COURT FILE NO.: CV-16-69905
DATE: 20211116
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: THE TORONTO-DOMINION BANK, Plaintiff/Defendant by Counterclaim (Responding Party)
AND
1633092 ONTARIO LTD., 2362378 ONTARIO INC., MATTHEW ROONEY, and HALEY ROONEY, Defendants/Plaintiffs by Counterclaim (Moving Parties)
BEFORE: Madam Justice Heather J. Williams
COUNSEL: Oren Chaimovitch, for the Plaintiff/Defendant by Counterclaim (Responding Party)
Felix Boutin, for the Defendants/Plaintiffs by Counterclaim (Moving Parties)
HEARD: June 15, 2021
ENDORSEMENT
OVERVIEW
[1] The defendants seek leave to amend their statement of defence and counterclaim in an action in which the plaintiff, The Toronto-Dominion Bank (“TD”), is seeking enforcement of a certain loan, line of credit and guarantee agreements. The defendants have filed a proposed amended statement of defence and counterclaim. In their submissions on the motion, the defendants have divided their proposed amendments into three categories:
(a) amendments to plead that all defendants suffered damages;
(b) amendments to plead the tort of deceit; and
(c) amendments to expand the pleading of breach of honesty and good faith.
[2] Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that on motion, at any stage of an action, the court shall grant leave to amend a pleading on such terms as are just, unless prejudice would result that could not be compensated for by costs or an adjournment.
[3] The rule requires the court to grant leave to amend unless the responding party would suffer non-compensable prejudice, the amended pleadings are scandalous, frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of the court’s process or the pleading discloses no reasonable cause of action. (1588444 Ontario Ltd. v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 2017 ONCA 42, at para. 25).
[4] TD argues that the defendants’ proposed amendments are statute-barred, an abuse of process, untenable at law or a combination of these factors.
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION AND THE APPEAL
[5] TD and the defendants had both brought summary judgment motions, which were heard in January 2019. The motion judge released her decision in March 2019. The parties disagreed about the wording of the judgment. In October 2019, the motion judge signed a judgment which provided as follows:
• THIS COURT FINDS there is no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding liability and the only genuine issue is the amount(s) to which the parties are entitled. A trial of that issue will proceed.
• THIS COURT FINDS the Plaintiff, Toronto-Dominion Bank, negligently breached its contract with the defendants.
• THIS COURT FINDS that Ms. Rooney cannot rely on the improper valuation of the family home with regards to the HELOC.
• THIS COURT FINDS the Plaintiff must pay the Defendants’ costs related to the Motions for Summary Judgment in the amount of $20,000, payable within 30 days from the date of the Endorsement Regarding Costs.
• THIS COURT FINDS since it only dealt with the issue of liability, the issue of damages is bifurcated and will be the only issue reviewed at trial. The issue of the amount owing from the Defendants to the Plaintiff regarding the HELOC must be determined at trial since there will be a potential offset from the determination of damages for the Plaintiff’s breach of contract.
[6] In an endorsement accompanying the judgment, the motion judge said that, at trial, TD could argue the rule in Foss v. Harbottle, which had not been raised before her.
[7] Both parties appealed the motion judge’s decision. The appeal was in writing.
[8] On the appeal, TD argued that the judgment for negligent breach of contract should be in favour of 1633092 Ontario Ltd. (“163”) only, and not in favour of all defendants. TD argued that the relevant contract, an agreement for a Canada Small Business Financing Loan (CSBFL), was with 163 only. The Court of Appeal allowed this ground of appeal.
[9] TD also argued that it should be granted judgment for the amount owing under a Home Equity Line of Credit (HELOC) immediately. TD argued that it was entitled to judgment because: (a) the motion judge had concluded that Haley Rooney had no defence to TD’s claim under the HELOC; and (b) Ms. Rooney would have no right of set-off. The Court of Appeal rejected this ground of appeal, noting that the parties had agreed that only liability would be determined on the summary judgment motions and that the issue of damages would be tried. The Court of Appeal said it would be referring the counterclaim to trial and that the issue of any available set-off should be determined at trial as well.
[10] In their cross-appeal, the defendants argued that the judgment approved by the motion judge failed to include findings she had made with respect to breach of contract, negligence and negligent misrepresentation. The defendants asked that the judgment be varied to reflect the motion judge’s reasons. The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge had treated all of the defendants as one and that, although she appeared to have made findings of a negligent breach of contract, negligence and negligent misrepresentation, her reasons did not analyze in detail the causes of action or how the pleadings supported her findings. The Court of Appeal held that in the absence of particularized findings connecting the causes of action to the parties wronged and to the causes of action advanced in the pleadings, the subject matter of the counterclaim should be referred to trial, along with issues relating to Foss v. Harbottle, to which the motion judge had referred in her October, 2019 endorsement. The parties had earlier agreed that the issue of damages would be tried. As I have already noted, the Court of Appeal said that any rights of set-off for either of the parties would be referred to trial as well.
[11] The Court of Appeal said that, for clarity, neither Ms. Rooney’s liability for the HELOC nor the Bank’s liability for negligent breach of its contract with 163 would be tried, as those issues had already been determined.
THE DEFENDANTS’ PROPOSED PLEADING AMENDMENTS
[12] I will consider, in turn, each of the categories of amendments requested by the defendants.
A. The proposed amendments to plead that all defendants suffered damages: paras. 56 and 59 of the draft amended statement of defence and counterclaim
[13] In the prayer for relief in the defendants’ original counterclaim, at para. 58, all defendants requested damages for negligence, negligent misrepresentation and/or breach of contract. At para. 59 of the original counterclaim, “the defendants” pleaded and relied on the facts and allegations in their statement of defence. At para. 60, “the defendants” pleaded that they had suffered damages by virtue of breach of contract, negligence and negligent misrepresentation, the full particulars of which would be provided prior to trial.
[14] Although all defendants pleaded that they had suffered damages as a result of TD’s negligence, negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract, the original counterclaim did not set out the constituent elements of the tort of negligence and asserted negligent representation only on behalf of “Tosh”, which was how the defendants had identified 163 in the original pleading. (The defendants do not now seek to amend the portions of their pleading which deal with breach of contract, presumably because the Court of Appeal has already determined the issue on a final basis, having confirmed the motion judge’s conclusion that TD had negligently breached its contract, albeit with 163 only.)
[15] Paragraph 56 of the defendants’ proposed pleading deals with negligence. It states that TD owed all of the defendants a duty of care by virtue of the defendants’ banking relationship with TD and that by failing to advance the CSBFL, TD fell below the standard of care and caused damage to the defendants.
[16] Paragraph 59 of the defendants’ proposed pleading deals with negligent misrepresentation. It pleads that “the defendants” and not just “Tosh” state that TD had negligently misrepresented that the CSBFL was an appropriate product for their project and that the “the defendants”, and not just Tosh, had relied on TD’s representation.
TD’s position
[17] TD argues that the proposed amendments in paras. 56 and 59 are significant. TD argues that neither 2362378 Ontario Inc. (“236”) nor the Rooneys had pleaded personal causes of action against TD in the original statement of defence and counterclaim. TD argues that its successful ground of appeal before the Court of Appeal was because only 163, and not all of the defendants, had asserted a breach of contract claim against TD. TD submits that the claims the defendants now seek to add are statute-barred, because the defendants would have known of the facts they are now seeking to add for more than two years. TD also submits that seeking to add these claims after the summary judgment motion and appeal have been decided is an abuse of process and that the personal causes of action are untenable at law.
Analysis
Are the amendments in paras. 56 and 59 statute-barred?
[18] An amendment to a pleading will be statute-barred if, after the expiry of the limitation period, it seeks to advance “a fundamentally different claim based on facts not originally pleaded”: (United Food and Commercial Workers Canada, Local 175, Region 6 v. Quality Meat Packers Holdings Limited, 2018 ONCA 671, at para. 64, citing North Elgin Centre Inc., 2016 ONCA 848, at para. 23.)
[19] In proposed amended para. 56, which deals with negligence, the defendants plead that TD owed all defendants a duty of care by virtue of their banking relationship with TD and that, by failing to advance the CSBFL, TD acted below the expected standard of care and caused damage to the defendants. In their original pleading, the defendants had asserted that they suffered damages because of TD’s negligence. The proposed amended para. 56 does not, therefore, assert a new claim. It adds to the facts already pleaded two elements of the tort of negligence: a duty of care and a breach. It also pleads that the duty was owed to all defendants. Similarly, in proposed amended para. 59, the defendants do not assert a new claim; they had asserted in their original pleading that they suffered damages because of TD’s negligent misrepresentation. In proposed amended para. 59, they seek only to expand their particularized claim of negligent misrepresentation to a claim asserted by all defendants from a claim asserted by Tosh/163 only.
[20] A new cause of action is not asserted if the amendment pleads an alternative claim for relief out of the same facts previously pleaded and no new facts are relied upon, or amount simply to different legal conclusions drawn from the same set of facts, or simply provide particulars of an allegation already pled or additional facts upon which the original right of action is based. (1100997 Ontario Limited v. North Elgin Centre Inc., 2016 ONCA 848, at para. 20, citing Morden & Perrell, The Law of Civil Procedure in Ontario, 2nd ed. (Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2014) at p. 142.
[21] The proposed amendments in paras. 56 and 59 provide particulars of allegations already pleaded by setting out the constituent elements of the tort of negligence (para. 56) and by applying the particulars of the negligent misrepresentation claim to all defendants (para. 59.) The proposed amendments in these paragraphs do not constitute fundamentally different claims based on facts not originally pleaded. Consequently, I find that the proposed amendments are not statute-barred.
Are the proposed amendments in paras. 56 and 59 an abuse of process?
[22] TD argues that the amendments in paras. 56 and 59 are an abuse of process. TD argues that the amendments should have been sought before the summary judgment motions were argued. TD submits that it had argued before the Court of Appeal that 236 and the Rooneys had not asserted personal claims and that the defendants appear to be attempting to circumvent the Court of Appeal’s decision.
[23] For several reasons, I do not accept TD’s argument.: (1) TD successfully argued before the Court of Appeal that the motion judge’s finding that TD had negligently breached its contract with the defendants should be limited to a finding that the contract was with 163 only. The defendants are not now seeking to add personal claims for breach of contract and are not, therefore, attempting to circumvent the Court of Appeal’s decision. (2) The Court of Appeal’s finding which limited TD’s liability to 163 was in respect of the breach of contract only. The Court of Appeal made no similar findings in respect of any claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation. (3) The Court of Appeal specifically held that, although it appeared that the motion judge had made findings of negligence and negligent misrepresentation in addition to her finding of negligent breach of contract, in the absence of particularized findings connecting the causes of action to the parties wronged and to the causes of action advanced in the pleadings, the subject matter of the counterclaim should be referred to trial. (4) Rule 26.01 provides that a party may seek to amend a pleading at any stage of an action; the defendants are not precluded from seeking to amend their pleading because certain issues unrelated to the amendments have already been decided on a final basis. (5) As I have already found, the proposed amendments in paras. 56 and 59 only provide particulars of allegations already pleaded and apply the particulars of the negligent misrepresentation plea to all defendants.
[24] For these reasons, I find that the proposed amendments in paras. 56 and 59 are not an abuse of process.
Are the proposed amendments to para. 56 and 59 untenable at law?
[25] TD argued that the Rooneys and 236 were not customers of TD to whom a duty of care was owed. I understand TD’s argument to be that the Rooneys and 236 had no relationship with TD and were only guarantors of 163’s indebtedness. TD’s argument is not supported by its pleadings. In its reply and defence to counterclaim, for example, at para. 8, TD pleaded that the Rooneys had asked for a CSBFL and that TD’s financial advisor had advised and assisted them. In para. 9, TD pleaded advice it had given to the Rooneys in respect of applying for the CSBFL. In para. 12, TD denied that it had provided certain advice to the Rooneys and pleaded that it was unlikely that the Rooneys would have qualified for a loan other than the CSBFL. In its statement of claim, at para. 3, TD pleaded that 236 guaranteed 163’s indebtedness but then at para. 8, TD pleaded that it had also entered into a mortgage agreement with 236 in December 2015.
[26] TD has not satisfied me that the role of the Rooneys and 236 was limited to that of guarantor of 163’s indebtedness or that the Rooneys and 236 were not customers of the bank to whom a duty of care was owed. TD has not, therefore, satisfied me that the proposed amendments in paras. 56 and 59 are untenable at law.
Disposition with respect to paras. 56 and 59
[27] The defendants shall have leave to amend paras. 56 and 59 of their amended statement of defence and counterclaim in accordance with the draft amended pleading filed.
B. Amendments to plead the tort of deceit: Paras. 27-29, 61, 62, 65a, 67, 73 and 74 of the draft amended statement of defence and counterclaim
[28] The defendants’ proposed amendments in respect of the tort of deceit are based on an interest rate reduction in respect of the HELOC TD offered to Ms. Rooney in late 2015. Ms. Rooney signed a maintenance form in November 2015 to reflect the interest rate change.
[29] Neither the defendants nor TD had referred to the interest rate reduction or the maintenance form in their original pleadings. However, in its summary judgment motion, TD argued that the defendants were precluded from seeking damages related to the HELOC from TD based on an inflated valuation of the Rooneys’ home. TD argued that because Ms. Rooney had accepted the lower interest rate and had continued to draw on the HELOC, she could not claim damages from TD relating to the appraisal. The motion judge accepted TD’s argument that there had been accord and satisfaction.
[30] The defendants now seek to plead that TD knew the appraisal of the Rooneys’ home had been incorrect and that TD had enticed Ms. Rooney to agree to a lower interest rate on the HELOC to protect itself from liability and also to ensure that the parties would subsequently enter into the CSBFL.
TD’s position
[31] TD argues that the plea of deceit is a new cause of action based on new facts not previously pleaded and that the claim is statute-barred.
Analysis
[32] The defendants concede that the tort of deceit is a new cause of action not previously pleaded. The defendants argue that they did not discover their claim for deceit against TD until they received the decision in the summary judgment motions. In her affidavit in support of this motion, Ms. Rooney states that the decision was released on or about March 7, 2019 and that it was at that time that she became aware that the reduction in the interest rate had the legal effect of barring her right of action in respect of the misrepresentation on the value of her home.
[33] Accordingly, the defendants submit that it was when they learned that the motion judge had determined that they would be precluded from pursuing TD for the inaccurate appraisal that they discovered that TD had acted in a manner to deprive them of their rights and that they had suffered damages.
[34] The expiration of a limitation period gives rise to a presumption of prejudice. When an amendment is sought after the expiration of a limitation period, the party seeking the amendment must lead some evidence to explain the delay and rebut the presumption. The prejudice referred to under Rule 26.01 is prejudice to a party’s rights in prosecuting the action. Where there is an issue of fact or credibility relating to the discoverability of the proposed claim, the matter will usually be left to the trial judge to determine. (Sarokin v. Zhang, 2020 ONSC 1839, at para. 18 (citations omitted.)) If the plaintiff provides a reasonable explanation on proper evidence as to why the essential facts were not known or obtainable with due diligence such that the court determines there is a triable issue of fact or credibility on the discoverability allegations, the court will normally permit the amendment with leave to plead a limitations defence (Sarokin, at para. 24.)
[35] I find that the defendants have provided a reasonable explanation as to why they did not discover the factual foundation for a pleading of the tort of deceit before they received the motion judge’s decision on or around March 7, 2019. Before that time, they did not know that they would not be entitled to pursue TD for the appraisal. The defendants’ explanation was provided on proper evidence, the affidavit of Ms. Rooney.
[36] The defendants’ notice of motion for this amendment motion is dated March 10, 2021, three days after the second anniversary of the release of the motion judge’s decision. However, limitation periods in Ontario were suspended for nine months due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Consequently, I am satisfied that the defendants’ amendment motion was commenced well within the allowable two-year window following the day they say they discovered their claim.
Disposition with respect to the tort of deceit
[37] The defendants shall have leave to amend their pleading to plead the tort of deceit in accordance with the draft amended pleading filed. The granting of leave to the defendants to plead deceit shall be without prejudice to TD’s right to plead a limitations defence.
[38] Although TD argued that the Court of Appeal determined Ms. Rooney’s liability with respect to the HELOC on a final basis, the decision to grant the defendants leave to plead the tort of deceit in the counterclaim is not inconsistent with the Court of Appeal’s decision.
C. Amendments to expand the pleading of breach of honesty and good faith: Paras. 52 and 53 of the draft amended statement of defence and counterclaim
[39] The defendants seek to add two new paragraphs to their pleading to plead that TD failed to exercise honesty and good faith in its dealings with the defendants. The proposed new para. 52 refers to the maintenance form Ms. Rooney signed in respect of the HELOC; the proposed new para. 53 refers to the CSBFL.
[40] The defendants submit that these amendments expand upon and clarify the pleas of breach of honesty in contractual performance in their existing pleadings and that the proposed amendments are, therefore, part of the factual matrix already pleaded.
TD’s position
[41] TD argues that the defendants are seeking to add a new cause of action based on new facts not previously pleaded. TD argues that the proposed paragraphs are statute-barred and impermissible.
Analysis
[42] I have carefully reviewed the defendants’ original pleading to determine whether the proposed new paras. 52 and 53 are, as the defendants argue, an expansion and clarification of existing pleas or whether, as TD argues, they represent “a fundamentally different claim based on facts not originally pleaded”, in which case they are statute-barred.
[43] In their original pleading, the defendants pleaded the following allegations relating to honesty and good faith:
• On or about May 17, 2016, the Defendants received Notices of Intention to Enforce Security pursuant to the PPSA and the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. These were received without any warning and at a time when the Bank had already agreed to advance the balance of the CSBFL under a special loan agreement. (Para. 44.)
• Tosh further states that the Bank has failed to negotiate and to perform the contract [the CSBFL] honestly and in good faith… (Para. 48.)
• The Defendants state that the Bank failed to adequately document, in a fair and transparent manner, the alleged bargain and contract that the Bank had recommended to the Defendants. None of the aforementioned terms described in paragraph 49 were incorporated into the written agreements, yet the Bank purported to rely on said terms and rely on a financing limit of 55% of eligible invoices despite there being no contractual or legal basis to do so. (Para. 50.)
• The Defendants further state that they are entitled to aggravated and punitive damages as a result of the lack of honesty and the bad faith conduct on the part of the Bank. In particular, and without limiting the foregoing, the Bank imposed last minute condition on the Defendants for the CSBFL, did not take the concerns of the Defendants seriously when the Bank failed to fund the CSBF, and reneged on its agreement to finally fund the CBSFL in April 2016. (Para. 64.)
[44] The allegations in the original pleading which raise issues of honesty and good faith deal primarily with the CSFBL, and not the HELOC. However, para. 64, which seeks aggravated and punitive damages based on a lack of honesty and bad faith conduct on the part of TD, provides particulars relating to the CSFBL, but also states that the particulars provided are not intended to limit the claim based on lack of honesty and bad faith conduct.
[45] I am satisfied that the proposed new para. 53, which alleges a lack of honesty and good faith on the part of TD in respect of the CSFBL relies on facts previously pleaded in the original statement of defence and counterclaim.
[46] The proposed new para. 52 is in respect of the facts underpinning the defendants’ claim of deceit: that TD reduced the interest rate payable on the HELOC, arranged for Ms. Rooney to sign a maintenance form and then asserted Ms. Rooney’s acceptance of the reduced interest to argue that it was released from any liability relating to its over-valuation of the Rooneys’ home.
[47] There is no question that the proposed new para. 52 is based on facts that were not originally pleaded. I have already found that the defendants have provided a reasonable explanation as to why they did not discover the factual foundation for the pleading of the tort of deceit earlier. I granted the defendant leave to make the amendment without prejudice to TD’s right to plead a limitations defence. The same rationale applies to the facts pleaded in para. 52, which are in essence the facts relating to the tort of deceit, combined with an associated allegation that TD had failed to act honestly and in good faith.
Disposition
[48] The defendants shall have leave to amend their pleading to include the proposed new paras. 52 and 53 in accordance with the draft amended pleading filed. The granting of leave to amend to include the proposed new paras. 52 and 53 shall be without prejudice to TD’s right to plead a limitations defence in respect of the proposed new para. 52.
TD’S CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION FOR COSTS THROWN AWAY AND TO BE INCURRED
[49] TD argues that the substance of the amendments sought by the defendants on this motion was known to the defendants before the litigation began. TD argues that if any of the amendments are granted, and they have all now been granted, the defendants should be required to pay TD’s costs of the summary judgment motion, the appeal, the motion to amend, fresh pleadings, production and discovery, on a solicitor-and-client (substantial indemnity) basis.
[50] TD argues that it proceeded with its motion for summary judgment on its claim and to dismiss the defendants’ counterclaim based on the defendants’ original pleadings and that, in the original pleadings, 236 and the Rooneys did not plead personal causes of action against TD. TD says that it would not have brought its summary judgment motion had the Rooneys and 236 pleaded misrepresentation and breach of contract and deceit in the first place, that it would not have incurred the costs of such a motion and that it would not have incurred the costs of the appeal. (TD’s factum; para 7.)
[51] I do not accept TD’s submission. It is evident from TD’s statement of defence (paras. 5 – 13) that TD had conflated the claims of the defendants, just as the Court of Appeal had found the motion judge had done. Similarly, in its factum in support of the summary judgment motion, TD did not argue that only some of the defendants had pleaded claims in negligence and negligent misrepresentation. It treated these causes of action as though they had been pleaded by all defendants: with respect to negligence, see TD summary judgment factum paras. 35 – 42; with respect to negligent misrepresentation, see TD summary judgment factum paras. 46 – 51.
[52] Further, I do not consider there to be any evidence on the motion before me in support of TD’s contention that it would not have brought its summary judgment motion if the defendants’ pleading had been different or if the defendants had moved to amend their pleading earlier. An account manager for TD filed an affidavit in response to the defendants’ amendment motion in which she stated: “The Bank would likely not have brought its motion for summary judgment had the Rooneys and 236 pled misrepresentation and breach of contract and deceit in the first place and would have at least conducted its discoveries differently to address these new allegations. As it stands, the Bank has incurred the cost of such a motion and further costs of an appeal.” The account manager provided no basis or explanation for this bald statement. She did not state that she was relying on information or advice obtained from another person or that she had any legal training herself. She did not state that she personally had been responsible for the decision to proceed with the motion or identify who had made the decision. She did not state that she had carriage of the defendants’ file at the time the decision to proceed with the motion was made. She did not address the fact that the defendants had also brought a summary judgment motion. I place no weight on the assertion by the TD account manager.
[53] TD’s appeal was based in part on the motion judge’s finding that TD had negligently breached its contact with all of the defendants. TD’s appeal on this ground was successful: The Court of Appeal found TD’s liability should be limited to 163. I do not accept TD’s suggestion that the appeal was only necessary because of the state of the defendants’ pleading; TD’s pleading would have contributed to any confusion.
[54] TD has not convinced me that the defendants should be responsible for TD’s costs of its summary judgment motion and/or its appeal.
[55] I do accept TD’s argument that, because of the defendants’ amendments to their pleading, TD will likely incur costs it would not otherwise have incurred. I accept that TD will be required to deliver an amended reply and defence to counterclaim. While I do not consider TD’s argument that further documentary disclosure and oral discovery may be required to be unreasonable, I am reluctant to order any associated costs when it is not certain that these steps will be undertaken and their cost cannot be ascertained. As I am satisfied that TD will be required to prepare an amended reply and defence to counterclaim, I will order the defendants to pay TD $1,050.00 plus HST for preparation of an amended statement of defence and counterclaim. Further costs incurred by TD as a result of the defendants’ amendment to their pleading which TD would not otherwise have incurred are referred to the trial judge.
COSTS
[56] If the parties are unable to agree on the costs of this motion, the defendants may deliver brief costs submissions within 14 days of the date of this endorsement. TD may deliver brief responding submissions within a further 14 days.
Date: November 16, 2021
COURT FILE NO.: CV-16-69905
DATE: 20211116
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
RE: THE TORONTO-DOMINION BANK, Plaintiff/Defendant by Counterclaim (Responding Party)
AND
1633092 ONTARIO LTD., 2362378 ONTARIO INC., MATTHEW ROONEY, and HALEY ROONEY, Defendants/Plaintiffs by Counterclaim (Moving Parties)
COUNSEL: XXXXX, for the Plaintiff/Defendant by Counterclaim (Responding Party)
Andrew Ferguson, for the Defendants/Plaintiffs by Counterclaim (Moving Parties)
ENDORSEMENT
Madam Justice Heather J. Williams
Released: November 16, 2021