Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: FS-16-00000507-0002 DATE: 2022-02-11 SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: Philip Shane Hiebert, Applicant AND: Maria Christina Eugenia Van Raalte, Respondent

BEFORE: Kurz J.

COUNSEL: Philip Shane Hiebert, Self Represented Maria Christina Eugenia Van Raalte, Self Represented

HEARD: January 10, 2022

Endorsement

[1] This is my endorsement regarding the portion of the Applicant’s motion to change that deals with retrospective and prospective support for the parties’ child, B.

[2] The Applicant, Mr. Hiebert (the “father”) seeks to change the child support terms of the order of Justice Giselle Miller of November 20, 2017 (the “Miller J. order”). That order, which was based on a shared parenting arrangement for B, calls for the income of the Respondent, Ms. Van Raalte (the “mother”) to be imputed at $24,500 per year. The income of the father was determined to be $87,000 per year. On consent, Miller J. ordered the father to pay support of $770 per month to the mother and for her to pay him $196 per month based on what the parties agree was an imputed income of $24,500 per year. The net payment that the father was required to pay was $574/mo. His payments were to commence on December 1, 2017.

[3] The shared parenting arrangement ended on November 23, 2019, when the mother was arrested for impaired driving and B came into the father’s primary care; where he remains to this day. However, the father continued to pay child support to Ms. Van Raalte through FRO direct deductions from his pay until I suspended them on July 13, 2020.

[4] Ms. Van Raalte has not paid any support to the father since B came into this care. She opposes his attempt to claim any support from her, citing a very low income that arises from her educational and employment status. For his part, the father points out that there was already an agreement to impute income to the mother. He says that he simply seeks a new imputation, of $30,000 per year, both retrospectively and prospectively. That amount is based on Ontario’s minimum wage.

[5] The support issues that I am required to determine are:

a. whether the father underpaid support to the mother before the parenting change of November 23, 2019, and if so by how much; b. the amount of the father’s overpayment of support to the mother from December 1, 2019 onward; c. The father’s entitlement to s. 7 expenses for B; d. The amount of child support, if any, the mother should pay to the father, retroactive to December 1, 2019.

The Amount of the Father’s Underpayment of Support Between November 20, 2017 and November 23, 2019

[6] The mother argues that the father underpaid child support to her before B came into his exclusive care. She claims a set-off of the amount of his underpayment from the amount, if any that she owes to him.

[7] The mother argues that the overpayment came in two forms:

a. the misapplication of the former iteration of the Child Support Guidelines (“CSG”) tables. Those tables changed, on November 21, 2019, the day after the Miller J. order was granted. The changed amounts increased the father’s support obligations to her under the Miller J. order; and b. he failed to accurately report his increases in income from 2017 – 19, meaning that she was unaware of his substantial increases in income.

[8] The present iteration of the CSG and its tables for the calculation of base child support came into effect on November 21, 2019, the day after the Miller J. order came into effect. Under the version of the CSG in effect on the date of the Miller J order, the father was ordered to pay support of $770 per month, based on an annual income of $87,000. However, under the amendment to the CSG tables which came into effect the day after the Miller J. order, the father’s support obligation on the same income would have been $810 per month, a difference of $40 per month. The mother’s support obligations did not change with the newer version of the CSG table.

[9] Under r. 25(19)(b) of the Family Law Rules, an order can be changed if it contains a mistake. Here, the mistake was the application of the iteration of the CSG tables that would no longer be in effect on the date of the first payment, December 1, 2019. The table support amount in the Miller J. order should have been $810 per month. I add that the error was that of counsel. Miller J. would have reasonably assumed that counsel had checked and included the proper table support amount in their minutes of settlement and draft order.

[10] That being said, the $40 per month miscalculation is not the end of the court’s consideration. It turns out that the father earned $16,000 more in 2017 than the $87,000 basis of the Miller J. order. Since the order was made less than six weeks before the end of 2017, the father knew or should have known that his support obligation was based on an incorrect figure. In light of the information asymmetry between himself and the mother, he had the onus of ensuring that his support obligations were based on the proper figures.

[11] The calculation of his underpayments of table support are set out below:

Year	Income	Should Have Paid	Actual Payment	Shortfall
2017:	$103,330	$936/mo.	$770/mo.	$ 166 [2]
2018:	$ 91,991	$846/mo.	$770/mo.	$ 912 [3]
2019:	$103,330	$936/mo.	$770/mo.	$1,992 [4]
Total Underpayment:				$3,070

The Amount of the Father’s Overpayment of Support Immediately After B Came into his Care

[12] The FRO enforced the Miller J. order against the father until I made my order of July 13, 2020. The parties agree that he overpaid support by $1,831.69 during that period.

The Father’s Entitlement to Claim s. 7 Expenses for B

[13] Under the Miller J. order, the parties are required to contribute to B’s s. 7 expenses at a ratio of 75% for the father and 25% for the mother. The order added that:

B’s current section 7 expenses include: rep hockey, rep ball hockey and soccer. These expenses shall include registration fees for each of these activities and, with prior written consent, equipment and other associated fees. Payment of these expenses shall be enforced by the Family Responsibility Office.

[14] Despite her view that she should not have to pay any table support, the mother does not dispute her continuing obligation to pay 25% of the s. 7 expenses cited above. The father has collected, through the FRO, most of the s. 7 expenses that he claims. He states that he is owed a further $554, less $213.96 that he collected for Flag Football (an activity for which the mother did not consent), $19.75 for an audiologist (no receipt provided). That leaves a total claimed of $260.29.

[15] The mother makes a number of arguments against having to pay many of the s. 7 activity expenses claimed by the father. She says, first off, that B is enrolled in too many activities for his own best interests. But the father says that these are activities in which B wanted to participate. As the primary caregiver, I will not question the father’s decisions in that regard, provided that the activities do not take away the mother’s parenting time and that they are in accord with the provisions of the Miller J. order above.

[16] The mother disputes some of the amounts claimed by the father as follows:

a. She argues that some of the father’s ice hockey expense calculations are inflated because he either double counted certain fees, or he received a refund of the fees. She claims to have obtained this information from officials with B’s hockey organization. But that hearsay information is uncorroborated. The father has presented the appropriate receipts, which I accept.

1. The mother argues that she should not have to pay for B’s Select hockey because it is a level below the “Rep” or Representative (of the hockey association for which one is playing) tier of hockey league. The organized hockey system in which B plays is divided into three tiers, based on skill level. House league is the lowest and is available for the least skilled and or competitive players. No try-outs are generally required for house league. Rep hockey is the most skilled and competitive level, and try-outs are required. Select is the mid-level between house league and Rep.
2. For one year, B did not make his hockey associations’ Rep team. For that year, he was placed in a Select team. He earned a place on his Rep team the following year and continues to play at that level. While the Miller J. order refers to Rep hockey, that is what I understand to be the level of hockey at which he was playing at the time of the Miller J. order. There is no evidence before me to indicate that the parties had intended to exclude support for Select hockey if B was not able to make his Rep team. I do not believe that they intended to punish him if he did not reach the Rep level of hockey for any year. I allow the Select hockey expense.
3. I also accept that indoor soccer is a form of soccer set out in the Miller J. order and allow the expense.
4. While the mother seems to wish to challenge the extended health expenses that the father claims, I see no reason to do so, other than the audiology, where no receipt is provided.

The Amount of Support, if any, the Mother Should pay to the Father, Retroactive to December 1, 2019

The Mother’s Arguments and Evidence Against a Further Income Imputation

[17] The mother seeks to avoid any obligation to pay table child support for B from the time that he came into the father’s care on November 23, 2019. She states that she was originally in school but then obtained a job in the gaming industry. She was working at that job when the pandemic closed her workplace. She states that she currently receives only the Canada Lockdown benefit. She states that the father continued to work and earn a substantial salary. Thus, in her telling, he does not need the child support from her. She states that when the pandemic is over and she returns to her job, she will start paying support.

[18] The mother has provided no evidence of any educational programme in which she was enrolled or its career utility. Nor has she provided evidence that she has sought employment of any kind since she was first laid off from her job. She admits that she has not done so. When asked why she did not seek alternate employment after being laid off of her job, she stated that she continues to receive her health benefits from her employer and retains her seniority. She also claims that if she were to work while she is laid off from her present employment, she would lose her health benefits. She has supplied no evidence to that effect or the extent of those benefits or her medical needs.

[19] As stated above, the father says that income has already been imputed to the mother, on consent, at the rate of $24.500 per year. He says that the imputation should continue but at a higher level: minimum wage, or $30,000 per year.

[20] While the mother justly complains that the father did not advise her of his salary increases, she did not do the same for the father when her income increased above the imputed, sub-minimum wage level. In saying that, I recognize that her increases were more modest than that of the father. The mother’s record of employment shows that she started working at Canada Gaming West (“CGW”) on or about September 10, 2019. She earned $16,985.17 over the following 24 weeks, or $707.72/week. That translates to $36,801.44 over 52 weeks. It also represents a 50% increase over the income imputed to her. There is no evidence that the mother informed the father after she obtained her job with CGW.

[21] To be fair, the mother’s 2019 Notice of Assessment shows a total income of $9,599 for the year, presumably reflecting her unemployment earlier in the year.

[22] The mother’s 2020 Notice of assessment shows that she earned $33,313 that year. Again, there is no evidence that she advised the father of her income that year or that she made any attempt to pay support that year.

[23] The mother was laid off by her employer at the advent of the pandemic, on March 14, 2020. Considering her income for 2020, she appears to have received CERB benefits that year. She returned to work at CGW over a year after her lay-off, on June 6, 2021. She then worked on what appears to be a very part-time basis until December 30, 2021. She earned a total of $4,064.32 from CGW in 2021. She also received some government benefits, but provides no actual evidence of the total amount she received in 2021.

Legal Principles Regarding Retroactive Variation of Child Support

[24] The principles that guide a request to retroactively vary a support obligation are set out by Martin J., writing for the Supreme Court of Canada, in Colucci v Colucci, 2021 SCC 24, [2021] S.C.J. No. 24, as follows:

113 To summarize, where the payor applies under s. 17 of the Divorce Act to retroactively decrease child support, the following analysis applies:

(1) The payor must meet the threshold of establishing a past material change in circumstances. The onus is on the payor to show a material decrease in income that has some degree of continuity, and that is real and not one of choice. (2) Once a material change in circumstances is established, a presumption arises in favour of retroactively decreasing child support to the date the payor gave the recipient effective notice, up to three years before formal notice of the application to vary. In the decrease context, effective notice requires clear communication of the change in circumstances accompanied by the disclosure of any available documentation necessary to substantiate the change and allow the recipient parent to meaningfully assess the situation. (3) Where no effective notice is given by the payor parent, child support should generally be varied back to the date of formal notice, or a later date where the payor has delayed making complete disclosure in the course of the proceedings. (4) The court retains discretion to depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity where the result would otherwise be unfair. The D.B.S. factors (adapted to the decrease context) guide this exercise of discretion. Those factors are: (i) whether the payor had an understandable reason for the delay in seeking a decrease; (ii) the payor's conduct; (iii) the child's circumstances; and (iv) hardship to the payor if support is not decreased (viewed in context of hardship to the child and recipient if support is decreased). The payor's efforts to pay what they can and to communicate and disclose income information on an ongoing basis will often be a key consideration under the factor of payor conduct. (5) Finally, once the court has determined that support should be retroactively decreased to a particular date, the decrease must be quantified. The proper amount of support for each year since the date of retroactivity must be calculated in accordance with the Guidelines.

114 It is also helpful to summarize the principles which now apply to cases in which the recipient applies under s. 17 to retroactively increase child support:

a) The recipient must meet the threshold of establishing a past material change in circumstances. While the onus is on the recipient to show a material increase in income, any failure by the payor to disclose relevant financial information allows the court to impute income, strike pleadings, draw adverse inferences, and award costs. There is no need for the recipient to make multiple court applications for disclosure before a court has these powers. b) Once a material change in circumstances is established, a presumption arises in favour of retroactively increasing child support to the date the recipient gave the payor effective notice of the request for an increase, up to three years before formal notice of the application to vary. In the increase context, because of informational asymmetry, effective notice requires only that the recipient broached the subject of an increase with the payor. c) Where no effective notice is given by the recipient parent, child support should generally be increased back to the date of formal notice. d) The court retains discretion to depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity where the result would otherwise be unfair. The D.B.S. factors continue to guide this exercise of discretion, as described in Michel. If the payor has failed to disclose a material increase in income, that failure qualifies as blameworthy conduct and the date of retroactivity will generally be the date of the increase in income. e) Once the court has determined that support should be retroactively increased to a particular date, the increase must be quantified. The proper amount of support for each year since the date of retroactivity must be calculated in accordance with the Guidelines.

Legal Authorities Regarding the Imputation of Income

[25] Under s. 19(1)(a) of the Child Support Guidelines, a court has the power to impute an income to a party which is greater than their actual income. The provision reads as follows:

Imputing income

19. (1) The court may impute such amount of income to a parent or spouse as it considers appropriate in the circumstances, which circumstances include,

(a) the parent or spouse is intentionally under-employed or unemployed, other than where the under-employment or unemployment is required by the needs of any child or by the reasonable educational or health needs of the parent or spouse;

[26] The leading Ontario case regarding the imputation of income to a support payor is the decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Drygala v. Pauli (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 711 (Ont. C.A.). At para. 32 of that decision, the Court described the imputation of income as:

... one method by which the court gives effect to the joint and ongoing obligation of parents to support their children. In order to meet this legal obligation, a parent must earn what he or she is capable of earning.

[27] As Chappel J. of the Superior Court Family Division explained in Szitas v. Szitas, 2012 ONSC 1548, at para. 56, citing Drygala v. Pauli:

The Ontario Court of Appeal has held that in determining whether to impute income on the basis that a party is intentionally underemployed or unemployed pursuant to section 19(1)(a) of the Guidelines, it is not necessary to establish bad faith or an attempt to thwart child support obligations. A parent is intentionally underemployed within the meaning of this section if they earn less than they are capable of earning having regard for all of the circumstances. In determining whether to impute income on this basis, the court must consider what is reasonable in the circumstances.

[28] In reviewing the applicable case law, Chappel J. cites seven principles that apply to the imputation of income to a support payor:

1. There is a duty on the part of the payor to actively seek out reasonable employment opportunities that will maximize their income potential so as to meet the needs of their children.
2. Underemployment must be measured against what is reasonable to expect of the payor having regard for their background, education, training and experience.
3. The court will not excuse a party from their child support obligations or reduce these obligations where the party has persisted in un-remunerative employment, or where they have pursued unrealistic or unproductive career aspirations. A self-induced reduction of income is not a basis upon which to avoid or reduce child support payments.
4. If a party chooses to pursue self-employment, the court will examine whether this choice was a reasonable one in all of the circumstances, and may impute an income if it determines that the decision was not appropriate having regard for the parent's child support obligations.
5. When a parent experiences a change in their income, they may be given a "grace period" to adjust to the change and seek out employment in their field at a comparable remuneration before income will be imputed to them. However, if they have been unable to secure comparable employment within a reasonable time frame, they will be required to accept other less remunerative opportunities or options outside of the area of their expertise in order to satisfy their obligation to contribute to the support of their children.
6. Where a party fails to provide full financial disclosure relating to their income, the court is entitled to draw an adverse inference and to impute income to them.
7. The amount of income that the court imputes to a parent is a matter of discretion. The only limitation on the discretion of the court in this regard is that there must be some basis in the evidence for the amount that the court has chosen to impute. (at para. 57, citations omitted).

[29] Amplifying on Chappel J.'s seven points, while I have broad discretion to impute income to a payor, that discretion is not untrammeled. As the Ontario Court of Appeal stated in Drygala v. Pauli:

Section 19 of the Guidelines is not an invitation to the court to arbitrarily select an amount as imputed income. There must be a rational basis underlying the selection of any such figure. The amount selected as an exercise of the court's discretion must be grounded in the evidence. (at para. 44).

[30] In Drygala v. Pauli the Ontario Court of Appeal set out the following three questions which should be answered by a court in considering a request to impute income under s. 19 (1) (a) of the CSG:

1. Is the party intentionally under-employed or unemployed?
2. If so, is the intentional under-employment or unemployment required by virtue of his reasonable or health educational needs?
3. If not, what income is appropriately imputed?

[31] The test set out in Drygala v Pauli was refined by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Lavie v Lavie, 2018 ONCA 10. There, Rouleau J.A., speaking for the court, set out a very clear black line test for intentional underemployment. It is one in which the subjective reasons for the underemployment (other than health or education needs) are not relevant. He wrote:

26 There is no requirement of bad faith or intention to evade support obligations inherent in intentional underemployment: Drygala v. Pauli, at paras. 24-37. the reasons for underemployment are irrelevant. If a parent is earning less than she or he could be, he or she is intentionally underemployed.

[Emphasis added]

[32] I add that once the court determines that it is necessary to impute income, the onus is on the party proposing a different amount on a motion to change (or a different approach to the calculation of income) to establish a material change in circumstances. In Galati v. Leach, 2018 ONCJ 315 (O.C.J.), O'Connell J. of the Ontario Court of Justice stated at para. 49 that it is well settled law that when, as here, "... income is imputed, then the issue will generally be res judicata on a motion to vary or change support... Although the court always has discretion with respect to the issue of res judicata and can consider fraud, fresh evidence, additional disclosure or issues of fairness, the principle of res judicata provides that generally, a matter cannot be re-litigated once it has been determined on its merits." [Citations omitted.]

[33] In order to prove a material change from an imputed income amount, it is not sufficient to point to tax returns, showing annual income figures that differ from those in the original order. Rather, evidence must be presented to satisfy the court that the rationale and calculations which led to the original imputation of income are no longer appropriate: Trang v. Trang 2013 ONSC 1980 (SCJ).

[34] At para. 63 of Colucci, Martin J. adopted this statement of Pazaratz J. in Trang:

53 If "declared income" automatically prevailed on a motion to change support, it would defeat the purpose of imputing income in the first place. It might even be a disincentive for payors to participate in the initial court process. They could simply ignore support Applications - as they often do. They could wait to see if the court imputes income, and how much. If dissatisfied with the amount, the payor could later return to court waving their tax returns, to suggest that the original judge got it wrong.

[35] Pazaratz J. added the following comments in Trang:

54 Support claimants should not be forced to go through this two-step process. Our family court system certainly can't afford it.

55 Similarly, the onus should not fall on the support recipient to establish why income should still be imputed on a motion to change. That determination has already been made. The onus is on the support payor to establish that there should be a change in the way their income is to be calculated.

Analysis

[36] The mother was aware of the material change in circumstances that placed B in the care of the exclusive of the father. While she seeks a retroactive decrease in her support obligations back to that date, she gave the father no notice of any need to change the income imputed to her nor did she provide him with any disclosure to support such a claim.

[37] The father brought his motion to change both the formal parenting and support arrangements on June 30, 2020. Among other relief, he sought to impute a $30,000 per year income to the mother. The only notice that the mother offered to the father was in the form of a response to his motion to change, which was unsworn and late-filed almost nine months later, on or about April 14, 2021. She asked that any support be based on actual incomes, rather than imputed income. She offered no reason for that proposed change.

[38] Upon the change in B’s primary care, which occurred on November 23, 2019, the mother became obliged to continue to pay table support to the father while he was no longer required to pay her a larger set-off amount. Her obligations began when the next support payment was due, December 1, 2019. At that time, she was employed and earning the equivalent of $36,801 per annum. But she did not earn that amount throughout 2019. She actually earned less than $10,000 that year. For that reason, I will not change the original imputation of income for December 2019. There was no reason to change the original imputation of income at that time. She should have paid $196 that month.

[39] For 2020, the mother actually earned $33,313. Under s. 3(1)(a) of the CSG, she should have paid $285 per month or $3,420 for the year. The mother has presented no evidence or argument that would cause me to deviate from that figure.

[40] For 2021 onward, I do not have full evidence of the mother’s income. However, it is clear that she was intentionally underemployed that year and remains so. That is because, following her layoff by CGW in March 2020, she choose not to seek alternate work. She nonetheless earned $33,313 in 2020. But in 2021, she again chose not to seek alternate employment, Instead, she accepted unemployment and for a time, very part-time work.

[41] The mother says that she chose not to seek alternate employment in order to retain whatever seniority and benefits she accrues from CGW. She provides no evidence of the extent of the medical expenses that she incurs that make her retention of her job, even though she is not working, so necessary. Nor is there evidence of the extent of her benefits or the notion that she will loose them if she obtains other employment until she is recalled to her job.

[42] Thus, she was earning less than she was capable of earning and offers no evidence of a medical or educational reason for doing so.

[43] For all of those reasons, I agree with the father that the mother was in 2020 and 2021 and remains intentionally underemployed. She has an obligation to contribute to her son’s support, even when the father makes far more income than her.

[44] Having determined that the mother was intentionally unemployed from January 1, 2021 onward, I must next calculate the amount of income to impute to her for that period.

[45] The imputation of $24,500 per year in the Miller J. order reflected the minimum wage in effect at the time of the order: $11.40 per hour: https://news.ontario.ca/en/backgrounder/46359/minimum-wage-increases-for-october-1-2017. The minimum wage was $14.25 per hour from October 1, 2020 to September 30, 2021 and $14.35 from October 1, 2021 to December 31, 2021. It has now increased to $15 per hour: https://www.ontario.ca/document/your-guide-employment-standards-act-0/minimum-wage#.

[46] The income that the father seeks to impute to the mother reflects the minimum wage for the period commencing in 2021. For example, $14.25/hr. x 40 hours per week x 52 weeks works out to $29,640 annually. The increase to $14.35/hr. works out to $29,848, while $15.00/hr. works out to $31,200 annually.

[47] I note as well that in 2019, the mother commenced a job that paid more than the minimum wage at the time. But when laid off in 2020, she chose not to look for further alternate employment. But as set out above, her total income exceeded a minimum wage level. Then in 2021 she chose not to seek alternate employment. For those reasons, it is appropriate to impute a minimum wage to the mother for the years 2021 onwards when calculating her child support obligations.

[48] With all of the figures set out above, an imputation of $30,000 per year is reasonable in the circumstances for 2021 onward. The table support for that annual income is $256 per month, commencing January 1, 2021. The mother presently owes the father $3,584 for the period between January 1, 2021 and February 1, 2022 and $256 per month thereafter until further order.

Conclusion

[49] In conclusion, the father owes the mother $3,070 for his underpayment of table support between 2017-2019. The mother owes the father $9,291.21, consisting of:

a. $1,831.00 father’s overpayment of support from December 2019 – July 2020 b. $ 260.21 net unpaid s. 7 expenses c. $ 196.00 unpaid 2019 table support d. $3,420.00 unpaid 2020 table support e. $3,584.00 unpaid table support January 2021 – February 2022. $9,291.21

[50] The net set-off amount that the mother owes the father for child support from December 1, 2019 to date, both retroactive and retrospective, is $6,221.21 ($9,291.21 - $3,070).

[51] I have considered the fact that, despite my imputation of income, the mother remains unemployed. That does not mean that I should rescind the arrears, as the mother requests. In Colucci, the court was very clear that there is a presumption against the recission of arrears of child support. As Martin J, wrote:

138 Accordingly, in this third category of cases, the payor must overcome a presumption against rescinding any part of the arrears. The presumption will only be rebutted where the payor parent establishes on a balance of probabilities that -- even with a flexible payment plan -- they cannot and will not ever be able to pay the arrears (Earle, at para. 26; Corcios, at para. 55; Gray, at para. 58). Present inability to pay does not, in itself, foreclose the prospect of future ability to pay, although it may justify a temporary suspension of arrears (Haisman, at para. 26). This presumption ensures rescission is a last resort available only where suspension or other creative payment options are inadequate to address the prejudice to the payor. It also encourages payors to keep up with their support obligations rather than allowing arrears to accumulate in the hopes that the courts will grant relief if the amount becomes sufficiently large. Arrears are a "valid debt that must be paid, similar to any other financial obligation", regardless of whether the quantum is significant (Bakht et al., at p. 550).

[52] Here, that presumption has not been overcome, The mother states that she expects to eventually return to work for CGW. That is why she is holding on to her status with the company. Thus, the conditions necessary for recission are not met here.

Order

[53] The mother shall pay child support to the father as follows:

a. table support of $256 per month on the first day of each month, commencing March 1, 2022, until further order. b. 25% of the s. 7 expenses set out in the Miller J. order as interpreted above. c. $6,221.21 in retroactive and retrospective child support. That mount shall be paid to the father at the rate of $100 per month, on the first day of each month, commencing September 1, 2023, until the full amount is paid. I am offering the mother a further six-month grace period to begin making payments, until she is presumably back to whatever full-time employment may be available to her at CWG or any other place of employment she may choose.

[54] Regarding costs, I have heard arguments of the parties. There have been no offers to settle. While the father is the more successful party, the results remain mixed. Further, he did not offer the mother the timely disclosure required by the Miller J. order. Accordingly, I grant no costs.

“ Marvin Kurz J. ”

Electronic signature of Justice Marvin Kurz

Date: February 11, 2022

[1] Calculated for the year in question [2] Underpayment calculated for one month only, December 2017 [3] Calculated for 12 months [4] Calculated for 11 months, January – November 2019