COURT FILE NO.: CV-5427-00
DATE: 2021 02 08
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Jagroop Singh and Kulwinderjit Sindhu, Applicants, Responding Party
AND:
Punjabi Community Health Services, Respondent, Moving Parties
AND
Amandeep Kaur, Baldev Mutta, Ekta Choksi, Nirlep Gill, Navkiran Singh Gill operating as Dala Films Productions, Amanda Williams aka Faeghan, Satvinder Mutta, Rakhi Mutta, Mutta Productions Inc., Harjeet Mutta, Ansdeep Kapoor, Arvinder Kapoor, Shanjot Singh, Gurpreet Bhalla, Hybrid Cloud Technology Inc. and All Type I.T. Solutions Inc., Other Respondents
BEFORE: J.M. Woollcombe J.
COUNSEL: Mark A. Klaiman, Counsel for the Applicant, Responding Party
Edwin G. Upenieks and Angela H. Kwok, Counsel for the Respondent, Moving Party
Ted Evangelidis, Counsel for the Other Respondents
HEARD: January 27, 2021 by Zoom
ENDORSEMENT
Introduction
[1] Punjabi Community Health Services (“PCHS”) brings a motion seeking injunctive relief against the Applicants. It seeks a court Order that the Applicants, as well as other named individuals whose affidavits have been filed in support of the Application, be required to return to it all property and confidential information said to have been taken improperly. It also asks for an Order that the Applicants be restrained from further disclosing or mis-using this confidential information. While the Notice of Motion also seeks an Order striking those portions of the Application and Supplemental Application that refer to this confidential information, PCHS now agrees that the issue of whether to strike portions of the material filed in support of the Application should be dealt with by the Application judge. Finally, PCHS seeks an Order sealing the court file because it contains this confidential information.
[2] Counsel for the Applicants opposes the granting of any injunctive relief and opposes the sealing Order.
[3] Counsel for the Other Respondents, while present for the hearing of the motion, filed no materials and takes no position on the issues raised in the motion.
[4] For the reasons set out below, PCHS’s motion is dismissed.
Summary of the Relevant Facts and Procedural History
[5] The moving party Respondent, PCHS, is a not-for-profit corporation created in 1995 to deal with issues affecting the South Asian community in the Peel Region. In 2010, it became a registered charitable organization and a Health Service Provider funded by the Ministry of Health and Long-Term care. Its mandate is to provide health, settlement and social services to improve the quality of life in diverse communities. It provides such services as case management, supportive counseling, education and community engagement.
[6] Not surprisingly, the nature of PCHS’s services and clients require it to protect confidential information in its possession. It imposes on its employees confidentiality obligations that apply both during and after their employment.
[7] The Applicant Jagroop Singh is a former employee of PCHS. He was a volunteer with PCHS between 2009 and 2014 and became an employee from January 2015 until September 5, 2017, at which point his employment was terminated. The Applicant Kulwinderjit Sidhu is Mr. Singh’s ex-wife. Pushpreet Dhillon is another former employee of PCHS who resigned on October 4, 2017. While not an Applicant, her sworn affidavits have been filed in support of the Application brought by Mr. Singh and Ms. Sidhu.
[8] As employees of PCHS, Mr. Singh and Ms. Dhillon each signed an employment contract that contained a confidentiality provision. When Mr. Singh was terminated, he was provided with a letter reminding him of his obligation to maintain the confidentiality of all information obtained in the course of his employment at PCHS.
[9] On December 18, 2017, after both Mr. Singh and Ms. Dhillon were no longer employed by PCHS, Mr. Singh and Ms. Sidhu brought an Application, pursuant to the Charities Accounting Act, R.S.O. 1990, ch C.10, section 23 of the Trustees Act, ss. 97 and 98 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Supported by affidavits of Mr. Singh, Ms. Sidhu and Bhupinder Gill, the Applicants allege serious impropriety on the part of the Respondents. These allegations include misuse of funds and breach of trust. The relief sought by the Applicants includes an Order for the Public Trustee and Guardian to investigate, repayment of monies and the removal of Board members.
[10] In March 2018, PCHS and the Other Respondents served responding materials. In July 2018, the Applicants served reply materials. Included in this material is an affidavit of Pushpreet Dhillon.
[11] In November 2018, PCHS sought dates for a long motion to bring the motion that is now before the court. While PCHS first advised that it intended to bring this motion in November 2018, the earliest date that the court could provide for the motion was September 25, 2019. In December 2018 PCHS served and filed its Notice of Motion. Its Motion Record was served in June 2019 in anticipation of the September hearing.
[12] It is PCHS’s position that Mr. Singh and Ms. Dhillon breached their duties of confidentiality by improperly taking documents from PCHS before they left its employment, and by including confidential documents and information in their affidavit materials filed in support of the Application. PCHS submits that the nature of the confidential information that has been included in the Application materials filed falls into four categories of information obtained without the consent or knowledge of PCHS. There are: information relating to PCHS’ clients; PCHS’s financial and employee information; PCHS’s internal communications and communications with third party contractors; and information of third party contractors. PCHS seeks return of this confidential information and that the Applicants not be permitted to disseminate it.
[13] In support of its position that Mr. Singh and Ms. Dhillon took confidential information during their employment, PCHS retained information technology consultant Gurpreet Bhalla to investigate their conduct from a technology perspective. Mr. Bhalla has provided an affidavit, dated June 5, 2019. In respect of Mr. Singh, he says that his investigation revealed that Mr. Singh had removed from PCHS an external hard drive containing confidential information, that he had access to systems and documents in the course of his employment, included an accounting system that produced documents he included in his first affidavit, that he printed and copied an unusually large number of documents in the month prior to his termination and that in the last six months of his employment he was frequently at the PCHS office outside his regular work hours.
[14] In respect of Ms. Dhillon, Mr Bhalla says that she deleted documents from the PCHS Sharepoint system, that she sent numerous emails with PCHS documents, including confidential documents, to her personal email address and that she had access to a document related to one of the PCHS programs, which she included in her affidavit of July 25, 2018.
[15] In response, Mr. Singh provided a very short affidavit in September 2019. He does not deny anything in Mr. Bhalla’s affidavit. He says that he has searched his documents and that there are no documents in his possession that are not appended as exhibits to the affidavits he has produced and which have been filed.
[16] Ms. Dhillon’s affidavit filed in response, dated September 17, 2019, indicates that the exhibits to her affidavit are either her documents or, in the case of Exhibit E, a document she obtained through Sharepoint. Other than this exhibit, she says that she has no other documents in her possession belonging to PCHS. She also says that she has not disclosed confidential information of PCHS to anyone other than for the purpose of this litigation.
[17] On September 23, 2019, counsel for the Applicants requested an adjournment of the motion as a result of a death in his family and scheduled funeral on September 24, 2019. On consent, the motion was adjourned to July 22, 2020.
[18] In March 2020, counsel for PCHS advised counsel for the Applicants that it intended to bring a motion to strike the Application, in light of an affidavit from Kulwinderjit Sidhu. It was agreed that the motion to strike the Application should be heard with this injunction motion. Counsel for the Applicants indicated he would bring a cross-motion to substitute Kulwinderjit Sidhu with another applicant. In July 2020, counsel agreed to adjourn the motion to January 27, 2021 at which time the motion for injunctive relief, motion to strike the Application and the Applicant’s cross-motion would all be heard.
[19] There is no motion to strike the entire Application. Nor is there a cross-motion by the Applicants. The only motion is brought by PCHS and seeks the injunctive relief already described, that portions of the Application to be struck, as was first requested in the Notice of Motion of December 2018 and the sealing order.
[20] In response to the motion, the Applicant accepts that its Application material contains documents that were subject to the confidentiality agreements that bound Mr. Singh and Ms. Dhillon. I understood counsel to agree that they are in breach of their duties of confidentiality. Their position, however, is that they are whistleblowers and that they are attempting to expose the wrongdoings of PCHS. As a result, they submit that they are entitled to use these documents for this litigation purpose.
[21] PCHS responds to the argument that the Applicants are whistleblowers with the submission that they cannot rely on the protection of being whistleblowers when there is no evidence that they tried to resolve the matter internally, using the “up the ladder approach”. PCHS says that under both its Code of Ethics, to which the Applicants were subject, and the common law respecting whistleblowing, this approach is required before whistleblowing protection is available.
Legal test for an injunction
[22] The parties agree that the test for an injunction, as set out in R.J.R. Macdonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), (1994) 1994 CanLII 117 (SCC), 1 S.C.R. 311 at paras. 83-85, puts the burden on the moving party, PCHS, to establish:
(a) That there is a serious issue to be tried;
(b) That it would suffer irreparable, non-compensable harm in the absence of the injunctive relief; and
(c) That the balance of convenience favours granting the injunction.
Analysis
i) Is there a serious issue to be tried?
[23] The first stage of the test asks whether PCHS has established that it has a prime facie case. This test can be met if PCHS can show that its claim is not frivolous or vexatious. In my view, the moving party has met its onus of establishing that there is a serious issue to be tried.
[24] Mr. Singh and Ms. Dhillon were, while employed by PCHS, and after the end of their employment, required to maintain the confidentiality of information that came into their possession by virtue of their employment. It is undisputed that material that falls within the rubric of being confidential information has been filed in support of the Application. This raises a serious issue about the alleged misappropriation of confidential documents and information.
[25] The Applicants say that PCHS should not be able to rely on the confidentiality agreement to prevent it from retaining and disclosing its serious allegations of impropriety on PCHS’s part for two reasons. First, it is submitted that when an employer who wrongfully dismisses an employee is prevented from enforcing restrictive covenants in the former employee’s contract of employment. Second, the applicants seek to rely on the assertion that Mr. Singh is a whistleblower and so should be permitted to rely on the confidential information to support his serious allegations.
[26] I am not persuaded that PCHS is precluded from relying on the confidentiality agreement because Mr. Singh was wrongfully dismissed. First, I have no evidence that he was wrongfully dismissed. His affidavit evidence suggests that he was terminated because he refused to continue to engage in what he believed was wrongdoing. PCHS’s affidavit evidence says that he was terminated because his position became redundant. Counsel advise that Mr. Singh brought an action for wrongful dismissal and that it has been resolved. Nothing about that resolution is in evidence.
[27] Even had there been evidence of a wrongful dismissal, which I cannot find on this record, I am not persuaded that this would preclude PCHS from relying on the confidentiality agreements. I am not satisfied that the case upon which the Applicants rely in support of their position, Globex Foreign Exchange Corporation v. Kelcher, 2011 ABCA 240 prevents an employer from relying on a confidentiality agreement following a wrongful dismissal. Globex was about whether a wrongful dismissal relieved the employee with covenants restricting future employability. In that context, it makes sense that the ex-employee not be bound by the contract and be able to seek other employment, But, even in Globex, the court recognised at para. 27 that had the respondents taken confidential information, they would arguably still have been in breach of their common law obligations. I do not conclude from Globex that had there been a wrongful dismissal, Mr. Singh could have breached his confidentiality obligations.
[28] The trickier issue is whether the Applicants are permitted to breach their confidentiality obligations because Mr. Singh is a whistleblower.
[29] Mr. Singh was subject to the PCHS Code of Ethics, which has a specific “Procedure to deal with allegations of violations of ethical codes”. This permits any employee to report a violation of the Code of Ethics by completing an Incident Report and submitting it to their supervisor, with a copy to the Human Resources Department or, if their Supervisor is involved, directly to the Human Resources Department. It is undisputed that Mr. Singh never followed this procedure.
[30] The whistleblower protection is an “exception to the duties that employees normally owe to their employer”. Employees are exempted from their traditional contractual obligations on the public policy basis that there should be “no confidence as to the disclosure of iniquity”: Merk v. International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental and Reinforcing Iron Workers, Local 771, 2005 SCC 70 (“Merk”) at para. 14; Ferreira v. Richmond (City), 2007 BCCA 131 at paras. 58-59.
[31] Whistleblower protection seeks to reconcile the employee’s duty of loyalty to an employer with the public interest in suppression of unlawful activity. The balance is best achieved when loyal employees try to address problems internally, rather than by going to the police. Indeed, the duty of loyalty is said to require an employee to exhaust internal mechanisms before going public. This “up the ladder approach” has been endorsed by Canadian courts: Merk, at paras. 23-24.
[32] PCHS says that having failed to follow its Code of Ethics, or to raise the matter internally, Mr. Singh does not fall within the whistleblower exception. There is a factual dispute between the parties respecting whether, and to what extent, Mr. Singh addressed his issues internally prior to his termination.
[33] In his initial affidavit, Mr. Singh said that before his termination, he raised his concerns about what was happening at PCHS with the Respondents Amandeep Kaur and Baldev Mutta. Their affidavits, and other affidavits filed in response by PCHS on the Application, dispute both the truth of the allegations made by Mr. Singh and dispute that he had the discussions he says were had. There has, to date, been no cross-examination on any of the affidavits.
[34] It is very difficult to determine the extent to which concerns were in fact raised by Mr. Singh during the course of his employment at PCHS. This makes it difficult to determine to which the Applicants may be able to avail themselves of the whistleblower exception. I find, on the basis of this factual dispute, that there is a serious issue to be tried as to whether Mr. Singh and Ms. Dhillon breached their duty of confidentiality by taking confidential information from PCHS, retaining it and including it in publicly available court documents. Further, there is a serious issue as to whether or not they can rely on the confidential information in support of the Application.
ii) Would there be irreparable harm of the order is not made?
[35] There is an obligation on the moving party, PCHS, to adduce evidence that irreparable harm will occur if the Order sought is not made. This obligation exists regardless of whether it is loss of market share or irrevocable harm to good will or reputation. There must be evidence that damage “will occur”, not that it “may” occur. Evidence of irreparable harm must be clear and cannot be founded on likelihood, speculation or inference: Dole Food Co. Inc. v. Nabisco Ltd. 2000 CanLii 16330 (F.C.) at paras. 28-29; Longyear Canada, ULC v. 89173 Ontario (J.N. Precise), 2007 CanLii 54076 (ONSC) at para. 37.
[36] The irreparable harm branch of the test requires consideration of the nature of the harm that would be suffered if the relief sought is not granted.
[37] In its Notice of Motion, PCHS asserts that if the Order sought is not granted, it will suffer “irreparable harm to the reputation and operations of PCHS and to the privacy interest of PCHS’s clients”.
[38] The only evidence of irreparable harm is in the affidavit of Anupma Sharma, dated June 4, 2019, filed in her capacity as President of PCHS. She asserts that a court Order is needed to require the Applicants and Ms. Dhillon to provide affidavits itemizing all property and confidential information that they have misappropriated from PCHS, and to ensure that they return same. Further, she says that an Order is required preventing them from using any of the confidential information for any purpose.
[39] The affidavit continues, saying:
There is a strong need to preserve the confidentiality of PCHS’ information, as it relates to highly sensitive information relating to its clients and its programs. Without a court order to prevent further improper use of all of the information misappropriated by the Applicants and Pushpreet, there is a high risk that there will be irreparable harm to PCHS’s reputation and its continued operations in providing services to the community.
[40] In my view, there is insufficient evidence to establish that court Orders are needed to prevent irreparable harm.
[41] First, I am troubled by the delay in bringing this motion. A significant period of time has elapsed since PCHS first learned that its confidential information was in the possession of Mr. Singh and Ms. Dhillon and had been included in the Application. That occurred when the Application was filed in December 2017. While responding materials were filed shortly after, there was no indication that injunctive relief would be sought until November 2018, eleven months later. Setting aside that the hearing of the injunction was not for more than two further years, and addressing only the initial eleven month delay, it is difficult to accept PCHS’s submission respecting irreparable harm when the documents were known to be in the possession of Mr. Singh and Ms. Dhillon, and in the public court file, for such a long period, with no steps taken to rectify the situation. Surely, if there was a genuine likelihood of harm, relief would have been requested much faster. I think the delay seriously undermines PCHS’s claim that the Orders are needed to prevent irreparable harm.
[42] Second, the affidavit evidence supporting this branch of the test is, in my opinion, both generic and speculative. There is no evidence that PCHS has lost any of its government funding. There is no evidence that it has lost any clients. There is no evidence that any of its clients have been at all concerned about any breaches of confidentiality. There is no evidence of any concerns or issues with suppliers. There is no evidence that there has been, by either Mr. Singh or Ms. Dhillon, disclosure of any confidential information apart from that arising in documents filed in this litigation. In short, despite the fact that more than three years have now elapsed since the Application was filed, there is no evidence that there has been or is likely to be any irreparable harm to PCHS from the Applicants having, retaining and using the confidential information in furtherance of litigation.
[43] Third, I have reviewed the documents appended to the affidavits that are said by PCHS to be the confidential information about which it is concerned. For the most part, these documents are internal emails and accounting documents and banking documents. They are not confidential counseling records. They are not generally personal records respecting clients. They are not, in my view, the sort of confidential documents over which there would be a strong expectation of privacy flowing from the nature of the records. Indeed, the only document referred to with a client’s name is a spreadsheet showing food delivery to seniors, which is attached to Pushpreet Dhillon’s affidavit as Exhibit “E”. She indicates in her affidavit that she deleted the names of the clients to protect their privacy when her affidavit was filed in court.
[44] While I accept PCHS’s argument that this is evidence that Ms. Dhillon has confidential information in her possession, and that she would have an unredacted copy of this spreadsheet, it seems to me that the redactions indicate the absence of any intention on her part to use confidential information from PCHS in a manner that will cause the sort of harm to PCHS that it is concerned about. In my view, while she may have made an error and failed to delete one name, I see this as an isolated error, and cannot conclude that the failure to redact that one name will result in irreparable harm to PCHS.
[45] Fourth, while PCHS submits that Mr. Singh and Ms. Dhillon have confidential information beyond that attached to their affidavits about which it is concerned, I cannot make that factual finding on the evidence before me. Both Mr. Singh and Ms. Dhillon have provided affidavits indicating that all of the PCHS document in their possession have been attached to their affidavits. They were not cross-examined on these affidavits. PCHS submits that this is not credible as there would have been considerably more documents on the hard drive that Mr. Singh is said, by Mr. Bhatta, to have taken from PCHS, and in the documents that he printed and photocopied at the end of his employment. In particular, it was submitted that there would have been 300 GB of information on the hard drive and Mr. Singh now has that.
[46] Whether or not Mr. Singh took the hard drive cannot, at this point, be decided by me on the basis of the affidavits. Mr. Bhatta says he did, though he cannot say when, and it is very unclear from his affidavit what his basis is for this bald assertion. Mr. Singh has not responded directly to this allegation in his affidavit, though he says he has nothing beyond the documents he has filed. On the evidence before me, while I certainly cannot rule out Mr. Singh having the hard drive, nor can I make a factual finding that he has it or documents beyond those he has admitted to having in his possession.
[47] In light of this, it is speculative to conclude that there are further confidential documents in the possession of the Applicants or Ms. Dhillon that will be, or may be used improperly, and that this will cause PCHS irreparable harm.
[48] In all of the circumstances, I cannot find that PCHS has met its onus of establishing that it will suffer irreparable harm if the injunctive relief sought is not granted. Accordingly, I need not address the third prong of the test, the balance of convenience. The motion for the injunctive relief must be dismissed.
iii) Should the impugned portions of the Affidavits be struck?
[49] As I have indicated, I understood Mr. Upenieks to agree that the issue of striking the impugned portions of the affidavits should be deferred to the judge hearing the Application. As a result, I decline to comment on this issue.
iv) Should a sealing order be made?
[50] Section 137(2) of the Courts of Justice Act permits a court to order that any document filed in a civil proceeding before it be treated as confidential, sealed and not form part of the public record. As set out in Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance), 2002 SCC 41 (“Sierra Club of Canada”) at para. 53, a sealing order should only be granted when:
(a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
(b) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.
The first branch of the test has three important elements. First, the risk in question must be real and substantial, in that the risk is well-grounded in the evidence and poses a serious threat to the commercial interest in question. Second, the “important commercial interest," cannot merely be specific to the party requesting the order and must be one that can be expressed in terms of a public interest in confidentiality. Courts must remain alive to the open court principal, which yields only if the public interest in confidentiality outweighs the public interest in openness. Third, the judge must consider whether there are reasonably alternative measures and to restrict such an order as much as reasonably possible while preserving the commercial interest in question: Sierra Club of Canada at paras.54-57.
[51] PCHS says that the first branch of the test is met because a sealing order is needed to protect sensitive and confidential information about it and sensitive information relating to its services and clients. The submission is made that its reputation will suffer irreparable harm and its ability to operate as an important community service provider will be negatively impacted if its confidential information remains in the public.
[52] I do not agree that the first branch of the test has been met.
[53] I accept that PCHS’s interest here is preserving confidential information and the reputation of PCHS in the community. But I do not think a sealing order is necessary to prevent a serious risk to those important interests.
[54] There is really no evidence to support PCHS’s claim that its reputation will be irreparably damaged if the confidential information in the Application, including the Affidavits and Exhibits, is available to the public through the court file. Much of this material has been publicly available for more than three years. Yet, there is no evidence that as a result, PCHS has suffered any risk to an important interest. There is no evidence of this material has been accessed or disseminated. Certainly there is no evidence that PCHS has suffered any reputational harm in the eyes of its clients, third parties, including suppliers, donors and funders, or in the eyes of the broader community. In short, I have no evidence upon which to conclude that PCHS’s reputation has been at all affected by the court file being open to the public for three years. I have no evidence upon which to conclude its reputation will be affected if the file remains open pending resolution of the Application.
[55] Moreover, it is important to remember the nature of the confidential information about which PCHS is concerned. As I have said, it is not intimate or highly confidential information about counselling or clients. The documents are largely business records. Absent context, it is difficult to discern what they would mean to someone seeing them or how they would lead to PCHS suffering the harm suggested. As a result, the benefit of a sealing Order in this case is greatly diminished because disclosure of the confidential information just could not, in my view, have the effects that PCHS suggests.
[56] The second branch of the test requires a balancing between the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial, the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right to free expression, which, in turn, is connected to the principle of open and accessible court proceedings. While I need not assess this branch of the test, given my conclusion that the test has not been met on the first branch, it is my view that even had an Order been necessary on the first branch, the balancing under the second branch would have favoured not granting a sealing Order.
[57] I appreciate that the salutary effect of a sealing Order would be to protect confidential information of PCHS. However, a sealing Order cannot be made to shield a party from embarrassing allegations. In my view, sealing the court file would effectively prevent the public from learning about the very serious allegations that have been made. I see a significant negative potential effect of denying the public the opportunity to learn about the serious allegations made by the Applicants against this prominent, successful, not-for-profit charity in this community. As a result, I see the deleterious effects of a sealing Order outweighing the beneficial ones and that the balance favours such an Order not being granted.
Conclusion
[58] In accordance with this Endorsement, PCHS’s motion for interlocutory relief and a sealing Order is dismissed. The motion to strike the impugned sections of the Application material is adjourned, on consent, to the judge hearing the Application.
[59] The parties decided to await the outcome of this motion before setting a schedule for the Application to proceed. With the release of this Endorsement, counsel should determine a mutually agreeable schedule to move the Application forward so that it can be adjudicated upon.
[60] At the conclusion of the oral hearing, the Applicants and PCHS provided to the court their Bills of Costs. As the successful party, the Applicants are presumptively entitled to reasonable costs. The parties are encouraged to resolve the issue of costs between themselves. If they are unable to do so, I shall decide the issue of costs on the basis of written submissions. The Applicants shall have two weeks from the release of this Endorsement to serve and file their costs submissions of not more than two pages, double spaced, in addition to any case law. PCHS will have ten days to file responding submissions of the same length. There will be no reply without leave of the court.
J.M. Woollcombe J.
Date: February 8, 2021
COURT FILE NO.: CV-5427-00
DATE: 2021 02 08
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Jagroop Singh and Kulwinderjit Sindhu, Applicants, Responding Party
AND
Punjabi Community Health Services, Respondent, Moving Parties
Amandeep Kaur, Baldev Mutta, Ekta Choksi, Nirlep Gill, Navkiran Singh Gill operating as Dala Films Productions, Amanda Williams aka Faeghan, Satvinder Mutta, Rakhi Mutta, Mutta Productions Inc., Harjeet Mutta, Ansdeep Kapoor, Arvinder Kapoor, Shanjot Singh, Gurpreet Bhalla, Hybrid Cloud Technology Inc. and All Type I.T. Solutions Inc., Other Respondents
BEFORE: The Honourable Justice Woollcombe
COUNSEL: Mark A. Klaiman, Counsel for the Applicant, Responding Party
Edwin G. Upenieks and Angela H. Kwok, Counsel for the Respondent, Moving Party
Ted Evangelidis, Counsel for the Other Respondents
ENDORSEMENT
Woollcombe J.
DATE: February 8, 2021