COURT FILE NO.: FS-15-83320 DATE: 2021-05-19

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Sara Fatahi-Ghandehari

Applicant

• and -

Stewart Wilson

Respondent

COUNSEL: Sara Fatahi-Ghandehari, Self-Represented, assisted by S. Siddiqui Stewart Wilson, Not Participating

HEARD: March 31, 2021

REASONS FOR DECISION

LEMAY J

[1] I am the case management judge in this action as well as other actions between these parties and other parties, both personal and corporate. This decision concerns the undefended trial that was ordered by Price J. in his September 21st, 2018 decision (2018 ONSC 5579). The Respondent, Mr. Stewart Wilson was not permitted to provide evidence or otherwise participate in the undefended trial.

[2] The pleadings of the Respondent, Stewart Wilson, in the family law action were struck out by Order of Price J. on September 21, 2018 after Mr. Wilson was found in contempt for failure to disclose documents. These Orders were not successfully appealed, although an appeal was attempted.

[3] I have previously provided the parties with procedural directions in this case, including a lengthy endorsement dated August 19th, 2020. In that endorsement, I stated that I saw no basis to conclude that there was any appeal of the Order of Price J. still pending. I will explain the reasons for that conclusion below. As a result, I have determined that an undefended trial could proceed, and it has taken place. What follows are my reasons in the undefended trial.

Background

a) Relationship

[4] Stewart Wilson and Sara Fatahi-Ghandehari met in 2005. They were married on August 12th, 2007 and separated on December 4th, 2014. There were no children of the marriage. The total period of cohabitation was eight (8) years.

[5] Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari raises allegations of abuse that allegedly took place during the marriage. She has provided photographs that suggest that she was assaulted. Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari stated that she was subjected to both physical and mental abuse during the marriage. This evidence is uncontradicted.

[6] During most, if not all, of the marriage, Mr. Wilson ran a business renting exotic cars. It was allegedly a very profitable business. The evidence received on the undefended trial supports the conclusion that Mr. Wilson was continuing to run this business even in the summer of 2020. The evidence at trial also supports the conclusion that Mr. Wilson had a significant portfolio of cars and was able to continue running this business continuously after the marriage ended.

[7] At the time that Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari met Mr. Wilson in 2005, she was employed as a jeweler by Birks, earning minimum wage. During the relationship and marriage, Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari worked in Mr. Wilson’s business providing administrative support and doing the banking. She was not paid a salary for this work and did not otherwise work outside of the home.

[8] There is no evidence that Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari has worked since the relationship ended. As noted above, there was evidence that Mr. Wilson continues to run his very profitable exotic car business. I will outline that evidence in more detail below.

[9] There is also some evidence that Mr. Wilson either is, or at the very least was, in a partnership with a Mr. Jason Braidmore and Mr. Braidmore’s companies. Mr. Braidmore has been involved in some of the litigation in this case as have some of Mr. Braidmore’s companies.

[10] Finally, based on the evidence I received (including the video respecting Mr. Wilson’s exotic car business), Mr. Wilson appears to be residing at a property with an address municipally known as 9860 Highway 20, Smithville, Ontario. Legal title to this property is in the name of Mr. Wilson’s mother, Elizabeth Wilson. Ms. Elizabeth Wilson is also a party to some of the ongoing litigation.

b) End of the Relationship and Litigation

[11] The relationship between the parties ended on December 4th, 2014. Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari alleges abuse throughout the marriage on the part of Mr. Wilson. I accept these allegations for two reasons:

a) Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari provided photographs of the abuse, showing her with some bruising and discoloration around her face. In addition, there was a video showing the alleged assault that is now part of the Court record.

b) These claims were all made in Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari’s pleadings. As a result, it is appropriate for the Court to address and resolve them at this stage even though Mr. Wilson is not participating in the litigation. One of the consequences of the contempt finding against Mr. Wilson is that his pleadings have been struck and these allegations are uncontested.

[12] In any event, a family law proceeding was commenced by Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari. In that proceeding, she sought spousal support, an equalization payment and other relief. Mr. Wilson opposed that relief. As is often the case, the proceeding started out with a series of production requests. Disclosure orders were obtained from the Superior Court of Justice on July 23rd, 2015 and July 7th, 2016. Mr. Wilson did not comply with these Orders. As a result, Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari brought contempt proceedings before Price J. I now turn to the procedural history of those proceedings.

c) The Orders of Price J. and Subsequent Steps

[13] The contempt proceedings were originally initiated before Price J. on July 26th, 2016. There is a complicated history of business dealings respecting Mr. Wilson’s business that underlies the contempt proceeding. This history is detailed in the November 3rd, 2016 decision of Price J. (2016 ONSC 6863).

[14] A key part of that complicated history is that, at some point around 2009, Mr. Wilson made an assignment into bankruptcy. As a result, the cars that he used to run the business were in the possession of a numbered company whose sole shareholder was Ms. Farzaneh Yaghinali who is Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari’s mother.

[15] In March of 2015, Mr. Wilson sought to have those cars returned to him. By way of an Order of Gray J. dated March 3rd, 2015, it was found that the cars controlled by the numbered company were actually the property of Mr. Wilson.

[16] Shortly after this order was made, Mr. Wilson’s Trustee in Bankruptcy secured an Order seeking to have these cars turned over to the Trustee. This order was made by Pattillo J. sometime in April of 2015. I understand that both the March 2015 Order of Gray J and the April 2015 order of Pattillo J. were appealed to the Court of Appeal.

[17] Understanding the disposition of those appeals is not necessary to the disposition of this case. Based on the March 3rd, 2015 Order of Gray J., these cars were Mr. Wilson’s property as of the date of separation. I will return to the significance of this conclusion in the section on the equalization payment.

[18] That complicated history of business dealings resulted in Price J. providing directions that there were to be examinations of non-parties in relation to Mr. Wilson’s assets. In addition, Price J. issued a preservation order respecting all the assets held by or on behalf of Mr. Wilson. These orders were generally made either as part of the contempt proceeding or contemporaneous to it.

[19] The contempt hearing was held over seven days during 2017. On October 10th, 2017, Price J. found Mr. Wilson to have been in contempt of Court for numerous and significant breaches of the Orders of Price J. and Miller J. Sentencing was deferred so that the parties could make submissions on the appropriate penalty. In addition, Price J. provided Mr. Wilson with numerous opportunities to purge his contempt. None of those opportunities were taken.

[20] As a result, Price J. held a sentencing hearing on March 21st, 2018. Reasons were delivered on September 21st, 2018 (see 2018 ONSC 5579). Those reasons state that Mr. Wilson had been given opportunities to purge his contempt and had failed to do so. As a result of the contempt and of the failure to purge, Mr. Wilson’s pleadings were struck.

[21] On the same day, Price J. delivered separate reasons (see 2018 ONSC 5587). This decision concerned a motion brought by Mr. Braidmore and his company to set aside the preservation order that had been granted against them. Price J. dismissed that motion and maintained the preservation orders against Mr. Braidmore and his company. Price J. expressed concerns about the nature of the transactions that had taken place between Mr. Wilson and Mr. Braidmore.

[22] Price J.’s decisions of October 10th, 2017 (contempt) and September 21st, 2018 (sentencing) were appealed to the Court of Appeal. An extension of time was granted by Miller J.A. to appeal the sentencing decision only (see 2019 CanLII 1036 (Ont. C.A.). This extension was granted to February 7th, 2019. The time limits to appeal the contempt finding were not extended and that decision is no longer appealable.

[23] On March 6th, 2019, the Notice of Appeal for the sentencing decision remained unfiled. A further motion for an extension of time to file the appeal was brought by Mr. Wilson before Nordheimer J.A. A further extension was granted by Nordheimer J.A. on terms. Those terms included a requirement that Mr. Wilson pay both the $10,000.00 fine ordered on the contempt and the outstanding costs awards that had been made against him. Failing these payments, the Registrar of the Court of Appeal was directed to dismiss Mr. Wilson’s appeal.

[24] Mr. Wilson appealed the decision of Nordheimer J.A. to a panel of the Court of Appeal. That panel dismissed Mr. Wilson’s appeal of Nordheimer J.A.’s decision (see 2019 ONCA 532). Mr. Wilson failed to comply with the terms of Nordheimer J.A.’s order and was unsuccessful in having that order varied. As a result, Mr. Wilson’s appeal would have been dismissed by the Registrar of the Court of Appeal. Therefore, the sentencing decision striking Mr. Wilson’s pleadings and ordering an undefended trial cannot be challenged at this point.

[25] Shortly after that time, Price J. elected supernumerary status and the matter was transferred to be case managed by Daley R.S.J. Daley R.S.J. was faced with a motion brought by Mr. Wilson’s counsel to recuse himself. In reasons reported at 2019 ONSC 3584, Daley R.S.J. dismissed that motion, noting at paragraph 14 that the moving respondent has offered no relevant or cogent evidence whatsoever in support of his motion for recusal.”

[26] Daley R.S.J. elected supernumerary status in February of 2021. As a result, I was assigned as the case management judge in this matter. I have provided the parties with directions since my assignment, including directions on the undefended trial. I now turn to the material filed for this trial.

d) The Relief Sought on the Undefended Trial

[27] In my August 19th, 2019 endorsement, I directed Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari to provide her materials on the undefended trial within thirty (30) days. As a result of delays, two extensions were granted to this deadline, and I did not receive Ms. Fatahi Ghandehari’s materials until early November of 2020.

[28] In the Order for an Uncontested Trial, Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari seeks the following relief in respect of property:

a) the Respondent shall pay to the Applicant an equalization payment in the amount of $1,226,522.00 as per Form 13B: Net Family Property Statement;

b) the Applicant shall be allowed to immediately seize and sell the property located at 9860 Hwy 20, Smithville, Ontario with the assistance of police, if necessary, to remove the occupants so the property can be listed for sale and shown to prospective buyers, and use the proceeds of sale to pay all amounts owed to her;

c) the Applicant shall be allowed to immediately seize and sell any assets owned by 2448083 Ontario Inc., Straightfoward Auto Inc. and 2553158 Ontario Inc. and use the proceeds of sale to pay all amounts owed to her;

d) the Applicant shall be allowed to immediately seize and sell any assets owned by Stewart Jared Kent Wilson, Karen Elizabeth Johannesen-Wilson and Jason Bradimore, with the assistance of police, if necessary, and use the proceeds of sale to pay all amounts owed to her;

e) the Applicant shall be allowed to immediately seize any funds in the bank and investment accounts of Stewart Jared Kent Wilson, Karen Elizabeth Johannesen-Wilson, Jason Bradimore, 2448083 Ontario Inc., Straightforward Auto Inc. and 2553158 Ontario Inc. to pay all amounts owed to her; and

f) the Applicant is entitled to remove the Certificate of Pending Litigation registered by the Respondent against the property located at 3329 Delfi Road, Mississauga, Ontario.

[29] In respect of the other issues, Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari seeks the following relief:

a) an Order for divorce between the Applicant and the Respondent;

b) an Order that the Respondent shall pay the Applicant the total amount of $2,736,686.60 comprised of an equalization payment in the amount of $1,226,522.00, repayment of the shareholder loan of $331,499, a lump sum payment of $350,000 for backdated spousal support, payment of outstanding costs awards in the amount of $156,388.55 and payment of $672,277.05 owing as reimbursement of the inheritance funds used to purchase the vehicles;

c) an Order that the Respondent, Karen Elizabeth Johannesen-Wilson, Jason Bradimore, 2448083 Ontario Inc., 2553158 Ontario Inc. and Straighforward Auto Inc. are jointly and severally liable for any amounts owing to the Applicant given their involvement in shielding matrimonial assets on behalf of the Respondent as previously determined by the Court;

d) an Order that the Respondent shall pay to the Applicant periodic spousal support in the amount of $5,000 per month for the following eight years or in the alternative, a lump sum spousal support payment in the amount of $480,000 given the Respondent's history of non-compliance with court orders;

e) an Order that the Respondent shall obtain and maintain a life insurance policy with a face amount of $500,000 and designate the Applicant as the sole beneficiary of the policy to secure his future spousal support obligations;

f) in the alternative, an Order for an unequal division of net family property of the parties in favour of the Applicant, pursuant to section 5(6) of the Family Law Act;

g) an Order that the Respondent shall obtain and maintain medical, extended health and dental benefits and maintain the Applicant as a beneficiary of those benefits;

h) an Order that the Respondent shall not deplete any property in the parties' names jointly, solely in his own name or in his name joint with a third party or solely in the name of Karen Elizabeth Johannesen-Wilson, Gregory Wilson, Viktoria Burbo or Jason Bardimore, for the benefit of the Respondent;

i) an Order for costs on a substantial indemnity basis, plus HST; and

j) such further and other Order as this Honourable Court may deem just.

[30] Given the scope of this relief as well as the amount being sought, I determined that an in-person appearance was required to address these issues. That in-person appearance was scheduled for March 31st, 2021 and took place over ZOOM. At that appearance, I heard sworn testimony from Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari and received evidence about Mr. Wilson’s business and financial affairs. This evidence included an interview with Mr. Wilson about his business that was shown as part of a YouTube video. I also heard argument about the relief being sought by Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari in this case.

Issues

[31] The following issues are raised by the relief sought by Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari:

a) What equalization payment should be provided to Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari?

b) What amount of spousal support, if any, should be provided to Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari? How should any future payments be secured?

c) Should the certificate of pending litigation on the property at 3329 Delfi Road, Mississauga, Ontario be removed?

d) Are there other payments that should be made to Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari?

e) Should an unequal division of net family property be provided in favour of Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari under section 5(6) of the Family Law Act?

f) Should relief be granted against individuals other than Mr. Wilson in this part of the proceeding?

[32] I will deal with each issue in turn. I also note that Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari seeks a divorce. The parties have been separated for more than five years and the litigation between the parties has been contentious. Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari has filed an Affidavit for Divorce as part of the material on this trial. Therefore, the parties are entitled to a divorce thirty-one days after the release of these reasons.

Issue #1 – Equalization Payment

[33] Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari seeks an equalization payment in the sum of $1,226,522.00. In support of this payment, she has provided portions of a valuation of Mr. Wilson’s business as of December 31st, 2014. A brief history of the business is required to explain how that valuation was arrived at.

[34] Mr. Wilson was originally petitioned into bankruptcy in 2011. I am not sure how that assignment came about. Part of the restructuring of Mr. Wilson’s affairs was the establishment of a company, 2446519 Ontario Inc., in which Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari’s mother was the only shareholder. An order was made by Gray J. on March 3rd, 2015 confirming that Mr. Wilson was the beneficial owner of the assets of this company, and the automobiles owned by it were transferred to Mr. Wilson. I have described at paragraphs 14-17 the sequence of events relating to these transactions.

[35] However, it was this numbered company that had the assets of the business as at the date of separation. I was provided with a valuation of the business that concluded the business was worth between $586,000.00 and $771,000.00 when both its assets and liabilities were accounted for. This valuation was calculated by taking the value of the businesses assets and subtracting the debts, specifically a shareholder loan that had been made to the business in the sum of $331,499.00.

[36] The Order of Gray J. made it clear that all the assets controlled by 2446519 Ontario Inc. were beneficially owned by Mr. Wilson. As a result, the value of the business as set out by the valuators is, at a minimum, the value of the assets that Mr. Wilson controlled as of the date of separation.

[37] Therefore, given the extensive lengths that Mr. Wilson has gone to in order to avoid disclosing information about his business affairs, it is not difficult to infer that the assets that Mr. Wilson owned were worth at least $771,000.00 as of the date of separation, which is the top end of the net value of 2446519 Ontario Inc.

[38] This brings me to the shareholder loan, which raises another issue. Pursuant to the Order of Gray J., 2446519 Ontario Inc.’s assets were all found to belong to Mr. Wilson and that he had the right to use those assets as he saw fit. However, the status of the shareholder loan is unclear. I understand that it may be the subject of separate litigation. It is, theoretically, Ms. Yaghinali’s asset. It is theoretically also a debt of 2446519 Ontario Inc. This debt would reduce the value of 2446519 Ontario Inc.

[39] However, for the purposes of valuing the assets that Mr. Wilson had at separation, it is not clear that this shareholder loan is a debt that Mr. Wilson had any responsibility for as of the date of separation. There is certainly no evidence before me that Mr. Wilson has a responsibility to pay the loan back. As I have noted above, that is a separate matter that appears to belong in separate litigation.

[40] As a result, the shareholder loan should not be used to reduce the value of the assets that Mr. Wilson beneficially owned for the purpose of the Net Family Property calculation. Therefore, I add that amount ($331,499.00) back in. The total value of the business that Mr. Wilson had control over for the purposes of the Net Family Property calculation is $1,102,499.00 as of the date of separation.

[41] To put it another way, Mr. Wilson beneficially owned all the assets of 2446519 Ontario Inc. as of the date of separation. However, there is no evidence that Mr. Wilson had any responsibility for the debts of 2446519 Ontario Inc. Therefore, the shareholder loan should not be used to reduce the value of the assets that Mr. Wilson owned on the date of separation.

[42] This brings me to the value of Mr. Wilson’s other assets. Based on Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari’s evidence, the following additional assets were owned by Mr. Wilson at the time of marriage:

a) The property at 1360 Neils Avenue in Burlington. I accept that Mr. Wilson provided funds to his mother and brother to purchase this property and that Mr. Wilson was the beneficial owner of this property as of the date of separation. I accept Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari’s evidence that this property had a value of $465,000.00 at the time of separation. The property was sold for this amount just over a year after the parties separated so the value proposed by Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari is not unreasonable.

b) TD Bank account with $105,000.00 in it as of the date of separation. There is clear evidence of this amount being in Mr. Wilson’s bank accounts within a few days either way of the date of separation.

c) Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari also deposes that there was a total of approximately $250,000.00 in a bank account as of the date of separation. Given Mr. Wilson’s failure to comply with the disclosure orders, I accept that a total of $250,000.00 in cash and other liquid assets were in Mr. Wilson’s name as of the date of separation. This includes the amount set out in subparagraph (b).

[43] There were also some cars that had been purchased with funds that Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari had inherited from her family. The evidence before me disclosed that, during the marriage, Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari had received money from family members as a gift. Documents in both Arabic and English setting out these gifts were included in the motion record, and I accept Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari’s evidence that she received approximately $700,000.00 from her father and grandfather.

[44] This money was used to purchase assets that are now in the possession of Mr. Wilson and, presumably, being used by him to generate income for his business. Bills of purchase for these cars were produced as part of the record in the undefended trial, and they show a total value of at least $640,000.00 that was paid by Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari. The documentation that I have shows that the cars were sold to Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari and that these amounts were actually paid.

[45] Based on both Ms. Fatah-Ghandehari’s Affidavit and the decision of Price J. dated October 10th, 2017 (see paragraph 122 of that decision), I conclude that these cars were purchased by Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari and that they were in the possession and control of Mr. Wilson. They are, therefore, Mr. Wilson’s assets for the purposes of the Net Family Property calculation. The question is what value to ascribe to them.

[46] I checked the list of cars against the Order of Gray J., which includes VIN numbers. I determined that two or three of the cars that were purchased with Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari’s gift money were cars covered by the Order of Gray J. Therefore, it is likely that these cars were included in the valuation of the business. The remainder of the cars, particularly a 2006 Lamborghini Gallardo and 2001 Ferrari 360 Spyder were not covered in the Order of Gray J.

[47] Therefore, I conclude that there were additional assets that were owned by Mr. Wilson as of the date of separation beyond the cars listed in the Order of Gray J. Given the lack of disclosure on the part of Mr. Wilson, it is difficult to know exactly how much his assets were worth. However, the additional evidence from Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari makes it clear that merely accepting the value of the assets in the Order of Gray J. as the complete valuation of Mr. Wilson’s money generating car collection would underestimate, perhaps significantly, the value of his assets as of the date of separation. Similarly, the assets set out at paragraph 42 of these reasons are also not a complete picture of Mr. Wilson’s assets as of the date of separation.

[48] As a result, I have determined that the full $640,000.00 value of the cars that Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari has purchased should be included in the valuation of Mr. Wilson’s assets. It is reasonable to infer that this additional amount represents a minimum estimate of the additional assets that Mr. Wilson owned as of the date of separation. It must be remembered that Mr. Wilson was found to be in contempt of Court for failing to comply with his disclosure obligations.

[49] I should make a final observation about capital depreciation allowances. In many circumstances, the Court would have to consider whether to factor in an allowance for depreciation for assets that had been purchased prior to the date of separation. In this case, however, these are exotic luxury cars. There is no evidence before the Court to suggest that they would depreciate in value. Therefore, no allowance for depreciation will be made.

[50] This brings me to the question of whether Mr. Wilson should be allowed any credits for property that he might have brought into the marriage. I conclude that he is not entitled to any deductions for pre-marriage property for three reasons:

a) Mr. Wilson would have been aware of the evidence that is set out above as demonstrating that he owed an equalization payment of at least a million dollars to Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari. In light of the evidence that the Court already has, it is open to infer that the additional evidence that Mr. Wilson would have provided if he had complied with the production orders would likely have demonstrated that he owed an even larger equalization payment. Otherwise, there would have been no point in ignoring the Court’s orders.

b) There is no indication in the material that I do have of any pre-marriage assets. The material I have includes financial records from Mr. Wilson.

c) On the evidence of Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari, Mr. Wilson was facing a bankruptcy proceeding in 2009 and was restructuring his affairs to hide assets. As a result, it can be inferred that he did not have a lot of assets at this point or in the preceding couple of years.

[51] Based on the foregoing, I find that the following were Mr. Wilson’s assets as of the date of separation:

a) The assets of the exotic car business confirmed to be Mr. Wilson’s property by Order of Gray J.: $1,102,499.00.

b) The Neils Avenue property: $465,000.00.

c) The bank accounts: $250,000.00.

d) Additional cars purchased by Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari and beneficially controlled by Mr. Wilson: $640,000.00.

[52] When these amounts are totaled up, Mr. Wilson’s Net Family Property as of the date of separation is $2,457,499.00.

[53] As I noted above, Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari received significant gifts during the course of her marriage to Mr. Wilson. Those gifts account for Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari’s ownership in the property at 3329 Delfi Road. I accept the remainder of Ms. Fatah-Ghandehari’s statements about the values of assets on the date of marriage and the date of separation. Those calculations produce a $0 net family property for Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari, as can be seen from the Net Family Property statement that she provided (attached at Appendix “A, but not included in the reported reasons as it contains financial information of the parties).

[54] Therefore, the equalization payment owing as a result of my Net Family Property calculation is half of Mr. Wilson’s Net Family Property as of the date of separation, which is $1,228,749.50. This is slightly more than the amount sought by Ms. Fatahi-Gandehari, so I will only order the amount she seeks, which is $1,226,522.00. This is the amount to be paid by the Respondent, Stewart Wilson to the Applicant, Sara Fatahi-Gandehari. Given the very lengthy delays in this case, that amount is due and owing by Mr. Wilson within thirty (30) days of today’s date.

Issue #2 – Spousal Support

[55] This marriage was approximately seven and a half years long. The total period of cohabitation was eight years. At the time that Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari entered the marriage, she was working at a minimum wage job. She gave that work up in order to work in Mr. Wilson’s business.

[56] Spousal support can be granted on either the needs basis or the compensatory basis. Given the significant equalization payment being made in this case, I am of the view that spousal support should be considered on the compensatory basis rather than the needs basis.

[57] The rationale behind the compensatory basis of spousal support was set out in Moge v. Moge (1992 CanLII 25 (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813 at 861, where the Court stated:

Today, though more and more women are working outside the home, such employment continues to play a secondary role and sacrifices continue to be made for the sake of domestic considerations. These sacrifices often impair the ability of the partner who makes them (usually the wife) to maximize her earning potential because she may tend to forego educational and career advancement opportunities. These same sacrifices may also enhance the earning potential of the other spouse (usually the husband) who, because his wife is tending to such matters, is free to pursue economic goals.

[58] I have also considered the factors and objectives set out in the Divorce Act at subsections 15.2(4) and 15.2(6). Those factors all require consideration in this case.

[59] One of the key factors in this case is the role performed by each party during the marriage. Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari gave up employment during the marriage so that she could assist Mr. Wilson in building his business. Mr. Wilson’s business has been, and continues to be, a thriving business. That is clear from the videotape that was presented in Court as well as from other financial records that are in evidence.

[60] In that regard, I note the following points:

a) Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari contributed both labour and money (part of her gifts from her family) to the business. The expectation was that both parties would devote their energies to the development of the business.

b) Mr. Wilson obtained the profits of the business both during and after the marriage.

c) Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari lost opportunities to explore other careers during the marriage by devoting her energies to the business that Mr. Wilson is now profiting from.

[61] It could be argued that Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari has already been compensated for her efforts in developing the business through the equalization payment. The problem with that argument is that Mr. Wilson continues to run the business and has done so for more than six years since separation. As a result, Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari has lost the ability to earn income from these assets for this time period.

[62] As a result, Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari has an entitlement to spousal support. This brings me to the question of what income should be imputed to Mr. Wilson. Some of Mr. Wilson’s tax returns (up to 2015) were provided as part of the disclosure in this case. The information from Canada Revenue Agency was not provided.

[63] The information on Mr. Wilson’s tax returns is of no evidentiary value. One example will suffice to illustrate why I reach that conclusion. In 2015, the tax return that Mr. Wilson provided showed an income of $15,115.00. However, his personal bank deposits in that year showed deposits of $236,057.58. This is a significant and unexplained discrepancy. Mr. Wilson has chosen not to disclose information that would explain that discrepancy. In addition, while the tax returns were disclosed, the Notices of Assessment and other documentation from the Canada Revenue Agency that would have shown what CRA accepted as Mr. Wilson’s income were not disclosed by Mr. Wilson.

[64] I also note that, when the few bank records that were provided are reviewed, they suggest that Mr. Wilson lived a much more luxurious lifestyle than someone who earned only half of minimum wage in a year would be able to live. Finally, further support for the luxurious lifestyle that Mr. Wilson lived can be found in both the video that was produced at trial and in the social media posts that Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari filed as part of the record.

[65] In support of imputing income to Mr. Wilson, Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari makes the following observations at paragraph 55 of her Affidavit:

55. In his affidavit sworn February 24, 2017, Jason Bradimore claimed that 2448083 Ontario Inc. was suffering losses in large amounts, because of the Ferrari 458 being stored with the bailiff pursuant to the preservation order. He includes reference to losses of $25,000 every week and $100,000 just for one day on May 5, 2017. Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit “Y” is a true copy of excerpts of Jason Bradimore’s affidavit.

[66] I have also reviewed the statements from Mr. Braidmore referenced in Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari’s Affidavit. Mr. Braidmore has been one of Mr. Wilson’s partners in this exotic car business. It is clear from Mr. Braidmore’s evidence that this business provides a very significant stream of net income. I infer that much of this income has been accruing to Mr. Wilson.

[67] In her support calculation, Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari suggests an income of $2,000,000.00 for Mr. Wilson. This would produce support of more than $20,000.00 a month even at the low end. I am not persuaded that there is sufficient evidence to show that Mr. Wilson has an income of $2,000,000.00 per year.

[68] I am of the view that a line 150 income of somewhere between $475,000.00 and $500,000.00 is appropriately imputed to Mr. Wilson. I arrive at that number for the following reasons:

a) If the evidence of Mr. Braidmore was accepted, the income that this business generates would be significantly more than $500,000.00 per year. Mr. Braidmore testified that his losses alone from the preservation order over a limited number of vehicles could amount to $25,000.00 per week. Even if I accept that this is a seasonal business, twenty-six weeks of losses is well in excess of $600,000.00.

b) The amount of money that flowed into Mr. Wilson’s bank account in 2015, being $250,000.00, suggests that the income of the business was substantially higher. It must be remembered that these are records that Mr. Wilson was willing to disclose. As I have already noted, Mr. Wilson’s refusal to disclose other records suggests that the income that should be imputed to him is even higher than what would be suggested on the records before me.

[69] This brings me to the issue of the ownership of Mr. Wilson’s current residence. I understand that he lives in a home at 9680 Highway 20 in Smithville, Ontario. This property is legally owned by Mr. Wilson’s mother. However, the evidence from the questioning of Ms. Elizabeth Wilson is that this property was purchased with proceeds from the Niels Court property in Burlington, Ontario.

[70] Further, Ms. Elizabeth Wilson acknowledged that the funds for the Niels Court property did not come from her. Therefore, I accept Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari’s evidence that the funds for the Niels Court property came from Mr. Wilson. As a result, for the purposes of this proceeding, I conclude that Mr. Stewart Wilson is the beneficial owner of the property in Smithville, Ontario.

[71] Having found that Mr. Stewart Wilson is the beneficial owner of this property, at least for the matrimonial action, I then note that this property is being rented out for weddings and other events. This income is an additional income for Mr. Wilson and should be accounted for in calculating his net income.

[72] Considering these points, as well as the evidence I have about the lifestyle that Mr. Wilson leads, I am prepared to impute income to Mr. Wilson in the sum of $500,000.00 per year for every year from the date of separation to the present.

[73] I do not accept that Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari is not capable of earning an income. She was earning minimum wage when the parties met, and she should still be able to earn minimum wage. As a result, I am imputing an income of $30,000.00 per year to her. I raised this issue with counsel at the hearing and he confirmed that there was no real objection to this conclusion.

[74] When these numbers are used, I ran a spousal support calculation which is attached as Appendix “B” to these reasons (but not included in the reported version of the decision) using both $475,000.00 and $500,000.00 as Mr. Wilson’s income. At an income for Mr. Wilson of $475,000.00, these calculations show a range of monthly spousal support payments of $4,172.00 to $5,562.00 with a midpoint of $4,867.00. At an income of $500,000.00, these calculations show a range of monthly spousal support payments of $4,406.00 to $5,875.00 with a mid-point of $5,141.00.

[75] There is considerable uncertainty about what exact number should be chosen for support. This uncertainty arises because of Mr. Wilson’s failure to comply with disclosure orders. As a result, I am of the view that a monthly spousal support amount of $5,000.00 should be paid by Mr. Wilson to Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari. This is a number that is relatively close to the mid-point in this case. It is also the number that Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari has requested.

[76] I should also briefly deal with the issue of Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari’s health. A couple of doctor’s letters were filed in order to explain Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari’s medical condition. I do not need to discuss what was in those letters in any detail, except to note two points:

a) These documents would not make a material difference to my conclusions on spousal support, as I have already determined that Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari is entitled to spousal support on the compensatory basis.

b) These medical records would be at least some proof that Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari has an entitlement to spousal support on the needs basis. However, I do not need to decide that question in this case.

[77] Then, there is the question of duration. I am not prepared to put a definite termination date on spousal support for the following reasons:

a) The income that I have imputed to Mr. Wilson appears, on the evidence I have, to be at the low end of the reasonable range.

b) It has taken some considerable time for this matter to be adjudicated, in large part because Mr. Wilson has, in the words of the Court of Appeal, made a “procedural morass” out of this case. As a result, support should not be terminated immediately.

c) The medical issues raised by Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari’s evidence raise questions about whether she will be able to return to work at more than a minimum wage.

[78] This brings me to the question of arrears. In this case, the claim for spousal support was made very shortly after the parties separated. In D.B.S. v. S.R.G. 2006 SCC 37, the Supreme Court set out the principles that a Court should consider for a retroactive award of spousal support. In this case, Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari bears none of the responsibility for the delays in this case. As a result, there is no basis for the Court to refuse a retroactive award of spousal support.

[79] As a result, commencing January 1st, 2015, Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari is entitled to be paid $5,000.00 per month in support. As of the release of this decision, she is owed support for 77 months. The retroactive support payment is, therefore, $385,000.00. This amount is to be paid on an after-tax basis by Mr. Wilson and to be received on a tax-free basis by Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari.

[80] Therefore, in accordance with the Court of Appeal’s observations in Fielding v. Fielding 2015 ONCA 901, it is reasonable to apply a deduction to this amount to account for the tax consequences of the retroactive payment. I am of the view that the minimum marginal tax rate of approximately 20% is the appropriate amount to apply as the deduction. I reach that conclusion because of the fact that Mr. Wilson has purportedly filed tax returns that show a minimal income and because Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari has not had any income in the past few years.

[81] Mr. Wilson is to pay Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari $308,000.00 on account of retroactive spousal support within thirty (30) days of today’s date. That amount is an after-tax amount for Mr. Wilson and he is entitled to no tax deduction on it.

[82] Mr. Wilson is to pay spousal support in the amount of $5,000.00 per month commencing June 1, 2021.

[83] This brings me to the question of enforcement. Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari sought a number of orders directing the seizure and sale of assets owned by individuals other than Mr. Wilson. As I will discuss below, I am not prepared to make those orders at this time.

[84] However, Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari wishes to have both the retroactive spousal support and the ongoing spousal support amounts enforced through the Family Responsibility Office. I am prepared to make the appropriate orders and I retain jurisdiction to make all necessary orders in respect to enforcement through FRO. The necessary Orders may be submitted to my judicial assistant for signature.

[85] For the edification of the parties, including Mr. Wilson, my retention of jurisdiction combined with my responsibilities as a case management judge mean that I retain jurisdiction over any motions that might be necessary as a result of FRO’s enforcement of these payments. This includes any motions for relief from FRO’s enforcement of my orders.

Issue #3 – Certificate of Pending Litigation

[86] Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari owns a property at 3329 Delfi Road, Mississauga, Ontario. This property was purchased during the course of the marriage. It appears to have been purchased, in part, by using funds that Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari received in an inheritance. A Certificate of Pending Litigation was registered against this property by Mr. Wilson.

[87] The Certificate of Pending Litigation was originally granted by way of Gray J.’s order of March 3rd, 2015. At that point, Mr. Wilson may have had a claim to equalization or a resulting trust remedy against the property. Certificates of Pending Litigation are usually granted when there is an interest in the land. In this case, once the equalization claim has been addressed, any other claims that Mr. Wilson may have in any other proceedings would easily be satisfied by an award of damages.

[88] I have also had consideration of the factors set out in 572383 Ontario Inc v. Dhunna (1987 CarswellOnt 551 (Master)). Many of those factors, such as the alterative claim for damages, the ease of calculating damages and the fact that damages would be a successful remedy support removing the CPL from the property.

[89] Finally, there is the harm that would accrue to each party if the CPL is or is not removed. In this case, as the Court of Appeal has noted, Mr. Wilson has made a “procedural morass” out of this case. Part of that procedural morass is the fact that Mr Wilson has brought proceeding after proceeding in this case and has refused to pay costs awards ordered in favour of Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari or otherwise comply with Court orders. Indeed, Mr. Wilson has been found in contempt of court orders.

[90] As a result, Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari has been put to considerable time, effort and expense in order to defend these actions. It would be a further harm to her to have the title to one of her major assets clouded. The harm to Mr. Wilson in lifting the CPL is much more limited, especially since this decision results in Mr. Wilson owing more than a million and a half dollars to Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari.

[91] For the foregoing reasons, the CPL on the Delfi property is to be removed. This decision is made without prejudice to any argument that Mr. Wilson may wish to advance in the other proceedings to have the CPL placed back on the property. However, for clarity, any motion to place the CPL back on the property must proceed before me on notice.

[92] For the edification of the other parties, any motion to put the CPL back on the Delfi property by any of Mr. Wilson, Mr. Braidmore, Ms. Wilson or any company or other entity that they control that is brought for any reason must be brought before me. Any attempt to bring that motion before any other judge of this Court without my leave will be viewed as contempt of Court and will be addressed as such.

Issue #4 – Other Payments to Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari

[93] Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari seeks additional repayments as follows:

a) Payment of outstanding costs awards in the sum of $156,388.55.

b) Repayment of the shareholder loan in the sum of $331,499.00.

c) Repayment of $672,277.05 as a result of costs incurred to purchase vehicles for Mr. Wilson’s business.

[94] I start with the costs awards. I indicated in my endorsement of August 19th, 2020 that those amounts remain owing by Mr. Wilson and I encouraged him to repay those amounts. I understand that none of these amounts have been paid. When I release an endorsement on the next steps in this matter, I will address the outstanding costs orders. I am not prepared to make any further order with respect to those amounts at this stage.

[95] The other two issues can be dealt with together. There are two problems with these claims:

a) They go beyond issues in the family law litigation. The shareholder loan, for example, is a debt allegedly owing to Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari’s mother rather than Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari. Similarly, the money that Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari loaned is, if it was a loan, a matter of a civil claim and not just a family law claim.

b) Both issues have been dealt with in the equalization calculation, as set out above. As a result, I am not prepared to make a second order with respect to these alleged debts as there may be some double-counting if I factor them into the Net Family Property calculation AND make a separate order with respect to them.

[96] As a result, I am not prepared to make any of the other orders for the repayment of alleged debts that Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari seeks in this case.

Issue #5 – Unequal Division of Net Family Property

[97] This issue was not aggressively pursued in oral argument. However, it is raised in the prayer for relief so I will briefly address it. Section 5(6) of the Family Law Act permits an unequal distribution of net family property where it would be unconscionable to have the assets divided equally.

[98] The general rule is that Net Family Property is divided equally and an unequal division is the exception. Further, the threshold for an unequal division of Net Family Property is very high. See Serra v. Serra 2009 ONCA 105.

[99] In this case, I am not persuaded that there would be any unconscionability in dividing the Net Family Property equally. The calculation that I have arrived at is based on several adverse inferences that I have drawn against Mr. Wilson for his failure to disclose documents. Those inferences have resulted in a higher Net Family Property and in higher spousal support. Therefore, I do not see any unconscionability in this case.

Issue #6 – Relief Against Other Individuals

[100] Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari seeks a whole series of orders against numbered companies, Ms. Elizabeth Johannesen-Wilson, Mr. Jason Braidmore and other parties. In essence, these orders are for final judgment against these third parties. I am of the view that, with one exception, no further orders should be made against these parties.

[101] I start by noting that a whole series of preservation orders have been made by Price J. against various third parties in this matter. Those orders have been made and upheld on the basis that assets may have been transferred by Mr. Wilson in part to avoid his financial obligations in the family law matter. These preservation orders were made under section 12 of the Family Law Act. They are sufficient to protect the assets at this point, with one exception which I will come to.

[102] I am also not prepared to make any orders against any of the third parties for two reasons. First, they are not subject to Price J.’s contempt order. Therefore, they have the right to be heard before any orders that may affect their rights are made. Second, they may have claims against these assets that entitle them to be heard before the assets are disposed of. I acknowledge that a finding has been made by Price J. that the assets in question are beneficially owned by Mr. Stewart Wilson. It is now not open to Mr. Wilson to challenge that finding. However, other parties may have a right to challenge that finding. The Court must be cautious about extinguishing the rights of litigants. As a result, any of the disposition orders must await further litigation within the context of the other cases I am case managing.

[103] This brings me to the one exception. It is the property that is currently registered to the name of Elizabeth Wilson in Smithville. There are two problems with simply leaving the issue of this property to another day. First, the evidence that I have strongly suggests that Ms. Wilson did not purchase this property with her own money. Instead, it appears to have been purchased with funds from the sale of the Neils Court property in Burlington. Second, Mr. Wilson appears to be using this property to run his business.

[104] Price J. has previously concluded that Ms. Elizabeth Wilson did not have the funds to purchase the Neils Avenue property at the time that the property was purchased (see 2017 ONSC 6034 at para 145). I have accepted this conclusion based on the evidence in the record before me.

[105] The money used to purchase the Neils Avenue property was, therefore, family property. This would entitle Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari to advance a purchase money resulting trust claim against this property. The principles relating to the doctrine of resulting trusts is set out in Rascal Trucking v. Nishi 2013 SCC 33. Since the proceeds from the Neils Avenue property were used to purchase the Smithville property, it is open to Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari to seek to trace matrimonial funds through to this asset.

[106] This brings me to the issue of a preservation order under Rule 12 of the Family Law Rules. The jurisprudence with respect to Rule 12 Orders is set out in the decisions of Price J. One of the key principles is the principle that Rule 12 preservation orders should not be made against non-parties. See Ho v. Ho 2003 CanLII 2315 (Ont. S.C.J.). However, there are also the counterbalancing principles set out in Price J.’s decision on Mr. Braidmore’s motion to set aside the preservation orders. Those counterbalancing provisions include a discussion of the Court’s jurisdiction to set aside fraudulent transactions in a family law case (see 2018 ONSC 5587 paras. 97-105). Price J. did not conclude that there were fraudulent transactions, and I do not reach that conclusion either.

[107] For the purposes of this litigation I have found that Mr. Wilson is the beneficial owner of this property. It is also possible to trace funds that are owed to Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari into this property. As a result, it is appropriate to make a section 12 order specifically about this house. To that end, I am ordering as follows:

a) No depletion of the property municipally known as 9680 Highway 20, Smithville, Ontario is permitted.

b) No further charges or other encumbrances of any kind may be placed on the property municipally known as 9680 Highway 20, Smithville, Ontario without my leave.

c) The property municipally known as 9680 Highway 20, Smithville, Ontario may not be sold, rented for more than a week at a time or transferred without my leave.

d) This Order shall be registered on the title of municipally known as 9680 Highway 20, Smithville, Ontario.

[108] Any variation of this Order by any person must be sought before me as the case management judge. I note that I have made no final determinations respecting Ms. Elizabeth Wilson’s rights in respect of this property, which is why I am not prepared to make any further orders in respect of the property.

Conclusion and Costs

[109] As will be clear from the foregoing reasons, I was not prepared to sign the draft Order that counsel had prepared in this matter. Counsel is directed to forthwith provide my judicial assistant with a draft Order. I will sign that Order and have it issued and entered by the Court office. I will then provide a copy of the signed order to Mr. Wilson’s counsel along with a copy of these reasons.

[110] There is also one other clerical matter to attend to. Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari filed two videos as evidence along with a detailed Affidavit that was more than six hundred pages. The format in which the Affidavit was filed permits me to view it, but does NOT permit me to download it to the Court file. The same applies to the videos. Therefore, Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari is to forthwith file copies of these documents with the Court office. I will then arrange to have them marked as exhibits on the trial.

[111] For the foregoing reasons, I am ordering as follows:

a) A divorce in this action will issue thirty-one days after the release of these reasons.

b) An equalization payment shall be made by the Respondent, Mr. Stewart Wilson, to the Applicant, Ms. Sara Fatahi-Ghandehari in the sum of $1,226,522.00 by June 18th, 2021.

c) Retroactive spousal support in the sum of $308,000.00 is to be paid by Mr. Wilson to Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari by June 18th, 2021. This amount is to be received by Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari on a tax free basis, and Mr. Wilson is not entitled to any tax deductions for this amount.

d) Commencing June 1, 2021 and on the first day of every month thereafter, Mr. Wilson shall pay Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari $5,000.00 per month in ongoing spousal support.

e) The amounts in paragraphs (c) and (d) shall be enforced through the Family Responsibility Office and I will sign all necessary orders in that respect.

f) I retain jurisdiction to address all issues relating to the Family Responsibility Office, including any refraining order or other relief that may be subsequently sought by Mr. Wilson.

g) Any application to vary the amount in paragraph (d) or to otherwise terminate the ongoing support payable to Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari must come before me for adjudication.

h) The CPL registered against the property municipally known as 3329 Delfi Drive is to be removed.

i) No subsequent CPL may be registered against the property municipally known as 3329 Delfi Drive by any of Mr. Stewart Wilson, Mr. Jason Braidmore, Ms. Elizabeth Wilson or any party or entity controlled by them.

j) For greater clarity, the Order in paragraph i) applies to all counsel involved in this case other than Mr. Siddiqui.

k) No encumbrances may be registered against the property municipally known as 9860 Highway 20 in Smithville Ontario. Further, this property may not be sold, leased for more than a week at a time or transferred without leave of the Court.

l) The order flowing from this judgment is to be registered against the title of the property municipally known as 9860 Highway 20 in Smithville Ontario.

m) No variations to the orders in paragraphs (k) and (l) may be sought without my leave.

n) Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari is to forthwith prepare and submit the Order flowing from these reasons to my judicial assistant.

o) Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari is to forthwith file hard copies of the videos that were part of her record as well as her lengthy Affidavit dated October 23rd, 2020 and all of the attachments with the Court office.

[112] This brings me to the issue of costs. While Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari was self-represented at the undefended trial, she was assisted by counsel, Mr. Shahzad Siddiqui, in the preparation of the materials for the undefended trial and at the undefended trial.

[113] Counsel has filed a costs outline, and seeks costs in the sum of $25,151.31 on a substantial indemnity basis or, in the alternative, costs in the sum of $20,959.01 on a partial indemnity basis. On receipt of this outline, I invited Ms. Fatahi-Ghandehari to provide her costs submissions, which I have received and reviewed.

[114] Costs are sought against Mr. Wilson, in the first instance, on a substantial indemnity basis. In support of this submission, counsel relies on Rule 24(8) of the Family Law Rules, which says that if a party has acted in bad faith, the Court shall decide costs on a full recovery basis and shall order the party to pay them immediately.

[115] As a result, there are two issues that I must determine in addressing costs. First, there is the scale of costs. Second, there is the quantum of costs.

[116] I start with counsel’s submission that costs should be paid on a substantial indemnity basis. Counsel points to two separate endorsements of the Court of Appeal that detail the conduct of Mr. Wilson in this case. The first endorsement stated that “the record amply shows that the appellant [Mr. Wilson] has made a procedural morass of this case.” 2018 ONCA 728 at para. 10. The second stated:

[12] The factor of the prejudice to the responding party flowing from the delay confirms my decision to dismiss the moving party’s motion for an extension of time in respect of the October 10, 2017 and January 26, 2018 orders. The moving party has repeatedly failed to comply with multiple orders of the Superior Court. He has not paid the costs that Price J. ordered him to pay on January 26, 2018 even though nearly a year has elapsed since that order. The evidence of the responding party is that the moving party’s failure to promptly file an appeal and comply with court orders has prejudiced her by embroiling her in vexatious and repetitive proceedings. This factor suggests that the justice of the case militates in favour of dismissing the motion.

[117] In determining which scale to award costs on, it is also important to remember that the trial proceeded on an undefended basis because the Respondent was in contempt of basic disclosure orders and refused to comply with them on repeated occasions in spite of being given an opportunity to purge his contempt.

[118] When the Respondent’s conduct as set out in Price J.’s decisions is considered, I am of the view that costs on a substantial indemnity basis are appropriate in this matter. I am also mindful of the Court of Appeal’s observation that this case has been made into a “procedural morass”. This is another factor that supports costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

[119] This brings me to the question of whether the quantum of costs sought by the Applicant is reasonable. I am of the view that it is. The motion record for the undefended trial was six hundred pages, and it was supplemented by viva voce evidence and submissions. It was a complex matter. As a result, I am of the view that costs should be payable by the Respondent to the Applicant in the sum of $25,151.31 inclusive of HST and disbursements. Those costs are to be paid within ten (10) calendar days of the release of these reasons.

[120] Approximately twenty-five percent of the monetary amounts that I have ordered relate to the spousal support payments. As a result, $6,287.83 of the costs order described in paragraph 118 may be enforced through the Family Responsibility Office.

LEMAY J

Released: May 19, 2021