Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: FC-16-1046 DATE: 2022/02/18 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN: Michael Switzer, Applicant – and – Colleen Switzer, Respondent

Counsel: Self-Represented, for the Applicant Eric Letts, for the Respondent

HEARD: In Writing

Supplemental Reasons for Judgment

Shelston, J.

[1] In my decision dated September 27, 2021 in Switzer v. Switzer, 2021 ONSC 5760, I made findings with respect to the income of the parties and the section 7 expenses. I ordered the parties to provide written submissions and DivorceMate calculations addressing the issue of table child support, section 7 expenses and spousal support retroactive to September 1, 2014. I have received the submissions and calculations.

[2] On November 5, 2021, I conducted a post-trial conference to address various issues that have arisen since the release of my reasons for judgment on September 27, 2021 being:

a. Determining the terms of the listing agreement for the matrimonial home including the agent and the listing price. b. The effect of the respondent discovering in October 2021 that the applicant was granted a judgment issued by the Licensing Appeals Tribunal dated May 21, 2021, granting the applicant income replacement benefits retroactive to 2018. c. The omission in the reasons for judgment dated September 27, 2021, to address section 7 expenses being summer camp, therapy and medicine for the children. d. Confirmation regarding each party’s position on support paid since September 2014. e. Consideration for the income tax effect on retroactive spousal support to September 1, 2014.

[3] At the case management conference on November 5, 2021, the applicant indicated that if the parties could not agree on support paid from September 1, 2014, he would be bringing a motion to reopen the trial evidence. Further, despite the reasons for judgement indicating that the listing price for the matrimonial home would be determined by the listing agent, the parties could not agree on the listing agent or the listing price. By endorsement dated November 26, 2021, I appointed the listing agent and set the listing price. Subsequent to the conference, the respondent opted not to reopen the trial to address the judgement granted to the applicant from the Licensing Appeals Tribunal.

[4] On December 16, 2021, the applicant proceeded on his motion to reopen the trial to permit him to lead evidence as to what he paid in child and spousal support in 2014 and 2015. I granted the motion and the continuation of the trial took place from February 7 - 9, 2022. In my reasons for this part of the trial, I determined that the applicant would be entitled to a credit of $49,101.53 to apply against any retroactive support order from September 1, 2014 to December 31, 2014 and $139,522.37 to apply against any retroactive support order from January 1, 2015 to December 15, 2015.

Duration of Spousal Support

[5] During closing submissions, the applicant’s position was that spousal support be at the low end of Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (“SSAG”) and that the support should terminate as of September 2019, being five years after separation. In his post-trial written submissions, the applicant’s position changed where he now seeks to terminate spousal support as of December 31, 2019, which would provide 5.5 years after separation on August 12, 2014.

[6] The respondent’s position is that the spousal support should be for an indeterminate period at the upper quantum of the SSAG.

[7] The SSAG recommend an indefinite (unspecified) duration, subject to variation and possible review, with a minimum duration of 5 years and a maximum duration of 18 years from the date of separation. I reject the parties’ submission’s with respect to the duration of spousal support for the reasons set out herein.

[8] The parties lived together from December 2009 until August 2014. At the time of separation, the respondent was 38 years of age with three children under two years of age. Post-separation, the respondent was terminated from her position with Lockheed Martin and her second position, partially because of her missing work due to her childcare responsibilities. The respondent is currently employed in a full-time position, with a salary of $50,000 a year with benefits including the ability to work remotely. However, there is no doubt that the respondent’s career path has been significantly affected by the separation and that her economic loss requires compensation and that the respondent has sustained a significant reduction in her standard of living from that enjoyed while the parties cohabitated. At this time, the respondent has not been able to find financial security. The applicant’s obligation to pay support was suspended in 2018 and he has paid little support since that time. The respondent moved out of the matrimonial home in December 2017, rented a home and was evicted from that home in the winter 2020 for nonpayment of the rent. She then moved to her parent’s home where she and the three children are sleeping in one bedroom in bunk beds. She has no savings and has significant postseparation debts to her former lawyer, her former landlord and CRA.

[9] On the other hand, the applicant has remained in the 3500 square-foot matrimonial home since December 2017 and has opposed its sale until my reasons for judgment ordered it sold. The matrimonial home sold with a closing date in early March 2022. Once terminated from his partnership in 2017, the applicant opted not to apply for employment with another firm but rather he started his own firm. Despite initial difficulties as a result of little work in progress, the applicant’s professional income has increased each year to the point that I have imputed an income to him of $175,000 effective in 2019. The applicant also has no savings, significant debt including to CRA as well as his previous lawyer but the applicant testified that he has significant cases ready to be tried in civil jury matters that will produce significant income.

[10] Despite the passage of over seven years since separation, I do not find that the respondent has been compensated for the roles assumed during the marriage, the assistance to the advancement of the applicant’s career, that her standard of living has plunged dramatically from that enjoyed before the separation and that she has not received any significant support since 2018. The respondent has been in a holding pattern waiting for this trial to conclude and an order is made with respect to support. This decision addresses that issue.

[11] The respondent is now 45 years of age with three young children going to school and her working full time. She has been economically devastated by the separation and the events post-separation. In my view, she requires a further period of spousal support to re-establish herself and obtain some degree of financial stability. I find that considering all of these factors, the applicant shall pay spousal support to the respondent until August 1, 2026, being 12 years from the date of separation subject to variation in the event of a material change in circumstances.

Additional Section 7 Expenses - Summer Camp, Therapy and Medicine for the Children

[12] In my reasons for judgment dated September 27, 2021, I addressed the issue of daycare and respite care. During closing submissions, neither party raised any other section 7 expenses. Upon receipt of the respondent’s spousal support submissions, I became aware that the respondent had included additional section 7 expenses being summer camps, therapy and medicine expenses. Upon a review of the trial evidence, I concluded that the respondent provided evidence in chief and was cross-examined by the applicant with respect to these issues. However, neither party addressed these additional section 7 expenses in their closing submissions. Despite the issue not being raised by counsel in final argument, the issues were before the court and should have been addressed. As such, I rule that pursuant to Rule 25(19) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, that I would provide supplemental reasons to address these expenses.

Summer Camps

[13] The applicant submits that because he takes the children to a cottage for two weeks in July and for two weeks in August to spend time with his family, that each party be responsible for their own section 7 expenses incurred during summer vacation. I reject this submission. The applicant is on vacation with his children for the two weeks in July and two weeks in August each year. While he testified that he works during these four weeks, the children are not placed in a camp but rather these weeks are spent with family and relatives. These expenses are not a summer camp but is a planned summer holiday with the children, their father and their extended family. The applicant’s claim is dismissed.

[14] With respect to the respondent’s claim for a March 2016 camp expense for the children in the amount of $1,350, I find that this expense is a section 7 expense and should be shared. There was no requirement to obtain the applicant’s consent before incurring said expense. This expense was in the best interest of the children and was a reasonable amount based on the parties combined incomes at that time.

[15] As a result of the June 28, 2016 Without Prejudice Partial Separation Agreement and the order of Justice Audet dated September 12, 2017, the respondent was required to provide the applicant with notice of her intention to incur any section 7 expense and obtain the respondent’s consent in writing before any liability for said expense was incurred. There is no evidence that the respondent ever provided the applicant with notice or sought his consent before incurring these expenses. As such, the respondent’s claims for summer camp in 2017 and 2020 are denied.

Therapy

[16] During the trial, the parties indicated that Patrick was admitted to the Portia Learning Center which was financed by a grant related to Patrick’s diagnosis of being on the autism spectrum. During the trial, the respondent admitted that she used part of the funds to support herself after separation. The amounts claimed for the therapy are significant but unfortunately, there is no evidence that Patrick was attending the program prior to July 2016. Nor is there any evidence that the respondent provided the applicant with notice and requested his consent to incur the expense which was significant in 2016 and 2017.

[17] I find that the respondent was aware that Patrick was attending the program but there is no evidence that the parties were required to fund the expense privately after the funding became available. Further, on September 12, 2017, Justice Audet ordered the respondent to provide the applicant with a complete accounting of all benefit payments, whether CCB, disability credits/benefits, or any other government tax benefits backs/credits received by or for the children. There is no evidence that the respondent provided that accounting. Further, there was insufficient evidence provided as to how much money the respondent received from the government for the specialized program for Patrick and how and when the money was disbursed. Further, at questioning, the respondent undertook to provide disclosure as to the cost of the therapy and the use of the grant funds received. She did not comply with that undertaking.

[18] I find that the respondent did not comply with the disclosure order of Justice Audet and did not comply with their undertakings at questioning and failed to provide an accounting of the therapy expenses versus the grants received during her testimony. Finally, at the trial she did not provide the accounting of the funds received in the funds disbursed. Consequently, I find that the respondent has not met her burden of proof and I reject these expenses.

Others

[19] With respect to the claim for $450 for the Lice Crusaders, the dental expenses, the vision therapy, the various medicines for the children, there is no evidence that notice was given to the applicant or that his consent was requested as required either under the agreement or the court order. As such, these claims are dismissed.

Calculation of Child Support, Section 7 Expenses and Spousal Support

[20] In determining the range of spousal support I have considered the SSAG recommended ranges of spousal support, my finding that the respondent is entitled to both compensatory and non-compensatory spousal support, the respondent’s needs, the applicant’s ability to pay, the residential arrangements of the children and finally the net disposable income to be received by each party. In determining retroactive support, I have taken the midpoint of the net spousal support for the years up to 2020. Attached as Schedule A are the DivorceMate calculations that I have relied on in arriving at my decision.

Year 2014

[21] When the parties separated on August 12, 2014, the respondent remained with the children in the matrimonial home and the applicant moved to his parents’ residence. The applicant continued to pay all expenses related to the matrimonial home until June 2015 when the parties agreed that commencing on July 1, 2015, the applicant would pay table child support, contribute to the daycare expense and pay spousal support.

[22] The applicant contests any retroactive order being made. He submits that it was unfair as he paid many expenses without any expectation that he would have to account for those expenses against a retroactive support order. I accept the evidence of the applicant that he was hoping to reconcile and for that reason encouraged the respondent to go on a vacation in October 2014 with the hope that she would come back and reconcile. The parties never reconciled. No proceedings were commenced in 2014 and in fact, proceedings were only commenced in 2016 by the applicant. There was no evidence that the respondent requested periodic support until sometime before July 2015. The parties did agree in the Interim Without Prejudice Partial Separation Agreement dated June 2016 that the respondent reserved her right to seek retroactive support back to separation.

[23] In my view, retroactive support would be appropriate if insufficient support was paid during this period of time. I found that the applicant would be credited with the sum of $49,101.53 based on expenses that he paid during the period ending December 31, 2014. I find that the applicant continued to pay the expenses that he was paying prior to separation and no notice was given to him in 2014 that periodic support would be formally requested.

[24] On the other hand, based on the applicant’s income of $414,697 and the respondent’s income of $73,814.03, the child support would be $6,563 per month while the appropriate monthly spousal support would be, in my view, the low end of the range being $4,372 per month. The combined child and spousal support of $10,935 per month would result in the respondent receiving 58.9% in the applicant 41.1% of the combined net disposable income of the parties.

[25] The result is that the applicant would have been entitled to $43,740 in child and spousal support for the four-month period while I found that the applicant had an entitlement to be credited $49,101 against any support order.

[26] Based on the payments actually made by the applicant, the amount of support that would have been ordered and that there is no evidence as to any request for periodic support during this period of time, I decline to make an order for retroactive support.

Year 2015

[27] For the year 2015, the applicant contests against any retroactive support order being made for basically the same arguments that he advanced for 2014. There was no evidence as to any request for support in 2015 prior to July 2015. However, the parties did agree that commencing July 1, 2015, the applicant would pay monthly child and spousal support in exchange for which the respondent would assume the carrying costs of the matrimonial home. Further, the Interim Without Prejudice Partial Separation Agreement signed in June 2016 specifically reserved the respondent’s right to claim retroactive support.

[28] Based on disclosures made during the reopening of the trial on February 7, 2022, the parties agreed that Workmen’s Compensation benefits received by the respondent during the year 2015 were not provided to the court and were not calculated in the respondent’s annual income. With the consent of both parties, the court received a revised DivorceMate calculation where the parties agreed that the respondent’s income was $181,130.

[29] In deciding whether to make a retroactive order for the year 2015, I have considered that the applicant is entitled to a credit of $139,522.37 against any retroactive order. Included in the credit are payments made directly to the respondent or on behalf of the parties’ matrimonial home exclusive of the mortgage payments. This sum is not exclusively restricted to direct payments.

[30] Based on the applicant’s income of $464,198 and the respondent’s income of $181,130, the applicant’s child support obligation was $7,285 per month and the appropriate level of spousal support would be the mid range of $2,463 per month, for a combined total of $9,748 per month, which would result in the respondent having 61.3% of the net disposable income and the applicant 38.7% of the net disposable income. The total child and spousal support for the year would be $116,976. Further, in 2015, the respondent had respite expenses and additional daycare expenses.

[31] Based on these factors, I find that the sums paid by the applicant were sufficient to meet the needs of the respondent and the children. As such, I exercise my discretion not to make an order retroactive for the year 2015.

Year 2016

[32] Based on the applicant’s income of $594,586 and the respondent’s income of $77,377, the table amount payable by the applicant was $9,013 per month totaling $108,156 for the year.

[33] Based on my child support findings, the SSAG recommend a range of spousal support of $8,435 (low), $9,856 (mid) and $11,343 (high). I find that the low range of $8,435 per month is the appropriate range and that it will provide the respondent with 59.8% and the applicant 40.2% of the net disposable income or $101,220 for the year. The net midpoint cost and distance of this case 52% of the spousal support is $4,355 per month.

[34] Based on these findings, child support for this period totals $108,156 plus spousal support of $101,220 plus $540 for net daycare expenses for a total of $209,916. I find that the applicant made payments by cheque in the amount of $43,250.93 and e-transfers of $146,338.76 for a total of $189,589.69.

[35] From the sum of $189,589.69, the sum of $108,156 should be applied towards child support leaving a balance of $81,433.69. From the sum of $81,433.69 I deduct the sum of $101,220 representing the spousal support leaving a balance owing of $19,786.31. As this retroactive spousal support is not taxable or tax-deductible, the net amount equals $10,288.88.

[36] I order the applicant to pay to the respondent $10,288.88 for retroactive spousal support for the year 2016.

Year 2017

[37] Based on the applicant’s income of $300,000 and the respondent’s income of $21,940, the table amount payable by the applicant was $4,888 per month totaling $58,656 for the year.

[38] Based on my child support findings, the SSAG recommend a range of spousal support of him $3,760 (low), $4,510 (mid) and $5,226 (high). The respondent incurred expenses in the amount of $50,555 for a respite care that were not found to be section 7 expenses but were to be considered in determining the range of spousal support. I find that the high range of $5,226 per month is the appropriate range and that it will provide the respondent with 61.6% and the applicant 38.4% of the net disposable income. For the year 2017, the spousal support payable is $62,712 for the year.

[39] I find that the applicant should be credited with paying $88,962.42 by way of cheques, $8,691.95 of e-transfers and $27,710.12 collected by FRO totaling $125,364.49. Based on these findings, child support for this period totals $58,656 plus spousal support of $62,712 for a total of $121,368. The difference of $3,996.49 shall not be credited as an overpayment to the applicant as I find that the applicant paid for the $50,555 of respite care without contribution by the applicant.

Year 2018

[40] Based on the applicant’s income of $100,000 and the respondent’s income of $25,326, the table amount payable by the applicant was $1,920 per month totaling $23,040 for the year.

[41] The SSAG recommend no spousal support is payable. I agree and make no order. I find the applicant should be credited with paying $4,437 by way of e-transfers in 2017 leaving a balance of $18,603. I order the applicant to pay to the respondent $18,603 in retroactive child support.

Year 2019

[42] Based on the applicant’s income of $175,000 and the respondent’s income of $23,817, the table amount payable by the applicant was $3,063 per month totaling $36,756 for the year.

[43] Based on my child support findings, the SSAG recommend a range of spousal support of $658 (low), $1,302 (mid) and $1,902 (high). I find that the high range of $1,902 per month per month is the appropriate range and that it will provide the respondent with 60.1 % and the applicant 39.9 % of the net disposable income. I find that the midpoint of the after-tax/benefit of spousal support is $1,249 per month totaling $14,988 for the year.

[44] I find that the applicant should be credited with the sum of $24,409.37 collected by FRO in 2019. Based on these findings, child support for this period totals $36,756 plus net spousal support of $14,988 for a total of $51,744. I order the applicant to pay to the respondent $27,334.63 in retroactive support for the year to 2019.

Year 2020

[45] Based on the applicant’s income of $175,000 and the respondent’s income of $47,278, the table amount payable by the applicant was $3,063 per month totaling $36,756 for the year.

[46] Based on my child support findings, the SSAG recommend a range of spousal support of $394 (low), $1,238 (mid) and $1,960 (high). I find that the mid range of $1,238 per month is the appropriate range and that it will provide the respondent with 58.9 % and the applicant 38.8 % of the net disposable income. I find that the midpoint of the after-tax/benefit of spousal support is $739 per month for a total of $8,868 for the year.

[47] I find that the applicant owes the respondent a total sum of $45,624 for child and spousal support in 2020. I find the applicant shall be credited with the sum of $1,371.47 paid in support payments in 2020. I order the applicant to pay to the respondent $44,252.53 in retroactive support for the year 2020.

Year 2021

[48] Based on the applicant’s income of $175,000 and the respondent’s income of $50,000, the table amount payable by the applicant was $3,063 per month totaling $36,756 for the year.

[49] Based on my child support findings, the SSAG recommend a range of spousal support of $306 (low), $1,142 (mid) and $1,823 (high). I find that the mid range of $1,142 per month is the appropriate range and that it will provide the respondent with 59% and the applicant 41% of the net disposable income. The total amount owing in spousal support for 2021 is $13,704.

[50] I find that the applicant owes the respondent a total of $50,460 for child and spousal support in 2021. I find the applicant shall be credited with the sum of $644 paid in support payments up to May 1, 2021. I order the applicant to pay to the respondent $49,816 in retroactive support for the year 2021 subject to any payments made subsequent to May 1, 2021 by the applicant.

Table Child Support, Section 7 Expenses and Spousal Support Commencing January 1, 2022

[51] Commencing January 1, 2022 and on the first day of each month thereafter, I order the applicant to pay to the respondent table child support for the three children of the marriage in the amount of $3,063 per month based on the applicant’s anticipated income fixed at $175,000 per year.

[52] Commencing on January 1, 2022 and on the first day of each month thereafter, I order the applicant to pay to the respondent spousal support in the amount of $1,142 per month per month based on the applicant’s anticipated income of $175,000 per year and the respondent’s income of $50,000 per year.

[53] The parties shall share in the section 7 expenses for the children. The respondent must obtain the consent of the applicant with respect to any section 7 expense before it is incurred. Such consent is not to be unreasonably denied. Based on the current child and spousal support order, the applicant shall pay 72% and the respondent 28% of the after-tax cost of any such expense.

Ancillary Orders

[54] I order the applicant and the respondent provide to each other, a copy of their personal income tax return by May 30 of each year commencing with May 30, 2022 and to provide a copy of their notice of assessment or notice of reassessment within 15 days of receipt.

[55] I order the applicant to provide to the respondent a copy of the corporate financial statement for Michael Switzer Corporation for the year ending September 30, 2021 by March 30, 2022. I order the applicant provide to the respondent a copy of his corporate financial statements on an annual basis by March 30 of each year.

[56] I order that upon production of the parties’ respective income tax returns and the applicant’s financial statement for Michael Switzer Corporation, the amount of child and spousal support may be reviewed.

[57] I order that on the first day of May of each year starting with May 1, 2022, the monthly amount of spousal support will increase by the indexing factor for the fourth month immediately before the indexing date in that year. The “indexing factor” means the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index for Canada for prices of all items for February of each year, as published by Statistics Canada. For the purposes of any such computation, the base month will be April 2020.

Life Insurance

[58] The applicant had a life insurance policy at the date of separation but by the date of the trial, no life insurance policy was in effect. The applicant testified that he could no longer afford to pay the premiums, resulting in the policies being terminated. The respondent seeks security for the child and spousal support by way of life insurance.

[59] The respondent makes three submissions. Firstly, the respondent seeks an order that the applicant obtain $500,000 in life insurance as security for child and spousal support. I reject this submission because the applicant does not have a life insurance policy in effect and there is no evidence as to the applicant’s insurability or the cost of any premiums for the applicant to obtain a life insurance policy of any amount. The Court of Appeal in Katz v. Katz, 2014 ONCA 606, addressed the issue of life insurance in a divorce proceeding as follows:

[74] That said, where there is no existing policy in place, a court should proceed carefully in requiring a payor spouse to obtain insurance. This case demonstrates the desirability of having evidence of the payor’s insurability and of the amount and cost of the available insurance. Careful consideration should be given to the amount of insurance that is appropriate. It should not exceed the total amount of support likely to be payable over the duration of the support award. Moreover, the required insurance should generally be somewhat less than the total support anticipated where the court determines that the recipient will be able to invest the proceeds of an insurance payout. Further, the amount of insurance to be maintained should decline over time as the total amount of support payable over the duration of the award diminishes. The obligation to maintain insurance should end when the support obligation ceases – and provision should be made to allow the payor spouse to deal with the policy at that time. Finally, when proceeding under the Divorce Act, the court should first order that the support obligation is binding on the payor’s estate.

[60] Secondly, the respondent raises, for the first time, in her supplemental support submissions, a request to secure the respondent’s support obligations. The respondent submits that the applicant has an abysmal history of not paying his support giving rise to the need for a security of his support. I find that the applicant paid expenses from August 2014 to June 2015 and then agreed to pay table child support and spousal support. Then the applicant paid support pursuant to a court order which was subsequently suspended. There has been no obligation to pay support since the suspension of the obligation until my reasons for judgment on September 27, 2021. As a result of a multiplicity of posttrial conferences, motions and continuation of the trial evidence, the decision on the quantum of retroactive and prospective child and spousal support has been delayed until the release of the supplemental reasons for judgment. I reject the request to secure his support obligations. The applicant practices law in Ottawa where his children reside and where he his exercising his parenting time.

[61] Thirdly, I agree with the respondent that any sums owing by the applicant to the respondent for retroactive support, equalization of the net family property or any other amount will be deducted from the applicant’s net share of the matrimonial home sale proceeds. There remains the issue of the accounting of the carrying costs of the matrimonial home and costs related to the trial to be adjudicated. Once there is a full accounting of all issues, I will make an order with respect to the proceeds of sale.

[62] Since the applicant has no life insurance at this time, I order that the applicant’s obligation to pay child and spousal support shall be binding on his estate. Further, I order that the applicant shall advise the respondent in writing if and when he has his life insured and provide the particulars of any policy of life insurance including but not limited to the name of the insurance company, the policy number and the named beneficiary. I order that upon the production of the particulars of the life insurance policy, this shall constitute a material change in circumstance permitting the respondent to apply to court to be designated as the beneficiary for both the child support and spousal support as applicable.

Summary

[63] I find that the applicant owes the respondent the sum of $291,162.29 calculated as follows:

a. $134,868.13 owing by the applicant to the respondent for an equalization payment. b. $6,000 owing by the applicant to the respondent related to the increased tax liability for the year 2015. c. $150,294.16 for retroactive support up to and including December 31, 2021.

[64] I find that the respondent owes the applicant $65,873.68 calculated as follows:

(i) $46,538.90 owing to the applicant for the carrying costs of the matrimonial home up to May 1, 2021. (ii) $8,018.12 owing to the applicant for the Honda Odyssey expenses. (iii) $2,072.41 owing to the applicant for half of the purchase price of the refrigerator. (iv) $1,000 owing to the applicant for the deductible on the garage door damage caused by the respondent. (v) $8,244.25 for half of the interest only payments on the Royal Bank of Canada capital loan.

[65] The matrimonial home is closing in March 2022. There remains the issue of an accounting of expenses incurred by the applicant since May 1, 2021, to the date of closing of the matrimonial home. The expenses to be shared equally are the mortgage payments, property taxes and property insurance. I order the parties to resolve the issue of the accounting of the expenses related to the matrimonial home within 10 days of the closing of the sale of the matrimonial home. If the parties are unable to agree, the parties may contact the Trial Coordinator to schedule a hearing before me to resolve any disputes.

[66] I order that upon the sale of the matrimonial home, that the balance of the proceeds of sale shall be retained in trust after the payment of the following expenses:

a. Real estate commission. b. Legal fees related to the sale. c. Royal Bank mortgage on the matrimonial home. d. Outstanding property taxes regarding the matrimonial home, if any. e. Registered liens or encumbrances by third parties. f. Any other expenses that the parties agree upon.

Remaining Seized of this Matter

[67] As I have conducted the trial and the post-trial proceedings and that this case is a high conflict matter on all issues, I will remain seized of this matter pending further order of this court.

Costs

[68] I order the respondent to provide her costs submissions not to exceed five pages, double spaced and in 12 point font with any offers to settle and a detailed Bill of Costs by March 7, 2022. I order the applicant to provide his costs submissions not to exceed five pages, double spaced and in 12 point font, with any offers to settle and a detailed Bill of Costs by March 21, 2022. I order the respondent may file reply cost submissions not to exceed two pages by March 28, 2022.

Released: February 18, 2022

COURT FILE NO.: FC-16-1046 DATE: 2022/02/18 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE BETWEEN: Michael Switzer, Applicant – and – Colleen Switzer, Respondent SUPPLEMENTAL REASONS FOR JUDGMENT Shelston J.

Released: February 18, 2022

Schedule A