WARNING

This is a case under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 and subject to subsections 87(8) and 87(9) of this legislation. These subsections and subsection 142(3) of the Child, Youth and Services Act, 2017, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows:

87(8) Prohibition re identifying child — No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.

(9) Prohibition re identifying person charged — The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.

142(3) Offences re publication — A person who contravenes subsection 87(8) or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)(c) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.

COURT FILE NO.: FC-17-821-2

DATE: 2020/02/11

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILD, YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES ACT, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sched. 1

AND IN THE MATTER OF M.G.O. born [….] 2015

B E T W E E N:

The Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa Applicant

– and –

T.S. (Mother) Respondent

– and –

M.O.U. (Father) Respondent

– and –

C.S. (Maternal Grandmother) Respondent

Counsel: Juliet Kim, for the Applicant Kimberley Pegg, for the Respondent (Mother) No one appearing for the Respondent (Father) Deborah Bennett, for the Maternal Grandmother

HEARD: October 30, 2019

ENDORSEMENT

D. SUMMERS J.

Introduction

[1] T.S., is the mother of M., born [.…] 2015. She brings this motion for his care and custody in the context of the Society’s amended status review application for an order placing the child in the custody of C.S., the maternal grandmother. In the alternative, the mother asks for an order pending final disposition that she and the maternal grandmother share M.’s care equally. She proposes that her time with M. include home visits and overnight visits with a view to his gradual reintegration into her care.

[2] Presently, M. is in the maternal grandmother’s care under the temporary without prejudice order of Justice Engelking dated August 6, 2019. The mother’s access is in the discretion of the maternal grandmother. It consists of two-hour visits twice a week and daily telephone calls. The maternal grandmother supervises all visits.

[3] The maternal grandmother opposes the mother’s motion. The Society supports the maternal grandmother’s position.

[4] The father never engaged with the Society and has been incarcerated since October 2018. His last visit with M. was October 5, 2018.

Background Facts and History of the Case

[5] Following M.’s birth, the mother and child lived with the maternal grandmother until April 2016 when they moved to their own home. The mother was 19 years of age and M. was approximately 8 months old. Aside from a birth assessment when M. was born, the Society did not become involved with the family until 2016. In August 2016, the mother signed a Voluntary Services Agreement.

[6] Early in 2017, the mother obtained a family court order awarding her custody of M. The father’s access was in her discretion. The court also made a restraining order against the father.

[7] In April 2017, M. was apprehended. The Society’s concerns included: the child’s exposure to domestic violence between the mother and father; the mother’s inability to regulate her anger; the father’s criminal history including assault charges against the mother and other partner(s); and the parents’ history of non-compliance with a restraining order. The child was placed in the temporary care and custody of the mother and the maternal grandmother. His primary residence was with the maternal grandmother.

[8] On November 27, 2017, Justice Linhares De Sousa found M. in need of protection and made a final four-month supervision order placing him with the mother and maternal grandmother. M.’s primary residence remained with the maternal grandmother. The father’s access was at the discretion of the Society and supervised by them.

[9] In February 2018, the Society brought a status review application seeking a four-month supervision order to the maternal grandmother. In April 2018, she became a party. M. remained in the care of the mother and maternal grandmother subject to the Society’s supervision.

[10] In August 2018, the Society amended its status review application to seek a six-month supervision order to the mother. On August 30, 2018, I made an order placing M. in the temporary without prejudice care and custody of his mother and maternal grandmother subject to supervision by the Society. M. was to have his primary residence with the mother and access with the maternal grandmother in accordance with a schedule approved by the Society.

[11] Despite the orders placing M. in the care of both his mother and maternal grandmother, the relationship between them had long been strained.

[12] On October 23, 2018, Justice Shelston made a final six-month supervision order to the mother.

[13] The Society brought this status review application in April 2019 seeking to terminate the supervision order and end their involvement. They were satisfied that the mother was appropriately protective, had demonstrated good insight into her past behaviour and how it impacted her parenting abilities and M. The Society was also satisfied that the mother was working with her counsellor and pursuing her college studies. The Society’s observations of the child, the mother, and her home, were positive. M’s daycare did not report any concerns.

[14] The maternal grandmother opposed the application and filed an answer and plan of care. She sought an order for access to M. and also wanted the Society’s continued involvement to supervise the father’s access in the event he was released from custody after his trial in August 2019.

[15] On June 4, 2019, the maternal grandmother advised the Society that she had received a Facebook message making certain allegations against the mother. She said the message was sent April 5, 2019 but she saw it for the first time that day. The message was from E.B., a long-time acquaintance of the mother. She alleged that the mother was in contact with the father, that she was using drugs and alcohol in the home with M. present, that she worked as an escort while a paternal aunt cared for the child, that the mother had threatened her, and she had called the police. E.B. was a complainant in the criminal case against the father and a former girlfriend of his. The maternal grandmother also conveyed her own ongoing concerns to the Society in much the same vein as she had prior to the Society commencing the status review application. She believed that the mother was not as stable as she was pretending to be and also relied on information received from E.B.

[16] The mother denied the allegations made by E.B. and the maternal grandmother. She said she had not been in contact with E.B. for over two years, but acknowledged E.B.’s recent efforts to connect with her. It later appeared that she had in fact been in contact with E.B. The mother remained cooperative with the Society but expressed frustration with the maternal grandmother’s lack of trust in the hard work she had done to regain care of M.

[17] The Society investigated the various allegations and found no concerns. Their efforts included more than one unannounced visit and follow up with M.’s daycare where he was reported to be doing well. The Society also talked to E.B. She told the worker that she did not doubt the mother’s ability to care for M. and admitted that she had contacted them in the past to make false allegations against the mother when she was mad at her. She said her allegations related to drugs and failing to provide M. with adequate care.

[18] By the end of June 2019, the Society confirmed to the mother that their plan had not changed. They were still seeking to terminate their involvement.

[19] Within a few weeks, the mother and maternal grandmother concluded an access agreement and approved a final order in preparation for the next court date on August 6, 2019. However, on July 23, 2019, the mother was arrested and detained. The charges against her include obstructing justice, criminal harassment and uttering threats in relation to witnesses in the father’s upcoming criminal trial in late August. E.B. was one of the two witnesses.

[20] The mother made immediate arrangements with the maternal great grandmother, D.G., to care for M. while she was in custody and the maternal grandmother was travelling abroad. The mother hoped that her family would assist with a plan for her release but that did not materialize and she remained in custody. On July 29, 2019, the maternal grandmother returned home and assumed care of M. She subsequently confirmed to the Society that she was prepared to provide him with stable, long-term care.

[21] On August 6, 2019, Justice Engelking made an order placing M. in the temporary without prejudice care and custody of the maternal grandmother. Engelking J. noted that the mother was in custody and not in a position to oppose the motion. Her order further provided for the mother’s access to be at the discretion of the maternal grandmother.

[22] The next day, the maternal grandmother contacted the Ottawa Police Services and reported that the mother threatened her during a telephone conversation. The mother was charged.

[23] On August 14, 2019, the Society filed an amended status review application seeking a custody order to the maternal grandmother under s. 102 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

[24] The father’s criminal trial was heard in August 2019. He was acquitted of all but one charge. He was awaiting sentence when the motion was heard.

[25] The mother remained in custody for six weeks. She was released on September 4, 2019 following her bail review. She maintains her innocence.

The Legislation

[26] A motion for temporary care and custody in the context of a status review application is governed by s. 113(8) of the Child Youth and Family Services Act[^1]. It states,

Interim care and custody

s. 113(8) If an application is made under this section, the child shall remain in the care and custody of the person or society having charge of the child until the application is disposed of, unless the court is satisfied that the child’s best interests require a change in the child’s care and custody.

Who Had Charge of M.?

[27] The maternal grandmother raises the issue of who had charge of M. when the Society intervened. She says that question must be answered first in order to know who has the onus of proving that the child’s best interests require a change in his care and custody. The mother submits that M. was in her charge at the relevant time and had been in her charge since early September 2018 – almost eleven months before she was detained on criminal charges and the matter came before Justice Engelking.

[28] The maternal grandmother, on the other hand, submits that the mother lost charge of M. when she was detained and reached out to her maternal family for help with his care. As she sees it, the mother was not available to care for the child and did not know when she would be in a position to resume care. That, she says, is when charge of M. shifted from the mother to her.

[29] The cases that the mother and maternal grandmother rely on in support of their respective positions regarding who had charge of M., were discussed by Justice John Harper in Children’s Aid Society of London & Middlesex v. D. (S)[^2]. The cases he reviewed dealt with the meaning of “charge” in the context of a care and custody motion in a protection application under s. 51 of the Child and Family Services Act[^3] [now s. 94 under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act[^4]]. The analysis under that section is equally applicable to the meaning of “charge” in a care and custody hearing within a status review application. At paragraphs 23 – 31, Harper J. said:

23 The term "charge" is not defined in the CFSA. It has been interpreted in at least three cases. In Children's Aid Society of Algoma v. G. (T.)(2002), 2002 CanLII 52569 (ON CJ), 125 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1020 (Ont. C.J.) [2002 CarswellOnt 5476 (Ont. C.J.)], Kukurin J. considered the definition of "charge." He made the following comment at para. 15: "... 'Charge' has connotation of authority and responsibility. 'Charge' of a child suggests some established relationship, not something transient or temporary...."

24 Kukurin J. did not think that simply having possession of a child was sufficient to bring that person within the meaning of the term "charge".

25 In Children's Aid Society of Ottawa v. C. (H.)(2003), 2003 CanLII 38754 (ON SC), 127 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1159 (Ont. S.C.J.) [2003 CarswellOnt 5286 (Ont. S.C.J.)], Blishen J. also considered the meaning of the term "charge" in s. 51. Blishen J. found that "charge" was linked to the term "care and custody" within s. 51:

[14] In order to apply the appropriate test on this care and custody motion, it is necessary to determine who was "the person who had charge of the child immediately before intervention". The word "charge" is not defined under the Child and Family Services Act. However, a close reading of the legislation makes it clear that the term "charge" is linked to the term "care and custody" as outlined in clauses 51(2)(a) and (b), which state that the child

... remain in or be returned to the care and custody of the person who had charge of the child immediately before intervention.

26 Blishen J. stated that questioning who had "charge" of the child is akin to questioning who had "care and custody." Like Kukurin J., Blishen J. was of the opinion that there had to be an active relationship of care and not mere possession of the child.

27 Most recently, in Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. A. (S.), 2008 ONCJ 348, [2008] O.J. No. 3110 (Ont. C.J.), Spence J. considered the same issue. In that case, Spence J. splits the idea of "charge" and "custody." He adopts a definition of "charge" that is grounded in actively caring for the child and potentially distinct from the legal notion of "custody." Spence J. ultimately determines "charge" to mean an active, caring relationship. He states:

[48] However, clause 51(2)(a) of the Child and Family Services Act does not talk about returning the child to the person who had "custody" but rather, returning the child to the person who had "charge" of the child. There clearly is a difference between the meaning of "custody" and "charge". There could be many instances where one person has custody of the child and another person has "charge" of that child.

28 Spence J. gives an example of his reasoning to demonstrate the difference. He describes a situation whereby a single mother, who has custody and charge of a child, informally relinquishes that child to an aunt for care purposes. After several months in the aunt's care, for example, the child would no longer be in the mother's "charge" but rather the aunt’s. Spence J. was of the view that for a person to have "charge" of a child there must be evidence of active care and responsibility.

29 I agree with the reasoning of Spence J. I am of the view that there must be evidence that a person has an active relationship with the child that includes care and responsibility. It is something more than physical possession or limited incidents of care.

30 I am of the view that s. 51 is structured in the manner that it is because the statute establishes a priority to the person who may have had the most active and responsible involvement with the child immediately before the apprehension.

31 If the court determines that the evidence discloses that there is a person who had the charge of the child immediately before intervention, then the court must return the child to that person unless there are reasonable grounds to believe that there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer harm and that the child cannot be protected adequately by an order that provides for a return on terms (s. 51(3)).

[30] Considering the facts in the present case, I find that the mother had charge of M. when the Society intervened. The child had been in his mother’s care and custody for approximately eleven months when the matter came before Engelking J. on August 6, 2019. I do not find that the mother surrendered M.’s care to the maternal grandmother. She looked to her family for short term help with M. when she was detained. She expected to be released on her next court date. In addition, I am satisfied that the mother believed that her family would also help her obtain bail. In my view, she did not lose charge of M. in the brief period between her detention and the matter coming before the court. He remained in his mother’s care at the relevant time. I find the maternal grandmother’s role is more appropriately regarded as physical possession of M. with “limited incidents of care”.[^5]

[31] The maternal grandmother further argued that the passage of time eroded the without prejudice nature of Engelking J.’s order. She says the import of those words no longer bind the court on the issue of who has charge of M. In this regard, she referred the court to Justice B. Weagant’s decision in Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. N.K.[^6] where he discussed the reasons for the court’s use of “without prejudice” orders and how the nature of such an order can vary from case to case, depending on the reason it was agreed to by the parties or imposed by the court. At paragraphs 14 – 17, he said:

14 I do not agree with the proposition that an order made “without prejudice” can bind the court prospectively and indefinitely on the issue of who has “charge” of the child. In my respectful view, notwithstanding a prior with prejudice order, once an intervening without prejudice order is made placing the child elsewhere, the presumption described above has a dwindling shelf life. I think the existence of an order made during disposition is but one factor, albeit an important one, to be considered.

15 Passage of time in the care of another person, even if it is on a "without prejudice" basis, can effectively create a new status for the child. As I have argued in other contexts, children are not pieces of furniture that can be stored for the convenience of a parent who wants to rehabilitate his or her situation, only to be taken out of storage once that parent feels that he or she is ready to argue the motion.

16 It is necessary, then, to examine why the "without prejudice" order was made in any particular case. This is especially true in status review cases. Events that trigger a motion to change the dispositional placement of a child will have almost always culminated in a re-apprehension of the child. As with any apprehension, the parties may not be ready to argue on first appearance and thus, a "without prejudice" order may be agreed to for the sake of expediency. However, when the interim motion is finally argued, the test on interim placement in a status review proceeding is not the "risk" test in section 51, but is a "best interests" test. See Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto v. D. (G.), 113 A.C.W.S. (3d) 279, [2002] O.J. No. 1433, 2002 CarswellOnt 1049 (Ont. C.J.), per Justice Heather L. Katarynych. Thus, it is the child's best interests at the moment of the re-apprehension that are central to the decision making and not an assessment of risk should the child be returned to the parent in whose care the child had been previously placed. Depending upon the facts in a case, the difference between these two tests could yield very different results for the parties involved.

17 Obviously, where a parent loses custody by agreeing to a "without prejudice" order because the parent needs time to rehabilitate his or her position, this may result in a very different "best interests" analysis than would result if a party merely needed time to hire a lawyer.

[32] In the case at bar, the situation is not one where the mother required extra time to rehabilitate herself before seeking M.’s return to her care. Nor was she “storing” M. with the maternal grandmother until she was ready to argue the motion. She did not consent to the order; she was not in a position to oppose. The crown would not consent to her release despite the absence of a criminal record. Her circumstances were beyond her control. I was not told why her bail review took six weeks but as soon as she was able, she moved promptly to prepare her answer and plan of care and obtain a date to argue her motion. However, the matter was adjourned for four weeks at the request of the maternal grandmother. That delay cannot be visited on the mother. I find that the temporary order placing M. with the maternal grandmother continued to be without prejudice to the mother when the motion was argued. The import of those words had not lapsed.

The Best Interests Test

[33] Having found that M. was in his mother’s charge when the Society intervened, he must be returned to her care and custody unless I am satisfied that there has been a material change in circumstances such that his best interests require a change. See Children’s Aid Society of Algoma v. S. S. and M. C.,[^7] where Kukurin J. said,

Subsection 64(8) [now s. 113 (8)] does not create a presumption in favour of whoever has care and custody of a child. It goes further than a presumption. The use of the words ‘shall remain’ implies that the status quo must remain in effect. The only exception is where the court is satisfied that the best interests of the child require a change in the status quo. In my view, the use of the word ‘require’ in this provision is not accidental. ‘Require’ is a fairly strong word. It denotes considerably more than being merely desirable. It carries the connotation of necessity or obligation.

[34] In Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. G. (S).[^8], Justice Murray agreed with Kukurin J. and at paragraphs 21 - 23, added,

21 It must be kept in mind that on a s. 64(8) motion [now s.113(8)], a court is being asked to vary an order that has previously been determined to be in a child’s best interests. That order has been based on either findings made after a trial, or on indisputable evidence presented at a summary judgement motion, or on facts upon which all parties have agreed. A 64(8) motion is usually—as is the case here—being argued on untested affidavit evidence.

22 Justice to the parties and the child requires that such a decision be made very carefully, only when it is clearly necessary to do so before trial. This prevents unnecessary changes in a child’s custody, and disruption of hard-won stability.

23 In my view, on such motions, the moving party must first establish that there has been a material change in circumstances related to the child’s best interests. If there has been such a change, then it must be demonstrated that it is necessary, in protecting the child’s best interests, to change the existing order before trial of the status review application. The Act sets out certain factors, in addition to continuity of care, which may be relevant in assessing a child’s best interests.

[35] I am satisfied that the criminal charges laid against the mother and her subsequent detention constitute a material change in circumstances that is related to the child’s best interests. The charges are serious, and they rendered her unable to care for M. for a six-week period. If proven, it will call into question her ability to make good choices and remain appropriately protective of M. where the father is concerned, and she may again be left unable to care for him. However, the charges have yet to be proven and the mother’s long-time acquaintance, E.B., appears to be a central figure behind them just as she was behind the allegations that caused the Society to re-open its investigation and delay termination of the supervision order. To the extent that E.B. admitted to the Society that she had previously contacted them to make false allegations against the mother, I find her credibility and apparent role in the troubles that have recently befallen the mother to be suspect, at best. I put no weight on any information that flows from E.B. in my assessment of M.’s best interests and whether a change away from his mother’s care is required. The mother’s trial is thought to be many months away and, for now, she is available to care for M. The mother worked hard to address the Society’s safety concerns in order to have M. returned to her care. By all accounts except for those of the maternal grandmother and great grandmother, M. was a healthy, happy and well-loved little boy when in his mother’s care. She provided for him and met his physical and emotional needs.

[36] The maternal grandmother filed voluminous materials. To a large degree, her affidavit and that of the maternal great grandmother, D.G., reviewed the history of their concerns about the mother from 2017 forward including their expressions of dissatisfaction with the steps taken or not taken by the Society to follow up and investigate as they thought they should. To the extent that the maternal grandmother had more recent concerns regarding the mother, some were based on suspicion, others related to her disapproval of certain behaviours, others stemmed from information that she received from E.B., and others from statements allegedly made by the child.

[37] There is one area of concern in relation to M.’s best interest that is common to both the mother and grandmother. They both worry about his behaviour since the change in his care – his anger, aggression and tantrums. Where they differ is on the cause of that behaviour. The maternal grandmother regards it as a sign of the life that she believes he is exposed to in the mother’s home, that his behaviour reflects what he has seen and heard there. According to the maternal grandmother, the only other time she saw M. behave that way was in 2017 when he came from the mother’s home to live with her. She indicates that, with the passage of time, she is seeing improvement but intends to obtain counselling for him. The maternal grandmother’s view of the cause behind M.’s behaviour is not in line with the observations of the Society while M. was in his mother’s care.

[38] The mother, on the other hand, believes M. is angry and acting out because she did not return after she dropped him off at daycare on July 23, 2019. She says he displayed similar behaviour when the father was incarcerated and suddenly disappeared from his life. She says she witnessed his anxiety regularly including drop offs at daycare in 2018. He would cry and worry that she would not return. She believes M. fears being left and his fear came true on July 23, 2019. The maternal grandmother also notes M.’s separation anxiety around drop off at daycare but observes gradual improvement as did the mother before her incarceration.

[39] The mother believes that M. needs to be in her care and that the limited supervised access time they have had has not been sufficient to meet his needs and reassure him. She has only 4 hours a week or approximately 16 hours a month plus daily telephone access. Her access is in the maternal grandmother’s discretion. I note the mother’s limited access particularly in contrast to the access agreement struck between the mother and grandmother in July 2019. That agreement provided the grandmother a minimum of 58 hours per month with M., to be exercised over one full weekend plus another Saturday from 10:00 a.m. until 8:00 p.m. The stark difference between the access to the maternal grandmother that she wanted and the access that she has been willing to facilitate for the mother, suggests a lack of objectivity around the mother and M.’s need to have her in his life in a significant way. Both the mother and maternal grandmother have been his primary caregivers at different times. Most recently, it was the mother. He is closely bonded with both.

[40] Section 74(3) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act[^9] also requires the court to consider the child’s views and wishes, if available, and give them due weight in accordance with the child’s age and maturity when determining the child’s best interests. Here, M. is only 4 years of age. His wishes were not available to the court except as hearsay through the maternal grandmother or mother. The maternal grandmother asks that I admit and give weight to certain statements by M. Section 94(10) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act allows the court to admit and rely on evidence that is found to be credible or trustworthy in the context of a care and custody hearing in a protection application. The same standard should apply to such a motion in the context of a status review application.[^10]

[41] I have considered the child’s various statements along side the specific statements that the maternal grandmother seeks to rely on. I do not find them to be credible or trustworthy. There were instances where, to the extent that the child said one thing to his mother, he said another to his maternal grandmother. The mother noted this behaviour with some concern to her child protection worker in 2018, long before the current proceedings. One example, was the child telling her that he did not want to go to the maternal grandmother’s house. Then, when it was time to come home, he would tell the maternal grandmother that he did not want to return his mother. The worker’s comment at the time was that perhaps he was trying to please both. I am not satisfied that the child’s statements as recounted to the court are credible or trustworthy. The circumstances surrounding the statements and the evidence offered to corroborate them do not persuade me.

[42] To the extent that the child’s views and wishes might have been available to the court, the maternal grandmother blocked his interview that the Society scheduled on September 12, 2019. On the record before me, it is not clear whether the Society requested the interview, or the grandmother did. The evidence is contradictory on this point. Regardless, the maternal grandmother refused to allow the interview to proceed with the mother’s child protection worker in the room. Her stated concern was that M. would associate the worker as the mother’s friend and that, she said, had the potential to colour his answers. The Society objected and insisted that the worker attend together with the person conducting the interview. The maternal grandmother cancelled the interview and neither side pursued it again. I find that decision concerning. Both thought it important to arrange the interview in the first instance, but each abandoned the plan when they could not control the process.

[43] I am not persuaded that it is in M.’s best interests to require a change in his care and custody from the mother, who had charge of him when the Society intervened, to the maternal grandmother, pending final disposition. The Society was satisfied with the mother’s ability to protect M. and care for him before she was arrested and charged. But for the unproven charges, I am satisfied that M. would still be in her care. In my view, M.’s behaviour since he was removed indicates his need for the emotional security his mother provides.

[44] The mother’s motion is allowed. M. is to return to her care under the supervision order of Shelston J. dated October 23, 2018.

Madam Justice D. Summers

Released: February 11, 2020

COURT FILE NO.: FC-17-821-2

DATE: 2020/02/11

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILD, YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES ACT, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sched. 1

AND IN THE MATTER OF M.G.O. born [….] 2015

BETWEEN:

The Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa Applicant

– and –

T.S. (Mother) Respondent

– and –

M.O.U. (Father) Respondent

– and –

C.S. (Maternal Grandmother) Respondent

ENDORSEMENT

D. SUMMERS J.

Released: February 11, 2020

[^1]: S.O. 2017, c. 14, Sched. 1. [^2]: 2008 CanLII 49155 (ON SC), [2008] O.J. No. 3796 (Ont. S.C.J.). [^3]: R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 11. [^4]: Supra, at note 1. [^5]: Supra, at note 2. [^6]: 2008 ONCJ 340. [^7]: 2010 ONCJ 332. [^8]: 2011 ONCJ 746, [2011] O.J. No. 5884. [^9]: Supra, at note 1. [^10]: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.G., M.L., C.G. and K.L., 2019 ONCJ 169.