COURT FILE NO.: CV-18-598123
DATE: 20201223
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
bhoumick sangHvi
Plaintiff
- and -
norvic shipping north america inc. and NORVIC SHIPPING INTERNATIONAL LTD.
Defendants
Lindsay Gluck, for the Plaintiff
Stephen Bernofsky, for the Defendants
HEARD at Toronto: October 6, 2020
Reasons for judgment
DAVIES J.
A. Overview
[1] Mr. Sanghvi was a Senior Vice-President at Norvic Shipping North America Inc. from May 2014 until February 2018 when he was terminated without cause during a corporate restructuring. Mr. Sanghvi’s employment contract states that Norvic could terminate his employment without reason “without giving any notice during the probationary period and one months notice on confirmation.” Norvic paid Mr. Sanghvi one month’s pay in lieu of notice as provided for by the contract. Nonetheless, Mr. Sanghvi claims that the termination clause in his contract is invalid because it purports to contract out of the minimum employment standards established in the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. L-2 (the “CLC”).
[2] Mr. Sanghvi argues that he is entitled to reasonable notice at common law. Mr. Sanghvi says he should be given eight months pay in lieu of notice. Mr. Sanghvi also argues that he is entitled to damages representing the benefits he would have earned during the common law notice period. Finally, Mr. Sanghvi argues he is entitled to the bonus he earned in 2017 as well as damages for the bonus he would have earned for the period he worked in 2018 and during the notice period.
[3] Norvic argues that the termination clause is enforceable because Mr. Sanghvi received more under his contract than he would have been entitled to under the CLC. If the termination clause is not enforceable, however, Norvic argues that Mr. Sanghvi is entitled to only four or five months pay in lieu of notice at common law. Norvic also argues that Mr. Sanghvi is not entitled to any bonus payment because the bonus was entirely within its discretion and was not an integral part of Mr. Sanghvi’s compensation.
[4] Mr. Sanghvi now brings a summary judgment motion. Norvic also takes the position that this matter can be resolved without a trial. I agree with the parties that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial and that this action can be disposed of by way of summary judgment under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194.
[5] There are four issues for me to decide on this summary judgment motion:
(a) Is the termination clause of Mr. Sanghvi’s employment contract unenforceable because it violates the CLC?
(b) If the termination clause is unenforceable, how much notice should Mr. Sager have received at common law?
(c) Is Mr. Sanghvi entitled to damages for the bonus he earned or would have earned in 2017 and 2018?
(d) Is Mr. Sanghvi entitled to damages for accrued but unused vacation and pay in lieu of time off for statutory holidays?
[6] For the reasons that follow, I find that the termination clause is not enforceable and Mr. Sanghvi is entitled to eight months common law notice. I also find that Mr. Sanghvi is entitled to the bonus he would have earned in 2017 and 2018 as well as damages in lieu of benefits he would have received during the notice period.
B. Is the termination clause of the employment contract unenforceable because it violates the [CLC](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/rsc-1985-c-l-2/latest/rsc-1985-c-l-2.html)?
[7] There is a common law presumption that employees will be given reasonable notice if terminated without cause. That presumption can be rebutted if the employment contract clearly provides for some other period of notice. However, any contract that fixes the notice period must comply with the applicable employment standards. Any attempt to contract out of the minimum standards required by the legislation renders the notice provision null and void. In those circumstances, the presumption has not been rebutted and the employee is entitled to reasonable notice at common law: see Wood v. Fred Deeley Imports Ltd., 2017 ONCA 158 at paras. 16-17; Machtinger v. HOJ Industries Ltd., 1992 CanLII 102 (SCC), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 986 at pp.1000-1002; and Andros v. Colliers Macaulay Nicolls Inc., 2019 ONCA 679 at paras. 19-20.
[8] The parties both argued that the CLC is the applicable employment standards legislation for the purpose of this application, not the Ontario Employment Standards Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 41 (the “ESA”). The CLC applies to any federal work, undertaking or business, including inland or maritime shipping and navigation companies. Norvic does not agree that it is a federal work, undertaking or business because it is a logistics company, not a shipping company. Nonetheless, Norvic argues that Mr. Sanghvi’s contract should be interpreted to mean that the CLC governs his employment and termination.
[9] There is ambiguity in the contract about which law applies. On the one hand, the contract says that Mr. Sanghvi’s employment “will be guided as per the Employment Standards Act, 2000 of Canada.” There is no federal “Employment Standards Act, 2000”. Perhaps this was intended to be a reference to the Ontario ESA. On the other hand, the contract says that it will be “governed and interpreted by, and construed in accordance with the substantive laws of Canada”, which seems to be a reference to federal legislation. Finally, the contract says that any dispute arising under the contract will be referred to arbitration, which is to be “governed by the Canada Labour Code.” Given the repeated references to federal legislation and the explicit reference to the substantive laws of Canada governing the interpretation of the contract, I am satisfied that the parties intended to incorporate the CLC into the contract, not the Ontario ESA.
[10] The question, therefore, is whether the termination clause in Mr. Sanghvi’s contract complies with the minimum standards in the CLC. The termination clause in Mr. Sanghvi’s contract states as follows:
- Notice Period:
This contract of employment is terminable, without reasons, by either party without giving any notice during probationary period and one month notice on confirmation. The Company reserves the right to pay or recover salary in lieu of notice period. Further, the Company may at its discretion relieve you from such date as it may deem fit even prior to the expiry of the notice period.
[11] Mr. Sanghvi was given written notice on February 8, 2018 that his position was being eliminated because of a corporate restructuring. Norvic paid Mr. Sanghvi one month’s salary in lieu of notice.
[12] Norvic argues that Mr. Sanghvi received more under the contract than he would have received under the CLC for both termination and severance pay and, therefore, the notice period clause is enforceable. Norvic takes the position that the parties agreed that in the event of termination, Mr. Sanghvi would receive a total of one month’s pay. Norvic described this payment in its factum as “the maximum amount to which Mr. Sanghvi would be entitled and Norvic NA would be responsible for paying to him” on termination. Norvic takes the position that the one month’s pay payment provided for in Mr. Sanghvi’s contract was intended to replace any entitlement to severance and termination pay.
[13] Section 230(1) of the CLC requires an employer to give an employee who is terminated without cause two weeks notice or two weeks pay in lieu of notice. Section 235(1) of the CLC also requires an employer to pay an employee who is terminated without cause severance pay calculated as the greater of (a) two days wages for each completed year of employment and (b) five days wages. Because Mr. Sanghvi was employed for less than four years, under the CLC he would have been entitled to two weeks (or ten days) termination pay plus six days of severance pay (two days for each of the three years of completed employment) for a total of 16 days pay. Norvic is, therefore, right that the one month pay that Mr. Sanghvi received under the contract is more than the termination and severance pay he would receive under the CLC. That does not, however, end the analysis.
[14] The question is whether the notice period condition in Mr. Sanghvi’s contract was valid when the contract was signed: see Waksdale v. Swegon North America, 2019 ONSC 5705 at paras. 18-19. Minimum employment standards are designed to protect employees who are often in an unequal bargaining position when signing employment contracts and unaware of their statutory and common law rights. Employment contracts are to be interpreted in a way that encourages employers to comply with the minimum employment standards when drafting contracts: see Machtinger at pp. 1003-1004. If an employer presents a prospective employee with a contract that has the potential to conflict with the minimum employment standards at any time after hiring, it is void: see Covenoho v. Pendylum Ltd., 2017 ONCA 284 at para. 7. The timing of the termination or the conduct of the employer on termination cannot remedy an otherwise unenforceable termination clause: see Wood v. Fred Deeley, at para. 45. If the termination clause purports to contract out of a minimum employment standard without substituting a greater benefit, it will be void even if the employee actually received his or her statutory entitlement on termination: see Andros v. Colliers, at para. 20.
[15] To assess whether the termination clause in Mr. Sanghvi’s contract is valid, I must, therefore, consider whether it would have afforded him less than the minimum termination and severance pay required under the CLC at any point in time. As set out above, Norvic takes the position that the one month’s pay under the contract was the maximum Mr. Sanghvi would ever have been entitled to on termination, regardless of the length of his tenure. If Mr. Sanghvi was terminated after seven years instead of four years, he would still only be entitled to one month’s pay (or approximately 20 working days pay) under the contract. However, after seven years of employment, he would be entitled to a total of 24 days pay under the CLC: two weeks (10 days) notice plus 14 days of severance pay. Because the termination clause in Mr. Sanghvi’s contract had the potential to violate the minimum standard in the CLC for termination and severance pay, I find that it is unenforceable.
[16] If I am wrong that Mr. Sanghvi’s employment contract is governed by the CLC, the termination clause would still be unenforceable because it also has the potential to violate the minimum notice requirement under the Ontario ESA. Section 57 of the ESA sets out the minimum notice of termination that must be given when an employee is terminated without cause. An individual like Mr. Sanghvi, who was employed for three years or more but less than four years, is entitled to at least three weeks’ notice: ESA, s. 57(c). Mr. Sanghvi, therefore, received more under his contract than he would have been entitled to under the ESA. However, if Mr. Sanghvi had been terminated after five years or more, he would have been entitled to more notice under the ESA than what was provided for in his employment contract. He may also have been entitled to severance pay: ESA, ss. 64 and 65. The termination clause in Mr. Sanghvi’s contract, therefore, had the potential to violate the minimum standard in the ESA and would also be unenforceable if the ESA is the governing legislation.
[17] I, therefore, find that Mr. Sanghvi’s employment contract does not displace the presumption that he is entitled to reasonable notice at common law.
C. What period of notice is reasonable in this case?
[18] Mr. Sanghvi argues that he should receive eight months’ pay in lieu of notice. Norvic argues that the appropriate notice period in this case is four or five months. What will be considered reasonable notice depends on the nature of the employee’s position, the length of service, the age of the employee on termination and the availability of similar employment. This is not an exhaustive list and no single factor is determinative: see Bardal v. The Globe and Mail Ltd., (1960) 1960 CanLII 294 (ON SC), 24 D.L.R. (2d) 140 (Ont. H.C.).
[19] Mr. Sanghvi was 43 years old when he was terminated from Norvic. He held the position of Senior Vice-President, from May 16, 2014 until May 3, 2017. He was then promoted to Senior Vice-President, Head of Global Operations, a position he held until he was terminated on February 8, 2018. In total, he worked for Norvic for three years, eight months and 23 days.
[20] Mr. Sanghvi’s base salary was $120,000 USD in his first year of employment. By the time he was terminated, his base salary was $168,000 USD.
[21] Norvic argues that Mr. Sanghvi was not in a supervisory or managerial position notwithstanding his title and, as a result, he is entitled to a shorter period of common law notice than is ordinarily given to senior executives. Mr. Sanghvi’s letter of employment contained the following job description:
❖ You shall be responsible for the performance of services as indicated by the Company and or its management from time to time.
❖ You shall be reporting to the President/CEO/Directors of the Company
❖ You will not have authority to enter into or bind the company or its Directors or its principals or associates in any contract or financial transaction which are exceptionally beyond your authority to execute your responsibilities as Sr. Vice President, unless specifically authorized to do so by the company, acting through any of its President/CEO/Directors.
Norvic argues that the language of the contract significantly limited Mr. Sanghvi’s authority to bind the Company, which suggests he was not in a significant managerial position. Norvic argues that the essence of Mr. Sanghvi’s job was to secure customers for Norvic in a particular geographic area and that any notice period should reflect the realities of his position rather than his title. I do not accept this argument.
[22] Mr. Sanghvi started in a senior executive position. In May 2017, he was named the Senior Vice-President, Head of Global Operations, which made him responsible for a new division in the company. In an email announcing Mr. Sanghvi’s position, the department was described as follows:
This teams [sic] will oversee the entire operations function and will act as a link between offices. It will be the main point of contact for management related to operational matters. The unit will provide support to all Chartering teams in terms of CP’s comments, vetting and clauses. This unit will work closely with the newly formed Legal Department to action any payment demands and/or debt recovery.
Under the direction of Bhoumick Sanghvi, the Global Operations Unit will also act as a bridge between Operations, Chartering and Legal.
From Norvic’s own description of Mr. Sanghvi’s position, it is clear that he continued to be in a senior supervisory role with significant managerial responsibilities until his termination. This tends to increase the amount of notice he should receive.
[23] Norvic also argues that Mr. Sanghvi’s age is a neutral factor because he was not close to the end of his career when he was terminated. I agree that Mr. Sanghvi was still relatively young and his age likely would not be a significant impediment to his ability to secure other comparable employment. Nonetheless, it is still a relevant factor when deciding how much notice is reasonable in this case.
[24] Norvic acknowledged in oral argument that Mr. Sanghvi has discharged his duty to mitigate his damages. I agree. Mr. Sanghvi made significant efforts to find other similar employment. He found some consulting work but he could not find a comparable position in the eight months after he was terminated.
[25] I find that eight months’ notice is reasonable in this case. Eight months’ notice is similar to or even less than the notice awarded in other cases involving senior executives terminated after less than four years of service: see Alpert v. Les Carreaux Ramca Ltée (1992), 1992 CanLII 7748 (ON SC), 9 O.R. (3d) 207 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Bester v. George S. May International Co.-Canada (1998) 36 C.C.E.L. (2d) 128 (Ont. Gen. Div).
[26] For example, in Shinn v. TBC Teletheatre B.C., 2001 BCCA 83, 85 B.C.L.R. (3d) 75, the Court reduced the notice from ten months to eight months for a 44-year-old marketing manager who worked for a horse betting service in B.C. for three years and three months. There was evidence that Mr. Shinn was unable to find a comparable position in the same industry after he was terminated despite extensive efforts. The Court found that the trial judge erred in finding that the notice period should be extended because Mr. Shinn was induced and because the employer failed to provide a favourable reference letter. The Court held that eight months notice was reasonable notwithstanding Mr. Shinn’s short tenure.
[27] Similarly, in Neely v. State Group Limited (1997), 1997 CanLII 14490 (ON CA), 28 C.C.E.L. (2d) 100 (Ont. C.A.), the Court upheld the trial judge’s decision to grant eight months’ notice for a 49-year-old Manager of Human Resources who lost his job during a corporate restructuring after three years and two months. The Court described Mr. Neely’s position as a “middle management position” and held that eight months salary in lieu of notice was appropriate.
[28] The cases relied on by Norvic to support its position that four to five months notice is reasonable are distinguishable from Mr. Sanghvi’s case because of the nature of his position. For example, in Rossman v. Canadian Solar Inc., 2018 ONSC 7172, aff’d 2019 ONCA 992, Mr. Rossman was a regional sales manager for a solar project company when he was terminated. He was 33 years old. Although Mr. Rossman had significant responsibilities within the company, he conceded that his position was not a management position, which significantly decreased the notice to which he was entitled at common law. The Court held that Mr. Rossman was entitled to five months’ pay in lieu of notice after three years and nine months of service. While Mr. Rossman’s age and length of service are similar to Mr. Sanghvi, the nature of their employment is not comparable. Mr. Sanghvi is entitled to more notice because he held a senior executive position with significant managerial responsibilities.
[29] Similarly, in Fasullo v. Investments Hardware Ltd., 2012 ONSC 2809, Mr. Fasullo was terminated from his position as a sales representative after less than four years. The Court found that Mr. Fasullo held a position of some significance but he was not a senior executive. Mr. Fasullo was 35 years old when he was terminated. The Court held that 3.9 months’ notice was reasonable. In my view, Mr. Fasullo’s position is not comparable to Mr. Sanghvi. In addition, Mr. Sanghvi is several years older than Mr. Fasullo. As a result, the decision in Fasullo is not a helpful precedent.
[30] Having regard to the nature of Mr. Sanghvi’s positions Mr. Sanghvi, his age, the length of his tenure and the difficulties he had finding comparable employment, I find that eight months notice is reasonable in this case. He is entitled to be paid all his compensation for eight months, including base salary, medical benefits, internet services and mobile phone fees: see Matthews v. Ocean Nutrition Canada Ltd., 2020 SCC 26, at para 53.
D. Is Mr. Sanghvi entitled to a bonus during the notice period?
[31] Mr. Sanghvi’s employment contract states that the company would consider, at its discretion, a yearly bonus based on his performance and the company’s profitability. Mr. Sanghvi received a significant bonus in 2014, 2015 and 2016. He did not receive a bonus for 2017 or for the time he worked in 2018. Mr. Sanghvi argues that his bonus was an integral part of his compensation even though it was discretionary and, as a result, he is entitled to a bonus for 2017, for the period he worked in 2018 and during the notice period.
[32] Norvic argues that any bonus was entirely within the discretion of the company. Norvic argues that Mr. Sanghvi was eligible for a bonus but was never entitled to a bonus and, as a result, he should not be paid for any bonus on termination.
[33] As a general rule, damages for wrongful dismissal should put terminated employees in the same financial position they would have been in had reasonable notice been given: see Sylvester v. British Columbia, 1997 CanLII 353 (SCC), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 315, at para. 1. Damages for wrongful dismissal will typically include all of the compensation and benefits the employee would have earned during the notice period: see Matthews v. Ocean Nutrition Canada Ltd. at paras. 49-54. Damages for wrongful dismissal might also include payment in lieu of a bonus the employee would have received during the notice period if the bonus was an integral part of the employee’s compensation, even if it was at the discretion of the employer: see Paquette v. TeraGo Networks Inc. 2016 ONCA 618 at paras. 16-18; Singer v. Nordstrong Equipment Limited, 2017 ONSC 5906, at paras. 27- 37, aff’d on this issue but rev’d on others, 2018 ONCA 364.
[34] To decide whether Mr. Sanghvi is entitled to damages for the bonus he was not paid, I must answer two questions. First, was Mr. Sanghvi’s bonus an integral part of his compensation? If it was, Mr. Sanghvi has a common law entitlement to the bonus he earned or would have earned up to the end of the notice period: see Andros v. Colliers, at para. 49. Second, does Mr. Sanghvi’s contract or the bonus policy unambiguously take away or limit his entitlement to a bonus?
i. Was Mr. Sanghvi’s bonus an integral part of his compensation?
[35] Mr. Sanghvi’s employment contract contained the following reference to a bonus:
The company will also consider to pay [sic] yearly bonus, completely at company’s discretion, based on your performance and company’s overall profitability on completion of yearly financials and audits.
[36] Mr. Sanghvi’s contract is silent on when the bonus would be calculated or paid. Norvic generally made decisions about bonuses in June, after the previous year’s financial position was known. Mr. Sanghvi received his 2014 bonus in October 2015. Mr. Sanghvi received his 2015 bonus in September 2016. Mr. Sanghvi did not receive his 2016 bonus until after his termination in April 2018.
[37] In 2017, Norvic formalized the date for annual salary increases and bonus payments. In an email to Mr. Sanghvi dated April 23, 2017, Norvic advised as follows:
Annual Bonus Plan: (Anniversary 1st July)
There will be annual bonus payout once each year by end July, subject to completion of all audit(s), internal & external.
Bonus will be based on performance of the preceding year on all closed & realized voyages.
Annual bonus will be based on gross profits & hit ratio.
[38] I am satisfied that notwithstanding the discretionary nature of the Norvic’s bonus plan, Mr. Sanghvi’s bonus was an integral part of his compensation. Mr. Sanghvi received a substantial bonus each year he worked for Norvic. In 2014, he received a bonus of $30,000 USD for the 7.5 months he worked. That year, Mr. Sanghvi’s gross salary for 7.5 months was $69,000 USD (he was earning $8,000 USD per month during his probationary period and $10,000 USD per month thereafter). His bonus of $30,000 USD was worth more than 40% of his gross salary in 2014. In May 2015, Mr. Sanghvi’s salary was increased to $144,000 USD. His bonus of $45,000 USD represents more than 30% of his gross salary that year. In May 2016, Mr. Sanghvi’s salary was again increased to $158,400 USD. His bonus was significantly smaller at $25,000 USD. According to Mr. Sanghvi’s affidavit, his bonus was smaller in 2016 because the company was less profitable, not because of his performance. Nonetheless, Mr. Sanghvi’s 2016 bonus still represented more than 15% of his gross salary.
[39] Mr. Sanghvi’s bonus was a significant and consistent part of his total compensation. I find that it was an integral part of his compensation and he has a common law right to the bonus he earned in 2017 and to the bonus he would have earned to the end of the notice period in 2018.
ii. Does Mr. Sanghvi’s contract or the bonus policy remove his common law entitlement to bonus in 2017 or 2018?
[40] Parties to an employment contract can agree that the employer is not obliged to pay the employee’s bonus entitlement on termination. To do so, however, the bonus plan or the employment contract must be clear and unambiguous: see Andros v. Colliers, at para. 52.
[41] Mr. Sanghvi’s employment contract says that his employment was subject to the Company’s policies, procedures and guidelines. However, there is no evidence that Norvic had a bonus policy beyond what was contained in Mr. Sanghvi’s contract and the April 23, 2017 email. There is no language in the contract to suggest that Norvic is not required to pay a bonus that had been earned before the employee was terminated. There is also no language to suggest that a terminated employee is not entitled to compensation in lieu of a pro rata share of a bonus during the notice provision. I, therefore, find that Mr. Sanghvi is entitled to a bonus for 2017 as well as a bonus for the time he worked in 2018 and during the notice period in 2018.
iii. How should the bonus be calculated?
[42] Norvic did not adduce any evidence about how it calculated bonuses for its employees. In particular, it did not adduce evidence about how Mr. Sanghvi’s bonus for 2017 would have been calculated or how it calculated bonuses for other employees in 2018. In the absence of specific information about the calculation of bonuses, it is appropriate to average the bonuses paid in the preceding three years: see Bernier v. Nygard International Partnership, 2013 ONCA 780, 14 C.C.E.L. (4th) 155. Mr. Sanghvi is, therefore, entitled to a bonus in the amount of $33,333 USD for 2017. He is also entitled to a pro-rated bonus for the time he worked in 2018 and during the notice period based on an annual bonus of $33,333 USD that year as well.
E. Is Mr. Sanghvi entitled to damages for unused vacation or statutory holidays?
[43] Mr. Sanghvi seeks damages reflecting pay in lieu of unused vacation time and in lieu of time off for statutory holidays.
[44] Mr. Sanghvi’s contract does not specify how many days of paid vacation he was to receive each year. Under s. 184 of the CLC, an employee is entitled to at least two weeks paid vacation after they complete one year of employment. This entitlement increases to at least three weeks of paid vacation after completing five consecutive years of service. Mr. Sanghvi was, therefore, entitled to at least two weeks paid vacation after May 2015. The evidence suggests that Mr. Sanghvi took more than two weeks of vacation in 2015 and 2016. In 2016, Mr. Sanghvi took more than 18 paid vacation days. From May 2017 to December 2017, Mr. Sanghvi took nine days of vacation. Mr. Sanghvi has not established that he accrued any unpaid vacation time.
[45] In terms of statutory holidays, there are nine recognized holidays in s. 166 of the CLC. Under s. 192, every employee is entitled to and shall be granted a holiday with pay on each of the recognized holidays. I accept Mr. Sanghvi’s evidence that he worked on several Canadian statutory holidays. However, there is no evidence that Mr. Sanghvi was required or expected to work on Canadian statutory holidays.
[46] Mr. Sanghvi worked for Norvic remotely from Hong Kong. When Mr. Sanghvi was hired, the plan was for him to join Norvic’s Dubai office once established. This plan never came to fruition and Mr. Sanghvi continued to work for Norvic from Hong Kong throughout his tenure. If Mr. Sanghvi chose work on Canadian statutory holiday for whatever reason, he should have advised Norvic so Norvic could decide whether to give him time off in lieu or insist that he take the statutory holidays. In any event, Mr. Sanghvi received at least 12 paid vacation days more than he was entitled to in 2015 and 2016. In the circumstances, the evidence does not satisfy me that Mr. Sanghvi is entitled to pay in lieu of time off for statutory holidays.
F. Conclusion
[47] I find that Mr. Sanghvi is entitled to damages in the amount of eight months’ base salary plus the benefits he would have earned during that period.
[48] I also find that Mr. Sanghvi is entitled to damages in the amount of $33,333 USD for the bonus he earned in 2017.
[49] Mr. Sanghvi is also entitled to damages on a pro-rated basis for the bonus he would have earned in 2018 to the end of the notice period, to be calculated based on an annual bonus of $33,333 USD.
[50] Counsel for Mr. Sanghvi is to prepare a draft order including all the calculations for the damages. I am hopeful the parties will agree on the calculations and the final amount of owing to Mr. Sanghvi. If not, the parties can submit written submission of no more than two (2) pages along with their proposed draft order by January 15, 2021.
[51] I also encourage the parties to reach an agreement on the issue of costs. If they are unable to do so, counsel for Mr. Sanghvi may serve and file written submissions on costs of no more than five (5) pages each together with their costs outline and any supporting authority on or before January 15, 2021. Counsel for Norvic may serve and file written responding submissions on costs of no more than five (5) pages with supporting authorities on or before January 22, 2021. In addition to filing their cost submissions with the Court, counsel are to send them to my assistant electronically. In the event that I do not receive any written cost submissions by January 22, 2021, I will deem the issue of costs to have been settled.
Davies J.
Released: December 23, 2020
COURT FILE NO.: CV-18-598123
DATE: 20201223
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
bhoumick sangHvi
Plaintiff
- and -
norvic shipping north america inc. and NORVIC SHIPPING INTERNATIONAL LTD.
Defendants
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Davies J.
Released: December 23, 2020