Court File and Parties
COURT FILE NO.: FC-20-1469
DATE: 2021/04/29
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Erika Suzanne Graffunder, Applicant
-and-
Server Aliyev, Respondent
BEFORE: Justice P. MacEachern
COUNSEL: Katherine A. Cooligan and Brad Yeagar, for the Applicant
James S. Marks, for the Respondent
HEARD: Hague Application heard by Vidoconference Feb.5, 2021 and further hearing on March 26, 2021
ENDORSEMENT
[1] This case is about the alleged wrongful retention of the parties’ two children, ages 6 and 11.
[2] Prior to November 16, 2019, the children and their parents resided in Adelaide, Australia. Both children were born in Australia and have Australian citizenship.
[3] The children came to Ontario, Canada with their mother on November 16, 2019, for a temporary visit. The children were supposed to return to Australia on January 15, 2020 but did not.
[4] On October 30, 2020, the father brought an Application under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction to have the children returned to Adelaide, Australia. The father commenced his Application for the children’s return within one year of the children’s retention.
[5] The father’s position is that the mother has wrongfully retained the children in Ontario since January 15, 2020 and that the children’s habitual residence is Adelaide, Australia. If the wrongful retention is found to be on a date later in 2020, the father’s position is that the children’s habitual residence is still Adelaide, Australia.
[6] The mother opposes the children’s return to Australia. The mother’s position is that the children were wrongfully retained by the father in Australia from September 2019 to November 2019, that the date of the alleged wrongful retention in Canada is August 26, 2020, and that the children’s habitual residence immediately prior to their alleged wrongful retention is Ottawa, Ontario, not Australia. If this Court finds that the children are being wrongfully withheld in Canada, she argues that these proceedings be adjourned for 30 days to produce a Voice of the Child report so that the views of ZD, now 11 years of age, can be heard.
[7] In its decision in Ludwig v. Ludwig[^1], the Ontario Court of Appeal provided guidance on the analytical framework that governs Hague Convention proceedings, especially the hybrid model for determining habitual residence that the Supreme Court of Canada adopted in Balev.
[8] There are two stages to a Hague Convention application: determining the habitual residence of the child, and, if the child is found to be habitually resident in the state of the applicant, determining if one of the exceptions to ordering the return applies.
[9] Under this analytical framework, the issues to be determined are:
a. Stage One: Habitual Residence
i. On what date were the children allegedly wrongfully retained?
ii. Immediately before the date of the alleged wrongful retention, in which jurisdiction were the children habitually resident?
b. Stage Two: Exceptions
i. If the children were habitually resident in Australia immediately before the wrongful retention, do any of the exceptions to ordering the return of the children apply?
[10] For the reasons set out below, I find that:
a. The date of the wrongful retention is April 2020.
b. The children’s habitual residence immediately before their wrongful retention is Adelaide, Australia.
c. None of the exceptions apply.
[11] Therefore, the children shall be returned to Adelaide, Australia in accordance with the terms set out at the end of these reasons.
Brief Summary of Important Facts
[12] The parties were married in Canada on November 1, 2008. They moved to Australia in February of 2009.
[13] ZD was born in Adelaide, Australia on *. ZR was born in Adelaide Australia on *. Both children are Australian citizens. They also have Canadian and German citizenship. ZD is also a citizen of Ukraine.
[14] In August of 2016, the family moved back to Canada. They purchased a house in August of 2017.
[15] The mother’s evidence is that this was intended the move to Canada to be a permanent move. However, the mother sent emails to others stating it was a trial year. The mother sent other correspondence in 2017 that related to childcare and the children’s schooling, indicating that the family would be returning to Australia.
[16] The father’s evidence is that the move to Canada was for a trial period, and that they struggled to settle into Ottawa, and the father had difficulty finding employment.
[17] By February of 2018, the family was planning to move back to Adelaide, Australia. The mother’s evidence is that the return to Australia was temporary only, that she only committed to staying for one year and then re-evaluating whether she and the children would stay for the 2-3 year duration of the father’s apprenticeship program in plumbing, which was the reason for the move.
[18] Although the father agrees that the impetus for the return to Australia was his acceptance into the apprenticeship program, his evidence is that there were other reasons for the return, being the difficulties they were having in Ottawa and their agreement that Australia provided a better environment for the family.
[19] In April of 2018, the father moved back to Australia. He rented a three-bedroom home near the children’s school, and purchased a Toyota Rav4, the mother’s preferred car.
[20] The father completed an entry level plumbing course in June of 2018. Before finding an apprenticeship position, he was offered another position that paid more than an apprenticeship. He accepted the position.
[21] The mother and children moved back to Australia on August 6, 2018. They rented out the family home in Ottawa under a two-year lease until August 2020. The mother took a one-year leave of absence from her employment.
[22] The parties separated shortly after the return to Australia. The mother’s position is that they separated on September 3, 2018. The father’s position is that they separated on October 1, 2018.
[23] The mother’s position is that she moved back to Australia, with the children, under false pretenses, so that the father could end the marriage with the children living in Australia. In support, she points to the timing of the separation and that the father had abandoned his apprenticeship.
[24] The father admits that they were having relationship difficulties for some time and had been attending counselling sessions since 2014. He denies that he intended to separate before the mother moved to Australia. He admits that he struggled for months to come to a decision to separate.
[25] The mother admits that their relationship had difficulties dating back to 2009.
[26] The mother retained legal counsel in Australia on September 29, 2018.
[27] The father moved out of the rented family residence in early October 2018.
[28] Shortly after separation, the mother told the father that she wanted to move back to Canada with the children. The parties had several emotional exchanges on the issue. The mother provided the father with a draft parenting plan on October 11, 2018, that permitted her to return to Canada with the children. The father refused to sign, responding that he would not agree to the children living away from him on different continents because the children need both parents.
[29] On November 30, 2018, the father sent the mother an email stating he would sign any papers she wanted him to. The father denies that he was consenting to the mother taking the children back to Canada, and claims he was only referring to her returning for the holidays. The mother’s response email, however, indicates that the mother understood that the father would agree to sign papers that allowed her to move with the children.
[30] On March 5, 2019, the mother presented the father with a draft Separation Agreement. The father responded that he signed the agreement but refused to deliver the signed agreement to the mother, indicating he had changed his mind.
[31] After their separation, both parties continued to be involved in parenting the children. The mother disputes the level of the father’s involvement in the children’s lives, but the material filed on this application, including communications between the parties, provides extensive evidence that both parents were involved in the day-to-day lives of the children.
[32] The evidence supports that after separation, in Australia, the parties’ parenting relationship was cooperative, and the children were involved with both parents on an almost daily basis. The children slept over with the father on alternate weekends. It was common for the children to also see their father daily.
[33] In the fall of 2019, the parties planned to attend mediation, which was required under the Australian state law prior to commencing litigation.
[34] On October 14, 2019, the mother asked the father’s permission to take the children to Canada for the holidays, for about one month. The father agreed. The mother confirmed they would leave on December 16, 2019, and a return on January 17, 2020. Due to time zone differences, a return date of January 17, 2020 in Australia means that they would depart Canada on January 15, 2020.
[35] On October 30, 2019, the mother advised the father that her mother, who resided in Kingston, Ontario, was diagnosed with cancer. She asked the father if she could take the children right away to Canada, considering her mother’s health. The father agreed. The mother and children left Australia for Canada on November 16, 2019.
[36] The mother did not ask the father to change the children’s return date. The mother’s communications to Fiona Besir, the mediator, confirm the mother’s intention to be away on a temporary trip, returning in mid-January 2020.
[37] On January 9, 2020, the mother told the father that she needed to stay longer to care for her mother and would not be returning on January 15, 2020.
[38] On January 12, 2020, the father sent the mother an email stating:
“Understanding your mom condition and reasons to extend staying in Canada for kids short term, I don’t and will not agree for kids to stay in Canada long term”.
[39] The children did not return to Australia on January 15, 2020.
[40] The father came to Canada to visit the children during the week of January 22, 2020. The mother’s evidence is that, during this visit, she told the father that her mother had three to six months to live and it was important for her and the children to be in Canada for her mother. The mother’s evidence is that the father agreed for her to do so. The father’s evidence is that he does not recall this conversation.
[41] Communications continued between the parties while the mother and children remained in Canada, including relating to when the children would return to Australia.
[42] In cross-examinations, the mother admitted that in April of 2020, the father sent her a demand that the children be returned to Australia.
[43] On May 15, 2020, the father sent the mother an email demanding the children’s return. The mother did not respond.
[44] The mother’s mother died on June 7, 2020.
[45] On August 26, 2020, the father sent the mother an email, demanding that the children be returned.
[46] On September 9, 2020, the father’s lawyer sent a legal letter demanding the children’s return on September 9, 2020.
[47] On October 5, 2020, the mother commenced an Application before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice for custody of the children.
[48] On October 30, 2020, the father commenced an Application for the children’s return under the Hague Convention.
Preliminary Matters
[49] The father objects to the mother’s affidavit sworn February 1, 2021 being considered on this motion. Both parties filed extensive material under the timelines set by Justice Engelking in her endorsement dated November 23, 2020. Both sought to file affidavits sworn after the timelines for filing affidavit material – the mother sought to file her affidavit sworn February 1, 2021 and the father sought to file his affidavit sworn February 2, 2021. I have admitted both affidavits for this motion.
[50] After the hearing of this Application on February 5, 2021, the mother filed written material seeking an interim order, pending the release of my decision. I denied that motion but have considered the parties’ supplementary affidavits as new evidence on this motion.
Statutory Provisions
[51] The Hague Convention has force in Ontario under s.46(2) of the Children’s Law Reform Act (CLRA). Articles 1, 3, 8, 12, 13, and 20 of the Hague Convention are most relevant to this case. These provisions read as follows:
Article 1
The objects of the present Convention are -
a) to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State; and
b) to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States.
Article 3
The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where –
a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and
b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.
The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State.
Article 8
Any person, institution or other body claiming that a child has been removed or retained in breach of custody rights may apply either to the Central Authority of the child's habitual residence or to the Central Authority of any other Contracting State for assistance in securing the return of the child.
Article 12
Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of Article 3 and, at the date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith.
The judicial or administrative authority, even where the proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the period of one year referred to in the preceding paragraph, shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment.
Where the judicial or administrative authority in the requested State has reason to believe that the child has been taken to another State, it may stay the proceedings or dismiss the application for the return of the child.
Article 13
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that -
a) the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; or
b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.
The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.
In considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, the judicial and administrative authorities shall take into account the information relating to the social background of the child provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority of the child's habitual residence.
Article 20
The return of the child under the provisions of Article 12 may be refused if this would not be permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Stage One: Habitual Residence
a) On what date were the children allegedly wrongfully retained?
[52] I find that the date of both children’s wrongful retention was April of 2020.
[53] Under Thomson v. Thomson 1994 CanLII 26 (SCC), [1994] 3 SCR 551 (SCC), the period of wrongful retention begins upon the expiry of the period of consent.
[54] The father consented to the children travelling to Canada from November 16, 2019 to January 15, 2020. The father agreed to the children travelling to Canada on a temporary basis, for the purpose of visiting their mother’s family and their maternal grandmother who was ill. The mother represented to the father, and to others, that the trip was for a temporary visit and that she and the children would be returning on January 15, 2020. The children had return plane tickets purchased to depart from Toronto, Canada, on January 15, 2020.
[55] I do not, however, find that the date of wrongful retention was January 15, 2020 because I find that the father agreed that the children’s stay in Canada could be extended, on a temporary basis, due to their maternal grandmother’s health.
[56] But by April 2020, the mother admits that the father asked her to return the children. This evidence was in the affidavit filed by the mother’s legal counsel’s assistant, which the mother acknowledged on cross-examination. That the father was asking the mother to return the children in April 2020 is also consistent with the father’s email sent on May 15, 2020, when he insisted on the children’s return.
[57] I reject the mother’s argument that the father agreed to extend the children’s stay until August of 2020. The mother relies on the father’s statement in his affidavit sworn October 30, 2020 that he “last extended the children’s return date to August 14, 2020, to desperately encourage the mother to voluntarily bring the children back to Australia”. The father was cross-examined on this point and repeatedly denied that he had agreed to an extension. I accept the father’s explanation that his statement was made in the context of referencing delays due to flight cancellations between Canada and Australia due to the pandemic and that he did not agree to an extension. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the mother does not provide evidence that such an agreement to extension was ever communicated to her.
[58] The mother also argues that the father wrongfully retained the children in Australia from the date of separation in September of 2018 to November 16, 2019. The mother argues that her move to Australia with the children in August of 2018 was only temporary and made under false pretences. She argues that she did not consent to the children extending their stay in Australia beyond the date of the separation and demanded the children’s return to their habitual residence – Canada.
[59] I do not find there was a wrongful retention in September of 2018. I find that the parties both agreed and intended, to move the children to reside in Australia on a permanent, long term, settled, basis, and did so. While I accept that the impetus for return to Australia was the father’s apprenticeship program, the evidence supports that the families stay in Canada was only on a trial basis, that they began making plans to return to Australia as early as 2017 due to the families deep connections to Australia. I do not find that their return to Australia was temporary or transient. The evidence supports that the parties intended, and agreed, to relocate the children’s lives back to Australia on a permanent basis, even though I also accept that the parties contemplated they may return to Canada at some point in the future.
[60] To the extent that the mother consented to the children’s relocation to Australia, she argues that her consent is vitiated because it was given under false pretenses. The mother argues that the father was seriously contemplating separation prior to the move and did not tell her. In support, she points to the timing of the separation, which she states was approximately one month after her move, and that the father left his apprenticeship program in July of 2018.
[61] I do not find that the mother has established on a balance of probabilities the level of calculated deceit and deliberate fraud necessary to vitiate consent in this context. The father denies that he had plans to separate when the mother returned to Australia. I do not find that the evidence is “overwhelming” to the contrary. The communications between the parties after separation evidence many instances of continued endearment and affection between them. The communications prior to separation show that the plan to move to Australia dated back to at least the winter of 2018, and even earlier to 2017.
[62] I also do not find that there was a fraud on the mother about the status of their relationship. Both parties admit to their being difficulties in their relations dating back many years. Both were aware that they struggled at times.
[63] The mother may have wanted to return to Canada with the children after the separation, but this does not amount to a wrongful retention by the father of the children in Australia as of that date. The mother’s conduct is inconsistent with this claim. It is not contested that the mother and children travelled to Canada in November of 2019 for a temporary stay, originally intended to be for one month over the holidays, then extended by an earlier departure date due to her mother’s health, and that the children would return to Australia in mid-January 2020. The mother knew she was not allowed to remove the children from Australia without the father’s consent or a court order – that is why she asked, and received, the father’s permission for such travel. The mother started a mediation process in Australia, that she intended to continue in January of 2020, which supports that she recognized Australia’s jurisdiction over their family law issues.
[64] I have considered the mother’s allegations that the father promised she could move back to Canada with the children after the separation. The father’s statements fall short of constituting his explicit consent to the children moving to Canada. At most, there are a few occasions when the father stated he would not stop the mother from moving with the children and would sign whatever papers she gives to him. But he also stated, several times, that he would never agree to the children living on a separate continent from him. At most, the father’s statement that he would not stop the mother and would sign whatever papers she wanted him to does not represent an informed, explicit waiver or, in the context of emotionally charged exchanges, indicates a binding commitment upon which it is reasonable to rely.
[65] In March of 2019, the father said that he signed the separation agreement but at the same time, also told the mother that he had made changes to the agreement and did not think he could give it to her. Regardless, the father did not deliver the signed agreement to the mother and told her that he did not think he would deliver it to her. Without delivery, it is not a binding agreement.
[66] The mother also had legal advice at this time. She had her lawyer prepare two draft legal agreements on her behalf. I infer that the mother was aware that she required the father’s agreement in writing in order to be binding and was aware, by March 27, 2019, that the father was not going to consent to her move. This is also consistent with the fact that she sought and obtained the father consent to travel with the children for a holiday in December of 2019.
b) Immediately before the date of the alleged wrongful retention, in which jurisdiction were the children habitually resident?
[67] In considering the entirety of the circumstances, I find that the children’s habitual residence immediately before the wrongful retention was Adelaide, Australia.
[68] In determining habitual residence, the court should take the following approach[^2]:
a. The court’s task is to determine the focal point of the child’s life, namely the family and social environment in which its life has developed, immediately prior to the removal or retention.
b. To determine the focal point of the child’s life, the court must consider the following three kinds of links and circumstances:
ii. The child’s links to and circumstances in country A;
iii. The circumstances of the child’s move from country A to country B; and
iv. The child’s links to and circumstances in country B.
c. In assessing these three kinds of links and circumstances, the court should consider the entirety of the circumstances, including, but not restricted to, the following factors:
i. The child’s nationality;
ii. The duration, regularity, conditions and reasons for the child’s stay in the country the child is presently in; and
iii. The circumstances of the child’s parents, including parental intention.
[69] The children have strong ties to Adelaide, Australia. They were both born there. They are both Australian citizens. Prior to the date of wrongful retention, they had lived all their lives in Adelaide except for the two-year period from August 2016 to August 2018, plus the time they spent in Canada from November 16, 2019 to April 2020.
[70] This latter period in Canada was under the guise of a temporary stay for the purpose of visiting their ailing grandmother, with the express intention and agreement to return to Australia on January 15, 2020. The father’s agreement to extend their return, as found above, was again temporary, short term, and tied to their grandmother’s health.
[71] ZD attended school in Adelaide and received good marks. He was connected to his community through school, activities, and friendships. When ZD was in Canada from August 2016 to August 2018 he travelled back to Australia as an unaccompanied minor to visit. ZR also attended school in Adelaide.
[72] The children’s links to Australia also include, perhaps most importantly, their deep connection to their post-separation family make-up and routine that involved almost daily interactions between the children and both parents, under a cooperative parenting model. This included the children spending significant time with their father, including travelling with their father in Australia, and the parents communicating frequently about parenting issues and parenting in a cooperative manner.
[73] I have also considered the children’s links and circumstances to Canada. Both parties are Canadian citizens and therefore the children are also entitled to Canadian citizenship. The children lived in Ottawa, Ontario for a two-year period from August 2016 to August 2018. During this period, ZD attended school and developed friendships. He remained connected, however, to his friends in Australia and, as stated above travelled back to Australia to visit. ZR was only 1.5 to 3.5 years of age when she resided in Canada during this period and therefore had fewer connections.
[74] During the period from November 16, 2019 to April 2020, the children’s stay in Canada was temporary. Their accommodations were temporary in nature. During the period from November 16, 2019 to February of 2020, the children stayed at their maternal grandmother’s home in Kingston, Ontario. From February 2020 to April of 2020, they stayed with a friend of the mother’s in Ottawa.
[75] The children did not attend school until February of 2020, and only attended in-person schooling for a few weeks before in-person schooling was suspended due to the pandemic. The mother’s email to the children’s school in Australia, copied to the father, advised that the children were registered in school in Canada so that they could continue their studies because she was not sure when they would be returning to Australia, and that “things have been moving quite fluidly”.
[76] The mother argues that a significant factor in determining the children’s habitual residence is their connection to her. The mother argues that the focal point of the children’s lives should not be seen so much as simply to a place, but to the children’s primary caregiver. But the evidence does not support that the mother is the focal point of the children’s lives to the exclusion of the father, which is what this argument suggests. The evidence supports that both parents were deeply connected to the children’s lives prior to the wrongful retention.
[77] The mother argues that the children’s habitual residence was Ottawa, Ontario because the move to Adelaide, Australia in August of 2018 was temporary. I do not accept this argument and find that the move to Adelaide in August of 2018 was intended to be “permanent”, and not temporary.
[78] The mother also argues that her and the children’s move to Australia in August of 2018 was made under false pretenses, because she alleges that the father already intended to separate. I also reject this argument. The mother relies on the timing of the separation. The party’s separation one month after the mother’s move to Australia does not establish on a balance of probabilities that the father intended to separate before her move.
[79] In addition, this factor would only be one factor, in all the circumstances, to weigh in assessing the focal point of the children’s lives. Such a factor, if it existed, would be minimal compared to the extent of the children’s deep connections to Australia that formed during their lives, both before their move to Ontario and after their return.
Stage Two: Exceptions
a) If the children were habitually resident in Australia immediately before the wrongful retention, do any of the exceptions to ordering the return of the children apply?
[80] Having found that the children were habitually resident in Australia immediately before the wrongful retention, the Hague Convention requires that the court shall order the return of the children unless it determines that one of the following exceptions applies:
a. The parent seeking return was not exercising custody or consented to the removal or retention (Article 13(a));
b. There is grave risk that return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or place the child in an intolerable situation (Article 13(b));
c. The child of sufficient age and maturity objects to being returned (Article 13(2));
d. Has the party opposing return met the threshold to invoke the court’s discretion to refuse return?
i. Has the child reached an appropriate age and degree of maturity at which the child’s views can be taken into account; and
ii. Does the child object to return?
e. Should the court exercise its discretion to refuse to return the child? In considering whether to exercise its discretion to refuse return, the court should consider:
i. The nature and strength of the child’s objections;
ii. The extent to which the objections are authentically the child’s own or the product of the influence of the abducting parent;
iii. The extent to which the objections coincide or are at odds with other considerations relevant to the child’s welfare; and
iv. General Hague Convention considerations.
f. The return of the child would not be permitted by fundamental human rights and fundamental freedoms of the requested state (Article 20); or
g. The application was brought one year or more from the date of wrongful removal or retention, and the judge determines the child is settled in the new environment (Article 12).
[81] The only exception in issue is the mother’s argument that the ZD, now age 11, has reached the age and level of maturity that his views should be considered. The mother states that ZD now objects to returning to Australia. She argues for an adjournment to obtain a Voice of the Child report so that ZD’s views and preferences may be placed before the court.
[82] I do not find that ZD is old enough or mature enough to appreciate the distinction between living in Australia and living in Canada. The evidence I have about ZD’s views and preferences is consistent that he loves and is deeply connected to both of his parents, and that he misses his father. I have taken these views and preferences into consideration.
[83] I do not find that it is necessary, nor in the children’s best interests, to delay this matter further for the purpose of a Voice of the Child Report, particularly given the children’s young ages.
[84] The father has provided several undertakings in his sworn affidavit. The mother and children will be eligible for a travel exemption to return to Australia because the children are Australian citizens and the mother is an Australian permanent resident. There is a required quarantine. The father’ undertakings include that he is willing to pay for the mother’s and children’s costs of travelling back to Australia and the associated quarantine costs. The father is also prepared to pay the airfares for the children to return to Australia, and to travel to Canada to accompany the children back to Australia, if the mother does not wish to return with them.
[85] The father has also undertaken to assist the mother in finding suitable accommodation that is close to Adelaide and located conveniently near the children’s school, in which they are still enrolled.
Disposition
[86] For the above reasons, I order that the children be returned to their habitual residence of Adelaide, Australia forthwith.
Costs
[87] If the parties cannot agree on costs, the Respondent father (moving party) may file submissions concerning costs on or before May 21, 2021. The Applicant mother may file submissions concerning costs on or before May 31, 2021. The Respondent father may file any Reply by June 7, 2021. Both parties' cost submissions shall be no more than five pages in length (three pages for Reply), plus any offers to settle and bills of costs, and shall be spaced one point five spaces apart, with no less than 12-point font.
Justice P. MacEachern
Date: April 29, 2021
COURT FILE NO.: FC-20-1469
DATE: 2021/04/29
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
RE: Erika Suzanne Graffunder, Applicant
-and-
Server Aliyev, Respondent
BEFORE: Justice P. MacEachern
COUNSEL: Katherine A. Cooligan and Brad Yeagar, for the Applicant
James S. Marks, for the Respondent
ENDORSEMENT
Justice P. MacEachern
Released: April 29, 2021
[^1]: Ludwig v. Ludwig, 2019 ONCA 680
[^2]: Ludwig v. Ludwig, 2019 ONCA 680