Court File and Parties
COURT FILE NO.: CR19-4961 DATE: 2022/01/10
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Crown J. McKenzie, for the Crown attorney
- and -
DYLON DUARTE Accused S. White and A. Lam, for Mr. Duarte
HEARD: December 22, 2021
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
A. J. Goodman, J.:
[1] In the very early morning hours of May 31, 2019, Tyquan Brown (“Tyquan”) was stabbed and killed by the accused, Dylon Duarte (“Duarte”).
[2] At trial, the jury determined that the Crown had not established the essential elements for first degree murder, rather, that Duarte intended to murder Tyquan or that he intended to cause bodily that was likely to cause death but was reckless as to whether death ensued. The jury concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution negated the legal justification of self defence.
[3] Duarte was convicted by a jury of second degree murder. As a result, he is to be sentenced to life imprisonment. The only matter to be decided is the period that he must serve before he is eligible to apply for parole, which must be fixed at between 10 and 25 years.
[4] Ms. McKenzie, on behalf of the Crown, submits that the period of parole ineligibility be increased to 20 years based on the numerous, serious aggravating features in this case, including domestic violence factors, the lack of mitigating elements, after-the-fact conduct, amongst other considerations. Ms. McKenzie invites this Court to send a message to Duarte and to similarly situated offenders in that the appropriate sentence to be imposed must reflect the ever-increasing understanding and changing attitudes towards violence against women and the protection of vulnerable persons in domestic relationships. In addition, the Crown requests a weapons prohibition order pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, a non-contact provision and a DNA order.
[5] Mr. White, counsel for Mr. Duarte, argues that the parole ineligibility period be limited to the minimum 10 to 12 year range. The defence submits that the court ought not to increase the period of parole ineligibility based on the lack of aggravating features, including no cogent evidence of planning or deliberation, the spontaneous conduct giving rise to the stabbing, Duarte’s expression of remorse, and his efforts at addressing his substance abuse issues. Significantly, Mr. White argues that the circumstances surrounding the killing of Mr. Brown do not fall under the domestic violence framework. There is no reported case of parole ineligibility being increased for “domestic assault” second degree murder where the deceased is not known to the offender. The court ought to consider his client’s rehabilitation prospects and eventual reintegration back into the community. There appears to be no dispute with regards to the ancillary orders.
The circumstances of the offence:
[6] On May 30, 2019, Duarte sent numerous text messages and other communications to the mother of his child, Hope Van Koughnett. She was avoiding him as the relationship was over, however, Duarte did not appear to accept that fact. It caused him to be very upset. His actions over the course of the day included various pleas by text or otherwise for Hope to return to him. It included a text message May 30, 2019 at 4:01 p.m: “Like I’m going to hurt people you don’t know like just some random person I want my family back.” Despite the text message sent by Hope at 2:52 p.m., Duarte repeatedly sent other messages to Hope during this time expressed his love and desire to have his family back and to continue the relationship with her. Duarte admitted that he had sent numerous various texts messages to her and was frustrated that he did not receive a response. He testified that despite his weapons prohibition order, he carried the large knife/bayonet in a sheath on his belt for days. Duarte solicited the help of two individuals in his quest to track down and locate Hope.
[7] That same evening, partygoers, including Hope, were at 180 Sherman Ave and had been socializing and had watching the Raptors game. Various guests had consumed alcohol along with marihuana. In the early morning hours of May 31, Hope and others went outside of the residence, congregating in the small area just adjacent to the steps. Duarte quickly approached 180 Sherman. He was brandishing a large knife also described as a machete or bayonet. Several witnesses described Duarte wearing jeans, a dark coloured jacket with a hood pulled up a hat and some face covering, a bandana or something else.
[8] Several witnesses testified that Duarte lunged at the group. Duarte was yelling and was described as angry. Hope testified Duarte arriving quickly from across the street, yelling while coming at everyone and she told him to stop. She tried to block him by placing hands on his shoulders. Hope did not want to see Duarte and had avoided his texts and calls during the prior evening. In any event, Duarte was swinging a knife and Hope testified that he screamed “ I am going to kill someone”, albeit not directed at any individual. Duarte was unknown to many of the partygoers. A witness testified that Duarte lunged at the group while he and Brown moved the girls out of the way. He also said “get back or I’ll kill you”. Another witness testified that he saw the man with a 10 inch knife coming at them. The man kept saying “what’s up” or “what’s good”. The man was swinging the knife. Tyquan was next to this witness closest to Case Street. The event happened quickly and then the man ran away north to a red Jetta. Another witness testified that the man was lunging forward with the knife, saying “I’m going to kill you, I’m going to kill all of you”. Everyone was yelling during this brief melee, unfolding so quickly. Everyone was backing off because of the large knife being waved and no one was about to confront this man. Another witness testified that the man had his face covered except for his eyes. He viewed a 11 or 12 inch silver blade knife or bayonet with a black handle in the man’s right hand, thrusting forward. No one saw the actual stabbing as the events unfolded within seconds in the melee. Duarte did not know Tyquan Brown.
Victim Impact Statements:
[9] Three victim impact statements (“VIS”) were filed with the Court.
[10] Briefly, La-Toya Salmon describes living in a horrible dream in losing her baby brother. Things will never be the same. She writes that “[T]his has truly affected the whole family the hurt, the sadness, the anger, and even the joy that he once touched this earth with left so many wonderful memories.” Rose Isaac and Barbara Rochester describes the inconsolable grief and devastation that Tyquan’s death has had on the family. Planning his funeral was one of the hardest things they had to endure as a family and knowing that he was killed and died alone is something that they can never forget. Hailey Thombs, a friend, says that 850 days have passed since she lost her friend. She writes: “[T]yquan was a man whose aura filled the room with his contagious laugh and joy and being the life of the party. Tyquan was always willing to lend a hand and he was loyal, hardworking, genuine, and humble, and will be missed.”
[11] Before I move on, and without taking anything away from the profoundly emotional and sincere comments referenced in the various VIS, I am unable to consider any of the statements therein with respect to what the various writers opine is the appropriate sentence or their suggestions about any sentencing considerations or remarks related to retribution. Those statements go beyond the admissible nature and scope of VIS in criminal proceedings.
[12] However, I want the family and friends of Tyquan to know that I have not failed to understand your pain and sorrow and I have not forgotten the tragedy of Tyquan’s death. The VIS’ outline the heartfelt sense of bereavement and loss felt by family and friends.
[13] Duarte has been convicted of murder and will be sentenced to a mandatory life sentence. Nothing I do here will bring Tyquan back or expunge the grief felt by his family. However, I cannot exact vengeance. The focus at this proceeding is what sentence I am to impose based on fairness, balancing of the judicial principles, the case law and on the circumstances of this case and the offender.
The circumstances of the offender:
[14] A pre-sentence report was not prepared in this case. Rather, submissions by counsel were made on his behalf. I have also learned much about the offender during the course of the trial, through the evidence presented by the parties at the sentencing hearing, and from his own testimony.
[15] Duarte has a prior criminal record. These include findings of guilt in youth court for assault with a weapon, break, enter and commit, flight while pursued from police. His adult record includes convictions in January 2019 for assault with a weapon, assault x2, fail to comply with a recognizance x2, assault and fail to comply with an undertaking and a sentence order. There are prior reported incidents of domestic assaults and violence. The assault with a weapon conviction involved the use of a taser and relates to a domestic violence incident with his former partner Hope VanKoughnett (“Hope”).
[16] When addressing the Court, Duarte expressed regret to the family for his actions. However, the focus appeared to be on his rehabilitation and the fact that he has and continues to resolve his substance abuse issues.
The governing principles:
[17] Under s. 745(c) of the Criminal Code, on conviction for second degree murder the offender must be sentenced to life imprisonment, with no eligibility for parole for a fixed period ranging from a minimum of 10 to a maximum of 25 years.
[18] Section 745.4 empowers the sentencing judge to increase the general parole ineligibility period from the minimum of 10 years to the period that the judge deems fit, up to the maximum of 25 years. Section 745.4 also requires that in exercising his or her discretion, the trial judge have regard to the character of the offender, the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission, and the recommendation of the jury.
[19] In R. v. Shropshire, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227, the Supreme Court of Canada articulated the standard to be applied in assessing the exercise of a trial judge's discretion under s. 744 [now s. 745.4] as follows:
... as a general rule, the period of parole ineligibility shall be for 10 years but this can be ousted by a determination of the trial judge that, according to the criteria enumerated in s. 744, the offender should wait a longer period before having his suitable to be released into the general public assessed. To this end an extension of the period of parole ineligibility would not be unusual, although it may well be that, in the median number of cases, a period of 10 years might still be awarded.
[20] As well, the Supreme Court held that the power to extend the period of parole ineligibility need not be sparingly used and is not restricted to "unusual circumstances." The court recognized that "in permitting a sliding scale of parole ineligibility, Parliament intended to recognize that within the category of second degree murder there will be a broad range of seriousness reflecting varying degrees of moral culpability”: Shropshire, at pp. 242-243.
[21] It is clear that sentencing ranges are merely guidelines and a judge must apply all of the considerations that flow from Part XXIII of the Code in order to arrive at a just and proper sentence. Sentencing remains an individualistic process requiring a careful exercise of judicial discretion. However, if a trial judge is considering going towards the high end of the range in cases of severe or brutal violence leading to second degree murder, there must be measured and articulable reasons for doing so.
[22] Both counsel have referred to a number of authorities setting out parole ineligibility findings in cases of second degree murder including those involving domestic violence. With respect, the cases proffered by the defence are unhelpful in my analysis. I tend to agree with the Crown attorney that all of the cases presented in support of the defence position on parole ineligibility are outdated and may not reflect current social values and sentencing principles, especially if this case falls under the auspicious of “domestic violence”. I have also considered a number of other reported cases.
Analysis:
[23] This court, or any court, is guided by the principles of sentencing as set out in ss. 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code. As directed by s. 718 of the Criminal Code, the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful, and safe society by imposing sanctions that reflect enumerated objectives.
[24] The objectives relevant to this case are denunciation of the unlawful conduct, specific and general deterrence of other potential offenders, separation of offenders from society where necessary and rehabilitation. It is important to impose a sentence that promotes a sense of responsibility in offenders, and an acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and to the community.
[25] The circumstances of the offence and of the offender must be analyzed to identify the aggravating and mitigating factors.
[26] In particular, in assessing s. 745.4 factors and in deciding whether to increase the period of parole ineligibility, all of the objectives of sentencing as found in ss. 718 to 718.2 are relevant. I am permitted to draw inferences from the evidence adduced at trial and arrive at my own conclusions of fact.
Jury Recommendations:
[27] At the end of this trial, one member of the jury recommended that the period of parole ineligibility be fixed at 10 years, three jurors recommended 15 years, one recommended 20 years and the remaining seven jurors recommended the maximum of 25 years of parole ineligibility.
[28] As Watt J.(as he then was) wrote in R. v. Barry, [1991] O.J. No. 2666 (Gen. Div.), aff’d. [1993] O.J. No. 3955 (C.A.). See also R v. Olsen, [1999] O.J. No. 218 (C.A.).
It is difficult to gauge with any accuracy the weight which should be attributed to a jury recommendation regarding parole ineligibility. In one sense, it might be said to represent the community view upon the issues. To so hold, however, as it appears to me, is somewhat to overstate the case. They are given no guidance on the precedents concerning the appropriate range. They are simply told the numbers. They are not required to at least endeavor to achieve unanimity. It is, as it was in this case, but a brief, somewhat informal exercise, after they have been earlier told that sentence forms no part of their responsibility in determining liability, and thereafter told it is but a recommendation. They receive no further evidence concerning, for example, the likelihood of recidivism, future danger to society or other matters which might logically bear upon the issue other than what they can recall was given at trial.
[29] After having reached a verdict in this case, the jury was then asked to make their recommendations. The jury spent less than 20 minutes and came back with their recommendations. I acknowledge and appreciate the jury’s combined wisdom and experience as representatives of the community.
[30] While the jury's recommendation is not binding on me, it is a factor that I consider and weigh when setting the period of parole ineligibility.
[31] It must be noted that members of the jury did not have the benefit of considering the applicable case law, the principles of sentencing pursuant to s. 745.4 of the Code, the aggravating or mitigating factors or have the benefit of hearing submissions from both counsel before making their recommendations.
Mitigating Factors:
[32] Duarte is a youthful offender. He expressed an apology for his actions. Duarte has successfully completed numerous self-awareness and other various courses while incarcerated and has been tackling his substance addiction issues.
Aggravating Factors:
[33] There are a number of serious aggravating factors in this case. As mentioned, Duarte has a previous criminal record. For all intents and purposes, Duarte has not led a pro-social life. There is a history of domestic violence, including convictions for violence towards Hope. In this case, Hope advised Duarte that the relationship was over and that she did not want to pursue it further. That did not appear to resonate well with Duarte.
[34] After the fact conduct: Duarte fled the scene and made some efforts to leave the jurisdiction. He discarded evidence immediately after the stabbing.
[35] The nature of the murder: Based on the evidence at trial, I am persuaded that there was some planning involved in the eventual stabling of Tyquan. Throughout the day leading up to the murder, Duarte sent a variety of messages to Hope. It bears repeating that at 4:01 p.m. just hours prior to the murder, Duarte sent a text to Hope stating: “Like I’m going to hurt people you don’t know like just some random person I want my family back.” Subsequently, he enlisted the assistance of two individuals in tracking down Hope. He arrived at 180 Sherman with his face all but concealed and confronted Hope before stabbing Tyquan.
[36] It is not an aggravating factor that Duarte pleaded not guilty to first degree murder and had a trial. In fact, Duarte was convicted only on the lesser offence of second degree murder. However, he cannot benefit from the mitigation that flows from a plea of guilty with the acceptance of responsibility for the charged crime.
Application of the legal principles to this case:
[37] One of the fundamental issues for this sentencing decision is whether Tyquan’s murder falls under domestic violence. Indeed, this is a unique case in that counsel were unable to find a similar case involving a so-called “domestic violence murder” where the ultimate victim was neither the spouse, nor the intimate or domestic partner. In fact, Duarte had no relationship whatsoever with Tyquan and did not even know him.
Does this particular case fall under a domestic violence context?
[38] Premised on Duarte’s overall conduct towards Hope prior to and at the time of the killing, I am persuaded by the Crown attorney that this inimitable case is one of domestic violence. Duarte killed Tyquan, the tallest man in the crowd of people as a result of his pent-up rage, frustration and anger towards his ex-partner. Hope had all but avoided him during the previous hours leading up to the killing. She had expressed that the relationship was over. In response, Duarte’s pervasive text messages to Hope ranged from affectionate, to pleading, to violent, all the while in an attempt to manipulate Hope to return to him with their son. Duarte’s dogged search and locate efforts for Hope became nothing short of obsessive.
[39] Undeniably, Duarte spent the eight hours searching for Hope, incessantly messaging, phoning and looking for her. When he received no response from her, Duarte enlisted his friend Anthony Plaenk (“Plaenk”) and Plaenk’s girlfriend, Torri, (who is Hope’s sister), to help him find Hope by telling them that Hope was drunk and needed to be picked up. Duarte armed himself with Plaenk’s 12” bayonet which he kept concealed from Plaenk, Torri and others. He actively directed the search for Hope and sent increasingly desperate messages. Once he viewed Hope with the partygoers, including Tyquan, he immediately threatened her and them.
[40] I agree with the Crown that Duarte took active steps to seek Hope out and confront her no matter where she was situated, what she was doing or with whom.
[41] Tyquan was just minding his own business, enjoying a good time with friends at a house party. Tyquan was stabbed and killed merely because he was at the wrong place at the wrong time. He did not deserve his fate.
[42] In the unique circumstances of this case, with the history of the relationship between Hope and Duarte, the close temporal aspect and the nature of the events leading up to the stabbing, along with Duarte’s ubiquitous efforts to manipulate Hope to acknowledge and return to him, including text messages as to his intentions, I find that this murder was a continuous series of events in the realm of domestic violence. The ultimate stabbing of Tyquan was merely the culmination and instrument of the domestic violence situation, which is recognized as a statutorily aggravating factor pursuant to s. 718.2 (a)(ii) of the Criminal Code.
[43] One of the former leading authoritative appellate cases in Ontario addressing the period of parole ineligibility for second degree murder in a domestic context is that of R. v. McKnight (1999), 44 O.R. (3d) 263 (C.A.). In that case, the offender murdered his wife of 20 years by stabbing her to death in their bedroom with a serrated bread knife. The victim sustained numerous injuries and had over 50 defensive wounds. There were elements of planning and deliberation.
[44] The trial judge in McKnight fixed the period of parole ineligibility at 17 years. In reducing the period of parole ineligibility to 14 years, Laskin J.A. held:
Taking into account all of these aggravating and mitigating features, in my opinion, a 17-year period of parole ineligibility falls outside a reasonable range. No two cases are the same but similar cases from this province of brutal second-degree murders of an unarmed wife or girlfriend suggest a range of 12 to 15 years.
[45] In the past, courts have held that McKnight supported a range for the period of parole ineligibility in cases of domestic violence to be between 12 to 15 years. However, in my opinion, that range has been expanded.
[46] In R. v. Berry, 2017 ONCA 17, [2017] O.J. No. 160, the Court of Appeal upheld a 17 year parole ineligibility for a domestic violence murder. In that case, the offender had a more egregious criminal record and the trial judge viewed the case as a near first degree murder.
[47] In R. v. Brunet, 2010 ONCA 781, [2010] O.J. No. 4932, the Court of Appeal reduced a 20 parole ineligibility period to 16 years. In Brunet, there was a brutal and violent attack upon an elderly 81 year old woman in her own home that also involved a sexual assault. The offender did not have a criminal record and the defence medical evidence established that he was not at a risk to reoffend.
[48] In the case of R. v. Czibulka, 2011 ONCA 82, [2011] O.J. No. 372, at para. 67, the Court of Appeal considered McKnight and opined that the range of 12 to 15 years for second degree murder of a domestic partner is not cast in stone for all violent spousal or domestic murders. A part of the exercise to determine parole ineligibility requires consideration of the availability or lack of mitigating factors. The court went on to opine that the ceiling for the range of sentence of parole ineligibility has increased to 17 years. In the end, the Court of Appeal did not disturb the trial judge’s conclusion of a period of 15 years of parole ineligibility.
[49] In the case of R. v. French, 2017 ONCA 460, [2017] O.J. No. 2910, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s sentence decision of parole ineligibility of 17 years. The deceased was strangled. At trial he was charged with first degree murder. French could be aptly described as a ‘near case’ of first degree murder, in that the trial judge accepted the accused’s confessions that he had planned to murder his common law partner, albeit the jury found that there was no deliberation: at para. 30. See also R. v. Hindessa, [2009] O.J. No. 6412 (S.C.) aff’d. 2011 ONCA 477, [2011] O.J. No. 2811 at paras. 36, 38. At para. 153 of Hindessa, the court outlined a series of aggravating factors, many of which not found in this case, including the brutality and savagery of the crime characterized by gratuitous violence and mutilation. The offender had a high risk to reoffend with no remorse. The judge fixed the period of parole ineligibility at 18 years.
[50] In R. v. Kenyon, 2014 ONSC 4454, Fuerst RSJ., imposed a period of parole ineligibility of 15 years. The Crown sought 15 to 18 years while the defence submitted that a period of 12 to 15 years was appropriate. The murder occurred in the deceased’s own home. The killing was excessively brutal. A particularly aggravating factor was the post-offence conduct, causing others to put their lives at risk in an attempt to rescue the deceased, along with the offender levelling a false accusation. The offender had an unrelated prior criminal record, primarily for crimes of dishonesty. While he presented letters of support from family and others, the learned trial judge found that the offender was not of good character. The jury had recommended ranges from 20 to 25 years of parole ineligibility.
[51] In R. v. Suarez-Noa, 2018 ONSC 7587, [2018] O.J. No. 6717, I set the period of parole ineligibility at 15 years in the context of a brutal domestic violence murder. As I mentioned in Suarez-Noa, based on the Court of Appeal decisions in Czibulka and French, I found that for serious domestic violence murder cases, the range of parole ineligibility has been expanded from 12 to 17 years in circumstances where there are negligible or limited mitigating factors. This range has been reflected in recent jurisprudence from both the Superior and appellate courts in Ontario.
[52] In my view, the guidance provided by the Ontario Court of Appeal does not appear to exceed 17 years of parole ineligibility for these types of cases.
[53] Despite Ms. McKenzie’s able submissions, I am unable to accede to her ultimate position of an increased period of parole ineligibility beyond the ceiling of 17 years.
[54] First, as mentioned, the range of 20 years exceeds the established range for murders in the domestic violence context. Second, and perhaps more importantly, I am able to distinguish the cases proffered by the prosecution, and other relevant authorities to the degree that inhibits my ability to elevate the ineligibility period to beyond the range as suggested by the Crown. With respect, Ms. McKenzie is overreaching when suggesting a 20 year period of parole ineligibility.
[55] I am not persuaded that the facts of this case or the circumstances of the offence and offender warrant surpassing the range established by the Court of Appeal or in other cases at the Ontario Superior Court level for second degree murder in the domestic context.
[56] If I have mischaracterized the nature of this case as one of domestic violence, I am persuaded that the facts demonstrate some elements of planning. It is true that the jury was not satisfied that the Crown failed to establish planning and deliberation first degree murder. However, I find that there was some preparation and scheming in the hours leading up to locating Hope and Duarte eventually confronting her, albeit his stabbing was directed at a random person.
[57] As mentioned, these include Duarte’s prior text messages, actively cajoling others to assist him in the search, his securing and hiding of the bayonet, with the parking of the vehicle a block away from 180 Sherman, arriving at the scene and rushing toward Hope and confronting the group with his face being masked, albeit directing his energy to kill an innocent bystander.
[58] The murder was not entirely spontaneous, rather the result of a build-up of rage and a loss of patience towards Hope. That being said, I am not prepared to classify this case as a “near first degree murder” as oft-described in other sentencing decisions.
[59] With respect, I reject the 10 to 12 year range of parole ineligibility submitted by Mr. White for this case based on the circumstances of this offence and of the offender. In my opinion, the suggested range does not adequately address the principles as set out in s. 718 to 718.2 of the Code.
[60] I have also considered the recommendations of the jury in assisting me with the appropriate period of parole ineligibility. While I cannot and must not ignore their recommendations, with respect, I have rejected the recommendations of those jurors who referenced a period at the highest end of parole ineligibility.
[61] There is no expert or medical evidence about Duarte’s prospects for rehabilitation or dangerousness to society at large, particularly to women. Whether or not Duarte has a moderate or high risk to reoffend or poses a risk or danger to the community will have to be assessed by the Parole Board in due course.
[62] As mentioned, in his comments to me, Duarte states that he is regretful and apologetic for his own involvement. However, I am not entirely convinced that his expression of regret to the deceased’s family is insightful, rather focused on his own efforts to address his substance abuse issues.
[63] The stabbing of a defenseless and vulnerable man for no reason other than turmoil within the relationship with his ex-partner and jealousy cannot be considered to be anything other than a serious and heartless murder. Tyquan was the instrument of this result, as explained by the evidence in this case. Recourse to violence of any nature or form, whether physical, verbal or psychological is not the manner in which to cope with an unhappy domestic situation, especially towards an innocent, random stranger. It cannot and must not be condoned.
[64] I must point out that with a conviction for second degree murder, the imprisonment may continue for the rest of Duarte’s natural life. Ultimately, it will be for the Parole Board of Canada to decide when, if ever, he has been sufficiently rehabilitated that he is no longer a danger to others in our society and that he may be released on parole. My determination of the minimum period of time at which Duarte will become eligible for release on parole does not necessarily mean that he will be released upon the expiration of whatever minimum period I impose today.
Conclusion:
[65] While the ultimate victim was not a domestic partner, per se, I conclude that this is a unique case of domestic violence. Adherence to the 12 to 17 year range of increased parole ineligibility for second degree murder in such cases is entirely appropriate. I find that the need for denunciation and specific and general deterrence are paramount. This, along with the many aggravating factors including an element of some planning requires a parole ineligibility period at the higher end of the range as set out in the jurisprudence.
[66] Therefore, the sentence to be imposed is as follows: Mr. Duarte is to provide a sample of his DNA pursuant to s. 487.051 of the Criminal Code. I order a s. 109 lifetime weapons prohibition.
[67] In accordance with s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code, Mr. Duarte is prohibited from communicating, associating or contacting directly or indirectly any member of Tyquan Brown’s immediate family and Hailey Thombs.
[68] Mr. Duarte has been found guilty of second degree murder and is sentenced to imprisonment for life. The life sentence will be noted to have begun from the date of his arrest, June 2, 2019. I hereby fix the minimum period of parole ineligibility at 16 years.
A. J. Goodman, J. Released: January 10, 2022