Court File and Parties
COURT FILE NO.: CV-21-674054
DATE: 20211223
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: MC Gledhill, Applicant
-and-
City of Toronto, Toronto Transit Commission, Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 113, Respondents
BEFORE: FL Myers J.
READ: December 23, 2021
ENDORSEMENT
[1] Counsel for the respondent TTC requests that this matter be dismissed because it was commenced without leave. The request was delegated to me by the Reginal Senior Justice.
[2] By order dated September 15, 2015, Dunphy J. declared Mr. Gledhilll to be a vexatious litigant as described in s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C.43. Dunphy J. enjoined Mr. Gledhill from commencing or continuing any litigation without leave of the court first being obtained. The order made by Dunphy J. provided a procedure for Mr. Gledhill to seek leave to proceed from the RSJ in writing.
[3] A prior attempt by Mr. Gledhill to seek leave to proceed by a process that did not adhere to the order made by Dunphy J. was rejected in Gledhill v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2019 ONSC 442.
[4] Rule 2.1.03 provides for the mandatory stay or dismissal of a proceeding commenced without leave by a person who has been declared a vexatious litigant:
2.1.03 (1) If the court determines that a person who is subject to an order under subsection 140 (1) of the Courts of Justice Act has instituted or continued a proceeding without the order having been rescinded or leave granted for the proceeding to be instituted or continued, the court shall make an order staying or dismissing the proceeding.
(2) Any party to the proceeding may file with the registrar a written request for an order under subrule (1).
(3) An order under subrule (1) may be made without notice, but the registrar shall serve a copy of the order by mail on every party to the proceeding for whom an address is provided in the originating process as soon as possible after the order is made. [Emphasis added.]
[5] While the applicant in this case is identified as “MC Gledhill”, I note that he provides the same residential apartment address in his originating process as the Mark Gledhill who was declared a vexatious litigant.
[6] Mr. Gledhill has commenced this proceeding without obtaining, or even seeking, leave to proceed as required. Therefore I am required to stay or dismiss the application.
[7] I see no basis to stay this litigation. It purports to be public interest litigation regarding affairs between the TTC and its employees’ bargaining agent concerning video surveillance and masking. There is no apparent limitation period to be preserved or other reason to countenance an effort by Mr. Gledhill to bring civil proceedings without leave.
[8] It is important to recall that a person who has been declared a vexatious litigant is not barred from using the civil courts to seek a lawful remedy to which he or she may be entitled. Rather, because the litigant has previously been held to have “persistently and without reasonable grounds” instituted vexatious proceedings or conducted proceedings in a vexatious manner under s. 140 (1) of the CJA, before commencing any further proceedings, he or she must first establish on a preliminary basis that the proposed proceeding has some legal merit.
[9] The simple act of commencing a legal proceeding imposes burdens on the responding party. It has to retain counsel and devote resources, time, and attention to collect information to understand and respond to the claim. Where an individual is sued, there can significant distress associated with the simple act of being sued; let alone the financial distress of participating in the expensive civil justice system.
[10] As no one is entitled to bring a proceeding with no legal merit, it is not asking much for a potential litigant to show that a proposed claim meets a certain merits hurdle before imposing these burdens on the responding parties. This is especially the case where, as here, the applicant or plaintiff has been found to have abused the system “persistently”.
[11] The application is therefore dismissed in its entirety. The registrar is directed to mail and email the final order to the applicant as soon as it is issued and entered. Any need for the approval of the form of content of the final order by Mr. Gledhill is waived.
[12] Costs, if demanded, are payable by Mr. Gledhill on a substantial indemnity basis to all of the respondents forthwith after the assessment thereof.
Date: December 23. 2021
FL Myers J

