COURT FILE NO.: CV-14-61290

DATE: 20210527

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

ISMET HAJRIZI

Plaintiff

– and –

THE DOMINION OF CANADA GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, KEVIN HICKS, and MARGARET DEMPSEY

Defendants

William Fuhgeh, for the Plaintiff

Jahmiah Ferdinand-Hodkin for the Defendant, The Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company

Jeremy R. Rubenstein, for the Defendant, Margaret Dempsey

HEARD: March 12, 2021

REASONS FOR decision

Beaudoin J.

[1] The Defendants, Margaret Dempsey (“Dempsey”) and the Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company (“Dominion”) bring this motion seeking:

a. Costs thrown away because of the Plaintiff’s failed attendance at mediation; and

b. Security for costs because the Plaintiff has been deported from Canada and has no assets in Ontario

[2] At the outset, Mr. Fuhgeh expressed concerns about my presiding at this motion. He stated that I had not given him sufficient opportunity to present his argument on a motion I heard in 2016. When pressed further on this point, he did not ask that I recuse myself and he agreed that I could fairly adjudicate the matters on the record before me.

Background

[3] These facts are found in Dempsey’s affidavit of September 18, 2019, her supplementary affidavit of January 15, 2020, the affidavit of Kyle Hamilton on behalf of Dominion sworn February 8, 2021, Hajrizi’s affidavit sworn March 3, 2021, the relevant exhibits, excerpts from the transcripts of the examinations for discovery, and the answers to the undertakings given.

[4] On July 4, 2012, Hajrizi and Dempsey were in a motor vehicle accident on Carling Avenue in the City of Ottawa. There were no injuries. They were travelling east in adjacent lanes and they disagree as to who crossed over the centre line and caused the accident.

[5] The Defendant, Kevin Hicks (“Hicks”) was an independent witness and he corroborated Dempsey’s version of events; namely that Hajrizi drifted into Dempsey’s lane and caused the accident.

[6] Hajrizi, Dempsey, and Hicks all gave their accounts to the Ottawa Police Services. Based on the information provided, the Ottawa Police Services charged Hajrizi with an offence under section 142 the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8. This charge was ultimately dismissed by the Crown.

[7] Hajrizi and Dempsey made claims to their respective automobile insurers. Dempsey’s insurers, (Royal & Sun Alliance) and Hajrizi’s (the Defendant, Dominion) undertook their own investigations. In applying the Fault Determination Rules under the Insurance Act R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, Dominion deemed Hajrizi fifty percent at fault for the accident. Hajrizi disputes this.

[8] Hajrizi had “Accident Forgiveness” with Dominion. As a result, there was no increase in his monthly automobile premiums and his driver’s record was unaffected. These facts were confirmed by Dominion in its answers to undertakings, demonstrated by the Plaintiff’s bank records, and were admitted by Hajrizi at his examination for discovery.

[9] Hajrizi was involved in a second accident on August 21, 2012. He was not at fault for this accident. His vehicle was written-off. As a result, Dominion paid Hajrizi for the value of his vehicle on or about August 28, 2012. Hajrizi’s monthly insurance premiums remained unchanged.

[10] Dominion cancelled Hajrizi’s automobile insurance effective at 12:01 a.m. on November 12, 2012 because he had not obtained a new automobile to insure, despite having been indemnified on August 28, 2012. Dominion considered the absence of a vehicle to insure a “material change in risk”.

[11] Hajrizi re-applied for automobile insurance with his broker after allowing his policy to lapse. He claims to have been quoted a higher rate than what he had previously paid prior to the lapse of his policy. Dominion has no record of providing the Plaintiff with a quote for his new premiums. Following the cancellation of his policy, Hajrizi sought a reinstate at the same premium rate.

[12] Dominion declined to reinstate the policy and advised Hajrizi by letter dated December 4, 2012. Dominion further informed Hajrizi that if he disagreed with the decision, he could contact the General Insurance Ombud Service and submit a complaint. No complaint was filed.

[13] Hajrizi has provided no evidence that any of the quotes he allegedly received on his re-application for insurance were in any way affected by the accident with Dempsey, regardless of how it happened or what was represented.

[14] Hajrizi then issued the within action on July 3, 2014, alleging, amongst other things, that Dempsey and Hicks misrepresented how the motor vehicle accident occurred to the Ottawa Police Services and alleging that they should bear responsibility for his increased monthly automobile premiums. He claims against Dominion for a declaration that it wrongfully cancelled his policy and a declaration that it breached its “Accident Forgiveness” feature. Hicks has not responded to the claim.

The Court Proceedings and the Referral to Mediation

[15] This action was at risk of being dismissed for delay pursuant to rule 48.14 (1). To avoid an administrative dismissal, Hajrizi had to pass his trial record and set the matter down for trial. Alternately, he could file a timetable signed by all parties pursuant to rule 48.14(4) or bring a motion for a status hearing pursuant to rule 48.14(5).

[16] Moreover, Hajrizi could not pass his trial record unless he completed a local Pretrial Request and Certification Form that indicated a mediation pursuant to rule 24.1 had been completed or had been scheduled.

[17] If Hajrizi passed the record and set the matter down for trial, rule 48.04(5) precluded him from conducting any further discoveries of the Defendants without leave.

[18] After some exchange of correspondence, on May 27, 2019, Mr. Fuhgeh wrote to the Defendants advising that he was required to set down the action for trial on or before July 2, 2019, and he wished to re-examine the Defendants and conduct a mediation prior to setting it down. He advised that he had not received defence counsels’ availability and stated he would unilaterally set down dates in June 2019 for further discoveries and mediation.

[19] On May 29, 2019, counsel for Dominion responded to Mr. Fuhgeh’s letter and communicated his willingness to move the file forward. He further advised that Mr. Fuhgeh could proceed to file his trial record, while counsel worked on the next steps in the file and that he would not take position that Mr. Fuhgeh was prevented for conducting any further discoveries he may have any entitlement to. He specifically asked Mr. Fuhgeh to not set arbitrary dates for discovery and mediation.

[20] Mr. Fuhgeh did not respond to that letter of May 29, 2019, but instead served notices of re-examinations for discovery on both Dominion and Dempsey, for June 3, 2019. There was a further exchange of correspondence between counsel. Mr. Fuhgeh sought counsels’ availability for a motion, but the nature of that motion was unclear.

[21] On June 5, 2019, Mr. Fuhgeh advised that he had unilaterally scheduled a mediation for June 14, 2019 at the Ottawa Public Library. He also reiterated his requests for counsels’ availability for a motion in the Fall of 2019, but he failed to advise what relief the motion would be seeking.

[22] In a letter dated June 6, 2019, Mr. Fuhgeh reported that the Public Library was closed on June 14, 2019. He then unilaterally rescheduled the mediation to be held at that location on June 20, 2019. He accused opposing counsel of obfuscating and preventing his client from setting the matter down for trial and enclosed certificates of non-attendance for both Defendants dated June 3, 2019 for their re-examinations for discovery, which he had also unilaterally scheduled.

[23] On June 14, 2019, Mr. Fuhgeh served his mediation brief on all counsel. He also included Irene Gauthier, Mediator, on this email. Dempsey’s counsel advised Ms. Gauthier that this was the first notice he had received where Mr. Fuhgeh intended to use her services as mediator. He also advised her that he required consent from his client before he could agree to Ms. Gauthier’s mediation terms. He advised Ms. Gauthier that there were several procedural disagreements amongst counsel, and he suggested that it might make more sense for the parties to consent to fail the mediation without attending. While the practice of “failing mediation” is discouraged, I am satisfied that this offer should have been taken seriously in this case.

[24] On June 14, 2019, Mr. Fuhgeh accused Dempsey’s counsel of obfuscating the Plaintiff from setting the matter down for trial. After a further exchange, the parties agreed to attend the mediation.

[25] On June 17, 2019, Mr. Fuhgeh advised that Hajrizi intended to send an “agent” to the mediation on his behalf, as opposed to attending the mediation in person. Dempsey’s counsel advised that if the Plaintiff was insisting that the mediation take place, Hajrizi was expected to personally attend the unilaterally scheduled mediation.

[26] The Defendants made themselves available and served mediation briefs in advance of the mediation. The Defendants attended the mediation along with their clients, but Hajrizi did not personally attend the mediation. As a result, the mediator (Irene Gauthier) issued her report that says: “The Mediation did not take place because the Plaintiff, Ismet Hajrizi, was not physically present in the mediation room. The Defendants did not wish to mediate via telephone with Mr. Hajrizi.”

[27] The Defendants subsequently learned that Hajrizi was deported to Kosovo on June 30, 2019 by the Canadian Border Security Agency (“CBSA”). Hajrizi could not attend the mediation in person on June 20, 2019 since he was being detained at the Regional Detention Centre, a significant development that Mr. Fuhgeh withheld from opposing counsel.

[28] Despite requests, Hajrizi has not explained why he was deported from Canada or the terms of the deportation. Dempsey learned of the deportation after seeing a newspaper article and several online posts about the Plaintiff. It was also reported that Hajrizi had been found guilty of extortion in 2006.

[29] On August 30, 2019, in response to a request under rule 56.02, Hajrizi’s counsel formally declared that Hajrizi was no longer ordinarily resident in Ontario.

[30] During his subsequent examination for discovery conducted on November 12, 2019, Hajrizi confirmed that he was deported from Canada on June 30, 2019, and that he resides in Litijan, Kosovo. There is no appeal pending in relation to his deportation. He further admitted that he has no assets in Ontario.

[31] On September 27, 2019, Hajrizi brought a motion for, amongst other things, an order that the Defendants be examined for discovery for a second time. On September 30, 2019, Justice Gomery dismissed Hajrizi’s motion as against Dempsey and did not award any relief against Dominion. She awarded $800 in costs to be paid by Hajrizi in favour of Dempsey. The Plaintiff has not paid those costs.

[32] These motions were originally returnable on February 18, 2021 but were adjourned at the request of Mr. Fuhgeh. Justice Mclean ordered Hajrizi to pay costs thrown away in the amount of $1500 for each of the Defendants. These costs were ordered payable forthwith and Justice Mclean further ordered that the issue of costs payment may be brought before the hearing judge. Mr. Fuhgeh confirmed that these costs have not been paid and that he will be appealing Justice McLean’s order.

Issue No.1

Are the Defendants entitled to an order for costs thrown away due to Hajrizi’s failure to attend the mediation scheduled on June 20, 2019?

[33] The Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 140 (“the Rules”) do not permit an ‘agent’ to attend on behalf of a party, save and except if the party is insured by an insurer that may be liable to satisfy all or part of a judgment. That is the only prescribed exception to the requirement for personal attendance by the parties at a mediation.

[34] A broad reading of the Rules reinforces the conclusion that in person attendance at mediation is mandatory, save for a demonstration of exceptional circumstances.

[35] At those pre-pandemic times, the Rules provided for attendance by telephone or teleconference for some steps in a proceeding, but mediation is specifically excluded. Rule 1.08(1) states:

1.08(1): Where Available

(1) If facilities for a telephone or video conference are available at the court or are provided by a party, all or part of any of the following proceedings or steps in a proceeding may be heard or conducted by telephone or video conference as permitted by subrules (2) to (5):

1. A motion (Rule 37).

2. An application (Rule 38).

3. A status hearing (Rule 48.14).

4. At trial, the oral evidence of a witness and the argument.

5. A reference (Rule 55.02).

6. An appeal or a motion for leave to appeal (Rules 61 and 62).

7. A proceeding for judicial review.

8. A pre-trial conference or case conference.

[36] Mediation was purposefully excluded from the list in rule 1.08(1). In Thompson v. Freeman, 2008 CanLII 41174 (ON SC), the defendant’s solicitor attended the mediation session with the assigned roster mediator but the defendant himself and the representative of his insurer failed to attend. In that case, the plaintiff was not given advance warning nor was his consent sought. Master Dash held that the party seeking relief from the requirement of personal attendance has the onus of seeking the consent of the opposing party or an order of the court.

[37] In addressing the defendant’s failure to attend the mediation, Master Dash held at para. 35:

35 Failure of the defendant and his insurer to attend, in addition to being a breach of the rules and an ineffective way to conduct a mediation, is also a breach of protocol and a sign of disrespect not only to the opposing party, to the opposing counsel and to the mediator, but to the mediation process itself.

[38] In Laporte v. Ridgewell, 2007 CanLII 2805 (ON SC), Master Pope considered the meaning of the phrase “to attend the mediation session”. Master Pope concluded that “Attend” in rule 24.1.11(1) means to “attend in person”. In that case, defendant’s counsel attended the mediation, but the client (a representative of an insurer) was not physically present at the mediation. The mediation did not proceed. Master Pope ordered that the defendant was to pay the mediator’s fees for the aborted mediation, the plaintiff’s costs for preparation and attendance at the mediation and the cost of rescheduling the mediation.

[39] In this case, Mr. Fuhgeh unilaterally scheduled the mediation and selected the mediator without consulting counsel for the other parties. He then refused to cancel the mediation, forcing the Defendants to prepare and attend with their respective clients. When defence counsel objected to an agent attend on behalf of Hajrizi, Mr. Fuhgeh did not respond.

[40] Defence counsel had a reasonable expectation that Hajrizi would be present. Mr. Fuhgeh concealed the fact that his client was unavailable and was on the eve of being deported from Canada. Given Mr. Fuhgeh’s unilateral actions in scheduling the mediation and his insistence on the personal attendance of the opposing parties, the Defendants were justified in refusing to proceed any further. I adopt Master Dash’s words and I conclude that Mr, Fuhgeh’s actions were, at the vey least; “a sign of disrespect not only to the opposing party, to the opposing counsel and to the mediator, but to the mediation process itself.”

[41] I find that the Defendants are entitled to their costs “thrown away” which I fix for each of them in the amount of $2500.

Issue No. 2

Should the Plaintiff be ordered to make a payment of security for costs as he is ordinarily resident outside of Ontario with no evidence of assets likely to satisfy an adverse costs order?

[42] Rule 56.01(1) of the Rules provides the circumstances in which security for costs may be ordered. An order for security for costs is discretionary and should be made “as is just” once certain criteria have been met. In this case, the relevant criteria are:

a) The plaintiff or applicant is ordinarily resident outside Ontario;

c) The defendant or respondent has an order against the plaintiff or applicant for costs in the same or another proceeding that remain unpaid in whole or in part;

or

e) There is good reason to believe that the action or application is frivolous and vexatious, and the plaintiff or applicant has insufficient assets in Ontario to pay the costs of the defendant or respondent.

[43] A motion for security for costs engages a two-step inquiry.

a) Has the moving party established one of the Rule 56.01 criteria? If so,

b) Has the responding party established it would not be just to order security for costs?

[44] Hajrizi has been deported from Canada by the CBSA and there is no appeal of the deportation order. Beyond that, his counsel made a formal declaration pursuant to rule 56.02 that Hajrizi is not ordinarily resident in Ontario. In addition, Hajrizi has unpaid orders for costs on these proceedings.

[45] The only issue for me to decide is whether the order for security for costs would not be just. This second step of the inquiry places the burden on Hajrizi.

[46] In Zeitoun v. Economical Insurance Group, (2008), 2008 CanLII 20996 (ON SCDC), 91 O.R. (3d) 131, (Ont. Sup. Div. Ct.) the Divisional court held at para.45:

45 Provided that the plaintiff is able to show that the claim is not clearly devoid of merit, impecuniosity may be a persuasive factor in tipping the scales in favour of no order for security. Where a plaintiff seeks to rely on impecuniosity, however, the onus falls on him to show it. As Doherty J. stated in Hallum v. Canadian Memorial Chiropractic College (1989), 1989 CanLII 4354 (ON SC), 70 O.R. (2d) 119, [1989] O.J. No. 1399 (H.C.J.), at para. 18:

A litigant who falls within one of the categories created by rule 56.01(a) to (f), and who relies on his impecuniosity to avoid an order requiring that he post security, must do more than adduce some evidence of impecuniosity. The onus rests on him to satisfy the court that he is impecunious: ….The onus rests on the party relying on impecuniosity, not by virtue of the language of rule 56.01, but because his financial capabilities are within his knowledge and are not known to his opponent; and because he asserts his impecuniosity as a shield against an order as to security for costs.

[47] Hajrizi admitted that he does not have any assets in Ontario. Accordingly, he must either prove impecuniosity or satisfy this Court that his claims are not clearly devoid of merit.

[48] In Hontaru v. John Doe, 2018 ONSC 1014, Master Jolley recently held at para. 33:

33 The cases consistently hold that the evidentiary threshold to establish impecuniosity is high. Bald statements unsupported by detail are not sufficient. The threshold can only be reached by “tendering complete and accurate disclosure of the plaintiff’s income, assets, expenses, liabilities and borrowing ability, with full supporting documentation for each category where available or an explanation where not available.” (internal citation omitted).

[49] At paragraph 10 of his responding affidavit, Hajrizi makes bald statements that he has no assets. He attaches bank statements without any explanation and these documents raise more questions than answers. Mr. Fuhgeh wrongly asserts that the Defendants should have clarified any ambiguity by cross-examining his client. His client has the onus of satisfying the high evidentiary threshold of establishing impecuniosity and he has failed to do so.

[50] Hajrizi’s statements must be viewed with caution. He has a history of frivolous litigation and of pleading impecuniosity. Before he was deported from Canada, Hajrizi and members of his family, unsuccessfully tried to sue the Ottawa-Carleton District School Board and one of its students.[^1] As in this case, that action involved allegations of misrepresentations to the authorities. After dismissing the case, Justice James ordered costs in excess of $165,000 against Hajrizi and his family. Hajrizi and his family tried to rely on “impecuniosity” in defence of any costs award. Justice James said the following at para. 19 of his decision on costs:[^2]

19 It has been held on numerous occasions that a litigant’s impecuniosity is not sufficient reason to displace the usual rule that costs should follow the event. There are exceptions to the general rule. In particular, a justifiable although unsuccessful action sometimes warrants a reduction in what would otherwise be a reasonable amount for costs. In addition, there is an access to justice aspect to the determination of an appropriate costs order for litigants of modest means. The flip side of this argument is that costs should not be watered down to the point of encouraging litigants to pursue unmeritorious claims because their impecuniosity insulates them from the natural consequences of their decision to proceed to trial. The present case sounds more in the latter category than the former. The plaintiffs’ allegations were not credible, and they pressed their inflammatory assertions of malice, collusion, misfeasance in public office, etc. from start to finish. (Emphasis added)

[51] Hajrizi has been deported from Canada for undisclosed reasons. In 2006, he was convicted for a crime of dishonesty. Mr. Fuhgeh’ s claim that his client was pardoned is not supported by any evidence.

[52] I am satisfied that Hajrizi’s evidence of impecuniosity is completely unreliable and does not satisfy the high evidentiary threshold. He continues to retain counsel who claims that he will appeal a $3000 costs award and Hajrizi participated in this motion by using a cell phone from Kosovo.

[53] Even if I were persuaded by Hajrizi’s impecuniosity, the case law is clear that impecuniosity does not automatically result in a dismissal of the motion or security for costs. The merits of the action must still be considered.

[54] In Padnos v. Luminart Inc., (1996), 1996 CanLII 11781 (ON SC), 32 O.R. (3d) 120 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)), Justice Kiteley carefully reviewed the case law regarding the relationship between impecuniosity and the merits of an action as follows:

…It is clear from rule 56.01(1)(e) that the merits are one of two critical issues when the defendant claims security for costs because the action is frivolous and vexatious regardless of whether the plaintiff raises impecuniosity.

…. the introduction to rule 56.01 is that the court may make an order for security for costs “as is just” on the enumerated grounds. As McKinlay J. (as she then was) pointed out in Horvat v. Feldman (1986), 15 C.P.C. (2d) 220 (Ont. H.C.J.), that for those words to have meaning, the court may consider all matters which will assist in making a “just” order and that that analysis may “often” include a consideration of the merits. She further held that the issue is not whether merits are considered but to what extent and that the appropriateness of any investigation into the merits depends on: (1) the nature of the action; (2) the complexity of the pleadings; and (3) whether the defendant can satisfy one of subrules (a) to (f). Merits have a role in any application under rule 56.01, albeit in a continuum; for example, rule 56.01(1)(a) would be at the low end and rule 56.01(1)(e) would be at the high end.

[55] At this stage of the proceeding, the burden placed on the plaintiff is not particularly onerous as our courts have repeatedly cautioned against stifling a possibly meritorious claim. A plaintiff’s poverty should not deny them access to justice. In assessing the merits, in John Wink Ltd. v. Sico Inc., 1987 4299 (ON SC) Justice Reid concluded with this often-quoted statement: “The onus on the plaintiff is therefore not to show that the claim is likely to succeed. It is merely to show that it is not almost certain to fail.”

1. The Claim against Dempsey

[56] Hajrizi’s claim rests entirely on an allegation that Dempsey and an independent witness, Hicks, lied to the police about what they observed on July 4, 2012. I agree with Dempsey’s counsel that this claim is almost certain to fail for three reasons:

a. the claim does not disclose a valid cause of action;

b. there is no evidence Dempsey misrepresented her account; and

c. Hajrizi cannot satisfy a simple “but-for” test to support a claim for damages.

[57] In Queen v. Cognos, 1993 CanLII 146 (SCC), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 87, the Supreme Court confirmed the 5 requirements a plaintiff must meet in order to succeed in a claim for negligent misrepresentation.

(1) there must be a duty of care based on a "special relationship" between the representor and the representee;

(2) the representation in question must be untrue, inaccurate, or misleading;

(3) the representor must have acted negligently in making said misrepresentation;

(4) the representee must have relied, in a reasonable manner, on said negligent misrepresentation; and

(5) the reliance must have been detrimental to the representee in the sense that damages resulted.

[58] In Hercules Management Ltd. v Ernst & Young, [1997] S.C.R. 165, the Supreme Court moved away from the term “special relationship” and instead re-focused the inquiry of the traditional concept of the duty of care. The Supreme Court nevertheless maintained that an action can only exist in negligent misrepresentation if the plaintiff is the recipient of the misrepresentation and the plaintiff reasonably relied on the misrepresentation to their detriment.

[59] In this case, Hajrizi’s claim for negligent misrepresentation is rooted in representations that were not made to him; they were made between to third parties. The claim falls outside of the scope of the tort as contemplated by the Supreme Court of Canada.

[60] Mr. Fuhgeh responds that there is a general claim in “negligence” against Dempsey, but no particulars of that claim are provided. Even the most generous reading of the statement of claim does not reveal any other cause of action against Dempsey.

[61] Even if a cause of action did exist, Hajrizi cannot satisfy a simple “but-for” analysis on the issue of causation. The evidence confirms the Plaintiff’s monthly premiums did not increase and his driver’s rating did not drop as a result of the accident involving Dempsey, regardless of whose version of events is accepted. This was admitted by the Plaintiff at his examination for discovery, confirmed by Dominion, and corroborated by the Plaintiff’s bank statements.

2. The claim against Dominion

[62] I conclude that Hajrizi’s claim that Dominion improperly cancelled the Plaintiff’s policy and improperly applied its “Accident Forgiveness” feature as a result of the accident of June 4, 2012, is almost certain to fail.

[63] Hajrizi has tendered no evidence to demonstrate any wrongdoing on the part of Dominion in cancelling his policy on November 12, 2012, because he no longer had a vehicle to ensure and this constituted a material change in risk.

[64] Hajrizi has provided no evidence that any of the quotes he allegedly received on his re-application for insurance were in any way affected by the accident with Dempsey, regardless of how it happened or what was represented.

[65] With respect to his premiums and his driver rating, Hajrizi admitted on discovery that:

a) his premium never changed between the first accident and the cancellation of his policy; and,

b) his driver rating never decreased between the first accident and the cancellation of his policy.

These admissions are fatal to the claims he has advanced against this Defendant.

Conclusion

[66] I have examined the Bills of Costs of each of the Defendants and while these are not unreasonable, I will limit the security to the amount of costs incurred to date, exclusive the costs incurred for the mediation. I therefore require the Plaintiff to post security for costs in the amount of $15,000 for each Defendant. This security is to be paid within 90 days. The Defendants are entitled to their costs of this motion. The parties are to make their written submissions as to costs within 60 days of the release of this decision.

Mr. Justice Robert N. Beaudoin

Released: May 27, 2021

COURT FILE NO.: CV-14-61290

DATE: 20210527

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

ISMET HAJRIZI

Plaintiff

– and –

THE DOMINION OF CANADA GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, KEVIN HICKS, and MARGARET DEMPSEY

Defendants

REASONS FOR decision

Beaudoin J.

Released: May 27, 2021

[^1]: Hajrizi v. Ottawa-Carleton School Board, 2018 ONSC 3213

[^2]: Hajrizi v. Ottawa Carleton District School Board, 2018 ONSC 6644