Court File and Parties

Court File No.: FC-11-1457-2 Date: 2021/01/05 Superior Court of Justice – Ontario

Re: Teresa Perez, Applicant And: Stefan Chiris, Respondent

Before: Justice Engelking

Counsel: Self-represented Applicant Self-represented Respondent

Heard: October 6, 2020

Endorsement

[1] This is a Motion to Change the parties’ Paternity Agreement dated May 25, 2011 originally brought by the Respondent, Mr. Chiris, in January of 2019 seeking an order to terminate or reduce child support for the parties’ child, Samuel Perez, born on August 3, 2000.

[2] The Applicant, Ms. Perez, responded to the Motion to Change and requested adjustments to child support, retroactive support and a contribution by Mr. Chiris to section 7 expenses. The issues of on-going child support and adjustments of child support for 2018 and 2019 have been resolved by the parties. In this motion, Ms. Perez is seeking an order that child support arrears be fixed at $10,182.50 as of December 2017, to be paid back at a determined rate, and for Mr. Chiris to pay $186 per month toward section 7 expenses, commencing September 1, 2019.

[3] Mr. Chiris seeks an order dismissing Ms. Perez’s claims to retroactive child support and on-going section 7 expenses. In the alternative, he seeks that Ms. Perez be required to provide further income disclosure to ascertain his appropriate share of section 7 expenses, as well as an order that Samuel be required to contribute to same and to disclose his yearly transcripts to Mr. Chiris. Finally, he seeks that he be credited an overpayment of $1,100 as per the order of Master Kaufman dated June 26, 2020.

Background Facts

[4] The parties never resided together. One child was born of their relationship, Samuel Perez, on August 3, 2000. Samuel is now 20 years of age and has always lived with Ms. Perez.

[5] The parties signed a Paternity Agreement on May 25, 2011 with the assistance of Ms. Perez’s Ontario Works worker, which provided that Mr. Chiris was to pay child support of $831 per month to Ms. Perez based on his annual income of $94,235. The agreement was filed with the Family Responsibility Office (“FRO”) for enforcement. The agreement was never changed, and Mr. Chiris continued to pay $831 per month to Ms. Perez.

[6] As indicated above, Mr. Chiris filed a Motion to Change in 2019 seeking an order terminating his child support obligation based on the facts that Samuel had turned eighteen years of age and he was retiring.

[7] Samuel, however, is engaged in a full-time post-secondary program in biochemistry at the University of Ottawa, which he started in September of 2019. The program is typically a five-year program, which he expects to finish in 2024. Samuel continues to reside with Ms. Perez and expects to do so for the duration of his schooling. He is in receipt of funds through the Ontario Student Assistance Program (“OSAP”) and also works part-time during the summer. Through these, he expects to contribute to his schooling.

[8] At a Case Conference on September 11, 2019, the parties agreed to reduce Mr. Chiris’ child support obligation for 2019 to $325 per month commencing January 1, 2019, on an annual income of $34,225 and also to set arrears for 2018 at $1,112.

[9] At a further Case Conference on June 26, 2020, the parties agreed to reduce the on-going child support payable by Mr. Chiris to $200 per month, commencing January 1, 2020, on an annual income of $21,667. At this Case Conference, Master Kaufman noted that the parties acknowledged that Mr. Chiris overpaid child support in 2019 and the first six months of 2020 in the total sum of $1,100, and that this amount “shall be credited towards ongoing s. 7 expenses.”

[10] The remaining issues, therefore, are: whether there should be retroactive adjustments for child support from January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2017, resulting in the fixing of arrears as requested by Ms. Perez, and what Mr. Chiris’ contribution to Samuel’s section 7 expenses should be as of September 1, 2019.

[11] For the reasons that follow, I find that Mr. Chiris owes to Ms. Perez $10,182.50 in retroactive child support from July 1, 2011 to December 31, 2017, to which a credit of $1,100 in Mr. Chiris’ favour is applied. I find additionally that no section 7 expenses contribution is payable by Mr. Chiris for the 2019-2020 academic year, and that he will be required to pay on-going contributions to section 7 expenses only after Samuel has made a contribution of $1,500 from his summer employment income and of 75% of the loan portion of his OSAP funding.

Issue #1 – Should there be retroactive child support adjustments for the years 2011 through 2017?

[12] As indicated above, with the assistance of Ms. Perez’s OW worker, Ms. Jane Kelly, the parties entered into a Paternity Agreement under section 59 of the Family Law Act, R.S.O., 1990, c.F.3 on May 20, 2011 in relation to Samuel. The agreement provided that effective July 1, 2011, Mr. Chiris would pay to Ms. Perez $831 per month in child support based on an annual income of $94,235. This was to continue until one of the following happened: (a) Mr. Chiris had a change in financial circumstances which results in a different table amount; (b) Samuel turned 18 and was not in a full-time education program; (c) Samuel turned 16 and withdrew from parental care; (d) Samuel ceased to reside with Ms. Perez; or, (e) Samuel married. According to the agreement, in the case of any of these occurring, the amount of support payable “may be varied by the Parties.”

[13] The agreement provided further that, “[i]n accordance with the Child Support Guidelines”, Mr. Chiris would provide Ms. Perez with financial disclosure on an annual basis “at the written request” of Ms. Perez. The disclosure to be provided included copies of Mr. Chiris’ personal income tax returns, notices of assessment or reassessment, statements of earnings if employed or business or professional financial statements if self-employed, confirmation from draws if in a partnership, corporate financial statements if in a corporation or, finally, copies of trust financial statements if the beneficiary of a trust.

[14] The agreement was to be enforced by the Family Responsibility Office, and it provided that child support was not to be in an amount less than the Federal Child Support Guidelines amount if Ms. Perez was in receipt of social assistance.

[15] Mr. Chiris never provided the disclosure outlined in the agreement to Ms. Perez. Mr. Chiris states that this was based on the fact that Ms. Perez never requested it in writing, as the agreement required.

[16] Ms. Perez acknowledges that she did not request financial disclosure from Mr. Chiris on an annual basis prior to his Motion to Change being filed, but she states that this was for two reasons. The first is that she did not truly understand from the process and agreement that this was a requirement. Ms. Perez did not have independent legal advice at the time she entered into the agreement, though the document itself makes it clear that she was advised of that right, given the opportunity to obtain it and waived it. According to Ms. Perez, she understood that Mr. Chiris was to pay child support based on his annual income. The agreement was also signed at a time that Ms. Perez did not feel comfortable in English, which is not her first language, and was prior to her attending English as Second Language (“ESL”) classes in 2013.

[17] The second reason is that Ms. Perez had an exchange with Mr. Chiris at the time and he made it quite clear to her in a final email dated June 10, 2011 that he did not want to have communication with her again. The email, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit “H” to Ms. Perez’s affidavit sworn on September 16, 2020 ended with: “To keep things simple, I don’t want to get in contact with you and your son and I don’t want to hear anything else from you.”

[18] Hence, Ms. Perez did not communicate further with Mr. Chiris. However, when he brought his Motion to Change in 2019, Ms. Perez requested a retroactive child support adjustment as per the agreement.

[19] Mr. Chiris’ annual income for the years 2011 through 2017 are as follows:

• 2011 - $109,480: based on this income, the table amount of child support for one child is $953.65;
• 2012 - $106,083: based on this income, the table amount of child support for on child is $927.60;
• 2013 - $113,476: based on this income, the table amount of child support for on child is $985.90;
• 2014- $108,747: based on this income, the table amount of child support for on child is $947.68;
• 2015 - $119,809: based on this income, the table amount of child support for on child is $1,035.47;
• 2016 - $113,027: based on this income, the table amount of child support for on child is $982.22; and,
• 2017 - $101,275: based on this income, the table amount of child support for on child is $899.09.

[20] Mr. Chiris’ evidence is that he changed residences at the end of May 2011. At the time, he was contacted by Ms. Kelly to obtain his current address for enforcement purposes. Mr. Chiris signed the necessary documentation, which was forwarded to FRO with his new address. Mr. Chiris received a letter from FRO dated September 20, 2011 at his new address, 1086 Grenon Avenue, Ottawa. He continued to pay $831 monthly to FRO on a timely basis. He believed that as both Ms. Kelly and FRO had his new address, so too would Ms. Perez. Additionally, his email address remained the same, which Ms. Perez acknowledges in her affidavit. Mr. Chiris never heard from Ms. Perez prior to bringing his Motion to Change, and, thus, had a genuinely held belief that he was fulfilling his support obligations.

[21] At the time that Mr. Chiris brought his Motion to Change, he did not know the address of Ms. Perez. He, therefore, brough a motion for an order of substitutional service on her by email, Facebook and through FRO. Between approximately March and July of 2019, Mr. Chiris sent Ms. Perez messages both by email and on Facebook which went unanswered by her. Mr. Chiris states that only as a result of receiving correspondence from FRO, did Ms. Perez respond to his Motion to Change. Ms. Chiris was taken aback that only in or about September of 2019, Ms. Perez sought a full retroactive adjustment to child support from 2011 onwards, despite never having requested it in the previous eight years.

Analysis

[22] Ms. Perez’s request pursuant to section 37(2.1) of the Family Law Act, for an order for child support adjustments based on Mr. Chiris’ actual income for the years 2011 through 2017 places her squarely into a D.B.S. v. S.R.G., 2006 SCC 37 (hereinafter referred to as D.B.S.) analysis.

[23] In D.B.S., the Supreme Court of Canada identified that the making of a retroactive support order is discretionary and there are a number of factors that a court should consider before making one. They are:

• Reasonable excuse as to why support was not sought earlier;
• Conduct of the payor parent;
• Circumstances of the child; and,
• Hardship occasioned by a retroactive award.

[24] The Supreme Court of Canada revisited these factors in the recently released decision in the case of Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24. With respect to the issue of delay in making an application, the court stated in paragraph 111 that “the focus should be on whether the reason provided is understandable” rather than whether the support recipient had a “reasonable excuse” for the delay. Further, at paragraph 113, the court held: “Rather, a delay will be prejudicial only if it is deemed to be “unreasonable”, taking into account a generous appreciation of the social context in which the claimant’s decision to seek child support was made (D.B.S., at para. 101).”

[25] In this case, Ms. Perez’s reason for delay is that she did not understand that she had to request annual financial disclosure from Mr. Chiris in writing and apply for a change in order to receive it. This is not an unreasonable understanding on her part. That she was not proficient in English at the time of the signing of the agreement, that her OW worker was assisting the parties with the agreement, that she obtained no legal advice and that she felt intimidated by Mr. Chiris’ last communication with her, only support the reasonableness of her understanding. A generous appreciation of the social context leads me to the conclusion that Ms. Perez’ delay in seeking to increase the support payable for Samuel is understandable.

[26] With respect to the conduct of the payor parent, the court stated at paragraph 115 of Michel: “D.B.S. purposively provided an expansive definition of blameworthy conduct, being “anything that privileges the payor parent’s own interests over [their] children’s right to an appropriate amount of support (para.106)””.

[27] At paragraph 116, the court states:

[116] …The failure to disclose actual income, a fact within the knowledge of the payor, is a failure of a significant obligation and is often the root cause of a delayed application. Indeed, in D.B.S., the Court recognized at para. 124 that “[n]ot disclosing a material change in circumstances – including an increase in income that one would expect to alter the amount of child support payable – is itself blameworthy conduct.” It further commented that “a payor parent cannot use [their] informational advantage to justify [their] deficient child support payments” and at para. 106 that “a[a] payor parent cannot hide [their] income increases from the recipient parent in the hopes of avoiding larger child support payments”.

[28] In this case, Mr. Chiris relies on the obligation contained in the Paternity Agreement of May 20, 2011 on Ms. Perez to request financial disclosure from him in writing to justify never having provided it or never having adjusted the support payable for Samuel. The agreement, nevertheless, references the Federal Child Support Guidelines in section 3 dealing with “Financial Disclosure”. Indeed, it commences that section with the words: “In accordance with the Child Support Guidelines…” Applicable sections of the Guidelines in this regard are:

3(1) Unless otherwise provided under these Guidelines, the amount of a child support order for children under the age of majority is (a) the amount set out in the applicable table, according to the number of children under the age of majority to whom the order relates and the income of the spouse against whom the order is sought (emphasis added);

14 For the purposes of subsection 17(4) of the Act, any one of the following constitutes a change of circumstances that gives rise to the making of a variation order in respect of a child support order: (a) in the case where the amount of child support includes a determination made in accordance with the applicable table, any change in circumstances that would result in a different child support order or any provision thereof;

16 Subject to sections 17 to 20, a spouse’s annual income is determined using the sources of income set out under the heading “Total income” in the T1 General form issued by the Canada Revenue Agency and is adjusted in accordance with Schedule III.

25(1) Every spouse against whom a child support order has been made must, on the written request of the other spouse or the order assignee, not more than once a year after making of the order and as long as the child is a child within the meaning of these Guidelines, provide that other spouse or the order assignee with (a) the documents referred to in subsection 21(1) for any of the three most recent taxation years for which the spouse has not previously provided the documents;

[29] Paragraph 1. (b) (i) of the Paternity Agreement additionally provides:

1. (b) These payments shall continue until one of the following occurs, at which time the amount of support payable by Party A [Mr. Chiris] may be varied by the parties: (i) Party A has a change in his financial circumstances, which would result in a different amount of support calculated according to the Child Support Guidelines;

[30] In Michel, the SCC states at paragraph 117:

[117] The nature and objective of the post- Guidelines child support system provide payor parents with the certainty and predictability that any material change in income should be disclosed and lead to a change in child support payments…It is also notable that s. 3(1)(a) of the Guidelines make the presumptive amount of a child support order the amount set out in the applicable table. Therefore, a payor’s conduct may be presumptively reasonable if they conform to an order or agreement, but only if there is no change in their income.

[31] Mr. Chiris knew or ought to have known, from both the Paternity Agreement and the Federal Child Support Guidelines, that an increase in his income resulted in a concurrent increase in his support obligation for Samuel. While Mr. Chiris conformed to the strict wording of the Agreement (and indeed section 25 of the Guidelines), his failure to disclose changes in his income (until he sought to decrease support) privileged Mr. Chiris’ own interests over Samuel’s right to an appropriate amount of support.

[32] Regarding the circumstances of the child, the court indicates at paragraph 121 of Michel that where a child “has suffered deprivation, this factor is a significant consideration in favour of relief”, and at paragraph 123: “… a recipient parent’s hardship, like that of a child, weighs in favour of the award of retroactive child support and an enlarged temporal scope.”

[33] Ms. Perez is a single parent of three children, Samuel, Marie (now 10) and Jeremiah (now 6). Her primary sources of income for the past ten years have been OW, GST and Child Tax Benefit (CTB). Over those very same years, Mr. Chiris’ income was over $100,000. In 2019, Ms. Perez graduated from Adult High School, and enrolled in a four-year biotechnology program at Algonquin College. She is hopeful that at the end of her program she will find work that provides her with an appropriate income. However, Ms. Perez’ income in 2019 was $9,565. There is no doubt, based on this evidence, that Samuel’s circumstance will have been challenging over the years in question. Samuel was, quite simply, entitled to support, which would have lessened any deprivation he experienced, that he did not get.

[34] Finally, in relation to the issue of hardship, the court in Michel indicates at paragraph 125 that the payor’s hardship “can only be assessed after taking into account the hardship which would be caused to the child and recipient parent from not ordering the payment of sums owing but unpaid.” This includes taking into account the benefit to the payor of unpaid child support for the full time in which it was unpaid. The court directs that “[v]iewing matters in this holistic way places hardship to the payor in its actual factual and legal matrix.”

[35] Mr. Chiris submits that an order of retroactive child support would cause him great financial hardship, based on the fact that he is now retired and that is income is only $22,140 per year. While Mr. Chiris admits to having savings in the form of a Manulife RIF and LIF, he submits that if he is forced to withdraw from them to pay a retroactive reward, he will be taxed accordingly, and his retirement savings will be correspondingly depleted. Mr. Chiris submits, moreover, that due to Ms. Perez’s delayed request, he had no chance to budget for a $10,000 payment.

[36] Mr. Chiris owns his own home (along with his current spouse) at 1086 Grenon Avenue, Ottawa. In his Financial Statement sworn on September 28, 2020, he attributed a value to his 50% share of it as $240,000. No mortgage is listed against the home nor is any mortgage payment included in his expenses. Mr. Chiris’ other assets include a RRSP Questrade of $90,531, a Manulife RIF of $64,479 and a Manulife LIF of $140,625. Indeed, Mr. Chiris’ total debts indicated are $4,724 on a Capital One credit card. His total assets are $542,489, giving him a net worth of $537,765.

[37] Mr. Chiris clearly has options available to him other than drawing on his retirement savings; namely, he has a mortgage free home with plenty of equity against which he could borrow to satisfy a retroactive reward, and he also has access to credit card debt. Following the logic of Michel, Mr. Chiris was, moreover, able to obtain that home, pay off his mortgage and/or accumulate savings with money that rightfully belonged to Samuel. That is his factual and legal matrix.

[38] For all of the reasons given above, I find that it is appropriate to exercise my discretion in favour of a retroactive award of child support.

[39] With respect to the date to which the award should be retroactive, D.B.S. established that the date as of which the payor’s child support obligation ought to be enforced is the date when effective notice was given to the payor (see Michel, paragraph 127). In this case, Ms. Perez gave Mr. Chiris effective notice in or about September of 2019. The court in D.B.S. stated that this principle was seen as “a compromise between the date of the recipients’ application for support and the date the amount of child support ought to have increased.” It also indicated that the court in D.B.S. “established a soft limit or rough guideline of three years’ recovery (para. 127).”

[40] However, this too was revisited by the Supreme Court in Michel. At paragraph 129, the court addressed the “inequality of information” inherent in these types of cases; namely that the support payor has the knowledge required to determine when a reduction of support should be sought (as Mr. Chiris did), but that the support recipient does not have the knowledge required to determine when an increase of support should be sought.

[41] At paragraphs 130 and 131 of Michel, the court states:

[130] …In some respects, D.B.S. itself provided effective notice of a parent’s responsibilities, by establishing the bedrock principles governing child support. Based on our shifted understanding of the payor’s certainty interest above, certainty materializes in different ways today than it did 14 years ago. Today, it is provided by the Tables and the payor parents’ knowledge that they are liable according to their actual income and will be held accountable for missed payments and underpayment, even if the enforcement of their obligations may not always be automatic.

[140] It results from this that it is now time to ask why the date of retroactivity of child support awards should not also correspond to the date when the support ought to have been paid. While D.B.S. evinced an attempt to balance certainty to the payor parent and fairness and flexibility to the recipient, and despite its emphasis on the other core principles of child support, it appears that the payor parent’s expectation “that the status quo is fair” remained the main rationale for maintaining effective notice as the default starting point (para.121). In today’s legal landscape however, the impact of the different potential dates of retroactivity needs to be measured against much more than the payor’s certainty interest, and indeed, in Contino this Court recognized that the Guidelines sometimes privilege fairness to children over predictability. (para. 33)

[42] Why indeed? Based on the Paternity Agreement dated May 20, 2011 and the Federal Child Support Guidelines, both of which make Mr. Chiris’ obligation to pay support in accordance with his income clear, I can see no reason why the date for a retroactive order would not correspond with the date when the support ought to have been paid. For these reasons, based on Mr. Chiris incomes as set out in paragraph 19 above, arrears of child support from July 1, 2011 to December 31, 2017 shall be fixed at $10,182.50.

Issue #2 – What is Mr. Chiris’ appropriate share of section 7 expenses?

[43] Ms. Perez seeks an order that Mr. Chiris pay her $186 per month towards the section 7 expenses of Samuel for his post-secondary education, commencing September 1, 2019.

[44] Mr. Chiris disputes the degree to which he is expected to contribute to Samuel’s section 7 expenses. He is of the view that Samuel’s contribution should be 75% of the loan portion of his OSAP funding and 1/2 of any income he has from part-time employment in the summer. The remainder should be divided proportionally between him and Ms. Perez according to their respective incomes.

[45] Section 7(1)(e) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines provides:

7(1) In a child support order the court may, on either spouse’s request, provide for an amount to cover all or any portion of the following expenses, which expenses may be estimated, taking into account the necessity of the expense in relation to the child’s best interests and the reasonableness of the expense in relating to the means of the spouse and those of the child and to the family’s spending pattern prior to separation: (e) expenses for post-secondary education,

[46] Ms. Perez has identified Samuel’s post-secondary expenses (along with receipts) to be $9,447.42 for the 2019-2020 school year. She estimates that it will be similar for his following school years, with slight variations in computer vs. books/supplies vs. tuition expenses. The total is reasonable and is not, in fact, disputed by Mr. Chiris. What is disputed is what Samuel’s contribution to those expenses should be.

[47] In 2019-2020, Samuel received $9,151 in benefits from OSAP, $4,064 of which is a loan portion which must be repaid. The remainder was a grant that does not need to be repaid. The total covered Samuel’s expenses but for $300. Ms. Perez seeks a contribution from Mr. Chiris for the loan portion and the extra $300, less a $1,500 contribution from Samuel from his part-time summer employment.

[48] Samuel made a net income of $2,393.82 in the summer of 2019 working part-time at Canadian Tire, so a contribution of $1,500 by him towards his education equals more than one half that amount. He again worked over the summer of 2020 at Canadian Tire, and expects to contribute a similar amount to his education. After taking into account Samuel’s contribution of $1,500 per year, Ms. Perez seeks a contribution from Mr. Chiris for $2,864 ($4,064 + $300 - $1,500 = $2,864). Based on Mr. Chiris’ 2019 income of $34,225 and her income of $9,565, Mr. Chiris’ proportionate share would be 78% versus her 22%, resulting in a contribution from him of $2,233.92 of the $2,864, or $186 per month.

[49] In the case of Brock v. Sorger, 2015 ONSC 7478, Justice Doyle found at paragraph 64 that $1,000 was a reasonable amount to save and to put towards his education for an adult child making a minimum wage over four months of the summer. In the same vein, I also find it reasonable that Samuel be required to put $1,500 towards his education from his summer employment.

[50] With respect to the issue of Samuel’s contribution towards a share of the loan portion of his OSAP funding, I agree with the submissions of Mr. Chiris that where the parents are of modest means, as was so in the case of Corby v. Corby, 2015 ONSC 2700, upon which he relies, a contribution of the adult child of a percentage of same is reasonable. Although Corby was also dealing with the issue of children who lived away from home to attend post-secondary institutions, Justice Mitrow noted at paragraph 33:

[33] The proper approach in calculating child support for each child while attending college or university, pursuant to s. 3(2)(b), is to quantify the tuition and book expenses together with rent and other living expenses; then it is necessary to consider each child’s resources and to allocate to each child, as her contribution, an appropriate portion of summer employment income, and adding to that all grants and/or bursaries received by the child; and then allocating to the child as her further contribution to post-secondary education expenses an appropriate percentage of all OSAP loans received by the child. (Emphasis added).

[51] At paragraphs 52, 68 and 91 of his decision, Justice Mitrow, relying on the case of Cavanaugh v. Glass, found that it was appropriate for the three children in that case (where the incomes of the parents were less modest than in this one) to be responsible for 75% of the loan portions of their respective OSAP funding. If Samuel is required to assume responsibility for 75% of the loan portion of his OSAP funding, the result is that his section 7 expenses for 2019 are covered ($4,064 x 75% = $3,048, resulting in a remaining $1,016 + $300 - $1,500 = -$216). Ms. Perez’s claim for Mr. Chiris to pay a proportionate share of Samuel’s section 7 expenses for the 2019-2020 academic year is dismissed.

[52] Mr. Chiris’ income for 2020 is approximately $21,677. Ms. Perez’s income for 2020 consists of a grant and loan from OSAP of $9,487 received in January of 2020, and a further approval of OSAP benefits for the 2020-2021 school year, over the course of which she will receive $25,028 in a grant and $12,154 in a loan. Ms. Perez received approximately $20,000 from this amount in September of 2020. However, her actual income for 2020 is unknown at this time. I am prepared to order that Mr. Chiris will be required to pay a proportionate share of Samuel’s section 7 expenses for post-secondary education as per the same formula above. That is, once Ms. Perez has provided Mr. Chiris proof of her 2020 income, he shall be required to pay a proportionate share of any section 7 expenses remaining after Samuel has contributed $1,500 of his summer employment income and 75% of the loan portion of any OSAP funding of which he is in receipt.

Order

1. Pursuant to section 37(2.1) of the Family Law Act, the Respondent shall, within 60 days, pay to the Applicant retroactive child support for the child, Samuel Perez, born August 3, 2000, for the period July 1, 2011 to December 31, 2017, fixed in the amount of $10,182.50;
2. The Applicant’s claim for a proportionate contribution by the Respondent to section 7 expenses for Samuel for the academic year of 2019-2020 is dismissed;
3. The Applicant’s claim for on-going proportionate contributions by the Respondent to section 7 expenses for Samuel shall be resolved as follows: a. By June 1st of each year, the Applicant shall provide to the Respondent confirmation of Samuel’s continued enrollment in full-time school and an accounting, along with all necessary receipts, of Samuel’s total section 7 expenses for the academic year, as well as confirmation of Samuel’s employment and OSAP income for the year; b. By June 30th of each year, the parties shall provide each other copies of their Income Tax Returns and Notices of Assessment/Reassessment for the previous year; c. The Respondent shall then pay to the Applicant his proportionate share of any section 7 expenses remaining for the previous academic year after Samuel has contributed $1,500 of his summer employment income and 75% of the loan portion of any OSAP funding of which he is in receipt; and, d. As there is no section 7 contribution payable by the Respondent for the 2019-2020 academic year, and as it is not yet known whether he will have a 2020-2021 or on-going contribution based on the formula outlined above, Mr. Chiris will receive a credit of $1,100 for his overpayment of child support in 2018 and 2019, which is to be applied to the arrears of child support owing of $10,182.50 as set out in paragraph a. above.

Costs

[53] If the parties are unable to reach an agreement as to the liability or quantum of costs payable, they shall make written submissions of no more than three pages, along with copies of their bills of costs and offers to settle, to me at intervals of 10 days from February 1, 2021, and I will make an order.

Justice Engelking Date: January 5, 2021