner can no longer rely on the “no CPL registration” clause. In any event, this is but one factor in determining whether the court should maintain or discharge the CPL.
Balance of Convenience
[77] As stated above, on one side we have an operating business in the Premises, albeit one which has not paid the purchase price (nor the interim occupancy rent). On the other side, we have an Owner who did not receive the agreed upon purchase price.
[78] As the Owner’s real interest is payment of the purchase price and outstanding interim occupancy rent, requiring these amounts to be paid into court, strongly favours maintaining the CPL on title to the Premises.
Balancing The Factors, Terms and Conclusion
[79] Considering the above, in my view, imposing appropriate terms strongly favouring the dismissal of this motion.
[80] Balancing the respecting rights, obligations and claims, the reasonable terms to protect the respective interests pending a judicial determination are the following terms hereby imposed by this court:
Within 30 days, the Plaintiffs are to pay into court (or to a solicitor’s trust account on consent) the amount of the October 30, 2022, tendered funds, being $960,492 on or before July 20, 2022, as this represents the amount the Owner claimed it was entitled to on the Closing Date; AND
Within 30 days, the Plaintiffs are to pay the Interim Occupancy rent of $1,000 per month that has not been received and negotiated/deposited by the Owner, from July 1, 2020, to August 1, 2022. If there is a disagreement about which Interim Occupancy rent amounts were not actually received and negotiated/deposited, I may be spoken as to how this amount will be determined by this court.
Commencing September 1, 2022 the Plaintiffs are to pay the sum of $1,000 for Interim Occupancy Rent to the Owner until trial or further order of this court.
Failure to comply with these terms, upon motion on notice, the Owner can seek the immediate discharge of the CPL and a writ of possession of the Premises for immediate occupation by the Owner (or subsequent registered owner).
[81] The above order is without prejudice to the respective claims of the parties to be determined at a trial and any adjustments the trial judge considers appropriate.
COSTS
[82] Cost Outlines have been filed by the parties.
[83] Either party seeking costs must file written submissions (5 pages maximum) within 2 weeks of the release of this endorsement, and with attachments which can include a Bill of Costs, Offers and Authorities.
[84] The responding party may file written responding submissions (5 pages maximum) within 4 weeks of the release of this endorsement and with attachments which can include a Bill of Costs, Offers, and Authorities.
[85] There will be no reply.
RSJ RICCHETTI
Released: June 22, 2022
COURT FILE NO.: CV-20-00004304-00
DATE: 2022 06 22
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: ANMOLDEEP SINGH, IN TRUST, 2774012 ONTARIO INC., 1336995 ONTARIO LTD. Operating as ZET TINT and Z. BLACK TINT & WRAP
v.
2722296 ONTARIO INC. and 2776901 ONTARIO INC. and TANVI OHRI
COUNSEL: B. Radnoff and D. Augruso for the Plaintiffs
P.E. DuVernet for the Defendants
ENDORSEMENT
RSJ RICCHETTI
Released: June 22, 2022